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Africanista A group of officers and civilians who propagated, supported and participated in creating a 
Spanish empire in Africa, especially northern Morocco. 
Alférez Provisional Provisional Second Lieutenant. A class of officer recruited in Nationalist Spain 
among well-educated young men who held temporary commissions. 
Askari Arabic for soldier. 
Bandera A battalion-sized unit. It refers to the Spanish Foreign Legion but also to the Falange 
battalions as well as the Carlist Requetés. 
Harka Irregular units, mobilised upon military need.  
Intervención The military service in charge of control of native affairs. 
Interventor Military control officer for native affairs. 
Kaíd  Literally leader. It refers to a tribal chief or a native officer with the rank of lieutenant. 
Mehal-la Moroccan troops that officially fall under the authority of the Moroccan government and 
therefore (formally) not part of the Spanish Army, though mostly led by Spanish officers. 
Mejasnía Moroccan military police.  
Makhzen The Moroccan government. 
Regulares: Short for Tropas Regulares Indígenas (native regular troops). A corps of Moroccan troops, 
officially part of the Spanish Army, that are led by, mostly, Spanish officers.  
Tabor A battalion-sized unit in both the Regulares corps and in the Mehal-las.  
Tercio Referes to the Spanish Foreign Legion. 





On an evening of September 1942 Adolf Hitler remarked, perhaps frustrated that Spain’s leader 
General Francisco Franco would not join the German war effort, that Franco ‘ought to erect a 
monument to the glory of the Junker 52. It is this aircraft that the Spanish revolution has to thank 
for its victory’.1 That ʽrevolutionʼ led to the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Hitler was referring to 
the airlift operation in the summer of 1936, the first in military history, that carried colonial troops 
from Spanish Morocco (see Appendix 1) to mainland Spain to support the military coup (the 
revolution Hitler refers to) that right wing segments of the Spanish Army committed against the 
government of the Spanish Republic. Hitler’s remark that a monument should be erected to the 
Junker 52 aircraft, illustrates the vital importance of its cargo: the troops of the Army of Africa, that 
consisted (in its majority) of Moroccans. The Junkers carried the Moroccans to air bases in southern 
Spain, mainly Seville. From there the Moroccans spread throughout Andalusia, Extremadura and 
further on to other parts of Spain, saving the military coup from failure, battling Republicans, 
defeating them, and spreading terror wherever they went. The Moroccans, or Moors as they were 
usually known then, became synonymous with terrifying retribution and violent death. The Junkers 
52 that brought them played indeed a prominent role in the Spanish ‘revolution’, but only because 
of their Moroccan passengers that went to encounter a new world in Spain.   
The Spanish Civil War had its origins in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco, which in turn 
originated from Spain’s loss of its overseas possessions in Cuba and the Philippines in 1898 after a 
war with the United States of America. A few years after the Spanish-American War, the country 
was presented with an opportunity to regain membership into the colonial club by dividing Morocco 
with France. The Algeciras conference in 1906 offered Spain a part of northern Morocco that it was 
to administer as a protectorate, which was formally established in 1912. The Moroccan venture 
offered opportunities for the military to regain some of its glory. But this military adventure soon 
proved difficult. Spain’s penetration into its assigned parts of Morocco, even before the official 
establishment of the protectorate, led to immediate military setbacks. Compulsory military service 
that required sending young Spanish men to Morocco often resulted in difficulties and was partly 
responsible for anti-government riots like the famous ‘tragic week’ in Barcelona in 1909. The 
necessity to decrease Spanish casualties and thereby the burden on Spanish manpower and internal 
political protest, were for a great part the reason behind efforts to organise native units, that would 
bear a great burden of the responsibilities of securing the Protectorate. In that, the Spaniards 
followed the example of the French army in Algeria.2  
                                                 
1 Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941-1944. His Private Conversations (New York 2000) 687. 
2 María Rosa de Madariaga, ‘Moroccan Soldiers in the Spanish Civil War’, in: Eric Storm and Ali Al Tuma, 
eds., Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945. “Aliens in Uniform” in Wartime Societies (New York 2016) 
161-181, here 161. 
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The first military units composed of natives, organised and trained along European military 
lines, were formed between 1911 and 1914, and were called the Regulares. Short for Fuerzas 
Regulares Indígenas (native regular forces), they formed the bulk of the Moorish units that served 
Spain. Along with the Regulares the Spanish depended on the Mehal-las, units which officially 
belonged to the Moroccan government and which long pre-existed the Spanish presence. They were 
staffed with Spanish officers. With initial difficulties, the Moorish units, especially the Regulares, 
proved important during the troublesome periods of armed resistance that Spain faced in Morocco. 
In 1921, a rebellion led by the tribal leader, Mohammed ben Abdul Krim al Khattabi, in the Rif 
mountains broke out and led to a brutal war that lasted until 1927, which Spain finally won with 
tremendous assistance from the French in Morocco.3 The war was reputed for its extreme methods 
in targeting civilians, the use of chemical weapons by the Spanish, and perpetration of atrocities 
towards prisoners of war on both sides. One of Spain’s darkest episodes was the defeat of Anual in 
1921, one of the most severe military disasters in modern colonial history, in which at least 8000 
Spanish soldiers were killed, and which exposed the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the Spanish 
armed forces. The disaster and its political ramifications (the attempt by opposition political parties 
to pinpoint responsibility on the King) contributed in large part to the military coup and dictatorship 
of General Miguel Primo de Rivera in September 1923. 
But the same Moroccan campaigns generated a new class of officers and troops that 
acquired a higher level of military efficiency and a more serious sense of military profession 
unmatched by other sectors of the Spanish armed forces. These officers led the Regulares and the 
Spanish Foreign Legion, a corps that was founded by General José Millán Astray in 1921, modelled 
on the French Foreign Legion. Unlike its French namesake, it was comprised of more Spanish 
recruits than foreigners. These officers were known as Africanistas, veterans of the Moroccan 
campaigns, whose struggles in Morocco led them to form a separate collective identity and esprit de 
corps. In addition, they developed an extreme politically conservative worldview, which saw in 
liberal politics the reason for the troubles of Spain in Morocco, and a militaristic colonial-based 
view on how to tackle Spanish politics. The Regulares, the Mehal-las, and the Spanish Legion 
formed what was to be known as the Army of Africa. 
The Second Spanish Republic, which came into existence after the fall of dictator Primo de 
Rivera in 1930 and the abdication of King Alfonso XIII in 1931, experienced turbulent years of 
strife among conservative, liberal, republican, anarchist, and socialist forces that centred around 
issues of social justice, redistribution of wealth, especially in rural areas in western and southern 
Spain where 2% of land owners held 40% of the land. Curtailing the influence of the Catholic 
                                                 
3 For the Rif war see, David S. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif. Abd El Krim and the Rif Rebellion (Stanford 
1968), Germain Ayache, La Guerre du Rif (Paris 1996), Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace. Morocco and 
the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford 2002), María Rosa de Madariaga, En el Barranco del Lobo. Las 
guerras de Marruecos (Madrid 2005). 
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Church in public life, including education was a contentious issue. Part of the Church’s property 
was seized by the Republic in its initial years. Also of great importance was the influence of the 
army in the affairs of the state and the size of its officer corps. To limit the power of the army and 
combat the inflation in the number of officers, promotions were slowed or even cancelled. Regional 
autonomies which the leftist government of the Republic was ready to grant, especially in Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, was a sensitive issue for conservative Spaniards who considered autonomy 
a route to separatism. These issues were contested both politically and by means of armed violence, 
whether through local insurrections or assassinations.4 Following the election of a conservative 
government, workersʼ uprisings in Catalonia, and more violently in Asturias, broke out in October 
1934. These were ferociously repressed by the Army of Africa under the leadership of General 
Francisco Franco y Bahamonde, one of the Africanistas who spent most of his military career in 
Morocco. In the wake of the leftist Popular Front’s victory in the February 1936 elections, which 
exacerbated the political polarisation, the Africanistas allied themselves with other conservative 
segments of the military and a collection of monarchists, Catholic conservatives, and fascists, with 
little to unite them except their fear of sweeping political changes and social revolution that might 
affect the established social and economic structures. On 17 July, the Army of Africa ignited the 
rebellion that led to an almost three-year-long war in Spain.5 The Moroccan troops would play an 
essential part in the final victory of the insurgents.  
The history of the Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) is the 
history of an encounter between two culturally and ethnically different people, and the attempts by 
both sides to take control of this meeting between two cultures. The question this study seeks to 
answer is formed by this encounter. To what extent was the Spanish-Moroccan encounter 
influenced by both the perception of the Otherness of the Moroccan soldiers’ presence in Spain (i.e. 
their different racial and cultural background as African Muslims in a European ‘Catholic’ country) 
and by the agency of the Moroccan soldiers? In answering this question this study will show how 
far war can bend, break, or reshape pre-existing limits, prejudices, and taboos that separated 
Spanish society from the colonial one, and how war shaped Spanish policies towards the 
Moroccans. But it will also show to what extend war could confirm such limits, prejudices, and 
taboos. The study will also show to what extent colonials could participate in negotiating the limits 
and taboos rather than being only on the receiving end of them. The examination of this encounter 
can shed new light on colonial relations, and on how unique or typical the Spanish colonial case is 
                                                 
4 For a general introduction to the Spanish Civil War and its causes see: Paul Preston, The Coming of the 
Spanish Civil War (London 1978), Stanley G. Payne, Spain’s First Democracy. The Second Republic, 1931- 
1936 (Madison 1993), Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain. An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War (New York 
1979), Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York 2001), and Anthony Beevor, The Battle for Spain. 
The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (London 2006). 
5 For background information on the Spanish armed forces in modern times and the Moroccan military 
endeavour, see: Stanley G Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Oxford 1967), and the above 
mentioned Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace. Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War.  
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in comparison to other European cases. This study sets itself apart from others conducted on the 
Moroccan troops of the Civil War, in that if lends great focus on the effects of this encounter on the 
level of the daily life of the Moroccan soldiers in Spain. It attributes a great role, in this encounter, 
to the factor of the agency of the Moroccan soldiers. This study can also argue that it is the first one 
to give - through the use of recent interviews and contemporary interrogations - a central role to the 
perspective of the Moroccan soldiers, whose voice has so far been largely relegated to the 
background or totally ignored.  
Colonial soldiers in an international context 
The Spaniards were not the first to dispatch colonial soldiers to Europe to fight a European war. 
Before them, the British and the French did so during the First World War. After them, the British 
and the French would again bring colonial soldiers to Europe to fight the Second World War. But 
while the British and the French brought Indians, West Africans, North Africans, and others to fight 
Germans, Austrians and Italians, the Spanish Nationalists in 1936 transported Moroccans to Spain 
to fight other Spaniards and change the political system of their own country. The two world wars 
were never perceived, by their Western belligerents, as religious wars, while the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-1939) was presented by one of the warring camps (that of General Franco) as a Christian 
holy war that was reminiscent of the medieval struggle to oust Muslims from Spain. This time 
however, the Muslims were brought to Spain to win this new crusade. These ‘Muslim crusaders’ are 
the subject of this dissertation. Their story and that of the Spanish Civil War starts in Morocco. 
This is by no means a comparative study, but it includes references to the experiences of 
other colonial troops serving in Europe are present in parts of this story. These references serve 
primarily to shed light on either the uniqueness (or lack thereof) regarding different aspects of the 
Spanish case study. The Moroccan experience in Spain was preceded by colonials fighting for the 
British and French armies in the First World War, and succeeded by colonials fighting once again 
for the British and the French in the Second World War, although the Spanish experience was not 
necessarily influenced by the First World War nor itself necessarily influenced the Second World 
War. The Spanish case is a refreshing addition to the repertoire of findings and insights gained from 
studying the French and British armies, and it will help future comparatives studies seeking to 
investigate the existence or not of European-wide patterns in dealing with the issues arising from 
the employment of colonial armies, both in the colonies and in Europe.  
For a long time there was a neglect, in the public sphere, of the efforts and sacrifices of 
colonial soldiers in the two world wars. In the case of Morocco for example, its independence (and 
that of other French colonies) possibly contributed to the decline in recognising the role of the 
French African troops in the war, until that role was recently rediscovered. Within the French 
context, the role of Moroccan, and indeed other Maghrebi soldiers was important. The 2006 French 
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language movie, Indigènes,6 which tells the vicissitudes of Maghrebi soldiers in fighting for France 
in Europe and their betrayal by the French, left a great impact upon both the French public and 
politics, and helped pave the way for an increase in compensation for colonial veterans of the 
French armies.  
But the interest in the academic circles predates the aforementioned move. Since the 1980s 
and 1990s a number of significant historical studies have emerged on the British and French 
colonial soldiers with a focus on the perspective of the colonial soldiers and treatment of ‘racial’ 
and cultural aspects. The publications of Marc Michel and Gilbert Meynier were one of the earliest 
to treat the role of West African and Algerian soldiers in the French Army, respectively, during the 
First World War. Echenberg’s Colonial Conscripts is largely based on archival materials but also 
utilises oral history through presenting a number of case studies of West African soldiers or better 
known as Senegalese Tirailleurs.7 Echenberg points to the importance of the slave origins of the 
soldiers, as no small number of them became free by enlisting. He examines the significant role the 
Senegalese Tirailleurs played during the Second World War and in the post-war nationalist 
movements. He concluded too that the German captivity experience of some of the soldiers led to 
the African veterans acquiring a heightened consciousness of themselves as Africans and a demand 
that equal sacrifices should entail equal rights. 8  
One of the most impressive efforts in researching the role of West African soldiers in the 
Second World War was that by Nancy Lawler, whose work Soldiers of Misfortune, figure more than 
a hundred interviews with veterans from the Ivory Coast,9 focusing not only on their hardships in 
battle, forced recruitment and experiences of captivity, but also their experience of France and their 
relationship with the civilian population there. Joe Lunn has also collected a large number of 
interviews of veterans of the First World War and used them in his study Memoirs of the 
Maelstorm. He argues that the racial conceptions the French had of certain types of African soldiers 
contributed to the high casualties they suffered on the Western Front, while also outlining the 
change that the war brought in the attitude of the soldiers towards their society and towards the 
French.10  
                                                 
6 Directed by Rachid Boucharib, 2006. Produced jointly in France, Belgium, Algeria and Morocco. 
7 Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960 
(Portsmouth 1991). 
8 Marc Michel, L’Appel à l’Afrique: Contributions et réactions à l’effort de guerre en AOF, 1914-1919 (Paris 
1982);Gilbert Meynier, L’Algérie révélée: La guerre de 1914-1918 et le premier quart du XXe siècle (Geneva 
1981). 
9 Nancy Ellen Lawler, Soldiers of Misfortune. Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II (Athens, OH 1992) 
10 Joe Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War (Portsmouth 
1999); Gregory Mann, Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century (Durham and 
London 2006). Other works that cover the period of the First World War include, for example, that of Chantal 
Valensky on the role of French colonials from Madagascar and of Reeves and Derooon those from Vietnam. 
Chantal Valensky, Le soldat occulté: Les Malgaches de l’armée française, 1884-1920 (Paris 1995); Maurice 




However, the study that this work is partly inspired by and modelled on is that of Richard 
Fogarty, Race and War in France (2008). His study investigates French conceptions of race and 
national identity as reflected in the attitudes and policies the French army and civil administration 
toward colonial soldiers. He examines the tensions and contradictions between the European racial 
prejudices the French had and the republican values of universalism and egalitarianism which often 
resulted in paradoxical policies, for example in the field of mixed romantic relationships or post-war 
residence in France. He studies the racial impact of French views and policies on the life of the 
colonial soldiers from a multi-faceted perception that includes tactics, culture, religion, sexual 
mores and relations and notions of citizenry and French identity. 11 
Since the 1980s David Killingray started to publish studies on the role of African soldiers in 
the British Army and he is considered one of the leading experts on African soldiers in the British 
army. His most recent and rich effort tells the story of the half a million African soldiers’ 
experience of the Second World War in the Horn of Africa, Italy, the Middle East and Burma, the 
greatest mass movement of Africans since the slave trade based on testimonies of the participants. 12 
He demonstrates how the ‘martial races’ theory influenced where recruitment should be most 
intense. David Omissi is one of the pioneers in presenting the voice of the Indian soldiers who 
fought in the European battlefields of the First World War alongside soldiers whose language and 
culture were alien to them. Omissi tells, through the study of an immense body of letters that the 
Indian soldiers sent home, these men’s often unsettling encounters with Europe and European 
culture.13  
 The Spanish historiography on the Moroccans of the Civil War 
Over the decades the Spanish Civil War has generated thousands of historical studies, including 
many that centred on popular themes, like foreign involvement, the International Brigades,14 but 
also on the German Condor Legion and the Italian troops.15 Yet somehow, Moroccan volunteers 
escaped being the subject of any dedicated historical studies. They figured in war memoirs, usually 
in passing, and also in general histories of the Civil War, more often than not as an impersonal 
uniform collective of blindly obedient and savage warriors, not because there was sincere interest in 
the Moroccans, but to illustrate the depravity of a regime that would bring these troops to a 
European conflict. Writing a history on the Spanish Civil War would be difficult without 
mentioning the role of the Moroccan troops, especially in its crucial first months. However, one 
                                                 
11 Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War in France. Colonial Subjects in the French army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore 
2008). 
12 David Killingray, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War (London 2010). 
13 David Omissi, Indian voices of the Great War: Soldiers’ letters , 1914-1918 (Basingstok 1999). 
14 For a broad historiographical overview of the writings on the International Brigades see: Manuel Requena 
Gallego, ‘Las Brigadas Internacionales: Una Aproximación Historiográfica’, Ayer, 56 (4) (2004) 11-36.  
15 See: John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton 1975), and Brian R. 




could easily read a general history or watch a documentary on the Tunisian or Italian Campaign of 
the Second World War, or about the liberation of France, and the occupation of Germany without 
North African (mainly Moroccan and Algerian) troops figuring at all among the players. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that, though North Africans played important roles in a number of battles, 
overall it was American and European troops that took the brunt of the fighting in southern and 
western Europe. The North Africans along with West Africans formed the bulk of the Free French 
Forces; however, the magnitude of the Free French contribution to the war, especially in numbers, 
lagged behind the American or British contribution, and was therefore less prominent, at least in 
English language historiography.16  
As already mentioned, reading a general history of the Spanish Civil War, or watching a 
documentary about it without the role of the ‘Moors’ coming into light would be inconceivable. The 
initial military coup; the first aerial bridge in military history; the failure of inexperienced regular 
army units to push through towards Madrid, necessitating the intervention of professional 
Moroccans; the stories of looting and raping; the personal guard of Franco while overseeing the 
victory parade in Madrid, all have ‘Moor’ written all over them. Even the ‘no pasarán’ (they shall 
not pass) war song of the Republicans that promised the Spanish Nationalists with defeat starts its 
first lines, not with the Italians, Germans or the Foreign legion, but with the Moroccans: 
 
Los moros que trajo Franco, en Madrid quieren entrar 
Mientras queden milicianos, los moros no pasarán 
[The Moors that Franco brought, want to enter Madrid 
While there remain militiamen, the Moors shall not pass] 
  
That makes even more remarkable the absence of studies dedicated to the Moroccan contingents 
that fought in Spain until relatively recently. Not even in Morocco are there any historical studies on 
the subject, whether officially or otherwise. Abdul Haqq Al Miryani’s Al Jaish al Magrhibi abra al 
Tarikh (The Moroccan Army Throughout History), which is a history of Moroccan forces from 
medieval times to the second half of the twentieth century is a case in point.17 Published for the first 
time in 1968 and going through its fifth edition in 1997, it ignores the role of the Moroccan troops 
in the Spanish Civil War almost completely. While this history devotes 22 pages to the participation 
of Moroccan troops in the Second World War, it dedicates less than a page to defining the 
Regulares, the Mehal-las, and the Mejasnia (Moroccan military police) in the Spanish zone, and 
                                                 
16 For recent overviews of the role of French colonial troops in the Second World War see chapters 2, 3 and 4 
by Raffael Scheck, Nancy E. Lawler and Moshe Gershovich respectively in: Eric Storm and Ali Al Tuma, 
eds., Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945. “Aliens in Uniform” in Wartime Societies (New York 2016). 
17 Abdul Haqq Al Miryani, Al Jaish al Magrhibi abra al tarikh (Rabat 1997). 
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only one sentence to the Spanish Civil War.18 It is an odd omission especially given the fact that the 
foreword for the study was written by Field Marshall (in Moroccan Royal Army) Mohammed 
Mizzian, a Moroccan who rose to the rank of Lieutenant General in Franco’s army and had played a 
prominent role in the military coup of July 1936 and the subsequent war in Spain. Prior to that he 
fought with distinction alongside Franco against the Rif rebellion in the 1920s.19 But perhaps the 
author did not see the Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War that ended with the 
installation of a military dictatorship as a glorious part of the nation’s military history. 
It was however in Morocco that a first attempt at a historical explanation of the role of 
Moroccans in the Spanish Civil War was made. In 1945, Mekki Redondo published, apparently in a 
very limited edition, a book that centred on the reasons for the Moroccan support of the Nationalists 
during the Spanish war. Though this early attempt at a historical study had escaped attention for 
decades until Mohammed Ibn Azzuz Hakim brought it to light by re-publishing it in 1997 under the 
title La actitud de los moros ante el Alzamiento.20  Redondo starts his book with his memories as a 
young boy, living in Morocco, whose father enlists in the Regulares and is killed at the battle of 
Talavera de la Reina (to the west of Madrid) not long after crossing into Spain. This loss motivated 
the son, several years later, to start a journey to discover how Moroccans of the Spanish 
Protectorate ended up fighting for Franco, primarily interviewing the Moroccan notables in the 
nationalist movement. While remarkable for its  relative frankness, something not possible for many 
Spaniards in the Iberian Peninsula at the time, the study gave answers about how the Moroccan 
nationalists in Spanish Morocco weighed their options, ideologically and practically, rationalising 
their support for the Franco regime.  
 In 1983, American historian Shannon E. Fleming published ‘Spanish Morocco and the 
Alzamiento Nacional’, focusing on the military, political and economic mobilisation of Spanish 
Morocco.21 Regarding the recruitment of Moroccans, Fleming significantly discusses the role of the 
interventores (military controllers), commissioned Spanish officers whose mission was to guarantee 
peace in the Moroccan countryside, and to act as ‘advisors’ to tribal chiefs. Bargaining with these 
sheikhs, they initiated the process of recruitment of tribal members for the war effort.22 The 
interventores had invested much time and effort to stay among the tribes and understand their 
                                                 
18 Speaking of the Regulares, it states, ‘They were all taken to Andalusia in 1936 to help Franco frustrate the 
conspiracy of the French military men’, whatever the author meant by that sentence (though it sounds as if the 
author suggested France had malicious designs on Spain). Al Miryani, Al Jaish Al Maghribi, 268. 
19 Al Miryani’s study eulogises the Rif rebellion and devotes 21 pages of text to it, which might have made 
writing a foreword by Mohammed Mizzian rather an oddity, supposing that the Field Marshall had read the 
book beforehand.  
20 Mohammed Ibn Azzuz Hakim, La actitud de los moros ante el Alzamiento. Marruecos 1936 (Malaga 
1997). Even though Azzuz Hakim is not the author of this work, in bibliographic references he is cited as 
such. The work cannot be found or located at any library by looking up Mekki Redondo as the author. 
21 Shannon E., Fleming, ‘Spanish Morocco and the Alzamiento Nacional, 1936-1939: The Military, Economic 
and Political Mobilization of a Protectorate’, Journal of Contemporary History 18(1983) 27-42. 
22 Fleming, ‘Spanish Morocco and the Alzamiento’, 30.  
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culture and ways, which generated a mutual liking and respect between the Berber tribesmen and 
their Spanish military advisors,23 who relied on a combination of the dispensation of liberal 
pensions to tribal chiefs and personal charisma.24 This study, however, focused on Morocco rather 
than the experiences of the Moroccan soldiers in Spain.  
 The next significant attempt at studying the role of Morocco and Moroccan soldiers was in 
1989, also in Morocco, in the form of a doctoral thesis by Bu Bakr Bu Hadi,25 which was described 
as perhaps the first historical research that took the Moroccan soldier as its main subject,26 and 
made use of interviews with Moroccan soldiers. Bu Hadi analysed the background for the success 
of the Nationalist coup in Morocco and the Nationalist recruitment campaign. He focuses on the 
good relations between the Nationalists and tribal leaders in the regions of the Rif, Jebala and Ait 
Amran, while also paying attention to the economic context of the Moroccan enlistments, the 
religious propaganda, the position of the Moroccan nationalists of both the Spanish and the French 
zone.27 But the study does not pay significant attention to the ʻracialʼ dynamics at play in Spain. The 
second Moroccan historian to give an extensive review focusing on the Moroccan soldiers, was 
Abdelmejid Ben Jelloun, who published in 1994, a ‘re-evaluation of the causes of the enrolment of 
the Moroccans in the Francoist ranks’,28 in which he, from an ‘exclusively Moroccan angle’ gave a 
brief overview of motives of the Moroccan soldiers, both material and psychological to enlist in the 
Spanish Army and go to war (see below).29  
The first significant Spanish contribution came in in 1991, when the military historian 
Gárate Córdoba provided an impressive quantitative study of the participation of troops from 
Morocco in the Spanish Civil War, presenting calculations on the number of Moroccan troops 
fighting in Spain, an estimation of casualties, the numbers and identities of the battalions, both 
Spanish and Moroccan, from Morocco fighting in Spain. His study, though the numbers were 
                                                 
23 Ibidem, 31. 
24 Ibidem, 36.  
25 The information on the thesis is based on: Abdul Aziz Al Tamsamani Khallouq, ‘Al Maghrib wal Harb al 
Ahliyya al Isbaniyya’, Revue Dar Al-Niaba. Etudes d’Histoire Marocaine, nr. 25 (1990) 59-62. Khallouq, the 
thesis supervisor, presented a critical review of Bu Hadi’s study. The thesis was kept in the library of the 
Faculty of Arts at Mohammed V University in Rabat. In 2011 I requested a 30 pages photocopy of the 
manuscript (the maximum number of photocopied pages allowed) but I was told that since the author had 
notified the university of his intention to publish his thesis, viewing the manuscript was not possible.  
26 Ibidem, 59. 
27 Ibidem, 60, 62. 
28 Abdelmajid Ben Jelloun, ‘Réevaluation des causes de l’enrolement de marocains dan les rangs franquistes, 
1936-1939, sous l’angle exclusif du Maroc’, Revue Maroc Europe, nr. 7 (1994) 219-234. 
29 In 1989 two volumes on the Regulares were published in Spain although these were more concerned with 
the uniforms, organisation, and weaponry.  José María Bueno Carrera , Los Regulares. Uniformes y 
organización de las ttropas Regualres Indígenas de Marruecos (Madrid 1989), and Delfín Salas, Tropas 
Regulares Indígenas (Madrid 1989).  
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occasionally adjusted by later historians, remains frequently cited because of the useful quantitative 
data.30  
 Up until the mid 1990s the studies devoted to the Moroccan troops of the Spanish Civil War 
lacked access to Spanish military and governmental archives on the topic, with the exception of the 
1991 study by Gárate Córdoba. As the military and administrative archives under the socialist 
administration in democratic Spain granted free access to historians, a wave of historical studies on 
the relationship between Morocco and the Spanish Civil War emerged. In relatively rapid 
succession appeared: Balfour’s Deadly Embrace. Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War 
(2000) which deals mainly with the pre-1936 colonial background of the Civil War; Madariaga’s 
Los moros que trajo Franco (2002) which discusses in great deal the propaganda aspects related to 
the Moroccans,  the crimes attributed to them and the situation in Morocco;  El Merroun’s Las 
tropas marroquíes en la Guerra Civil española (2003) which is in its greatest part devoted to 
tracking the military operations of the Moroccan troops. In 2004 appeared both de Mesa’s Los 
moros de la Guerra Civil española, with a great focus on military organisation, and Sanchez 
Ruano’s Islam y Guerra Civil española, a study of almost encyclopaedic proportions but also of 
fresh field investigations into certain massacres And in 2005 Gustau Nerín’s La guerra que vino de 
África was published with a focus on the Africanista establishment within the Spanish armed 
forces.31 These studies became standard reference works for authors seeking information on the role 
of Moroccans in the Civil War.  
 Sebastian Balfour’s study deals with the Spanish Civil War only in its last, but very 
significant chapter. The study was based on public archives but also on an impressive array of 
private archives, as well as interviews with Moroccan veterans of the colonial and the Civil War. It 
excels in demonstrating how the war in Morocco initiated much of the resentment that Spanish 
Africanistas developed towards democratic politics and leftist parties in particular. It also shows 
how the Moroccan experience shaped the worldview of the Africanistas who came to regard 
metropolitan Spain as a frontier, with its own brand of Riffian rebels that needed to be subjected to 
the civilising mission that the army would undertake. The concept of the Other in Morocco was 
transported to Spain to be applied to the Republican enemies, while the military service of many 
Moroccans in the Spanish army led to a more positive adjustment of the image of the Moroccans 
among Spanish officers. Destruction, pillaging, and other colonial military tactics were also carried 
out in Spain.  
                                                 
30 José María Gárate Córdoba, ‘Las Tropas de Africa en la Guerra Civil española’, Revista de historia militar, 
nr. 70 (1991) 9-61. 
31 María Rosa de Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco. La intervención de tropas coloniales en la Guerra 
Civil española (Barcelona 2002); Mustapha El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíes en la Guerra Civil española 
(Madrid 2003); José Luis de Mesa, Los moros de la Guerra Civil espaňola (Madrid 2004); Gustau Nerín, La 




María Rosa de Madariaga’s study depends largely on the administrative archives of Alcalá 
de Henares, especially those of the Delegation for Native Affairs to discuss the situation of 
Moroccan troops in Spain and aspects of their daily life. She also relies heavily on British 
diplomatic records, and both French diplomatic and military intelligence to demonstrate the 
existence of a number of anti-Francoist rebellions in Spanish Morocco as a result of protests against 
the recruitment of soldiers and the repression of these revolts. Such rebellions in Morocco would 
remain invisible should the historian rely solely on Spanish military archives, the existence of which 
are denied by other historians like Mesa who criticise the use of French sources which contain 
unreliable and second hand information on the supposed rebellions. The existence of the rebellions 
has so far not been confirmed by testimonies of Moroccan veterans of the Civil War whom I (and 
other historians) interviewed, nor in Spanish documentation that I have consulted. Madariaga 
contributes greatly to the issue of the public ‘rehabilitation’ of the negative image of the Moroccan 
soldier, through her extensive use of the contemporary Spanish Nationalist press. Madariaga’s 
stance is clearly pro-Republican and reflected throughout the study in the form of defending the 
Republic’s policy towards Spanish Morocco before and during the war, as well as her condemnation 
of the use and conduct of the Africa Army. 
The study of the Moroccan historian El Merroun is mainly based on the material of the 
military archives in Ávila, and spends a great deal of effort in tracking the military operations of the 
individual Moroccan battalions. As such, the study is more of a military history than Madariaga’s. 
While El Merroun conducted a great number of veteran interviews, these sources substantially 
under-represented in the study, in the form of one sentence here or there with which El Merroun 
presents a conclusion or a statement on certain topics, such as hospitals, or treatment by officers, 
without substantial quotes. El Merroun’s political stance might not be as clear-cut as that of de 
Madariaga, but he clearly defends Moroccan troops against charges of misconduct. And while he 
condemns the Franco regime sometimes for its use of the economically poor situation in Morocco to 
recruit soldiers, he also regards positively the treatment of Moroccan soldiers by the Francoists and 
criticises the Republic for its policies towards Spanish Morocco.  
The Spanish historian José Luis de Mesa’s Los moros de la Guerra Civil, is largely a 
history of the Moroccan units’ operations and military hierarchies and is largely based on 
documents of the Ávila archive but also important unpublished source material, and constitutes a 
valuable work on the military aspect of the Moroccan participation in the Civil War. But it also 
takes a political stance in the conflict, lacking any substantial criticism of the Franco regime, and 
largely acquitting the Moroccan units, and therefore the Franco regime, of any wrong doings. It 
focuses mainly on non-material incentives as background for the recruitment of Moroccans in 
Franco’s army, as well as criticises claims of the existence of opposition in Spanish Morocco to the 
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recruitment efforts as unsubstantiated in Spanish documents, a stance I find myself tending to agree 
with. 
Francisco Sánchez Ruano’s Islam y Guerra Civil española, published in 2004 is the largest 
yet in terms of its size. While it does not diverge much from the previously mentioned studies in 
terms of the focus of its research, it distinguishes itself by its impressive effort in consulting not 
only the national military, administrative and municipal archives in different parts of Spain, as well 
as oral interviews he conducted with both Spanish as well as Moroccan participants of the conflict. 
Those interviews took him to Northern Morocco and to the former Spanish Western Sahara, and 
includes rare interviews with a former Moroccan member of the International Brigade and family 
members of Field Marshal Mizzian. Ruano is clearly pro-Republican in his stance and criticises El 
Merroun and other Moroccan historians for ‘shielding their compatriots’ from accusations of 
extreme misconduct on the battlefield, even though the reader of Ruano’s work will notice that his 
Moroccan interviewees themselves never produced the confessions he sought. Nevertheless, 
Ruano’s study exonerates the Moroccans from some of the atrocities attributed to them such as the 
massacre of Badajoz. 
Finally, there is the study by the pro-Republican Gustau Nerín, La guerra que vino de 
África, which touches on the role of the Moroccan troops in Spain and the crimes they committed in 
his view. However, it focuses more on the main Africanista commanders, their military, political 
and personal evolution in Morocco that developed into the lethal enmity against liberal and 
progressive values, and therefore the Republic, and how they transported their worldview and war 
practices from Morocco to Spain. His views towards the Moroccan units are clear. They were both 
perpetrators of crimes against civilians, but were also subjects of racist attitudes of the Spanish 
Nationalist military.     
Points of contention 
A number of contested issues form points of discussion among historians. These questions 
concentrate on two points: the motives for Moroccan troops in joining the Francoist army, and the 
question of the crimes against civilians and prisoners of war in Spain. It appears that a favourable 
political stance towards the Republic or Nationalists partly determines the answers to these points of 
contention. Madariaga and Balfour and the Moroccan historian Abdelmajid Ben Jelloun (along with 
Ruano and Nerín) are clearly pro-Republican. While others like the Moroccans Ibn Azzuz Hakim 
and Mustapha El Merroun are clearly less enthusiastic about the Republic, though they cannot be 
considered pro-Francoist, while De Mesa and Gárate Córdoba have more obvious Nationalist 
sympathies. 
Regarding the motives of the Moroccan troops to participate in the Spanish Civil War, the 
matter is fairly straightforward for María Rosa de Madariaga who in her Los moros que trajo 
Franco, contends that Moroccan soldiers who fought in the Civil War were ‘mercenaries’, who 
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could not in any way be compared to the Republicans who defended their legitimate government, or 
with the combatants of the International Brigades who went to Spain to defend democracy and 
freedom.32 Balfour, in his Deadly Embrace, agrees that the reason the Moroccans joined the Spanish 
Nationalist army was above all economical. According to his definition, the Moroccans were not 
mercenaries in the strict sense of the word, that is professional soldiers, but rather the majority were 
civilians who volunteered to military service to earn money.33 The wages were higher than those 
usually earned by Moroccans in seasonal labour in Algeria.34 He does, however, allow in his study 
for military bonding and comradeship, forged during the colonial war in Morocco in the 1920s, as 
basis of motivation for continuing the war on the side of the Nationalists. 
Among Moroccan historians, Abdelmajid Ben Jelloun, agrees with the definition of 
Moroccan troops as mercenaries. According to his research, tremendous misery and drought in 1936 
in many villages in the Rif pushed great numbers of men to volunteer.35 He would later adjust his 
conclusions, based on new findings, arguing that there were, in addition to the ‘macroscopic’ 
(economic) context, other ‘microscopic’, i.e. personal, reasons including psychological factors such 
as the love of adventure, a youthful, romantic spirit as well as an inclination towards bellicosity, and 
even the will of some to exact revenge on the Spaniards by bringing war to the land of the 
Christians, though the latter seems remarkable given the fact that the Spanish commanders of the 
Moroccan units were responsible for war and destruction in the Rif during the 1920s.36 
The Moroccan, Ibn Azzuz Hakim, is a case of how emotional the subject is to some 
Moroccan historians. In his introduction to Redondo’s La actitud de los moros ante el Alzamiento, 
he is indignant of the negative view, held in Spain, of his compatriots, and asserts that they were 
twice ‘forced’ to be in Spain, once by the Republic, (an obvious reference to the 1934 Asturian 
uprising) and later by the Francoists. But in another part of his introduction, he expresses a different 
view. He argues that what has been written about the Moors as being ‘forced’ to go to war as unfair. 
For him, what is particularly unfair is to consider Moroccan troops as mercenaries who sacrificed 
their lives or became incapacitated for a cause that was not theirs, and Hakim presents the religious 
motives and propaganda as important factors in explaining the enlistment of the Moroccans in the 
war.37    
The case of Mustapha El Merroun is interesting too. Sebastian Balfour writes in the 
epilogue to El Merroun’s Las tropas marroquíes en la Guerra Civil española, that El Merroun 
proved that the reason for Moroccans to volunteer for the war was economic. But an examination of 
                                                 
32 Maria Rosa Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco, 343.   
33Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 277, 313.  
34Ibidem, 272.  
35 Abdelmajid Ben Jelloun ‘La participacion de los mercenarios marroquies en la Guerra Civil española 1936-
1939’, Revista Internacional de Sociología 46 (1988) 527-541, here 534. 
36 Ben Jelloun, ‘Réevaluation des causes de l’enrolement’, 228-233. 
37 Ibn Azzuz Hakim, La actitud de los moros ante el Alzamiento, 45. 
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the book does not vindicate that point. I find El Merroun partly responsible for the confusion. At 
one point, he asserts that the material motives were some of the most important for joining the 
Spanish Nationalist armies, and that recruitment was in fact not totally voluntary since Franco 
exploited the situation in Morocco to recruit many who were unemployed.38 El Merroun, however, 
rejects the ‘mercenary’ term to describe the Regulares who fought in Spain. He points out that a 
mercenary is someone who is attracted by the prospect of profit and who is not sensitive to 
ideological aspects, a situation which, according to El Merroun, does not apply for the Moroccans 
of the Civil War for two reasons: first, the vast difference in the daily pay between the Republican 
armies and militia which reached ten daily pesetas and the Spanish Nationalist army pay of three 
pesetas. It would be, in his opinion, ‘ridiculous’ to see the three pesetas as a decisive motive when 
many Moroccans, especially volunteers originating from the French Protectorate in Morocco, could 
have, still according to El Merroun, found a way to enlist in the Republican armies. Second, the 
status of the northern zone of Morocco as a Spanish Protectorate, which meant that the inhabitants 
could be considered Spanish citizens, since the Protectorate would be an extension of Spain. After 
all, the Republic itself used the Moroccan troops on two occasions in 1932 and 1934 to quell 
rebellions, not as mercenaries but as part of the Spanish army.39 I find that despite el Merroun’s 
assertion, the Moroccan soldiers were not, de jure, Spanish citizens, but subjects of a recognised 
Moroccan king and state. However, I will also note that such considerations did not prevent France 
from using Moroccans on European territory during the First and the Second World Wars, and the 
term ‘mercenary’ is not readily used to describe those Moroccans in the French army, or any other 
colonial soldiers in the French or British armies in both global conflicts. 
José Luis De Mesa’s Los moros de la Guerra Civil española, who is part of the less pro-
Republican side of the historiographical debate, leans towards a heavier emphasis on non-material 
motives for Moorish troops to volunteer for the Spanish military effort, like religion and the concept 
of a holy war, the chance to fight ‘those without god’ as well as the chance to fight the ‘French’ 
who, the Nationalists would claim, were aiding the ‘reds’ and manning their artillery, and also 
listing, among other reasons, the policies followed by the Republic before July 1936, the anti-
Semitism of the Moorish troops (they were supposedly told that they were going to fight Jews in 
Spain), the good relations between Spanish Nationalist officers and tribal chiefs, as well as the 
prestige that General Franco enjoyed among Moroccans.40 The other point of contention among 
historians of the Moroccans in the civil war concerns the brutal acts for which they were accused. 
These issues will be discussed at length in the first chapter, and it suffices to say here that the 
                                                 
38 Mustapha El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíes, 41.  
39 El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíesl, 187. 
40 Mesa, Los moros de la Guerra Civil, 124-130. Sometimes it is not clear whether quotes used by Mesa like 
‘the reds would have burnt the mosques and delivered their women to the international volunteers' or ‘the reds 
ridicule Mecca’ are quotes given by Moroccans or Spanish Nationalist propaganda. He uses, however among 
his sources, his own youth memories. 
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division in opinion on this issue is strongly similar to the division of views regarding the debate 
about motivations.   
A third main point of contention concerns the morality of bringing Moroccan troops, 
considered foreign, to Spain. One of the leftist foreign critics of Franco is the American historian 
Herbert Southworth, who accused the Nationalist generals, in his El mito de la Cruzada de 
Franco,41 of introducing elements alien to Spanish political life, i.e. the African garrisons. He 
preempts the countercharge that the Republic used African units in 1934 during the Asturian 
uprisings by stating that it was a rightist government (with Franco in command within the Ministry 
of War) that brought the Army of Africa into Spain in 1934 and the political left should not be held 
accountable for that.42 Gárate Córdoba responds to this view by citing a little-known aspect of a 
well-known event. In August 1932, Manuel Azaña, the Spanish Republican prime minister, decided 
to bring Regulares of Ceuta to the Peninsula to repress the sanjurjada, the coup committed in 
Seville against the nascent Republic, by General Sanjurjo, a royalist and veteran of the Moroccan 
wars.43 As it happened, the coup collapsed almost instantly and no confrontation ensued with the 
African units that landed in Cádiz. Most members were likely oblivious to the fact that they were 
sent to fight against their former chief. Had the Republic held control over the Moroccan forces it 
would, I strongly believe, have used them to fight against the rebels of July 1936. 
Given the importance of the Moroccan participation in the Civil War, it is significant to 
observe that most of the conclusions and moral judgement about the Moroccan soldiers were largely 
made without giving (or being able to give) the Moroccan voice its rightful place in forming those 
conclusions or judgement, even though significant efforts had been made to recover that voice. This 
study builds on those efforts, and enriches them with its own, to finally give that Moroccan 
perspective a more central position in the debates on the Moroccans. 
Primary sources: Finding the Moroccan voice 
While different combatants of the Spanish Civil War, whether Spanish Nationalists or Republicans, 
as well as European volunteers who came to the aid of one camp or the other, made their stories and 
experiences of the Spanish Civil War heard, whether by publishing themselves, or by being 
interviewed for a number of oral histories, it has taken a long time for the voice of the Moroccan 
soldiers to contribute to the historical knowledge and debates of the war in Spain. This state of 
affairs is attributed to the fact that most of the Moroccan soldiers who participated in the war were 
illiterate, and even in the case of the literate, there was no incentive or demand for writing their war 
                                                 
41 Herbert R. Southworth, El mito de la Cruzada de Franco (Paris 1963). 
42 Southworth,  El mito de la Cruzada de Franco, 117. 
43José María Gárate Córdoba, La Guerra de las dos Españas (Barcelona 1976) 220. 
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experiences, even though speaking of their war feats to friends and families or reminiscing about 
them with other veterans continued.44  
It is also noteworthy that the Spanish government in Northern Morocco, up until 
independence in 1956 did not come with an initiative to record the war experiences of the Moroccan 
veterans in Spain even for propaganda purposes. Mekki Redondo’s attempt at finding answers for 
his father’s death ended up being a top-down explanation for the Moroccan support to the Franco 
regime.45 In this dissertation, various collections of interviews will be used, whether regarding 
military matters, religion, culture, or women. It also helps those interested in the Moroccan role in 
the Spanish Civil War to get information about, instead the relatively faceless Moroccans of that 
war, the personal experience of the Moroccan soldiers, as human beings with different characters, 
with motivations, with fears, love, hatred and sense of humour. They, without doubt, constitute a 
different cultural group, compared to the Spanish or other Western participants of the Civil War. 
But even the Spanish soldiers or the western volunteers, were not uniform in their experiences.  
One of the first – perhaps the very first – scholarly presentation of the accounts of 
Moroccan soldiers’ experiences in Spain to be published, was that by the Moroccan journalist Alí 
Lmrabet who, in 1989, conducted interviews with three former soldiers of Franco’s army on the 
subject of the battle of Madrid that raged towards the end of 1936, and which was the battle that put 
a stop to the series of successive victories that had brought the Army of Africa from Morocco to the 
gates of the Spanish capital, and a battle that, according to Lmrabet, ‘demystified the splendor of 
invincible warriors’ and left ‘in the memory of that battle the image of exhausted combatants, 
conduced little by little to commit the worst excesses’.46 At first his interviewees were not thrilled to 
meet him, as he was going to write for a Spanish publication. They felt wronged by what they saw 
as left-leaning hostile Spanish propaganda and blamed the Republic for the duration and suffering 
of the war. Despite the limited number of interviewees and the sole focus on the battle of Madrid, 
                                                 
44 Using the letters of the Moroccans to construct the soldier’s own version of the war events would prove 
futile. Letters to families have not survived the test of time and have been thrown away. What few letters 
there are now, exist thanks to the Spanish censorship, but the letters preserved in the archives of the AGA, are 
too few to base a study on them. Either these letters are yet to be found in some undiscovered parts of the 
Spanish archives, or the Spanish administration gradually lost or destroyed them. It is not logical that the 
censorship only managed to intercept a handful of letters throughout the entire war. 
45 One scholar who could have undertaken the effort of interviewing the Moroccan war veterans was David 
Montgomery Hart who published in 1976 an anthropological study, the result of years of field work studying 
the Aith Waryaghar (also known as Beni Uriagel) tribe which provided many recruits for the fight in Spain. In 
his study, he touches briefly on the Spanish Civil War and what he thinks were influences on the Rif tribes’ 
members desire to enlist, but otherwise does not seem to have attempted to garner any information on their 
life in Spain. David Montgomery Hart, The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif. An Ethnography and 
History (Tucson 1976). 
46 Alí Lmrabet, ‘Los fieros marroquíes en la Guerra Civil. Los últimos o los recuerdos indeseables. Madrid, 
1936-39’, Historia 16, nr. 216 (1994) 22-32. 
19 
 
Lmrabet’s interviews remained for some time the sole source on how the Moroccan soldiers 
remembered the war.47 
In the 1990s El Merroun conducted a group of interviews with Moroccan veterans, 
conducted mainly in Tetuan, where he resided at the time. El Merroun has generously granted me 
especial access to his transcripts of interviews with Moroccan veterans. Neither Madariaga’s Los 
moros que trajo Franco nor Nerín’s La guerra que vino de África use any Moroccan oral sources of 
its own. Belfour’s Deadly Embrace did however make use of the author’s own interviews with 
Moroccan soldiers of the Civil War: about 13 veterans and with help of El Merroun, although their 
use is usually of supportive character to already established findings or drawn conclusions, and the 
interviews do not necessarily have the character of an indispensable source. Ruano’s Islam y Guerra 
Civil is most prolific in using oral interviews with Moroccan veterans, reproducing verbatim both 
questions and answers of short parts of the interviews. His interview with a Moroccan member of 
the International Brigades is perhaps his most valuable addition to the repertoire of oral history 
material, given the lack of material from  the perspective of pro-Republican Moroccan volunteers. 
Still most of his interviews are dispersed within the text and often used haphazardly. Despite their 
value (also for this study), had the excerpts he uses been taken out of the study, the reader would 
have hardly noticed their absence.  
On oral history 
Since this study makes use of oral interviews a word must be said about the advantages and 
limitations of using oral history and the reliability of its material. In recent decades, oral histories 
have made a positive contribution to research, carving out their own research paradigm and by the 
end of the twentieth century this approach has become a respected and accepted technique for social 
research. The previous homogeneous appetite for written evidence has been challenged by oral 
histories and, as society has changed, oral histories have evolved to enable those from previously 
excluded populations to tell their stories.48 In discussing oral history, Thompson argues that a more 
fair transformation of the past can be achieved by introducing new evidence from the side of the 
underprivileged (in our case the Moroccan soldiers), by opening new areas of inquiry, by 
challenging some of the assumptions and accepted judgements of historians and by bringing 
recognition to substantial groups that had been ignored.49 Portelli makes a similar argument as 
Thompson adding that interviews often reveal unknown events or unknown aspects of known 
                                                 
47 Although Ben Jelloun indicates to have had access to interviews with Moroccan veterans, his brief studies 
do not indicate how many Moroccan veterans he met or any significant anecdotes or quotes. He instead makes 
references to one of Lmrabet’s interviewees. Ben Jelloun, ‘Réevaluation des causes de l’enrolement’, 232-
233. 
48 Elaine Batty, ‘Reflections on the Use of Oral History Techniques in Social Research’, People, Place & 
Policy Online 3 (2009) 109-121, here 118. 
49 P. Thomspon, The Voice of the Past. Oral History (Oxford 2000) 8. 
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events.50 From this point of view the only problem posed by oral sources would be verification.51 
Protelli reminds us that factual credibility is not the monopoly of written documents, as documents 
themselves are often the uncontrolled transmission of unidentified sources.52 A prejudice against 
oral histories is the insistence that they are distant from events, and therefore undergo the distortion 
of faulty memory. This problem exists also for many written sources that are written some time 
after the event they describe and often by non participants. 53 In addition, as Oelofse argues, the true 
distinctiveness of oral history evidence lies in the fact that it presents itself in an oral form. The 
recording may be a more reliable and accurate account of an interview than a purely written record, 
with the interview bringing the information much closer to the human condition. The speaker can 
also be challenged immediately.54  
With regard to the reliability of memory, Hoffman and Hoffman propose that certain 
memories can be so resistant to deterioration with time that they are best described as archival.55 
Archival memories consist of those special memories which, because of their relevance to our 
conception of ourselves, have been reviewed and pondered to the point that they have become 
indelible.56 Such memories, as Marigold Linton explains, are likely to become indelible when an 
event has certain features. Firstly, it is perceived as highly emotional at the time it occurs. Secondly 
the subsequent course of events makes the event appear to be a turning point. Lastly, the event must 
be relatively unique, not blurred by repetition.57 These conclusions could be applied to the case of 
the Moroccan soldiers unique and highly emotional experience of the Spanish Civil War, which for 
the majority must have been a turning point in their lives. 
As is the case with all historical sources the oral is also subject to the examination of 
consistency and accuracy through a process of cross-checking with both other oral testimony and 
documentary evidence. This point is tackled by El Merroun for his oral material. In an interview 
with him in Rabat in 2011 he explained that he painstakingly followed the sequence of events, 
battles, cities and villages conquered, names of commanders, cooperating units, as told by his 
interviewees and compared them with the Diarios de operaciones (war diaries) of the Tabors 
(Moroccan battalions) to which these individuals belonged and other military documents, reaching 
the conclusion that both versions of events matched, rendering the oral interviews largely 
                                                 
50 Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories. Form and Meaning in Oral History 
(New York 1992) 50. 
51 Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories, 50. 
52 Ibidem, 51. 
53 Ibidem, 52. 
54 Marietjie Oelofse, ‘Applying Principles of Historical Critique: Authentic Oral History?’, IPEDR 5 (2011) 
41-44, here 42. 
55 Alice M. Hoffman and Howard S. Hoffman, ‘Reliability and Validity in Oral History: The case for 
Memory’, in: J. Jeffrey and G. Edwall eds., Memory and History. Essays on recalling and interpreting 
experience (Lanham 1994) 107-135, here 128. 
56 Hoffman and Hoffman, ‘Reliability and Validity in Oral History’, 129. 
57 Cited in Hoffman and Hoffman, ‘Reliability and Validity in Oral History’, 128. 
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dependable for the hard data they provide. In the case of this study however, the oral evidence is not 
primarily used for hard facts or dates, but for general insights. The verification and comparison 
material I use consists of policy documents, oral history collected by other historians, and 
contemporary accounts by Moroccan soldiers in the French military archives which will be referred 
to below. The results I believe, vindicate the oral history approach. 
It also does not matter that the oral sources are ‘subjective’. The subjectivity of the speaker 
can be a useful trait. In the case of the Moroccan soldiers, and since this study includes not only the 
visibility and effects of Spanish policy on the Moroccans, but the Moroccans’ own responses to that 
policy, this subjectivity can even be important. For example Gustau Nerín could make his statement 
that the Spanish Africanista commanders held paternalistic and even vicious racist attitudes towards 
the Moroccans, that survived even during the Spanish Civil War.58 But even if he makes a good 
case for this statement, how relevant would such racism be if the majority of the Moroccan veterans 
(see chapter 3) argue that they did not experience racism? This discussion on oral history 
necessitates a presentation of the interviewees and the circumstances that surrounded conducting the 
interviews. 
Interviewing the Moroccan protagonists 
In January 2011, I was walking along the fence that separated the Spanish enclave of Ceuta from 
Morocco proper, following it towards the border crossing, when a patrol of the Guardia Civil 
stopped me and admonished me for walking in a restricted security zone and demanding that I turn 
back and follow another path. That meant climbing some steep and slightly muddy hills in rainy 
weather, the same hills that I climbed, in the same rainy weather, down towards Zaouiat Sidi 
Ibrahim where lay the isolated home of El Hussein ben Abdesselam. He was an old, short and easily 
likable man who once formed part of the force of Moroccan soldiers who fought for General Franco 
during Spain’s bloody civil war between 1936 and 1939. One of the few surviving Moroccan 
veterans of that war, he talked to me about his origins in the French Protectorate of Morocco, how 
he left home in search of an adventure and ended up in the Spanish army, what he saw in Spain, 
how he fought, how he received an injury to the head and how he ended the war convalescing in 
Ceuta where he lived ever since. While I listened to his soft voice and observed his calm manner, 
his small stature and his overall grandfatherly impression I wondered how anyone could imagine 
that this man had ever been one of the fear inspiring, vicious, blood thirsty, throat slitting, 
plundering, raping, senselessly violent Moors, that have forever been associated with the tens of 
thousands of Moroccans like him who participated in the Spanish conflict. Obviously long decades 
and a lot of change in physique and character separated the Civil War from the time I met these 
veterans. I will not deny that I was left with a sympathetic impression each time I met a Moroccan 
veteran of this war. But I was also consciously aware of this impression, and it did not prevent me 
                                                 
58 Nerín, La guerra que vino de África, 174, 206-207. 
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from asking questions on the unpalatable aspects of the conduct of the Moroccan soldiers. Of course 
I put these question to them rather indirectly (‘did any of the other Moroccan soldiers commit such 
and such’) and eased into them while the interview was well underway, following ‘neutral’ type of 
question on their participation: their age while enlisting; type of training; reasons for enlisting; 
battles they participated in; whether they were wounded; relations with other soldiers or officers etc. 
The importance of these interviews, in any case, lies in the fact that no matter what their past was, 
the story of the Moroccan participation in the Civil War is not complete without the perspective of 
its Moroccan participants.   
 El Hussein in Ceuta, was the second Moroccan veteran I met. The first one I interviewed 
was Mohammed ben Abdellah Susi who was residing in a house next to the Regulares barracks of 
Gonzalez Tablas and provided to him and his family by the Spanish state, as he remained in Ceuta 
after Moroccan independence and therefore became a Spanish citizen. Eighty-eight years old at the 
time, he proudly described his role in the war, but towards the end he told me that his days were 
numbered and that I would not be seeing him again. He passed away ten days later. Since then I was 
informed of the death of some of the veterans I interviewed and I assume that most of the others that 
I have interviewed have since passed away.  
The process of meeting veterans in Morocco was not without bureaucratic difficulties. 
Being a stranger to the country must have played a role in addition to the ‘military secrets’ 
mentality that holds sway over the Moroccan Association des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de 
Guerre (AACVG). My first attempt at interviewing a veteran of the Spanish army was in Tetuan in 
2011 when a journalist took me to the Tetuan branch of AACVG where an old veteran of the 
Regulares made his living by selling cigarettes and snacks. Asking him if he would consent to an 
interview he answered that the head of the Tetuani branch must first give his authorisation for these 
are ‘military matters’ and adding in Spanish: ‘un orden es un orden’ (an order is an order). The head 
of the branch told me he was not allowed to give such an authorisation and I should ask in Rabat, to 
which I headed and where I met the secretary general of the AACVG whom I convinced of my 
good intentions and who therefore authorised me to conduct as many interviews as I wanted. Such 
obstacles might seem familiar to some researchers.59 After meeting the secretary general of the 
AACVG, the doors were opened, and wherever the representative of a local club of war veterans 
demanded an authorisation, a phone call by the head of the Association in Rabat was enough to ease 
                                                 
59 In Chefchaouen one of the members of its branch of AACVG told me in 2012 about meeting an American 
student a year earlier who wanted to interview one or two Moroccan veterans of the Spanish Civil War and 
how he was not comfortable with the idea, and how she could write things that would jeopardise the 
reputation of the country. Me, however, as a fellow Arab and who was not a sensation-seeking journalist but a 
serious historian, he would trust.  
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the matter. In the end I managed with the help of the Moroccan Association to interview sixteen 
veterans of the Spanish army.60 
The circumstances and settings for the interviews were far from uniform. Two contrasting 
examples will illustrate this. On June 30th, 2011 in the barracks of the Regulares,61 in the Spanish 
enclave of Ceuta I interviewed three veterans of the Civil War who had come along with former 
Moroccan members of the Spanish army and led by the AACVG, to celebrate the 100th anniversary 
of the Regulares troops. These aging men, former members of the Spanish army, and who came 
from Tetuan, Alcazarquivir, Chefchaoen, and other places of the north west of Morocco, were 
members of the association of friends of the Regulares, and were invited each year to attend the 
celebrations in Ceuta, where they were treated to lunch before the parade in the centre of the city at 
the Murallas Reales (royal walls) and to dinner before heading home. In the afternoon of that day I 
was present in one of the halls of the Regulares barracks, when the the Spanish military governor of 
the Ceuta region entered and saluted the old veterans who in turn enthusiastically saluted back. The 
military governor gave a speech, thanking the Moroccan old men for their ‘glorious past’, and a gift 
was presented to the oldest among the veterans. During dinner, a Spanish woman approached some 
of them and told them that they, the old ones, were the real soldiers who did the job well. Words of 
praise during the parade also rained on them from the population. It was a festive day, and it seems 
that every year on this day it is the same. When I interviewed three Moroccan veterans of the Civil 
War (there were others whom I had interviewed earlier in other places) on that day in Ceuta, they 
were praising the Spanish army, their officers, or Franco himself, and they were proud of their 
participation, perhaps quite logical on such an occasion.   
A few days later I travelled to Nador, to the north east of Morocco where I interviewed 
three other veterans of the Civil War, who were not as enthusiastic about their former participation 
in the war or about the Spanish army or Franco and complaining about their meagre pensions. The 
Spanish enclave of Melilla is a short drive from Nador (north east Morocco), and has its own 
Regulares units, and as in the case of Ceuta also celebrated the 100th anniversary of its Regulares 
corps. But here there was no association of friends of Regulares that included Moroccan veterans, 
and no one from the AACVG was invited each year to attend the celebrations. The contrast between 
the impression given by accounts of both groups of interviewees, I thought, was not coincidental 
and reflected the difference between the received acclaim in Ceuta and the lack of it in Melilla. In 
the end, however, and in terms of the ‘facts’ surrounding their participation in the war, the stories 
were not quite dissimilar. They agree more often than not. 
                                                 
60 I have also interviewed in Morocco, and in France 20 additional former Moroccan soldiers of the French 
Army, who fought either in the Second World War or the Indochina War or both. The experience of life and 
war in the French Army, is in many ways similar to those in the Spanish Army.  
61 There are today two Regulares regiments in the Spanish Army, one in Ceuta and the other in Melilla. Part 
of the troops are formed by Muslim residents of the two Spanish enclaves.  
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Only in three cases did I interview veterans in their homes and in the presence of their 
families. Two of these were interviewed in Ceuta, and in the third case pure luck led me to 
interview a veteran in Brussels, the only interview of a Spanish army veteran outside Morocco and 
Ceuta. In the rest of the cases it was either in the office of the local branch of the AACVG, or in 
public places, usually in the presence of a member of the AACVG. The interviews were conducted 
with individuals separately. In some cases, the interview was conducted in a mixture of Arabic and 
Spanish, and in others completely in Spanish. Local directors of the AACVG stepped in 
occasionally, on my request, to translate whenever the colloquial Moroccan Arabic proved 
incomprehensible to me but these were rare instances. Only in one case a veteran of the Civil War 
declined being interviewed, telling me that he was not able to remember absolutely anything about 
the war. 
In terms of numbers of interviewees, it was a meager harvest (fourteen), considering the 
tens of thousands of veterans who took part in the war in Spain. Nevertheless, it was a treasure of 
some sorts. To add to this batch of interviews, the El Merroun archive of oral interviews would by 
itself guarantee the Moroccan voice in this study. But there is another equally important source for 
the Moroccan voice that adds value to the collection of oral interviews of later and recent times, not 
only because of the extra data but because of the significantly different and contemporary nature of 
this source. 
The Moroccan ‘voice’: The contemporary version 
The Service Historique de la Défense, kept in the Chateau de Vincennes, preserves interrogations 
by French officers of Moroccans who had their origin in French Morocco, enlisted in the Spanish 
army, fought in Spain and deserted back to the French Protectorate after receiving leave, usually 
following a battle injury.62 This group of 147 men is in fact more numerous than the group of 
veterans who were interviewed by this author and all other previously mentioned historians put 
together. Nevertheless, this group represents a minority of the Moroccans who fought in Spain. 
Firstly, because the volunteers from French Morocco were numerically less present in Franco’s 
army (see chapter one) and secondly, because deserters, whether French Moroccan or Spanish 
Moroccan, would not have formed more than a very small percentage of the Moroccan contingent, 
given the fact that in Spain they would have hardly had a place to escape to. In that sense the French 
Moroccan deserters represent a minority within a minority of the Moroccans who fought in Spain.  
Aside from their French Moroccan origin, what makes this group distinct from the group of 
aging veterans of later decades is that their testimonies took place immediately after their war 
experience and therefore did not undergo the risks to the memory that come with the lapse of time 
or any other political or pension-related considerations. However, the fact is that they gave their 
testimonies to French officers about their activities in the Spanish army when it was against the law 
                                                 
62 The files are located in the 3 H series, Box 266. 
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in French Morocco to enlist in the Spanish forces, and by returning to French Morocco they risked 
imprisonment of up to six months and in a few cases up to a year. That means that there is a real 
risk that the interrogated might be willing to bend the facts, regarding the circumstances and 
motivations to enlist, in a manner that will gain the sympathy of the French interrogators, or to 
perhaps hide any wrongdoings they might have committed against a European, in this case Spanish, 
population. Further, having reasons and grievances that drove them to desert means that their 
experience of the army and war could be different than those who chose not to desert. The 
interrogations themselves vary in size. The variation might reflect the readiness of each of the 
interrogated Moroccan soldiers to provide extensive accounts of their adventures, but also the 
willingness of the French interrogators to ask detailed questions about these experiences. In most of 
the cases it is obvious that the interest of the French interrogators is mainly focused on technical 
aspects, like information on the use of tanks and the means to oppose them, aeroplanes, or tactical 
ones like the sort of cooperation between infantry, armour and artillery. Besides, the French were 
very interested in information about German and Italian forces.  
Considerations about the relationship between Moroccan soldiers on the one hand and 
Spanish officers and the Spanish civilians on the other, as well as different aspects of the daily life 
of Moroccan soldiers, seem to have a lesser importance for the interrogators and therefore was not 
always the subject of inquiry. Nevertheless, these interrogations represent a vital source of 
information on the participation of the Moroccan soldiers in the Spanish Civil War that has so far 
been ignored by studies on this topic.63 The insights these files provide are very valuable (see 
chapter 3).  
The structure of the study 
As already mentioned the question this study seeks to answer is related to the extent that both the 
Spanish authorities (Nationalist and Republican) and Moroccan soldiers (and to a lesser extent, the 
Moroccan authorities) tried to control the encounter between Moroccan fighters and their Spanish 
military and civilian environment during the Spanish Civil War. To answer this question this study 
will focus on the effect the perception of a unique Moroccan-ness (or Moorish-ness) of the colonial 
troops had on the military roles they were assigned, and how that perception determined the way in 
which the Spanish Nationalist military leadership dealt with its Moroccan troops. It will also deal 
with the role the perception of Moroccan soldiers and their agency played in coping with their place 
in the war, with the Spanish army, and with the way they were treated by their Spanish superiors. 
The study will show to what extent the Spanish perception of a different Moroccan psyche and 
cultural background, and the place of the Moroccans in the imperial hierarchy (as protected people) 
determined the lengths to which the Moroccan soldiers were allowed to cross the Spanish-Moroccan 
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cultural and racial divide. But it will also how the other perception (that of the Moroccans 
themselves) of the Spanish-Moroccan cultural divide determined the Moroccansʼ ability and 
willingness to cross it. 
The role of racial perception in the participation of Moroccan troops in the war in Spain has 
three broad aspects that are reflected in the three parts of this study. One part is dedicated to the 
strictly military domain (combat and relations within the army), because the realisation of military 
objectives was the primary reason to bring Moroccan soldiers to Spain, and because it is in the field 
combat and military life that the first interactions between the Moroccan soldiers and Spain took 
place. The presence of the Moroccans soldiers in Spain, and their encounter with the Spanish 
culture, did not of course revolve exclusively around the military aspect of that presence, and 
therefore a second part deals with a relatively non-military aspect, and is connected to relations 
between Moroccans and female civilians in Spain, and religious policy of the Spanish Nationalists 
towards the Moroccan troops. I say relatively non-military, because even when this aspect is mostly 
discussed outside the scope of combat, the Spanish Nationalist Army has a lot of influence in this 
area. The last part is related to the Spanish adaptation, on both sides (Republican and Nationalist) of 
pre-war prejudices and of the Moroccan Protectorate-related conditions, to the new situation of 
Moroccan presence in the Spanish peninsula.  
Part I illustrates the significance of the Moroccan troops in the Civil War and it displays the 
role of the racial and cultural prejudices in the way the Moroccans were used militarily and in the 
way the position of the Moroccans within the army was determined by both the Spanish policy and 
the agency of the Moroccans soldiers themselves. Chapter 1 gives an overview of the Spanish Civil 
War and the importance the Moroccan troops had in it. The comprehension of the value of the 
Moroccan troops is essential in order to grasp the importance of the cross-cultural encounter 
between Moroccan and Spaniards, both within the military environment as well as the civilian one, 
and the measures taken by the Spanish (mostly military) authorities to control said encounter. It is 
the large context within which the issues in the following chapters take place.  
Chapter 2 discusses how the Moroccans were, in the Spanish perception, excellent material 
for war, and that they were apt for specific tactical roles to the exclusion of others. It shows that 
their ʻothernessʼ could have its tactical advantages vis-à-vis Republican enemies, both soldiers and 
civilians, which was reflected in the reputation for terror that the Moroccans enjoyed among the 
enemy, to the benefit of the Nationalists.  
Chapter 3 deals with the role of racial perceptions in military life, but outside the scope of 
combat. It illustrates how the Spanish perceived the Moroccan soldiers as having peculiar 
psychological traits which necessitated a special treatment by their commanders and that the 
Moroccans caused disciplinary problems that were different from those encountered with Spanish 
soldiers. Besides, the longer the war lasted, the more segregated the Moroccan units became from 
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other non-Moroccan ones. It also shows that the Moroccan soldiers, far from being passive agents 
of the Spanish army, were often assertive in their demands to be treated fairly, and were selective in 
choosing to enlist in units that they found more suitable for themselves and in demanding 
commanders who were more to their liking and more closely connected to their language and 
traditions.  
Part II of the study deals with the role of the perception of race and culture in determining 
the space the Moroccans had to occupy within Spain outside the military context. This part is 
divided into two chapters. Chapter 4, which treats the relations between the Moroccans and women, 
demonstrates how the Spanish Nationalist army and state tried to control mixed sexual 
relationships. The Nationalists made efforts to prevent marriages between these two different 
groups, based on arguments of differences in faith, the undermining of the Spanish prestige and the 
protective mission of the Spaniards in Morocco. There were also hurdles on the Moroccan side 
against such unions. The chapter shows that the Nationalist army tried to implement this separation 
between Moroccan men and Spanish women even in the realm of sexual services by importing 
Moroccan prostitutes to service the Moroccan contingents in Spain.  
Chapter 5 examines the Nationalists’ policy towards the religious identity and space of the 
Moroccans. It will become clear that the Nationalists perceived the Moroccans as first and foremost 
Muslims, and therefore geared their propaganda towards the Moroccans that described the war in 
Spain in religious terms. The Franco regime paid special attention to the religiousness of the 
Moroccan soldiers by adapting all the aspects of their life inside and outside the fronts in a way that 
would respect the boundaries of their Islamic religion. As a consequence, the army fought the 
attempts of the Catholic Church to convert Moroccans to Christianity, and life in hospitals was 
organised in a manner that reflected Franco’s supposed respect for Islam. Furthermore, the ‘respect’ 
for Islamic faith policy of the Franco regime did not only mean allowing the Moroccans to freely 
practice their faith, but it also meant ensuring that the Moroccans would not step outside their 
religious space. The Moroccans were both allowed and pressured to be conservative faithful 
Muslims.  
Part III shows the extent of hostility and rejection towards the Moroccans on the one hand 
and acceptance on the other hand. It shows that the attitudes of both the Republicans and the 
Nationalists towards the Moroccans had much to do with old racial prejudices, the pre-war history 
of confrontation with the Moroccans, and the conditions and policies of the Spanish administration 
in Spanish Morocco. Chapter 6 analyses the relationship of the other side of the conflict, the 
Republic, with the Moroccans. While the Nationalists were eager to accommodate the Moroccans 
and temporarily abandon their suspicious attitude towards them, the Republicans were more 
insistent on adhering to the traditional Spanish enmity towards the ‘Moor’, and which was 
translated, especially in the early stages of the war, into a no-mercy attitude towards the Moroccan 
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soldiers who were often shot by the Republicans upon capture. This uncompromising and 
suspicious attitude also negatively affected their relations with Moroccan and other North African 
players who were ready to assist the Republicans in anti-Nationalist endeavours.  
Chapter 7 examines the overall attempts by the Nationalists’ to balance between including 
and accepting the Moroccans in Spain on the one hand, and their policy to isolate them as much as 
possible from interaction with other Spanish units, Spanish civilian society and religion on the other 
hand. The chapter shows that attempts to create a distance between the Spanish and the Moroccan 
were two-sided, as often the Moroccan soldiers, the Moroccan authorities and the Moroccan 



















A military overview of the Spanish Civil War and the role of the Moroccan troops 
 
After the Army of Africa took control of North Morocco in an anti-Republican coup on 17 July 1936, 
a series of rebellions took place in the Spanish Peninsula. Most of Old Castile, Galicia, Navarre, and a 
number of Andalusian towns fell into the hands of the rebel officers and their rightist allies. The 
rebellion failed however in Madrid and the large cities of Barcelona and Valencia, as well as the 
Basque provinces, Asturias, Cantabria, the entire east coast and even the greatest part of Andalusia 
(See Appendix 2 on the development of the Spanish Civil War). It was evident that a longer military 
operation was needed if the rebels were to succeed, and for that reason the rebels in the Spanish navy 
were given the task of carrying the Army of Africa across the Gibraltar Strait. After delivering the first 
batch of Moroccan soldiers to Cádiz, the pro-Republican sailors mutinied and killed or imprisoned 
their officers.1 It was the inability to use the navy to ferry more troops to Spain that brought about the 
intervention of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany to the aid of Franco. Mussolini wanted an allied Spain 
to help secure Italian hegemony on the Mediterranean. Hitler was initially hesitant to intervene but 
Franco’s emissaries, who included German businessmen and members of the Nazi party, as well as 
Hitler’s advisors convinced him of the benefits for Germany and its armed forces to use Spain as a 
training ground. The Germans and Italians provided, by the end of the third week of July 1936, 
transport aircraft to carry Legionnaires and Regulares to southern Spain.  
The French Popular Front government, led by Leon Blum, supported the Republic and initially 
provided arms to the Spanish legitimate government. Later, due to internal pressure from right wing 
French parties, and to adhere to the European agreement on non-intervention in the Spanish conflict, 
the French would stop the supply of arms. Only intermittently would France later open the borders for 
the flow of more arms. Only the Soviet Union (and Mexico) was ready to provide a steady stream of 
arms to the Republic. The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin hoped to stem the advance of Fascism in 
Europe. In return however he received payment in gold from the Spanish government. By the end of 
1936 the Republic, fearing the fall of its capital, deposited its entire gold reserves in the Soviet Union. 
Stalin kept the gold forever. His Communist International (Comintern) helped organise communist 
volunteers from all over the world (but mainly European communists) to help the Republic. They were 
formed in the so-called International Brigades. 
                                                 
1 A Moroccan sergeant suspected foul play in the ship that brought him to Cádiz. On arrival in the port city, he 
recognised General José Enrique Varela, under whose command he fought in Morocco, and who took command 
of the Spanish rebel forces in Cádiz. He warned him: ‘you look general, I Hamido of the harka [Moroccan 
irregular unit], by Allah our great Mulana [Master], those people [of the] boat are no miziana [good]’. Varela 
offered a platoon of Regulares to the captain of the ship on his way back to the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. The 
captain declined the offer, and the boat was seized by the sailors after its departure. Francisco Sánchez Ruano, 





On the rebel (Nationalist) side, the war presented dramatic changes. The assigned leader to the 
rebel side, the exiled General Sanjurjo (who tried to topple the government in 1932), died in a plane 
crash while departing from Portugal to Spain. General Emilio Mola, also a Morocco veteran, who 
coordinated the rebellion in Spain, failed to make any fast military progress towards the capital. It fell 
to the army of Africa under General Franco to deliver the death blow to the Republic. After airlifting 
colonial troops to the Spanish mainland, the Army of Africa scored a rapid succession of victories 
against the Republican loyalist army and militia in Andalusia and Extremadura in the fall of 1936. 
Franco also managed, with the aid of foreign aircraft, to finally prevent the Republican navy from 
endangering further naval transport of troops to Spain. His army that contained thousands of battle-
hardened troops and experienced officers easily swept aside the Republican fighting force, in parts of 
Andalusia, Extremadura and New Castile, and which consisted of militiamen with little experience in 
fighting outside urban areas, and an army that lacked sufficient training and any combat experience.  
Some revolutionaries on the Republican side exacerbated the military problem by insisting on 
ignoring military rank and discipline, and electing their commanders on a democratic basis, rather than 
by military expertise. The revolutionary spirit led to widespread collectivising of industry and 
agriculture, mainly in zones under control of anarchists. Excesses in the Republican zone, the result of 
a lack of firm government control during the initial weeks of the war, including the widespread killing 
of the Spanish clergy, owners of sizable property and other so-called ‘enemies of the people’, scared 
off more moderate supporters within the Republic, as well as Western governments. Western 
diplomats largely ignored the less visible excesses by the Nationalists (because outside of the main 
cities) which took a more organised form of execution, torture and imprisonment campaigns, in which 
the Army of Africa took the leading role (accompanied and aided by other security forces and the 
Falange militia). The terror of the Army of Africa and its military efficiency brought greater influence 
to Franco, and in the wake of his success in lifting the Republican siege of the Alcazar of Toledo on 
27 September 1936, he was chosen a few days later in Salamanca as head of state and Generalissimo 
of the Nationalist armies.  
The spectacular advance of the Army of Africa between July and October 1936 grew slower 
as the Republican resistance stiffened under the leadership of the socialist Prime Minister Largo 
Caballero. The militia started to follow regular military discipline and Soviet military advisors and 
materiel appeared on the scene, particularly the T-26 tanks that were superior to the German and 
Italian light tanks, and the ‘Mosca’ and ‘Rata’ fighter aircraft, that for months successfully faced the 
German and Italian planes in the struggle to dominate the skies. The Italian force would grow into tens 
of thousands who made up the Corpo di Truppe Voluntari (CTV), while the German military mission 
consisted of the Condor Legion that was principally an air force, as well as technicians and military 
advisers and a small armoured force. The later appearance (in 1937) of state of the art German fighter 
planes in large numbers began to tip the balance in favour of Franco. But in November 1936 it was the 
Army of Africa that would have to conquer Madrid. While the Republican government evacuated to 
32 
 
Valencia, Madrid prepared for the Nationalist attack. Franco, his Legionnaires and his Moroccans, 
however, failed to capture Madrid. The prominent role of the International Brigades, the Soviet 
advisors and materiel in the defence of the capital, and the Spanish communist leaders insistence on 
halting any revolutionary changes in the Republic and on an alliance with the bourgeois democratic 
forces while focusing on military efficiency and victory in the war brought great influence to the 
communists within the Republic.  
The failure of the attack on Madrid and subsequent operations to encircle the capital, 
principally the Jarama offensive and the failed Italian attack on Guadalajara in the spring of 1937, 
pushed Franco to opting for a piecemeal destruction of Republican territory. During this time the 
armies of both warring parties started to grow through the introduction and enforcing of conscription.2 
The Nationalists were no longer exclusively dependent on the Army of Africa or the volunteer 
militias, though the African units still carried out crucial roles. The period that encompassed his 
northern offensive in Asturias, Cantabria and the Basque country, which lasted from March 1937 untill 
October 1937 witnessed important events. It was during this campaign that General Mola met his 
death in an air crash, removing the last possible military and political rival to General Franco. During 
this offensive the Condor Legion launched its infamous raids on Durango and Guernica killing 
hundreds in each town, raids which were ominous precedents to the so-called strategic bombing 
campaigns of the Second World War that destroyed complete cities. In May 1937, a civil war within a 
civil war broke out in the Republican camp, between the communists and the anarchists, that ended 
with the defeat of the latter and the halting of the revolutionary process that was taking place in 
Catalonia, and victory for those who insisted on order and concentrating efforts on victory. The May 
crisis, as it was called, led to the fall of the government of Largo Caballero, who was accused of being 
too much in favour of the extreme left, especially the anarchists. He was succeeded by the more 
moderate socialist Juan Negrín. The domination of the communists and their allies of the Republic 
acquired an almost total character. 
The Republic also tried to divert the attention of Franco from attacking the North by launching 
a costly offensive in Brunete. Franco briefly halted his northern offensive, won in Brunete, and 
pursued the war in the North that ended with the destruction of a large part of the Republican army. 
From that moment, the war progressed slowly but steadily in favour of General Franco. Republican 
counterattacks, such as the winter battle in Teruel (December 1937-February1938), brought temporary 
small victories but ended in disaster. Subsequent Nationalist offensives in Aragon brought the forces 
of Franco to the Mediterranean, separating the Republican territory in Catalonia from the rest of the 
Republic, and prompting a Republican counter attack, the battle of the Ebro, in the summer of 1938 
which became the longest battle of the Civil War and which the Republic fought with numerical and 
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material disadvantage. A brief moment of optimism shone for the Republic during the 
Czechoslovakian crisis of September 1938, when it seemed that a European war was about to break-
out between Germany and the Western democracies. In that case, the Republic hoped that France 
would intervene militarily and defeat the forces of German-allied Franco. The ‘peaceful’ solution of 
the crisis, surrendering Czechoslovakian Sudetenland to Germany, crashed those Republican hopes. 
Following the battle of the Ebro, the Nationalists overwhelmed Catalonia (November 1938-February 
1939) and the fate of the Republic seemed sealed, despite a last desperate offensive in Extremadura 
(January-February 1939). Tired of war, anti-communist elements in Madrid, including the anarchists, 
conspired to topple the government with the hope of gaining a merciful peace with Franco. The coup, 
commanded by Colonel Segismundo Casado, defeated the communists in Madrid who were willing to 
fight to the end, but failed to elicit from Franco any response beyond an unconditional surrender. In 
March Madrid surrendered to Franco and the war was officially over on 1 April 1939. Decades of 
dictatorship by General Franco would follow. 
The military significance of the Moroccan troops  
That the Moroccan troops played an extremely important military role in the early days, weeks and 
months of the Spanish Civil War is common knowledge to the students of the Spanish conflict. 
Moroccan troops and the Legionaries of the Army of Africa occupied much of Andalusia and 
Extremadura and defeated one Republican army after another until they reached the gates of Madrid. 
Nationalists, besieged in the Alcazar of Toledo or in Oviedo, could not be relieved by Nationalist 
Peninsular units and had to hear spoken Arabic or see the red headgears of the Regulares to know that 
salvation was coming. It was the second time that the Army of Africa, with its Regulares and Foreign 
Legion proved that they could save the day. It had already done so with brutal efficiency in 1934 when 
the Spanish leftists and their Asturian mine workers militia rebelled against the rightist led government 
in Madrid, and the Peninsular army and security forces faced enormous troubles in trying to combat it. 
That efficiency was reflected in the heavy losses brought upon the rebels vis-à-vis the relatively few 
losses for the Army of Africa.3   
The importance of the Moroccan troops certainly diminished as the Civil War progressed as 
peninsular armies grew and foreign contingents and weapon technology were flown in. Yet, the 
Moroccans’ role remained important during the whole period of the war. Perhaps Seidman does not 
exaggerate when he notes that ‘the Moroccan army may well have been, as a number of perceptive 
                                                 
3 The Spanish Foreign Legion suffered 13 fatalities, the 3rd Tabor Regulares of Ceuta (the only Regulares unit to 
have engaged in combat in Asturias) only seven, even though they included the commander of the Tabor sent to 
Asturias. It is estimated that about 1500 and 2000 died in Spain as a result of the rebellion, of which 320 were 
soldiers and other state security personnel plus 35 priests. The light fatal casualties of the Army of Africa (a total 
of 20) speaks to its efficiency, also given the urban nature of the combat with which it was not familiar during 
the colonial wars in Morocco. José E. Álvarez, ‘The Spanish Foreign Legion during the Asturian Uprising of 
October 1934’, War in History 18 (2011) 200-224, here 222; Carlos González Rosado and Juan García del Río 




observers have labelled it, “the decisive factor” of the war’.4 There are significant indicators of that 
important role. These indicators are, among others, their geographical distribution, their share in unit 
citations and the casualties suffered by them.  
First of these is the manner of their distribution after the initial phase of the conflict. Whereas 
the Moroccan troops formed, along with the Foreign Legion, the Army of Africa between July and 
early 1937, the Moroccan Tabors were later distributed geographically over different theatres and 
grouped with other Spanish units forming newly raised divisions.5 This is explained as being the result 
of the desire to integrate within the new divisions a number of experienced, battle-hardened shock 
troops that would raise the fighting quality of the new formations. This is demonstrated by the request 
the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco Colonel Juan Beigbeder submitted to General Franco in 
December 1937. Beigbeder, pointing to reasons of raising the military effectiveness of the Moroccan 
troops, asked in his request for Tabors of each group of Regulares to be grouped together in the same 
geographical neighbourhood.6 Franco responded negatively to the request, pointing that otherwise it 
would affect the combat value of the grand units.7  
A second indicator in gauging the military value of the Moroccan units is by reviewing the 
collective decorations awarded to Spanish Nationalist units for their achievements between 1936-
1939. We will take here the examples of the prestigious Medalla Militar and the Orden de San 
Fernando or La Laureada as it is better known. Around 85 collective Medalla Militar have been 
bestowed on either individual units or groups of units in the Spanish armed forces for services 
rendered during the Civil War. There are 33 collective citations featuring Moroccan units out of 85 
which make these North African units, given their percentages of the total army, overrepresented 
among recipients of these citations.8 The image is slightly different with regard to the Orden de San 
Fernando.9 This has been collectively granted 21 times, of which four times to Moroccan units and 
twice to the Spanish Foreign Legion. On first sight it might not make the Moroccan units seem to 
possess a disproportionately high place among the recipients of the collective version of this medal. 
However, fifteen other Orden de San Fernando collective medals were conferred to, among others: 
two cities, and large collective of units like ‘the forces defending the University Campus’ or ‘several 
forces fighting at the Teruel front’, operations in which Moroccan troops participated, which would 
make their share in these citations rise. In fact, only eight times was this military distinction separately 
                                                 
4 Michael Seidman, The Republic of Egos. A Social History of the Spanish Civil War (Madison 2002) 43. 
5 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 738.   
6 AGMAV, A.2, L.158, Cp 25. Among other measures, Beigbeder suggested replacing individual leaves with 
collective ones where whole Tabors would enjoy rest along with all their officers, as well as taking measures so 
that any soldier belonging to a group of Regulares would not be assigned to a different group, and if possible to 
always stay within his Tabor. It seems that the first of these suggestions was not followed upon, probably 
because of the necessities of war. 
7 Franco’s response to Beigbeder, 31 Dec. 1937 AGMAV, A.2, L.158, Cp 25.   
8 Servicio Histórico Militar, Galería militar contemporánea, Vol.IV : Medalla Militar. Cuarta Parte: 
Suboficiales, tropa y condecoraciones colectivas (Madrid 1976) 
9 For these see: Servicio Histórico Militar, Galería militar contemporánea, Vol.I:  La Real y Militar Orden de 
San Fernando (2nd Madrid 1984) and La Real y Militar Orden de San Fernando. Segunda Parte (Madrid 1980). 
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awarded to specific battalions or companies, four among which, as already mentioned, went to 
Moroccan units: one battalion, two companies and one squadron. 
Talking about overrepresentation raises the question of the numbers of the Moroccan troops 
that participated in the Spanish war and their share of numbers within the Spanish army. Hugh 
Thomas estimates the probable number of Moroccan participants as reaching 75,000.10 The military 
historian colonel Gárate Córdoba, conducting extensive documentary research, put the numbers of 
Moroccan participants at more than 78,000,11 while Maria Rosa Madariaga does not diverge too far 
when estimating the number as being around 80,000.12 This represents less than ten percent of the total 
combatants who fought under General Franco between 1936-1939.13  
The main source of recruitment was the Spanish Protectorate, with the interventores and local 
tribal chiefs playing a significant role. Thanks to their work, recruitment efforts intensified in the Rif, 
in Jebala and in Gomara. An important meeting, on 20 July 1936, was held in Ajdir (the previous 
capital of Mohammed ben Abdul Krim al Khattabi) were Soleiman al Khattabi, at the time the leader 
of the Beni Urriagel (the tribe that had played the main role in fighting the Spaniards during the Rif 
rebellion), announced that he would join the Nationalists. His tribe would provide a great contingent 
of soldiers to the Spanish Army.14 Many ex-rebel leaders would join the effort along with ex-rebel 
combatants. Another source of recruitment was Ifni and the Sahara, although these less densely 
populated regions would provide smaller numbers of recruits compared to Spanish northern Morocco. 
During the first weeks and months, the recruitment did not face difficulties and was even met with 
enthusiasm. By the end of 1936 and early 1937 the numbers of people enlisting started to diminish 
(though enlistment never ceased), possibly either due to news of increasing casualties and because of 
the limits to what the Spanish Protectorate could demographically bear. There were reports and 
rumours of increasing hostility and even violent resistance to recruitment, especially in the regions that 
had been most resistant to Spanish invasion,15 but these are mainly based on French (and to a lesser 
extent British) reports. War weariness would have, to a certain extent, been present in Spanish 
Morocco and among some Moroccan soldiers in Spain (see chapter 3), in the same way it existed in 
Spain itself, as a country involved in a prolonged war. But (as already mentioned in the introduction) 
Spanish archival material has yet to confirm the existence of armed resistance against recruitment in 
the Spanish Protectorate.16 Oral testimonies of Moroccan veterans do no refer to the existence of such 
rebellions either. 
French Morocco 
                                                 
10 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 944. 
11 Gárate Córdoba, ‘Las Tropas de África en la Guerra Civil española’, 56. 
12 Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco,172. 
13 Shannon E. Fleming, ‘Spanish Morocco and the Alzamiento Nacional’, Journal of Contemporary History 18 
(1983) 30. 
14 María Rosa de Madariaga, Marruecos. Ese gran desconocido. Breve historia del Protectorado Español 
(Madrid 2013) 326-328; El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíes en la Guerra Civil española, 36-37. 
15 Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 275; Madariaga, Marruecos. Ese gran desconocido, 330, 332.  
16 Mesa, Los moros de la Guerra Civil española, 188. 
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The Moroccan soldiers who fought in Spain did not in their entirety originate in the Spanish zone of 
Morocco, as many from the French zone enlisted in Franco’s army to fight in Spain. But there is a 
huge divergence in estimates of how important was the French zone as a source of manpower for the 
Spanish Nationalists. According to Ibn Azzuz Hakim, Moroccans from the French Zone formed two 
thirds of the total of Moroccans in Franco’s army.17 Ruano mentions the historian J.Wolf putting the 
percentage of Moors from the southern zone in the Nationalist army as being 75% though Ruano 
dismisses it as exaggerated and not based on any sources.18 Balfour asserts that six months into the 
war 50,000 Moroccans were fighting alongside the Nationalists, of these only one third were from the 
Rif mountainous region in the Spanish Protectorate.19 Madariaga on the other hand puts the share of 
Moroccans from French Morocco at 10% of the total of Moroccans who fought in the Spanish 
Nationalist army.20  
The French authorities in Morocco estimated that in July 1936, when the war started, a quarter 
of the number of the Regulares already serving with the Spanish were Moroccans who originated from 
the French zone. The French started to implement preventive, as well as punitive, measures to curtail 
the enrolment of new recruits from their zone in the Spanish army and concluded that they were 
achieving success by the end of 1936, when cases of recruitment were scarce.21 In early 1937 the 
Sultan Mohammed ben Yusuf (the future Mohammed V), who was nominally also the sovereign of 
Spanish Morocco, issued a decree warning those Moroccans enlisting in the Nationalist army to 
condemn them for rebellion and a punishment of a fine of 200 francs (which could reach up to 500) 
plus six months of prison.22 But according to the French authorities in the French Protectorate, the 
Francoist recruitment campaign intensified starting in April 1937, and the French military cabinet of 
the General Residence attributed that to the economic situation in eastern and southern Morocco which 
had its effects on the natives, as well as to the ‘spirit of adventure which animates them’.23 Punitive 
measures included fining or imprisoning a number of tribal chiefs as well as well as recruiting agents, 
with prison sentences varying from one month to one year.24 A number of returnees were also given 
prison sentences.  
The preventive measures by the French in Morocco led the Spanish Nationalists to refuse to 
give permission to their soldiers who originated from the French zone to go to their homes to enjoy 
their leaves. A more drastic measure, perhaps with the issue of Non-intervention in mind, was to 
officially hide the identity of the Moroccans coming from the French zone. In July 1938, secret 
                                                 
17 Ibn Azzuz Hakim, quoted in: El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíes en la Guerra Civil española, 187. El 
Merroun does not specify which publication by Ibn Azzuz Hakim he is citing. 
18 Ruano, Islam y Guerra Civil, 221. 
19 Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 278. 
20 Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco, 187-192. 
21 Report by the Residence General in Morocco on 20 May 1937. Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), 3 H 
265.  
22 Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco, 194. 
23 Report by the Residence General in Morocco on 20 May 1937. SHD, 3 H 265. 
24 Report by the Residence General in Morocco on 27 July 1937. SHD, 3 H 265. 
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instructions from Burgos, the temporary seat of the Spanish Nationalist government, to Morocco 
ordered that recruits from the French zone should be given new tribal names chosen from tribes living 
in the Spanish zone.25 The documents show examples of recruits from the French Zone being assigned 
new home towns or tribal origins. So soldiers from Marrakech and Casablanca became inhabitants of 
Alcazarquivir, while those of Fez took Xauen and Alcazarquivir as their home towns. Tribal names 
changed from Beni Mestara and Beni Serual, in the French zone to Beni Ahamed in the Spanish one, 
and Beni Kasen to Beni Hamed, and from Beni Sarat to Senhaya and so on and so forth.26  
The Spanish Nationalist archival military material establishes that in July and August 1938 
there were 6215 soldiers originating from French Morocco, fighting in Spain,27 which makes it highly 
unlikely that volunteers from French Morocco ever formed a majority of the Moroccan troops in the 
peninsula, especially given the fact that many had been serving in the Spanish army even before the 
war started.28 
Casualties 
The total numbers of participants help to understand the scope of the role of the Moroccan units when 
examining their combat deaths. These represent the role played by the Moroccan units well, especially 
when compared to the fatalities of other units fighting for the Nationalist cause. Let us begin with the 
overall Nationalist fatal casualties. Hugh Thomas estimates the combat deaths of the Nationalists in 
the neighbourhood of 90,000 and those of the Republicans as being 110,000, or ten percent of total 
combatants.29 The Spanish Falangist battalions, for example, which fought on the side of Franco, are 
estimated to have suffered a ten percent combat death and probably less. The death percentage for 
Spanish royalist Carlist units was even lower,30 while the Italians suffered five percent combat deaths 
during their intervention to aid Franco.31 It appears to be difficult to document the combat death 
among Moroccan troops. A figure, widely accepted by specialists in the field is given by Gárate 
                                                 
25 AGMAV, C.2301, L.1, Cp.1/19. 
26 See examples in AGMAV, C.2301, L.1, Cp.4/4,5,6,7,8,9,10 and following.  
27 AGMAV, C.2301, L.2, Cp. 1 and upwards. Two historians Gárate Córdoba and Mesa have consulted this 
material before and came up with different numbers: 5240 and 5830 respectively. See and: Mesa, Los moros de 
la Guerra Civil, 236. Gárate Córdoba made a mistake of basing his numbers on a consultation of one paper 
giving a summary for all the native regiments (which did not include all numbers) instead of consulting each 
individual sheet sent by each regiment and then adding up the numbers. As for the difference between my 
calculations and those of Mesa, that is something which I cannot explain given that I am not familiar with how 
he made these calculations. The breakdown of the numbers I calculated  is as follows: Mehal-la of Tetuan nr 1: 
237, Mehal-la of Melilla nr 2: 16, Mehal-la of Larache nr 3: 336, Mehal-la of Gomara nr 4: 466 (260 in Spain), 
Meha-la of Rif nr 5: 163, Regulares of Tetuan nr 1: 680, Regulares of Melilla nr 2: 207, Regulares of Ceuta nr 3: 
1481, Regulares of Larache nr 4: 1558, Regulares of Alhucemas nr 5: 495, Battalion of Tiradores Ifni: 257 + 
365, Battalion of Cazadores San Fernando nr 1: 23, Battalion of Cazadores Las Navas nr 2: 78, Battalion of 
Cazadores Melilla nr 3: 11, Battalion of Cazadores Cariñola nr 6: 10, Battalion of Cazadores Ceuta nr 7: 5, 
Battalion of Cazadores Serrallo nr 8: 18, Battalion of Zapadores Morocco (engineers): 15. 
28 The dates present in the archival material suggest that somewhere around 800 were recruited from the French 
zone before the war, going back as early as 1913, while Mesa estimates the number as somewhere between 
1000-1500. See Mesa, Los moros de la Guerra Civil, 241. These estimates are far lower than the 5000 made by 
the French and referred to above. 
29 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 900. 
30 Ibidem, 901. 
31 John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton 1975) 398, 418.  
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Córdoba who estimated the combat deaths as being a maximum of 11,331.32 A manuscript edited by 
the Ibn Azzuz Hakim quotes a document by the Spanish Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas which gives 
the far higher number of 21,800 dead plus 1700 missing.33 Assuming the total number of Moroccan 
troops that took part in the war to be 80,000, the combat death estimates given by Córdoba would be 
higher than 14% of the total number of participating Moroccan combatants, while those quoted in the 
Indigenous Affairs Department document would represent slightly higher than 27% of total numbers 
(leaving out the missing). Whatever percentage we accept it represents a significantly higher rate of 
casualties compared to other units in the Spanish Nationalist camp, and is probably topped only by the 
pro-Republican International Brigades, which by some estimates might have suffered 33% fatalities.34 
The Moroccan casualties have certainly served to spare many lives on the Nationalist side. As one 
Spanish Nationalist veteran puts it: ‘the high command of the Nationalist army made a great decision 
in taking so many thousands of Moors to the Peninsula, for had it not done that, we would have lost 
half as many more dead Spanish soldiers. In the end, the thousands of Moors who died saved the lives 
of so many other Spaniards’.35 To stress the point even more, it is informative to know that some 
Spaniards who did not respond to the Nationalist call to arms and who were arrested were sent, as 
punishment, to serve in the Moroccan units which were known to suffer high casualties in combat.36  
However, there is no documentary evidence that shows that the Nationalist command 
deliberately sought to increase Moroccan casualties to save Spanish lives. More probably, the 
Nationalists trusted the efficiency of the Army of Africa more than peninsular units, and casualties of 
the Spanish Legion were not generally less heavy than the Moroccan ones. In any case, the 
Nationalists were less dependent, compared to the Republicans, on conscripts to launch difficult 
offensives, and mainly relied on professional troops and volunteers, including the Moroccans, leaving 
to most of the Spanish conscripts the less dangerous task of holding positions rather than engaging in 
costly offensive operations.37  
The Moroccan soldiers themselves obviously were aware of their own primary role and 
importance for the military effort and they, both during the war as well as long decades later and not 
without pride, stressed their role in the first lines of combat.38 Some Moroccan soldiers though that 
Franco’s army was only victorious because of the native soldiers.39 Others admitted that the Spanish 
Legion also played its part along with the Moroccans and that both the Moroccans and the legionnaires 
                                                 
32 Gárate Córdoba, ‘Las tropas de África en la Guerra Civil española’, 59. 
33Ibn Azzuz Hakim, La actitud de los moros ante el Alzamiento, 190-191.  
34 Coverdale, Italian Intervention, 398. 
35 José Llordes Badía, Al dejar el fusil. Memorias de un soldado raso en la guerra de España (Barcelona 1969) 
72.  
36 Pedro Corral, Desertores. La Guerra Civil que nadie quiere contar (Barcelona 2006) 445-446. 
37 Matthews, Soldados a la fuerza, 257. 
38 Interview with Mohammed Abdullah Susi, Ceuta, 19 January 2011. See also Republican intelligence Report  
on 2 November 1938. Seccion Nacional de Coordinación, Servicio de Información exterior. International 
Institute for Social History, Archivo FAI, Cp, 33/5. 
39 Interrogations of Lachmi ben bi Rebbouh and Mohammed ben Allal. SHD, 3 H 266. 
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were the best troops in the field.40 Some contrasted their prowess by disparaging other combatants 
whether Spanish or Italian,41 although there were also those who highly praised either the enemy,42 or 
foreign allies, particularly the Germans.43 
With a clear idea on the significance of the Moroccan troops in the Spanish war, now it is  
time to discuss the influence of cultural and racial stereotypes in constructing the encounter between 
the Spaniards and the Moroccans, an encounter that will deal first with its military aspect. 
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Testimony of Hamido Al Ma’dani, Tetuan, 30 September 1996, El Merroun archive. 
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The Moroccans in the battlefield 
 
The Moors, the Moors! They cried taken by panic. And the image of the Regulares, tall, 
dishevelled, filling the air with their shrieks, presented itself to them like an infernal apparition. 
 From a diary describing the entrance of the Regulares into an Andalusian town.1  
 
The Moroccans who fought in the battlefields of Spain were not merely soldiers who were used as 
rationally as any other source of manpower. Their ethnicity, culture, or both influenced most of 
aspects of their fighting experience in Spain, including ideas about their employment as soldiers, 
the tactical role they fulfilled, and the impact they had on enemy soldiers and civilians. There is 
hardly any aspect in which the cultural identity of these warriors did not influence the military 
aspect on the battlefield. And it is this influence, varying in forms, that this chapter will discuss. 
The Moroccan as a combatant 
How did the Spaniards perceive the Moroccan troops in terms of special traits, including race, 
religion, or geography, and how this impacted the way Moroccans were deployed in war? In fact, 
the role of ʻraceʼ in tactical thinking becomes apparent by noting that the Moroccan units, most 
notably the Regulares, were not entirely Moroccan. Let us examine the following table that is 
based on a statistical summary of troops and weapons for the Melilla Regulares group.2 
 
Tabor Native troops European troops Percentage of 
European troops to 
total 
1st 440 114 20.57% 
2nd 442 98 18.14% 
3rd 447 108 19.45% 
6th 492 119 19.47% 
7th 509 121 19.20% 
8th 449 152 25.29% 
9th 518 129 19.90% 
10th 520 121 18.87% 
11th 448 108 19.42% 
                                                 
1 Eduardo Dominguez Lobato, Cien capítulos de retaguardia (Alrededor de un diario) (Madrid 1973) 45. 
The town which the Regulares were entering, was Sanlúcar de Barrameda in Cádiz province. 
2 AGMAV, A.31, L.1, Cp. 7. The 4th and 5th Tabors were kept outside of this list as the European troops 
listed in the source totaled 15 and 18 respectively, in comparison to 509 and 496 native troops for each 





As Table 1 demonstrates, the average percentage of European troops in these infantry battalions 
was 20.03% for the nine listed Tabors. If we put aside the slightly divergent percentage of 25.29% 
for the 8th Tabor the average percentage would be 19.30%, which would not diverge greatly from 
the previous percentage. Roughly speaking, a fifth of the ‘native’ Regulares troops were composed 
by European (i.e. Spanish) soldiers. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tabors existed already before the war and 
contained the approximately one-fifth portion of European soldiers to the total of troops, while the 
rest of the Tabors in the list were formed after the outbreak of the war and still maintained, on 
average, the same approximate ratio of native to European troops.  
Table 2 indicates troop strength for the Grupo de Tiradores de Ifni nr. 6,3 and gives 
numbers for September 1939, which is approximately half a year after the war, and therefore does 
not necessarily reflect the conditions until April 1939. The overall image that is given here does 
not diverge significantly from the previous Table. This Table shows the following percentages.  
Tabor Native troops European troops Percentage of 
European troops to 
total 
1st  7254 260 26.39 % 
2nd  4675 127 21.38 % 
3rd  3886 344 46.99 % 
4th   3837 96 20.04 % 
5th   4468 97 17.86 % 
6th   5509 102 15.64% 
Table 2 
Compared to Table 1, this has more extreme differences between the 15.64% of the 6th Tabor at 
one extreme and 46.99% of the 3rd Tabor at the other. Thus far, there is no apparent explanation 
                                                 
3 AHMC, Varela, 95/346. 
4 The overall native troop strength was given in the table as 750, but including 25 native sergeants. Whereas 
in case of European troops, the European sergeants were not included in the 260 number, and put in a 
separate category for non-commissioned officers.  I opted therefore to subtract the number of sergeants in 
the case of native troops. The same principle of subtracting the number of native sergeants is applied in the 
following five Tabors. Corporals are included in the original table in the category of troops for both 
Europeans as well as natives. 
5 The overall native troop strength was given in the original table as 478. 11 sergeants were subtracted from 
this total. 
6 The overall native troop strength was given in the original table as 396. 8 sergeants were subtracted from 
this total. 
7 The overall native troop strength was given in the original table as 397. 14 sergeants were subtracted from 
this total. 
8 The overall native troop strength was given in the original table as 457. 11 sergeants were subtracted from 
this total. 





for the extremely high number of European soldiers in the 3rd Tabor compared to the others, and 
whether this increase in the European percentage of soldiers occurred during the war or after it 
ended. As an anomaly the 3rd Tabor will be barred from the calculation of the average percentage 
of the European troops in this Grupo de Tiradores. This leaves an average of 20.26% of troops 
composed of Europeans, which is not very different from the average percentage of European 
troops vis-à-vis the total that is given by Table 1 of the Melilla Regulares Group. To strengthen 
these numbers with yet another example, the records from the Group of Regulares in Ceuta show 
that the three infantry Tabors, which the Group possessed before the start of the war contained 
1833 soldiers, of whom 1452 were ‘Moors’ or 79.2% of the total.10  
Why was there a need for an average of 20% European troops in these so-called native 
units? The ratio of European troops to total men has varied throughout the entire war and in all 
native units. José Montes Ramos notices that during the Civil War the five Regulares groups 
increased their infantry battalions to 51 and their cavalry ones to five, comprising 70,000 troops of 
whom 63,000 were natives,11 which means that 10% of the Regulares were European. In addition, 
Gárate Córdoba gives a detailed overview of the Tabors dispatched to Spain during different 
stages of the war, estimating the number of the natives within each infantry Tabor or cavalry 
squadron. For example, according Gárate Córdoba, on the night of 18 July 1936, 1235 troops of 
Regulares of Ceuta were shipped to Cadiz, among whom 1146 were natives,12 meaning that less 
than 8 % of the soldiers were Spanish. Two Tabors of Regulares of Tetuan, comprising 1000 
troops were airlifted to Spain between 20 and 30 July, among whom 930 were natives.13 Until the 
end of September 1936, 9746 troops passed to the Peninsula, of whom 9183 were natives, or more 
than 94%. Gárate Córdoba indicates that he made estimations of the proportion of soldiers within 
Tabors, 25 to 30 Spaniards per Tabor, possibly more if officers were included.14 However, he in a 
later page of his study states that Europeans formed 22% of effectives of a Regulares Tabor,15 
whereas the tables he presents, in almost all the cases, the Europeans form less than 10% of the 
total troops in native units.16 It is probable that due to circumstances of war, and the demographics 
                                                 
10 Corporals are included with the soldiers. The two cavalry squadrons of the Groups contained 262 soldiers 
of which 226 or 86.2% a slightly higher percentage of Moroccans compared with the infantry battalions. 
González Rosado and Del Río Fernández, Grupo de Fuerzas Regulares de Ceuta nr. 3, 203. 
11 José Montes Ramos, Los Regulares (Madrid 2003) 35. 
12 José María Gárate Córdoba, ‘Las Tropas de Africa en la Guerra Civil española’, 18. 
13 Ibidem, 20. 
14 Ibidem, 18n13. 
15 Ibidem, 33.  
16 There is a confusing passage in Gárate Córdobaʼs study. He states, while giving the numbers of the 
Moroccan troops passing to the peninsula between 6 and 14 October 1936, that the data did not explicitly put 
the number of native troops and therefore he tried to deduce them by subtracting 35 Europeans from the 
total, ʻin accordance with the proportion that existed in the composition for Tabors of 588 men in total and 
456 natives, that is, 22% of Europeansʼ. Ibidem. Subtracting 35 from 588 does not result in 456. Besides, as 
we have seen, the numbers he gives show, in most cases, less than 10% of Europeans among troops passing 




in Morocco, there was no possibility to provide all the new native units with 20%  European 
troops, at least not during the initial stages of war, and probably most of native units contained 
among their ranks 10% or less European troops.17  
In any case, there was a European component within the native units, which so far, has not 
been explained. Documentation of the Civil War period does not discuss this question. José 
Montes Ramos, however, notices that when the Regulares were created, it was decided, in order to 
provide them with the most possible cohesion, to include a sizable nucleus of European soldiers 
and officers, as the army sought to exploit the ‘warlike aptitudes of both the Spanish and the native 
personnel’,18 which is a repetition of the royal decree of July 1914, that Montes Ramos cites earlier 
in his text. It stipulates that to provide the Regulares troops with the utmost cohesion, they should 
be provided with a nucleus of European personnel that should form 20% of the troops.19 Although 
Montes Ramos does not explain (neither does the royal decree) what the different aptitudes 
between Spanish and Moroccan soldiers were, there is no shortage of commentators to point to 
these differences. These were perceived differences that, in Spanish eyes, led to different tactical 
employment of Moroccan troops, even though both Spanish and Moroccan soldiers followed 
similar training methods and tactical instructions in the use of fire arms.  
Before examining the ‘warlike aptitudes’ of the Moroccans, and what kind of soldier the 
Spanish thought the Moroccans were or were supposed to be, it must be noted that despite the 
military importance the Moroccan soldiers had in the Civil War, most of the Moroccan volunteers 
who fought in Spain had no previous fighting experience. As José Montes Ramos notices, by the 
time the war started, only 2000 of the Regulares were veterans of the colonial wars against Abdel 
Krim.20 As one military report complained in November 1936, the pacification and disarming of 
the Moroccan Protectorate (in the 1920s) had led to the loss of ‘the inclination to use armsʼ in 
some places.21 Most of the interviewees for this study, and the majority of the deserters from 
French Morocco who gave their testimony on their war experiences in Spain, had never touched a 
weapon before enlisting in the Spanish Army,  as they were very young when they joined, even 
though some yearned to have the experience of managing a rifle. One could, however, add to the 
already mentioned 2000 men with combat experience, a number of ex-members of Regulares who 
would have re-enlisted in 1936 after they had left the army following the pacification campaign; 
members of the Mehal-las (and ex-members who would have re-enlisted); as well as former rebels 
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the number of troops in a company but no breakdown of the ethnicity of the soldiers.  
18 Montes Ramos, Los Regulares, 38. 
19 Ibidem, 36. 
20 Ibidem, 46.  




who had experience fighting against the Spaniards. Still, people with prior combat experience 
would have formed a minority among the Moroccan soldiers who went to Spain. Why did the 
Spanish believe the Moroccans would be good soldiers? In what way should they be used? What 
were their strengths and weaknesses? 
The uniqueness of a Moroccan soldier  
Besides the obvious benefit of reducing Spanish casualties in the Spanish Civil War and the 
Moroccan wars before that, which prompted the foundation of the Regulares units in the first 
place, the Spanish believed that Moroccans belonged to a ʻmartial raceʼ. Writing in the Ejército 
(Army) magazine, one Spanish officer, Hermenegildo Tabernero, stated that the Moroccans ‘are 
warriors by nature and possess in the utmost degree the characteristics of the perfect infantry man: 
sober, fast walkers, agile, disciplined, strong, capable in the coup de mains, tenacious in the 
defence and fierce in the attack. Besides, they have an instinct that is to be envied, for making use 
of the terrain which they know to apply perfectly during the advance as well as during retreat’. 
Therefore, he concluded, forces that are constituted by such elements ‘can and should be, naturally 
excellent’.22 Since he wrote this piece two years after the end of the Civil War, the notion of a 
ʻmartial raceʼ had clearly survived the test of the Civil War.  
The idea of a ʻmartial raceʼ had been utilised in the campaign to recruit Moroccans for the 
war effort. Colonel Beigbeder, the Commissioner for Native Affairs and later High Commissioner 
in Morocco, gave a speech in a recruitment meeting directed to a number of tribes in which he 
‘recalled to the minds of his audience that it had long been a tradition of the Moor that it was a 
disgrace for a man to die in bed. There could be no nobler death than to die in battle, in the full 
flush of manhood, for noble ideals’.23 The image of the Moroccans as people born for war and 
enamoured with arms was propagated in the war propaganda in Spain. For example, a memoir 
published in 1937 referred to an injured Moroccan soldier, ‘I have here one Moor, one of those 
who are fighting for Spain. He carries in his belt a machete, a gumía, a Russian rapier, a sabre. 
This does not matter. He carries what he could take from the enemy. But that yes! The rifle has 
much importance. The rifle must be the best that he has seen. He asks for it with true eagerness, 
and when he has it, he caresses it, takes care of it, and sleeps and eats with it and loves it more 
than a woman of his liking’.24 
 The notion of warrior races is one that also dominated military thinking in the British, French and 
Dutch empires, and so it was not a new discovery by the Spanish. The British in India ‘discovered’ 
the martial races to be located mostly in the northern part of the country, in regions like Punjab, 
the North West Frontier, Rajputana and the United Provinces. Soldiers from communities in these 
regions were supposedly both loyal and effective. The martial race discourse inverted negative 
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colonial images of barbaric otherness. One of the purposes of the martial race theory that the 
British first developed was to inspire. By putting a positive and gloss on the men’s cultural 
difference, it encouraged white officers to trust their troops, to respect their qualities, and to get 
more from them. The idea could help sustain the army, for any regiment is likely to work better 
and fight harder if its officers are persuaded that they command near-perfect soldiers.25 The French 
also had their own martial races or races guerrières, with a hierarchy of their own, that put West 
Africans on top as infantrymen, followed by North Africans, of whom the Moroccans were put in 
the lead, followed by Algerians and Tunisians. Indo Chinese, for example, were relegated much 
lower in this hierarchy as infantrymen, though they were deemed better suited for either technical 
or labour duties.26  
For the Spaniards, the notion of Moroccans as natural born warriors was already 
developed in the early twentieth century as a result of the difficult campaigns to establish their 
presence in their protectorate in Morocco. But if the French and the British had large multi-racial 
empires and could afford the luxury of choosing which race to recruit from, the Spanish had a 
small empire that consisted of northern Morocco, the Moroccan region of Ifni, and the Sahara, as 
well as the small territories of Equatorial Guinea. As it happened, it was Morocco that provided 
the pool from which the Spanish recruited their soldiers. The Moroccans were not only the 
ʻwarrior raceʼ to recruit from, they were practically the only colonial ʻraceʼ to choose from. One 
might perhaps have distinguished between the men from Ifni and the Sahara on the one hand and 
the Riffians on the other hand, but that does not seem to have occupied the minds of the Spanish 
commanders or to have played any significant role in their deployment. This does not say, in any 
case, much about how racial perception was a determinant in the way Moroccans were used in 
combat. In this regard, an article that appeared in the Spanish army magazine Ejército is 
illustrative. 
In 1952, José Alonso Mayo, an infantry captain and veteran of the Civil War published in 
Ejército ‘A Psychological Investigation on the Moroccan Soldiers and Those of the Sus’.27 Mayo 
had joined the Regulares as a second lieutenant (Alférez) during the Civil War, and on the first day 
an incident made him determined to study the characteristics and ‘especial customs’ of these 
soldiers. One day during the war food was being distributed to native soldiers of the Regulares in a 
Spanish village. This raised the curiosity of neighbours who came to attend the scene. One of the 
Moroccan soldiers separated from the formation and tried with signs to communicate with some 
potential acquaintances without obeying the order of the Spanish sergeant who told him to get 
back in the formation. Tired of this disobedience the sergeant struck him with his whip. This had 
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the immediate effect on the rest of the soldiers who threw their plates on the ground, breaking the 
formation and causing major confusion. Mayo who had joined the unit merely half an hour prior to 
the incident inquired about the reason for the disturbance; the answer, which came after calmness 
was restored, was that the punishment was just in itself, given how manifest the disobedience was, 
but they could not tolerate that it was administered in the presence of women because that 
constituted a ‘great shame for everyone’.28 It was the first insight Mayo had into the psychology of 
Moroccan troops. 
Several years after this incident, Mayo wrote the article in which he expounded on how 
religious and geographical background influenced the quality of Moroccan soldiers, and how such 
background determined the tactical advantages and disadvantages of the Moroccans, and therefore 
how to employ them in combat. He started with the influence of Islam, which as an expansionist 
faith, had contributed to the creation of a ‘warrior spirit’ that was maintained (even after Islam 
could not expand its frontiers anymore) through internal strife. He saw the participation of the 
Moroccans in both the First and the Second World Wars, as well as the Spanish Civil War as a 
vehicle by which the ‘contained tension’ escaped and by which the ‘eternal fire’ was kept 
burning.29  
Having explained the ‘warrior spirit’ by religious factors, Mayo continued to comment on 
the physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses of the Moroccan as influenced by his 
religion. He explains how polygamy, the ease in which a man can divorce his wife, and the 
exaltation of bodily pleasures led the ‘uncultivated masses’ to resort to submitting to carnal 
instincts in a way that wastes health and morale; therefore, the ‘physical yield is poor, and the 
morale deficient’. But on the positive side, he deals with an aspect of belief that he finds 
advantageous in military terms, that is the Mectub, or the belief that destiny is written, and that a 
man will die ‘whenever he has to die’ and not at any other moment ‘if it is not written’. The writer 
found the consequences of such fatalism socially lamentable since it was a hurdle against progress. 
However, such belief also produced valour, as death would not come ‘even if the enemy wants it’, 
and that it would not be wise to think of ‘what will happen tomorrow because it will be as it is 
written’.30 
Moving from religion to the environment and its influence, Mayo continues his argument 
through his observation of the difficult life Moroccans in the Spanish Protectorate led in poor 
terrain that was either dry or mountainous. Coupled with their fatalism and resistance to foreign 
ways, and the lack of a feudal regime, they were both ‘simple’ and ‘little hard working’. Living in 
a harsh environment and with little to do meant that the Moroccans of the Spanish protectorate 
were bestowed with the virtue of ‘patience’. But perhaps the most important factor Mayo mentions 
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was the role of feet as a ‘principal vehicle’. He observed that for most of the simple people the 
usual mode of transport was ‘feet’, since every family had only one donkey and mounting it was a 
privilege given to the more elderly members. Given the monotony of life, and the need to acquire 
provisions from the weekly tribal markets, members of the tribes were constantly on the move, 
making them good walkers and resistant to heat and fatigue. This last point contradicted the earlier 
remark Mayo makes about Moroccans having a poor physical yield, a contradiction that he fails to 
explain explicitly. Mayo observed yet a further advantage of Moroccans being good walkers. As 
these trips took place during day and night, Moroccans developed good eyesight and a good sense 
of orientation.31 The article concluded that the Moroccan had a number of factors; the most 
important were as follows:  
A-positive factors: a warrior spirit – valour – sobriety – astuteness – patience – being good 
walkers – resistance to heat – resistance to fatigue (limited), good eyesight (during day and night) 
and a good sense of orientation (also during day and night). 
 
B-negative factors: poor physical yield (long term)32 – deficient morale (in specific 
situations and aspects) – being easily insubordinate – little hardworking.  
 
C- factors that could be both positive or negative: bloodthirsty instincts and monetary 
appetite.   
 
Mayo finally recommended the best way to tactically employ the Moroccan troops, and noted that 
the Moroccan infantrymen were suitable for: coup de main operations, go-between missions, 
ambushes, pursuit of the enemy, mountain operations in temperate weather, cleaning operations, 
and defences. As cavalrymen, they were suitable for reconnaissance, pursuits, and charges. The 
operations for which he considered the Moroccans little suitable as infantrymen were attacking 
strongly organised positions, breaking the frontline, garrison duties in the rearguard, and guarding 
prisoners,33 though these last two points are not properly explained. As cavalrymen he found that 
the Moroccans were little suited for duties other than those already mentioned.34 
In a way, Mayo’s words explain why part of the troops of the Regulares and Tiradores 
units were formed by Spanish soldiers. The Spanish soldier, if his logic is followed, would close 
the gap where the skills and psychological aptitudes of the Moroccan soldier were wanting. 
Mayo’s analysis of how the religion and environment of the Moroccans influenced their value as 
                                                 
31 Ibidem, 34. 
32 It is by adding (long term) to the ‘poor physical yield’ attribute, and (limited) to the ‘resistance to fatigue’ 
one that Alonso Mayo perhaps is trying to reconcile the contradiction referred to above.  
33 The unsuitability for garrison duty in the rearguard is not explained. Perhaps the whipping incident is 
meant to illustrate how it is not suitable to place the Moroccans among civilians. 




soldiers may have been written in 1952, but must have been reinforced by his experiences of the 
Spanish Civil War. In many ways it reflects opinions of Spanish witnesses of the war, many of 
whose testimonies and points are repeated by Mayo. It is apparent that an ideal tactical 
employment of the Moroccan, as imagined by Mayo was often applied in combat in Spain. As the 
role of the cavalry was of diminishing importance in the war, and as their numbers were naturally 
far inferior to those of the infantry, the focus will be on the infantrymen.  
Mariano Fernández Aceytuno, in his study published in 2001 on Ifni and the Sahara, 
agrees with many of Mayo’s points. While Mayo spoke about Moroccans in general, Aceytuno 
makes a number of specific points with regard to the inhabitants of Ifni and the Sahara that relates 
their environment to their combative capabilities. For example, he distinguishes between the Ba 
Amrani people from Ifni and the Saharaouis. He concludes that since the Ba Amrani’s are more 
sedentary, they are suitable for defence as they will ‘stick to the ground and defend it with nail and 
teeth’, while the more nomadic Saharaouis are suitable for attack, since they supposedly lack a 
sense of property ownership, and therefore are more prepared to act in open space and undertake 
operations of an offensive character.35 Because of the harsh conditions in the Sahara, the nomads 
have learned to be astute hunters and trackers, and have developed good hearing capabilities, an 
excellent sense of orientation, and patience in the face of hunger.36 
General Varela had already, years before, confirmed some of these stereotypes of the 
Moroccan soldier. Talking to the Telegrema del Rif in July 1939, he stated that the Moroccan was 
‘[m]agnificent as an infantry soldier. He is the man of war in all notions for his special 
characteristic and audacity which allows him to attack with surprise. He is the warrior par 
excellence, enduring and fierce. He bears the pain like the best soldier in the world. He is more 
suitable for the offensive [Italics added]’.37 In a nutshell, General Varela, who spent many years 
leading Moroccan troops in Morocco and Spain, described what he thought were the advantageous 
characteristics of the Moroccan as a soldier, and how and in what role he should be employed: an 
infantry man, during attack and preferably conducting a surprise operation.   
Lower rank officers and soldiers also confirm ideal ways to employ Moroccans as stated 
by Mayo. An officer of the Spanish Foreign Legion, Francisco Cavero y Cavero, wrote in 1938 
about operations in the Aragonese front, and how the Republicans were present at a rising called 
Pueyos de Larrés, while they threatened the town of Sabiñánigo in Aragon.  One of the 
commanders looking at what the Nationalists were up against, remarked how tiring it would be to 
climb the rising only as a tourist (let alone climbing it while fighting). That is why, noted Cavero, 
it was the right decision to send ahead the Moroccans of the Mehal-la, for the Moroccans climbed 
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it, each on his own, while hiding ʻthe way they know itʼ, and hunting the unaware Republicans, 
before handing the top over to the Legion.38 He had already expressed his admiration for the 
Moroccans who, before an attack, ‘crept towards their starting point, as only the Moors know how 
to creep’.39 Foreign opponents of the Moroccan troops noted also their good use of the terrain. The 
British volunteers of the International Brigades, during the battle of Jarama, noted that the 
Moroccans were experts at finding cover in open ground and within seconds their entire skirmish 
line would disappear.40 A South African volunteer of the British Battalion considered the 
Moroccan’s ability to ‘exploit the slightest fold in the ground... amazingly skilful. Bobbing up and 
down, running and disappearing again’, they advanced while all the time maintaining accurate fire, 
a feat made more impressive as they ‘had to travel more than two thousand yards... with no 
apparent cover’.41 
As for the supposed night vision capabilities of the Moroccans, a Spanish veteran of the 
war wrote, thirty years after the war, how it was a relief to have Moroccans assist in guarding 
duties in Melilla at the start of the war, for ‘it provided confidence and security to have them at our 
side to do the guarding [duties], for they did not even blink, and in the night, as I understood, they 
have eyes like those of cats, that is to say that their visual system enlarges and they see things in 
plain darkness. Besides they have the hearing of a lynx: they detect every sound’. Much later, on 
the battlefield in the Peninsula itself, these perceptions were confirmed. The shrieks and incessant 
shooting of the advance guard of the Moroccans ‘struck awe, in a big way, at the soldiers in the 
trenches of the reds, who were always wary of having so close the Moroccans who were so agile 
and accurate in managing the rifle in addition to their sharpness and night vision like grand 
felines’.42 Such perceptions of Moroccans having extraordinary night time capabilities extended to 
some officers who led those soldiers. One Lieutenant Pahisa of the Regulares, described his 
soldiers as the ‘Moroccans proved themselves especially in the night. During the day [they 
constitute] nothing, but in the night protected by darkness the Moroccan was fearsome’.43 
Interestingly, one Moroccan veteran agrees with the advantage the Moroccans had at night. ‘Those 
communists were very strong, but they did not take into account the Moroccans and their fighting, 
because we the Muslims attack at night’.44  
Coup de main attacks 
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 In light of such stereotypes, and the perceived superiority of the Moroccan in matters of surprise 
and in dark environments, it is not surprising that quite often they were used to conduct so-called 
coup de main operations. Some of these operations are shrouded in a myth of extraordinary 
capabilities and cruelty. A member of the British battalion tells a harrowing story about one 
nightly deadly incident involving Moroccans, during the battle for the Ciudad Universitaria in 
Madrid. 
 
It was out in University City…we were holding a very rough line… when one of our 
French comrades was separated from us in an advanced position. It was… quiet… and he 
slept like the rest of us, except for those on guard. In the night Moors crept forward, found 
him… and … gouged out his eyes as he lay there helpless. We heard his screams…[but by 
the time] we found him they had killed him and fled.45 
 
 There are two famous examples concerning the heavily contested battle at the Jarama River (to 
the south of Madrid) that was fought in early 1937 as part of the effort to encircle Madrid. One 
example concerns a British company which supposedly allowed itself to be captured by a group of 
Moroccans who gained access to the British trench by simply singing the Internationale,46 which 
of course had nothing to do with savagery, but it might have been a reflection of the belief in the 
deviousness of the Moroccans. It is more probable that the affair was caused by lax security 
measures and good faith on the part of the British.47 The other, more dramatic, example concerns a 
Tabor of Moroccans who on 11 February 1937 ‘silently worked their way in the dark’ to the 
Pindoque railway bridge, where they, as Hugh Thomas puts it, knifed the sentries of the pro-
Republican French André Marty Battalion ‘one by one’. This might have happened the way it is 
described by Thomas and such daring achievements are not lacking in military history.48 Although 
it takes an extreme amount of amateurism on the part of the French sentries to let a complete 
battalion – or even part of it –  approach them to a knifing distance, and dispatch them one by one 
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without raising alarm.49 More probably, one or two guards, fast asleep were dispatched by the use 
of knives and the rest were killed by hand grenades.  
But the treacherous knife-wielding Moroccan who kills everyone with cold steel rather 
than rely on the safety of the hand grenade or the rifle suits a more exotic and macabre image, 
which is more what Spanish and Western audiences expected and tends to disregard the negligence 
of the victims.50 The Nationalist propagandist, Víctor Ruiz Albéniz described one such coup de 
main on the Jarama in a way that (certainly unintentionally) demystified the fiendish image. He 
related on 14 February 1937 that every day at nightfall, a ‘red guard’ was raining ‘the most 
obscene’ insults on the Nationalists. Five ‘Moors planned to give them their deserved 
punishment’, and at night jumped the walls where they had observed the enemy only to find the 
Republicans asleep. The result was capturing a number of prisoners, and killing another number 
while the rest fled leaving behind two machine guns and nine rifles, for which the five were 
rewarded with a thousand pesetas.51 Daring indeed was the raid but the results were hardly 
surprising given the gross negligence of the Republicans. 
Peter Kemp, a volunteer for the Spanish Foreign Legion also noted the use of the 
Moroccan soldiers for daring operations. In his memoirs, published in 1957, he remembered that 
‘a half-platoon of Regulares occupied two rooms of a ruined house next to ours; they had nothing 
to do with the defence of the position, but were there for sniping, reconnaissance and an occasional 
coup de main raid’.52 From the statements of a Nationalist deserter from a Tabor of the Regulares 
who defected to the Republicans in January 1939, it is clear that although the percentage of  
Moroccans in his Tabor of 550 men was only 50% (which possibly indicates problems in finding 
enough Moroccan recruits), a group of 40, specialising in coup de main operations was formed, 
                                                 
49 Peter Kemp a British volunteer in the Spanish Legion, refers to an inspection he made of the corpses of a 
company of Frenchmen that was destroyed by Regulares while [i.e. the Frenchmen] trying to cross a bridge 
(he does not name the bridge) on the Jarama. Although he does not specify the day of his inspection nor that 
of the destruction of the company, it clearly, given the context, takes place somewhere around 11 February 
1937. It is not simple, though, to tell whether he refers to the same stealthy attack on 11 February (since he 
was not present at the engagement), or whether they are two different incidents despite the great similarities 
- Republican French volunteers destroyed by Moroccan Regulares on a bridge on the Jarama in February. 
But if it were the same incident then the state of the corpses bearing only traces of knifing work should have 
attracted Kemp’s curiosity, which is not the case. Peter Kemp, Mine were of trouble (London 1957) 71-72. 
50 In his ‘Una trompeta lejana. Las Brigadas Internacionales en la Guerra de España: Una reconsideración 
sesenta años después’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie V, H. Contemporánea, nr. 12 (1999) 225-238, 
Michael Alpert contends that despite the undeniable valor and self-sacrifice that the International Brigade 
volunteers demonstrated, their efficiency and the military expertise of their leaders is questionable, and is by 
far outweighed by the moral effect their presence had in the Republican army.  
51 Víctor Ruiz Albéniz, Las cronicas del Tebib Arrumi, Vol.II : Las campañas del Jarama y el Tajuña 
(Valladolid 1938) 53-54. 
52 Peter Kemp, Mine Were of Trouble, 59. He apparently liked this Moroccans who were ‘were happy, 
giggly little men - some of them fairer in complexion than myself, and one of them red-haired. They soon 




‘exclusively from Moroccans’ under the command of a Spanish lieutenant, and it seemed that they 
were going to ‘act very often’.53 
There is an anecdote, recounted by a Moroccan veteran that shows how a similar operation 
was conducted. Al Filali of the Regulares Larache recalled in 2011 one such coup de main, 
somewhere in Catalonia. One day the captain commanding his company called for four volunteers 
to plant a flag on a hill where ‘the reds were entrenched’. He and three others started their climb 
on 10.30 in the morning, ‘we went crawling on our hands and feet up there, through a forest’. They 
reached the positions of the Republicans and waited until dark, when they saw that the single 
posted guard was sleeping. A comrade of Al Filali named Al Hussein, was carrying a ‘machete’ 
with him; he asked Al Filali to keep an eye on the guard and to shoot him if he stirred, while he 
crawled towards the guard, then slit his throat. They dealt with the rest of the enemy using hand 
grenades as they were carrying six bombs each. As some Republicans were killed and others fled, 
the Tabor advanced and took to the hill. For this operation Al Filali and the others were promoted 
to the rank of corporal.54 A similar incident was told, in 1996, by another veteran who described a 
difficult enemy position that the Tabor could not take. When the night fell, volunteers were asked 
to lead an assault and ‘we attacked only with grenades, and then the Tabor would follow us in the 
attack’.55  
One rescue operation, however, does seem to belong, as Mesa puts it, to the realm of 
motion pictures. At the Catalonian Collell monastery, a group of Nationalist aviators and an even 
greater number of pro-Nationalist women were imprisoned by the Republicans; there were fears 
that before retreating, the guards would execute the inmates. To prevent that, the Mehal-la of 
Tetuan was tasked with conducting a raid on the monastery. The plan, suggested by a Moroccan 
officer was to reach the monastery, passing as Republicans, then knock on the door and take 
advantage of the confusion to liberate the prisoners. The approach took place at night, in trucks 
and on foot, when a Spanish officer in the company of a couple of Moroccans knocked on the 
door. When a trusting Republican guard realised who they were after opening the door, he was 
killed with a knife. The units of the Mehal-la poured in and all the resisting defenders were killed. 
More than 260 female prisoners were freed (the aviators had already been evacuated).56 One 
Moroccan interviewee, also a member of the Mehal-la of Tetuan, relates this incident in 1996, 
though with some different details. 160 women according to him were freed, along with a 
‘German alférez [lieutenant]’, possibly a pilot. Although it would seem remarkable that this 
German pilot would be left behind after the other airmen were, according to the account Mesa 
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quotes, evacuated.57 Despite these examples which might point to a preference by Spanish 
Nationalist commanders to use Moroccans in night operations and stealthy raids given their 
supposed capabilities, one must not forget that such operations would not have been uniformly 
successful, nor that the Moroccans were the only ones who conducted such operations. One must 
not forget either that the Moroccan troops in their majority, and most of the time, were deployed in 
traditional military attacking (and also defensive) roles, even if they were deemed exceptionally 
efficient at adapting to the terrain or to nocturnal situations. 
Moors versus tanks 
In addition to night operations and surprise raids, Moroccan soldiers were also particularly 
connected with a special anti-armour tactic that was first used during the Spanish Civil War, i.e. 
the use of incendiary bottles against tanks, or what is commonly referred to as the ‘Molotov-
cocktail’.58 There are many instances that were witnessed where bottles were used to destroy or 
disable Soviet tanks, which were superior in both armour and weaponry to Nationalist (mainly 
German and Italian) tanks, and an increase in the role of the Moroccans in such attacks. Albert 
Bartels, a German observer of the war, noted that ‘many Russian tanks fall in our hands. Many 
were destroyed by our Pak-guns or taken by the petrol bottles of the Moroccans’.59 Colonel Von 
Thoma, chief of German armoured operations in Spain, remembered, after World War II, how he 
had offered 500 pesetas to anyone who would capture a T-26 (the daily pay in the Nationalist 
army was three pesetas at the start of the war). ‘The Moors’, Thoma continued, ‘bagged’ a lot of 
those tanks,60 an accomplishment that these infantrymen achieved, presumably, using mainly the 
bottles. By the end of the war, 30-60 Russian tanks had been captured and organised in at least two 
tank companies in the Nationalist army.61 In addition to monetary reward, it seems that such daring 
tactics also entailed promotions for those who volunteered and succeeded in disabling tanks.62 The 
Russian commanders and observers also pointed to Russian tanks being sneaked upon and 
destroyed by Moroccans during nightfall.63 
As it was not, however, an easy endeavour for individual soldiers to burn a tank, the 
process had to take place from an extremely close range and, not rarely, meant the death of the 
attacker, especially in an open field. It is not surprising that some of those who attempted to do it 
were rewarded with the prestigious Medalla Militar. The earliest date for which an action 
                                                 
57 After the liberation, this veteran continues, the troops sat and drank tea. Testimony of Hamido Al 
Ma’dani, Tetuan, 30 September 1996, El Merroun archive 
58 The term ‘Molotov Cocktail’ was only coined by the Finns who used petrol bottles against Soviet armour 
during the Winter War (1939-1940). 
59 Bartels, unpublished memoirs, 128, 143. 
60 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill. Germany’s Generals, their Rise and Fall, with their Own 
Account of Military Events 1939-1945 (London 1951) 123.  
61 Kowalsky, La Unión Soviética y la Guerra Civl española. Una revisión crítica (Barcelona 2003) 219. 
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involving burning a tank by an infantryman was awarded the prestigious Medalla Militar, is 4 
November 1936 on which a Moroccan, Sid Mohamed Ben Larbi Al Fasi, from the Regulares of 
Tetuan group burned a tank, killing its crew. Other Moroccan examples followed and were 
awarded the same medal.64 Although Spanish Nationalist soldiers also adopted the tactic (as did 
Republicans), and some were awarded the Medalla Militar for their bravery in attacking enemy 
tanks using this dangerous method, the Moroccans were disproportionately represented among the 
recipients of this medal for attacking tanks, and the image of the Moroccan as the main protagonist 
of the bottle tactic prevails. 
Were Moroccans perceived as better suited to this type of tactic? Or was the initiative 
taken by Moroccan soldiers in return for monetary reward or promotion responsible for this state 
of affairs? In one case, a Moroccan deserter claimed that anti-tank guns were not available in the 
Regulares battalions, but only in European ones, or with the artillery units, and therefore 
Moroccans could only use bottles of petrol and hand grenades.65 That claim does not mean that 
Moroccan troops were always left to their own devices. Perhaps the perceived stealthy capabilities 
of the Moroccan soldiers, as well as their supposed extraordinary adaptability to the terrain and 
their skilful use of it, was combined with the eagerness for rewards, to establish the higher profile 
as tank destroying infantrymen, compared to Spanish infantrymen. But even then, those who 
would take such a tremendous risk would have been a minority among the Moroccan soldiers. 
Almost none of the Moroccan soldiers interviewed (whether deserters interviewed by French 
interrogators, or veterans interviewed by historians) admitted to have themselves destroyed tanks 
or even used bottles to attack tanks. One veteran confessed that although he was issued with a 
petrol anti-tank device for the eventuality of repulsing a tank attack, he threw it away rather than 
keep the bottle and use it as intended, because he did not deem the risk worth it.66 In that respect, 
the majority of the Moroccan soldiers were probably rather comparable to the majority of Spanish 
soldiers.  
The difference between Spanish and Moroccan soldiers 
It has become clear how the background of the Moroccans was used to justify in the way the 
Spanish army should employ them, but it would be interesting to come across texts comparing the 
Spanish soldier with the Moroccan soldier in terms of martial qualities. Obviously, areas where 
Moroccan soldiers had an advantage have been discussed above. But how does the Moroccan 
soldier stand vis-à-vis the Spanish one? Two opinions here compare the Moroccan soldiers with 
those of the Spanish Legion or the Tercio as it was also known, that was seen to be among the 
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strongest units in the Spanish army. The first opinion is that of a Nationalist propagandist and war 
commentator Manuel Gomez Domingo who wrote in 1937: 
 
The Tercio is something, the Regulares something else. We need a clarification so that we 
would not fall behind the common planes of logic. The Tercio is a force of shock the value 
of which must be measured by the same heterogeneity of the elements that compose it. A 
rocket of released rage, an impetus of an erupting thing that resounds without limits nor 
concrete zones, like the sonorous thunder of the sea. In the Regulares the potentiality and 
efficacy that live in its weapons is rooted in the same antipode of the Legion: it is born in 
the homogeneity of the whole, in the similarity of one psychology, in the peculiarities of a 
race that is born, lives and dies for war. In the “tabor” the West utilises as natural 
elements, [or] let us say as raw material, the untamed nerve, the unsettled anxiousness, the 
restlessness and the covetousness that is native to the Riffian man so as to project them 
towards a warlike improvement. 
 
Hence, the native, after submitting to the modern way of soldiery, multiplies his natural efficacy 
and bravery: ‘And thus comes the high contribution during the campaign achieved by those 
melancholy, strong, enduring men’ of the Tabors of Regulares ‘which are commanded by officers 
who are carefully selected’.67 Vague words and expressions, though perhaps, for their 
propagandistic nature, they were meant to be moving rather than a sound military analysis, but it is 
telling how his words reduce the Rif Moroccans to a group possessing one homogenous 
psychology that lives and dies for war.  
Lieutenant Pahisa, who led Regulares troops, has a somewhat easier way of comparing the 
Moroccans with the soldiers of the Legion: ‘As a combatant, the difference between the Moroccan 
and the Legionnaire was absolute. The Moroccan, I told you already that his advantage lay in 
surprise. Attacking head-on was not his strong point. The Legionnaire, on the contrary, confronted 
the enemy courageously, with gallantry and guts. He went to kill, prepared to die. He knew that he 
belonged to a corps of shock of legendary fame, and that he could not cheat his comrades nor the 
enemy who was in front of him. The green shirt weighs a lot’.68 This is an interesting choice of 
words from someone who commanded Moroccan Regulares, though certainly there are other 
Spanish officers with Moroccan experience who would not agree with Pahisa’s suggestion that the 
Moroccans lacked the courage to attack head-on. The disproportionately high casualty rates among 
Moroccan troops should make one disagree with Pahisa’s suggestion. But his words suggest that 
he would have used the Moroccan troops in the roles and ways he thought they were suitable for.  
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It has by now become obvious that Moroccan soldiers almost exclusively served as 
infantrymen and to a lesser extent (numerically) as cavalrymen. They were trained to use rifles and 
hand grenades. Many of them operated machineguns with excellence and mortars. But they did not 
serve any medium or heavy artillery pieces, neither did they serve as tank crews,69 even as drivers 
of vehicles of their own units, and certainly they did not pilot airplanes, with one honorary 
exception.70 Administrative tasks were apparently also not deemed suitable for Moroccans. The 
chief of the Ceuta Regulares Group suggested, in October 1938, to the General Staff the creation 
of the non-commissioned rank of Brigada (which existed in other units of the Spanish army) in the 
Regulares in order to assist the company captains.71 Given the administrative and tactical 
assignments of this rank, and the fact that the administrative tasks could consume significant time 
and effort, the chief of the Regulares suggested the creation of two Brigadas for each company, 
one administrative occupied by a Spaniard. The other, tactical in his functions would be a Brigada 
Indígena, whose functions would require little technical instruction; the natives would fulfil this 
role competently as it is closer to the ‘temperament and the warrior spirit of the native soldier’.72 
There is one aspect of the otherness and difference of the Moroccan that could be used for military 
purposes which was not touched upon explicitly by the theorists and commanders who advised on 
the use of the Moroccans, and that is using the Moroccans as a psychological weapon. 
The Moroccan as a psychological weapon 
It has already become clear how some in the Spanish military attributed to the Moroccans human 
physical capabilities that were far beyond average. But the Nationalist propaganda could go a step 
further in depicting the Moroccans, as well as their fellow African based Legionnaires, as 
invincible. The Nationalist propagandist, Ruiz Albéniz, known since the time he served as 
physician in Morocco as El Tebib Arrumi (the Christian Doctor), treated his readers to a tale of 
immunity to sickness that distinguished the Moroccans of the Regulares and the Mehal-las as well 
as members of the Spanish Legion. His story takes place while the Nationalist troops arrive at the 
University City on the outskirts of the Spanish capital, which must be in November 1936: One 
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Bandera of the Legion and one Moroccan Tabor billeted in the Alfonso XIII National Institute of 
Hygiene. The Legionnaires and the ‘jametes’,73 given the lack of variety and tastiness of their 
‘menu’, rummaged around in that building and found rabbits, guinea pigs, chicken, kittens, all of 
which were used to prepare new dishes for the troops. All that food did not, according to Ruiz 
Albéniz, produce a single casualty even though:  
 
those rabbits were inoculated with typhus, the guinea pigs with the plague, the chicken 
with cholera and the cats with we do not know what other devilish pathogenic germ of 
those established as the most deadly for the human species. They ate them so deliciously, 
and till the next one! Bacilli for the Legion? Vibrions for the Regulares? Come on, come 
on, formalities, gentlemen, formalities! We are dealing with “men”, real men, whom not 
even a thunderbolt could break.74 
 
The ‘Christian Doctor’ must have had the intention of reassuring his readers, in the context of the 
extreme difficulties that accompanied the attempts to penetrate Madrid, that the troops trying to 
occupy the capital are not only alright, but are humanly superior to anything the enemy could put 
in the field, even though the event he described might not have ended as well as he put it.75 Ruiz 
Albéniz’s story was only one manifestation of reassuring Nationalist followers at the home front, 
that wherever the Africans are everything would be fine.76 For the Nationalist defenders of the 
besieged city of Oviedo, it was the sight of the Moroccans, in October 1936, that brought relief to 
the surrounded defenders, with cries of ‘moros en la cuesta’ (Moors on the hills), an ironic 
reminiscence of the Spanish famous danger alert ‘moros en la costa’.77 As one of the city 
defenders put it ‘they [Regulares] were distinguished by their headgear. If it were other soldiers 
you would not know to which camp they belonged because they all wore the same, we knew that 
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Franco had finally sent two Tabors of Regulares to liberate Oviedo’.78 But the psychological edge 
that the African troops, especially the Moroccans, provided was not mainly to reassure the 
Nationalist power base and its allies, but more importantly to instil fear in the Republican enemy 
in ways that included the impression that the Moroccan soldiers were somewhat beyond human. 
One day in the fall of 1936, when the Nationalists had not yet approached Madrid, the 
Pravda correspondent, Mikhail Koltsov, who had feared leaving Spain before ever setting eyes on 
the mythical ‘Moors’ managed to finally meet two injured Moroccan soldiers. Talking to them he 
found their smile ‘confident’ and their tales ‘simple and honest’. ‘How could these men’, he 
wondered, ‘even if completely healthy and armed, inspire such an amount of fear?’79 He was 
referring to the many occasions, early in the war, in which the appearance of Moroccan troops or 
the mere mention of their presence sent waves of panic through the ranks of Republican militia 
and even among regular army units. In some cases this resulted either in flight or refusal to fight 
and abandon cities, a recurrent phenomenon in, among other regions, Andalusia.80 Over some 
villages, Nationalist planes threw leaflets warning the population to surrender or the ‘Moors’ 
would be sent in, which would result in men fleeing to the mountains and the ‘Moors’ occupying 
the village anyway.81 Even in villages where people had never met any ‘Moors’ and where the 
‘Moors’ were not anywhere near, panic spread. The British writer and poet, Gamel Woolsey, who 
was residing in a village near Málaga, described how one day she woke up to find old and young 
women in her kitchen who were ‘all in terror of the Moors, and afraid to stay in their own houses’. 
‘They will come and cut off our heads’, they said to her and asked whether they could come to 
seek refuge in her house, as an English woman, at the ‘fatal hour’. 82 In other towns and villages in 
Asturias people had experienced the Army of Africa in 1934 during the workers’ rebellion (or 
were very close to where it happened and therefore witnessed it). The image of the ‘Moor’, 
inherited from the Middle Ages, that was one of magic, myth, and distrust, was widespread. The 
1934 events, as well as the Civil War, later added to that image a level of cruelty and ferocity that 
instilled in many Asturians a disdain mixed with fear towards the Moroccans.83 
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The Republic, to avoid the discouragement of its supporters, hid the news of the arrival of 
the colonial forces for a few days.84 According to a Nationalist intelligence report, citing officers 
who deserted to the Nationalist line, there was a ‘curious incident of panic’ that took place in 
Madrid on the 27th of October. Some bulls, on the way to the slaughterhouse escaped, which led to 
cries of ‘que vienen los toros!’[the bulls are coming!]. Some militiamen thought hearing ‘que 
vienen los moros!’ [the Moors are coming!], threw their arms and entered one of the entrances of 
the metro.85 In fact, the reputation of Moroccans was so terrifying that during the Battle of Brunete 
in the summer of 1937, Galician fighters on the Nationalist side were ordered to dress like Moors 
to scare their Republican enemy.86 Members of the British battalion in Spain were already aware 
of the fearsome reputation of the Moroccans, and they feared and loathed them, even though only 
a handful had met  Moroccans before the battle of the Jarama. ‘The worst blokes we ever came 
across were the Moors’, remembers one of the British veterans. ‘God they were vicious… They’d 
put the fear of God into you. They were death or glory blokes [who] thought they’d be going to 
heaven as soon as they were shot’.87 Another British veteran stated ‘[They] didn’t sit around doing 
nothing. If they’re in the line, they’re in the line and they’re always looking to kill someone’.88 
Even as late as 1938 the idea of the presence of the Moroccans made even non-Spanish 
volunteers nervous. Captain Piet Laros, a Dutch member of the International Brigades described 
that during the retreat of his Dutch company to Gandesa in 1938, they ‘marched with the cover of 
the left and right flank, and behind every tree they saw a Moroccan soldier. You had to take that 
out of their heads “there can’t be any Moroccan here”, that was a nervous situation’.89 But it was in 
the summer and autumn of 1936 where the fear reached a peak; a period in which the advance of 
the Nationalist troops some have called avance a gritos (advancing by shouting) in reference to the 
shrieks of the Moroccans that announced their presence, and prompted some Republican leaders to 
reprimand their troops and assure them that the Moors were ‘men like you’.90 ‘Men like you’ is an 
interesting comment. Does it imply that some among the supporters of the Republic did not think 
of their Moroccan adversaries as regular human beings? That is what many Moroccan veterans 
actually express during interviews. ‘The other people [the Republicans] thought we were devils 
who had horns and ate people. Among them someone would cry “Moros, Moros” and then panic 
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would spread. The Germans, the French, the Italians, the Poles, the Belgians, the Hungarians, the 
Czech, the Swiss, the English, the Scandinavians, everybody runs’.91 
That the Republican combatants, let alone their international allies, thought of the 
Moroccans, even for a short while, as devils with horns can of course be excluded. Although it is 
not quite impossible to imagine that people in some remote mountainous villages who rarely ever 
saw a foreigner in their lifetime let alone a ‘Moor’, would let centuries old myths influence their 
preconceived ideas of the Moors, and so ‘[t]he Spaniards were surprised because they heard that 
the Moroccans had horns, while we do not have horns’.92 But even more than ‘horns’ was the 
conception that the ‘Moor’ was, in terms of skin colour, quite black. In many places ‘people would 
approach us to see that our white colour was not artificial’.93 A remark echoed in the La Comuna 
valley in Aragon, where horror stories were spread with regard to the behaviour of the army that 
came from Spanish Morocco. A few decades after the war, people from the region, trying to 
explain the use of the Moroccan soldiers, stated that ‘Franco had promised them that when they 
die, they will return to earth as whites, and they were used everywhere in the first lines. The black 
hired killers were half savages, and they plundered and arsoned out of pure desire to destroy. 
[Italics added]’.94 It is interesting to notice that these people in La Comuna believed that the 
Moroccans themselves thought that they would return to earth after death (and as whites), whereas 
one Moroccan veteran believes that it was the Spanish who ‘thought “moro tiene cuernos”,95 that if 
he died in Spain he would come back to life in his country. They [the Spanish] said so’.96 
 The fear or shock that some Republican units felt when confronting Moroccans on the 
battlefield could possibly and partly be related to the unnerving shrieks the Moroccans let out 
while attacking; shrieks that might have sounded both novel and unearthly to the ears of the 
inexperienced Republicans. One Nationalist lieutenant speaks, in the course of fighting in 1936 
and early 1937, of these ‘howls’ in such a way as to give the impression that they actually 
mattered during the battle as the ‘air fills with savage howls, that at times freeze the blood and at 
others inflame us. They are my Moors who, while running towards the enemy cry, shoot and 
howl…’. Interestingly he describes on another occasion the Moroccan soldiers howling ‘as 
demons’, while observing at yet another engagement that the ‘continuous howling of the Regulares 
must terrorise them [the Republicans], because soon it can be observed how fire is decreasing on 
their part’.97 But this howling was not always effective, though it left its impression on the foreign 
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volunteers of the Republic who also thought those cries were used to scare the Republicans. As 
one British paper cited a British doctor at the Jarama in early 1937, ‘at night he Moors steal down 
the hillside and crawl towards our lines. Then, when they are quite near, they jump up, and 
uttering fiendish cries to frighten our men, rush forward. But our lads are not frightened, and in 
many cases those wild cries of the Moors have been their last’.98 A Nationalist officer wrote about 
an operation in La Caseta, on the Aragon front, where a surprise attack was conducted against 
Republican positions and ended with the Republicans retreating. He noted that despite the 
disappearance of the surprise element ‘the shrieks of the Moors while they jumped to the assault 
with hand grenades’ shattered the enemy’s morale.99 
Less than the perception that the Moors were too black for Spanish taste or that they had 
head outgrowths which would render them less human, or the blood freezing howls, it was indeed 
the horror stories about the barbarities supposedly committed by Moroccans which precipitated the 
panic-stricken reaction of many Republican troops when encountering the Moroccans. Many acts 
of horrifying brutality involving mutilation, mass murder, executions and rape were ascribed to 
them. The marching of the Army of Africa through Andalusia and Extremadura, and the massacres 
that accompanied them and especially the massacre in Badajoz in August 1936, had led the 
Republicans’ imaginations run wild about the Moors who usually figured as the main actors in 
these stories. These horror stories were partly true, partly imaginary, and partly deliberate 
fabrications. But an important role in the creation of this reputation was the alien and ‘exotic’ 
nature of these troops, which combined with the traditional Spanish image of the medieval 
menacing Moorish enemy, and which let the fantasy fill the gap when facts were wanting. The 
Moroccan image of savagery apparently became a criterion, adopted by even some of the 
Nationalists, and against which brutality was to be measured, even when the Civil War was over. 
A propaganda pamphlet at the end of 1941, directed by the Red Army towards Spanish volunteers 
of the Blue Division fighting on the Eastern Front, contains a letter by a prisoner of war, in which 
he laments how he was deceived by the propaganda of the Falangists that claimed that the ‘red 
soldiers are worse than the Moors’.100 However, a Nationalist army chaplain observed, roughly 
twenty years after the war, that it was the ‘reds, with their horrifying propaganda’ about the 
savagery of the Moroccans who were responsible for making their people jump at the sound of ‘los 
moros!’.101 
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An example of stories of atrocity which turned out to be false is given by the British 
volunteer in the Spanish Legion, Peter Kemp. During the battle of Jarama in 1937, a French 
company of the International Brigades was destroyed, upon crossing a bridge over the Jarama, by 
Moorish troops. Reports circulated about French corpses castrated by the Moors. Kemp and a 
German press photographer examined the bodies of the French. Although stripped of their outer 
garments, the corpses, left in their underclothes, bore no traces of mutilation.102 It seems that even 
the massacre of Badajoz could be blamed on others rather than the Moroccans. In 2004, Sanchez 
Ruano made headlines in the Spanish press when he presented new information on the massacre. 
In his study, based on oral resources, he presents the massacre of civilians and prisoners of war as 
being the work of the local Guardia Civil rather than the Moroccan/Legionnaire troops.103 That, 
however, does not prevent Ruano from accusing the Moroccan troops of criminal behaviour. He 
presents a great deal of interesting material (archival and oral) and his conclusions with regard to 
excesses and particularly rape charges levelled at the Moroccan troops are remarkable. All his 
Moroccan interviewees without exception denied committing any excesses like mutilations of 
bodies of the enemy or committing rape,104 even though Ruano dismisses these denials. He 
ascribes excesses like the mutilation of dead bodies to tribal belligerent traditions.105 His 
judgement and explanation on the matter is that ‘they [the Moroccan soldiers] were always in the 
vanguard and their lives were worth nothing, and so they hardly valued the lives of others, who 
were neither compatriots nor Muslims’. Their victims were the enemy, from ‘the country of the 
reds’.106 
For Maria Rosa de Madariaga, also pro-Republican like Ruano, the occurrences of 
atrocities, pillage, mutilation, and rape are not only an accepted fact, but constituted the standard 
practice of the colonial forces, both Moroccan and Legionnaire, in Morocco. Such practices 
continued in Spain and were systematically exercised until the end of 1936, and less systematically 
thereafter but still existent, with the ‘red’ enemy replacing the ‘savage’ Rif rebel as the object of 
such acts. Those kinds of excesses were, she explains, committed by both Moroccans as well as 
Spaniards of the Army of Africa, and not only sanctioned, but in general encouraged by the 
Nationalists commanders. Moroccan soldiers who committed rape in Morocco without being 
punished by their Spanish commanders did not refrain from committing them in Spain.107  
The same line of argument, as that of Madariaga, is given by Sebastian Balfour: atrocities 
committed by members of the Legion and the Regulares were sanctioned by their commanders. 
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One reason for this, according to Balfour, is that they knew no other form of war than colonial war 
in which massacre and looting was common practice and second nature.108 The same is the case 
with rape. For Balfour, the European colonisation of Africa was not only a political, cultural, and 
economic experience, but a sexual encounter as well, with rape and sexual exploitation a common 
feature of racist domination by the invaders.109 According to Balfour, it seems that some 
commanders gave Legionnaires and Moroccans the freedom to scour a town they captured for an 
hour for booty and women, a common practice in the Moroccan wars.110 
Pro-Francoist historians tend to downplay the image of brutality associated with Moroccan 
troops, as it would automatically damage the image of the Franco regime that brought them in the 
first place. So someone like Gárate Córdoba naturally attacks what he considers the myths about 
Moorish ‘apocalyptic horsemen’ who, as some kind of ‘Moro Juan’, go about raping ladies, an 
image designed to instill fear in the civilian population, especially during the defence of Madrid. 
While in fact mounted horsemen were scarce because of lack of horses, the difficulty to transport 
them across the straits, and their limited application in modern combat.111 His opinion on the 
conduct of Moroccan troops is that it reflected the behavior of a soldier who would wage war with 
no more savagery than his opponent,112 a statement which could be interpreted in more than one 
way. Does it mean that the Moroccans conducted themselves reasonably well or does it mean that 
all in this war behaved in a horrendous fashion and that the Moroccans had their equal share?  
 El Merroun, not an anti-Republican historian, but with strong Moroccan sentiments, 
rejects what he considers fabrications about brutalities and especially rape based on his interviews 
with Moroccan soldiers, arguing that severe punishments by the Nationalist armies were deterrent 
enough.113 Of course one must understand that if there were atrocities that were falsely attributed 
(like the Badajoz massacre according to Ruano) to Moroccan soldiers, there are indeed incidents 
where Moroccan soldier did commit what amounts to be crimes of war. For example, there is 
enough documentary evidence to show the shooting by Moroccan soldiers of Republican prisoners 
of war, by orders of their Spanish officers,114 although this would not make them unique as both 
Spanish Nationalists and Republicans did the same. But there is also scarce and exceptional 
admission in oral testimonies that unarmed people were shot. According to an ex-soldier of the 
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Regulares of Larache, his unit captured two ‘rojos’, one of them a doctor, both unarmed and took 
them to the Spanish commander. When asked why they brought these prisoners, they answered 
‘[we] said that we found them and we brought them. He told us “next time kill them, wherever you 
find reds kill them”, so he called a corporal and told him to execute them’.115 
While Gárate Córdoba obviously meant with his ‘Moro Juan’ that it was the Republic that 
was instilling fear in the civilian population of Madrid (and it was), that does not mean than the 
Nationalists were not doing the same. There is no documentary evidence, or a ‘smoking gun’ for 
an elaborate, explicit, and thought-out psychological warfare scheme on the part of the Nationalist 
command to use the Moroccan troops as an instrument of fear. If there was a policy then it was 
implicit and spontaneous. 
The first time the psychological factor of the mere presence of the Moroccan soldiers 
played a role, took place in Cádiz with the arrival of the first batch of the Regulares. The civil 
governor of the port city, Mariano Zapico who chose to remain loyal to the Republic, had 
entrenched himself in the government building, fending off the attacks of the rebels, trusting in the 
invulnerability of the building, and rejecting General Varela’s demands to surrender. ‘Never!’ was 
his answer,116 until he observed in the morning of 19 July 1936 the turbans of the Moroccan 
soldiers arriving to the city. Fearing that their attack would end with a massacre, he surrendered.117 
When the military governor of Cádiz, who had sided with the rebels, told General Queipo de Llano 
in Seville (who faced a stronger armed working class militia opposition than the one in Cádiz), 
how easy his triumph was thanks to the fear for the Moroccans, Queipo was impressed. He 
demanded from Pinto to send him the Moroccan Tabor.  Pinto refused because the situation in 
Cadiz was not yet completely stable, neither was that of the neighbouring villages. Queipo 
threatened Pinto with negative consequences, but General Varela intervened and an agreement was 
reached to send Queipo a Moroccan company (the 3rd company of 1st Tabor of Regulares Ceuta), 
which Queipo used to drive around Seville constantly to impress the Sevillian workers.118 
General Queipo de Llano, the man who led the Nationalist rebellion in Seville and 
conquered the city gained infamy through his radio chats in which he threatened the Republican 
adversaries with a horrible fate. He put the fear of the Moroccan forces to use in his radio 
broadcasts, even before they arrived. On 18 July Queipo announced on the radio: ‘Troops of the 
Tercio and the Regulares are already on their way to Seville, and when they arrive, those 
troublemakers will be hunted like vermin’.119 He continued to threaten resisting towns and villages 
with setting deadly examples. On 21 July, after an attack on the Regulares near the town of 
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Carmona (on the road between Seville and Cordoba), he threatened with punishing the place and 
to make ‘Carmona remember the Regulares for a long time’.120 The following day he announced 
that the place suffered ‘an exemplary punishment that will remain in memory for a long time.121 
Other ‘examples’, according to Queipo, followed.122 He also threatened female Republican 
fighters. On 29 August, commenting on the battle of Talavera de la Reina (to the west of Madrid), 
he mentioned capturing ‘many male and female prisoners. How happy will the Regulares be, and 
how envious La Pasionaria’.123 Queipo was responsible for much of the propagation of the fear and 
the image of savagery that was attached to the Nationalist military campaign and the troops of the 
Army of Africa. 
If the massacre of Badajoz was not the work of the Moroccan and Legionnaire troops of 
Colonel Yagüe, then his implicit admission to an American journalist to have shot the ‘reds’, must 
be seen as a means to scare the enemy into avoiding a fight, occasionally succeeding as witnessed 
by the many occasions of flight demonstrated by Republican militia early in the war. In the end, 
even some of the Moroccans themselves believed that Franco did use them as a tool to terrify the 
Republicans.124 This tells that the mere presence of the Moroccan soldier in the field, along with 
his image of brutality, his howling, his imaginary inhuman nature, and aside from his actual 
fighting capabilities, had distinctive tangible tactical advantages on the field which the presence of 
a Spanish peninsular soldier might not have had.  
 The psychological effect of the presence of the Moroccan soldiers reflected also on the 
way the Nationalist command was to plan the immediate aftermath of the war. On 10 February 
1939, in the wake of the collapse of Catalonia, and anticipating a Republican surrender at any 
moment, the General Quarters of the Generalissimo issued a number of instructions on how to 
maintain order and achieve a most effective disarming of the Republicans. Among the twelve 
instructions, there are two that concern the Moroccan troops. One of these (instruction nr. 5) called 
for distancing, as soon as possible, the surrendering soldiers from ‘our troops’ so as to allow for as 
little contact as possible and to entrust the task of guarding the prisoners to forces that could be 
trusted completely, ‘preferably’ the Regulares. The other instruction (nr. 9) dealt with the entry of 
populated areas, which had to be done by Spanish forces, while the Regulares and the Tercio 
should ‘avoid doing it’. These forces would have to remain outside as forces of reserve under the 
most ‘severe discipline’.125 It is interesting that while one instruction is designed to keep a distance 
between the African units and the Spanish population, the same African units are preferred when it 
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comes to closely guarding the future population of the prisons. We could infer that the element of 
‘otherness’ in the Regulares units and their fearsome reputation would, in the eyes of the 
Nationalist command, apparently be an obstacle to the smooth and peaceful subjugation of popular 
centres now that that these centres were expected to willingly surrender rather than be taken by 
force, while the same ‘otherness’ would seem an advantage against the dangers of fraternisation 
with enemy prisoners. Once again, the foreign nature of the Moroccan troops had its military 
value, and shortly afterwards the assignment of Regulares units to prisoner camps guarding duties 
was being implemented.126  
As the Nationalists gained advantages from the fearsome reputation of the Moroccan 
troops, the Republic also built on that reputation to exhort its followers to fight to the bitter end, 
especially when defending Madrid. The communist female icon, Dolores Ibárruri, known as La 
Pasionaria famously decried ‘the savage Moors, drunken with sensuality who run amok raping 
our girls, our women in the villages that have been trampled by the fascist hooves…Moors, 
brought from the Moroccan aduars [Arab villages] from the most uncivilised of the Riffian 
settlements and rocks’.127 The first lines of the famous Republican song No Pasarán start with ‘the 
Moors that Franco brought, want to enter Madrid’ and ends with ‘the Moors shall not pass’, a sign 
that the defenders of the capital were first and most concerned with the ‘Moors’ before any other 
Spanish enemies; and proud to have stopped the ‘Moors’. If they could stop these Moroccans, then 
anything else was possible. That is to say that the Moroccans in this case were used as a 
psychological weapon but with goals reverse to those of the Nationalists. More interestingly there 
is evidence, on one occasion at least, that the Republicans not only wanted to take advantage of the 
psychological effect of the presence of Moroccan soldiers, but in fact some wanted to create 
circumstances that would lead to the destruction of Moroccan troops by creating outrageous acts 
committed against civilians.  
There is an undated document in the archive of the anarchist Federación Anarquista 
Ibérica (FAI) in Amsterdam which is part of a general plan of action, to be taken by Republicans 
in the Nationalist rearguard. It is not very clear to whom it was presented: anarchist leadership, or 
part of the Republican command. An interesting aspect is the ‘colonial’ section of the plan 
recommended infiltrating or buying ‘some Moors in the military expeditions that are sent to Spain 
to instigate these forces to commit violations and acts of violence in Spanish territory, and if this is 
used well it will lead to wide protests and it will produce large scale executions of Moors, which 
could be used later in Morocco in the action that will be organised among its population’.128 If it 
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were not for the presence of this document, the mere suggestion of such a plan might have seemed 
to belong in the realm of conspiracy theories. The overall plan was rejected by a higher command, 
though no comment was given on the specific ‘colonial’ section of the project. Aside from 
insurmountable obstacles in putting such a plan into action which might make it unrealistic, its 
sheer cynicism with regard to the lives of the Spanish civilians leads to questions. If there were 
some in the Republic who thought nothing of using their Moroccan enemies to commit acts of 
violence against the civilian population which the Republic is officially defending, so as to 
stimulate the growth of the negative and brutal reputation of the Moroccans, then surely there must 
have been more people willing to fabricate facts and haphazardly ascribe all kinds of brutalities 
committed in the war to the Moroccans.  
The Moroccans meet the civilians 
Republican plans did not in the end determine the relationship between Moroccans and Spanish 
civilians, although it was obviously good for the Republican propaganda that such a relationship 
should be challenging. But how do Moroccan veterans, approximately 60 to 70 years later, 
perceive their own relationship with the Spanish civilians and the fear the latter held towards 
them? When commenting on Spanish civilians, Moroccan veterans agree on two points. The first 
is that Spanish civilians were afraid of Moroccans. The second is that such fear was, in the view of 
these veterans, unfounded. As Stitou Bouinou sums up, although in the beginning civilians were 
afraid of Moroccans, with the passage of time and as the Spanish ‘got to know us’, relations 
became friendly. ‘They treated us well and we them too’.129 
 When it comes to the fear the Spanish had of the Moroccans one word was frequently 
uttered: ‘cuernos’ (horns). In the memory of many Moroccan veterans, the image many Spaniards 
had of them was of scary beings with horns. A number of veterans stated that the Spaniards 
thought ‘moro tiene cuernos’ (the Moor has horns),130 ‘Franco used us to scare the Spaniards, so 
much that the people would come closer to ascertain that our white colour was genuine and not 
artificial’. 131 Besides inhuman attributes, some of the veterans were aware of the fear of looting. 
One veteran remembered that in Catalonia there was a saying among the population advising to 
lock the doors because ‘que vienen los moros a llevar conejos’ [the Moors are coming to carry 
away the rabbits].132 Another Moroccan, present in the war and who worked in the legal affairs of 
a military unit, commented that ‘[we] the soldiers went there to make not to break. The army was 
free, if we entered a city and you wanted to loot and plunder, go plunder you are free, one thing 
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[however] and that is to respect the unarmed civilians’. Those deviating from the law would face 
court martial and then ‘we would kill him’.133 
 If the civilians were afraid of Moroccan soldiers it was not because of any wrongdoing on 
their part, or so the veterans overwhelmingly claim. A veteran noted that the civilians ‘knew their 
laws and we knew our laws. [If] you commit falta, fusilar [if you commit a wrongdoing, you will 
be shot]’.134 Some claimed that ‘theft was punished’,135 and that ‘we entered the town and it was 
not allowed to take anything except clothes and bombs. You would not take money because it 
could not be spent’.136 Others, however, admitted that ‘when we entered the first time we would 
collect the booty’, but they were also followed by the Guardia Civil and the Guardia de Asalto, 
and ‘we left the village to them because they were better knowledgeable of their populations’.137 
More amusing is the admission by Abdelkader Amezian that ‘when we were in Aragon, the 
askaris [soldiers] would loot and plunder, but when we entered Catalonia, they [the superiors] 
advised us that people there are nasty and do not want anyone to commit aggression against 
them’.138  
In any case, the consensus is that the Moroccan soldiers did not physically maltreat the 
civilians. Far from it, some even spoke of very friendly relations and mutual help. Al Hussein ben 
Abdesselam, spoke of how his unit, upon landing in Algeciras, found the population in a state of 
poverty and need, and ‘Spanish women and children who came begging for food. The kaíd [native 
officer] ordered food from our rations to be distributed for we had plenty’. Thereafter, the troops 
were taken by train to the Jarama River and ‘when we arrived there, it was the people who 
distributed food to us because they had plenty’.139 Abdelkader Amezian, the same veteran who 
admitted that Moroccans looted in Aragon and were warned not to do so in Catalonia, also 
presents an image of good relations. ‘We, on the contrary, were lenient on them, we would give 
them chocolate and bread and food. And the people would welcome us in their homes’.140 Others 
remembered the ‘Christians’ who ‘would come to us and wash the clothes in return for money’,141 
or the kind women of the villages who knitted headgears and other ‘presents’ for the Moroccan 
soldiers.142  
Post war terror of the Moor 
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The awe inspiring presence of the Moroccan units was probably a factor in the continuation of 
their employment in post-war Spain against remnants of the Republican army, composed of 
fighters who fled and refused to surrender and some civilians who joined them later and became 
known as Maquis. In the early post-war period, mixed forces of Moroccan troops, forces of the 
Legion, civil guards, and Falangists were entrusted with finding and destroying these bands of 
anti-Franco resistance. These forces operated mainly in the regions of Córdoba, Asturias, Orense, 
Leon, Ciudad Real, and Valderrobes.143 As the Spanish historian Secundino Serrano puts it, ‘the 
relation of these troops with the different populations followed the line of the behaviour of an 
occupation army: the lootings were frequent and the obituaries intensified’. Serrano cites two 1940 
examples of this occupation army behaviour, in the Cordoban region. In the first, ‘the Regulares 
killed three neighbours’, and in the second, ‘colonial troops poured boiling oil into the ears’ of the 
father of one of the anti-Francoist guerrilla fighters.144 Despite these cases, the intensity of the 
violence must have been far lower compared to the active phase of the war that preceded this post-
war period. After 1940, the role of the army diminished in fighting the guerrillas. The situation 
then changed in 1943 to 1944 as guerrilla activities increased, and the defeat of friendly Nazi 
Germany loomed, which converted the guerrillas into a real threat that materialised in the 
operation Reconquista de España, a failed invasion of northern Spain by 4000 guerrillas. The 
regime detached the army including companies of Regulares troops to regions with concentrations 
of guerrillas or sensitive regions, using Regulares for example to guard the border with France,145 
or maintain order in Málaga and Granada.146  
 The post-war experience of the Spaniards with regard to Moroccan troops differed from 
place to place and from time to time, varying from violent experiences, as mentioned above to 
more benign ones, as was the case with an Asturian female who was interviewed by Madariaga. 
During the 1940s, this interviewee, called Sole, witnessed Moroccan cavalrymen who were 
dispersed in villages, occupying requisitioned houses. ‘They did not interfere with anyone and had 
good relations with people, but we all feared them’.147 As Madariaga notices, the fear towards the 
Moroccans is curious given the correct behaviour of the troops. She considers it an instinctive 
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rejection due to the inherited prejudices against the Moors, as well as their bad reputation as a 
result of horror tales.148  
In his study on the Maquis, Historia de los Maquis. Entre dos fuegos, David Baird gives 
special attention to the Andalusian region of Frigiliana where he conducted a number of interviews 
with elderly citizens. One notices, in the study, that whenever the Civil Guards are mentioned, the 
Moroccan Regulares are very often mentioned in the same breath. A Tabor of Regulares was 
destined to the regions of Málaga and Granada, and a part of it was stationed in Frigiliana. The 
consequences of causing problems with Moroccan troops were manifested in 1950 in an incident 
which, apparently, led to traumatic memories for the villages long after.149 A Spanish supporter of 
the guerrilla, to prove his loyalty to two prominent guerrillas, whom he wanted to join and who 
asked him to demonstrate his loyalty by doing something strong, attacked a Moroccan soldier who 
was taking a bath, knocking him down and causing injuries before fleeing. The fellow Moroccans 
of the attacked soldier, who eventually recovered, destroyed the attacker’s house and his 
belongings but failed to find any guerrillas. The Civil Guard then took it upon itself to search for 
‘the usual suspects’, relatives of guerrillas, and detained three young men. They were found dead 
with their bodies badly beaten. It is not clear how they met their fate. Some neighbours maintain 
that the three were delivered by the Civil Guards to the Regulares who took their revenge on 
them.150 No Moroccan soldier was attacked in Frigiliana afterwards. By the early 1950s the 
guerrilla movement in Andalusia, and the rest of Spain for that matter, was all but destroyed and as 
a consequence the Moroccan troops were withdrawn in 1951.151 
Another anecdote in another part of Spain, Asturias, that took place also in 1950 is also 
demonstrative. This was the case of the elimination of Adolfo Quintana Castañon, known shortly 
as Quintana. In the documentary Guerrillero Quintana,152 one of the neighbours recalled that the 
forces that traced Quintana and wanted to attack him, along with another guerrilla called ‘El 
Canario’, ‘even wanted to call the Moors’ who were quartered nearby, but that the captain in 
charge of the ‘Moors’ rejected the suggestion saying ‘it is not a military issue. If the Moors 
intervene they will burn the town’, although, apparently, the Civil Guards were instructed to ‘burn 
the town’ if it were necessary to prevent their prey from escaping. However, a Moroccan veteran 
who volunteered for the Spanish army in the middle of the 1940s, and moved to Asturias where his 
Tabor was for a certain period stationed, indicates clearly that the Moroccans did participate in the 
operation to liquidate Quintana. His recollections of Asturias as a dangerous region, where at least 
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one Moroccan kaíd was killed and his body was mutilated after going out alone, though the 
veteran does not mention when this happened. Before returning to Morocco, his unit took part in 
eliminating Quintana, who was searched for in Gijón and Oviedo. ‘We kept looking for him. He 
came to Asturias only at night… one time they caught sight of him in Gijon, and when he came, he 
entered his sisterʼs house, where we surrounded him, and the shooting started’.153 Whatever the 
case, the comments by the neighbour in the documentary demonstrate, as the Frigiliana case, the 
fear of the Moroccan troops, and therefore the rationale behind their continued employment in  
low-level armed conflicts for which other Spanish security services and army units should be 
better suited to tackle.  
Some Moroccan veterans lived to talk about this episode in post-war fighting. Any violent 
act on their part towards the civilian population was absent from these memories, at least as they 
were revealed to their interviewers. Speaking about his memories in post-war Spain, Al Sebtaoui 
states that after the war, in which he took part, he was sent to Oviedo, the capital of Asturias, ‘we 
went to catch the chiefs of the rojos who were hidden there in the mountains, and would come 
down at night to commit crimes. We were in guard duty and we would hold their families captive 
to pressure them to surrender’.154 This is a rare admission of repression towards civilians, though 
without inflicting physical violence. Abdelkader ben Mohamed was sent with his Tabor, after the 
end of the war, to Alcazarquivir in Morocco, only to be sent once again to Spain, to Asturias 
where he stayed for two years as ‘we went around in the mountains looking for rojos’. The efforts 
were fruitful as ‘we caught someone called Barrasco and his gang. That gang was roaming the 
mountains and they would go to their cousins [fellow Spaniards] and steal from them and drink 
there and stay in their houses and they would leave them nothing. No one of them [i.e. the gang] 
was left. We caught them all and killed them’.155  
The guerrilla who let the Moor go free 
Given the violence that sometimes characterised the presence of Moroccan forces in Spain during 
the post-war period, and the fear that the Moroccan forces were supposed to inspire in the local 
population as well as the guerrillas, the encounter one Moroccan soldier had in post-Civil War 
Spain with a pro-Republican guerrilla fighter is both remarkable and atypical. This soldier’s name 
was Dandi Mohammed. His destiny could have been to fight and perhaps die at the Russian front. 
Joining the army in 1943 he was destined to be in the Spanish Division of Volunteers, better 
known as the División Azul (Blue Division).156 Around 1500 men from Morocco, according to him 
(in 2011), were to join the Blue Division in Russia. They even received the uniforms with the 
insignia of the blue unit. In the end, this did not happen as ‘things went badly for the German 
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army’, so the group was distributed to the different regiments, and he ended up with the Regulares 
of Ceuta.157 But in 1946, now part of the ranks of the Tetuan regiment, he set foot for the first time 
in Spain, the land where his father had died on the Teruel front in 1937. Like father, like son, he 
was in Spain to confront Republicans who now had already acquired the title of Maquis. He was to 
stay in Spain for a remarkable period of six years, conducting search operations and intelligence 
gathering, as part of the reconnaissance battalion of the Tetuan Regulares, mainly in Galicia and 
Asturias. ‘In that area we had the task of reconnoitring the villages, counting the numbers of 
houses, the cattle, where is the water coming from, where do they drink the water, whether there 
are roads or not, whether there is a forest or not’. 
His battalion always operated in conjunction with a detachment of the Civil Guards. ‘We 
went to a village and closed all the roads’. The Regulares would allow anyone to enter but no one 
to exit except with an authorisation by the Civil Guards. The Regulares would leave only after the 
Civil Guards had finished their search in the village. But then when he had set foot in Spain ‘there 
were no big battles, they had cleaned almost everything’, and Dandi never had the chance to fire 
his weapon against the guerrillas though he came in close contact at least twice, one of them could 
have ended his life. He explained that: 
 
[t]he Guardia Civil had their file: so and so is Maqui who is the son of so and so from this village. 
The municipal police would not catch the Maquis, even if they found one in the street, except if 
something at the moment was being committed. Only the Guardia Civil [would catch them].  So 
when they tell us to close the village down, if someone gets out with no authorisation from the 
Guardia Civil we take him to the Guardia Civil.  
 
As for the attitude of the civilians towards the Maquis, he thought they were: 
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forced to help the Maquis. If they do not help them they [the Maquis] kill them. If 
someone in the district reports on one of the Maquis they come and kill that man. The 
people feared them. They were dangerous, and they would come to get money. They 
would send a letter asking someone to bring two, three or four millions at such hour and if 
not, then they will kill you. If that señor does not get the money ready they come and kill 
him. 
 
The first time this Moroccan veteran met the Maquis it almost ended with his capture. The soldiers 
used to go to cafés or the bodegas or even to a verbena where there was ‘singing and dancing, 
during the day of San Jose or San Pedro etc. The girls would start singing. Well, we were soldiers 
so we went to look, to enjoy. When we arrive there, there is nothing but wine’. And then the 
Maquis arrived. Dandi and his comrades did know first that there were Maquis among the 
partygoers. A group of men approached them and started a conversation while drinking, asking the 
Moroccans how and why they came to Spain. ‘We answered: we were forced to come. Spain is the 
master in Morocco and they brought us here to serve…almost forced’. A few hours passed before 
the soldiers decided that it was time to retire. One of their Spanish drinking companions then told 
the Moroccans that they were not going anywhere and that they ‘will come with us to the 
countryside’. ‘We are the Maquis!’ he added, revealing a sub-machine gun that was tucked inside 
his greatcoat. The menacing scene developed into one of drama. With an embarrassed smile, 
Dandi remembers ‘we were so young so we started weeping and some of us said: “I left my 
mother [alone], this cannot be!”’. The menaces and entreaties lasted for half an hour, at the end of 
it the guerrillas decided, (whether out of mercy or to prevent reprisals), to let the young men go. 
Reaching their barracks Dandi and his companions informed their superiors of the presence of the 
Maquis. By that time, their captors had left the village. It was a terrifying experience, and after that 
the young Moroccans moved only in twos or threes but never accompanied by a Spaniard. There 
was no room for trusting a Spaniard. ‘If a Spaniard offered us to go with him and have a cup of 
coffee [we would say]: no’, Dandi concluded. It seemed as if the Moroccan troops were doomed to 
be distanced from the general population, whether by their own acts of aggression or as a result of 
being targeted by the anti-Francoist forces. 
 North Africans in the French Army 
In many aspects, the racial perceptions the Spanish had towards the Moroccans, and the role these 
perceptions played in employing Moroccan troops were similar to the situation of Moroccan and 
other North African troops, as well as other African troops in general in the French Army during 
both world wars. As Richard Fogarty comments, the North Africans stood high in the hierarchy of 
the so-called martial races, just below the West Africans. Among the North Africans, the French 




conscripted Algerian neighbours or the Tunisians for that matter. During the First World War, and 
after attacks, the Moroccan troops would be pulled off the line because they supposedly disliked 
defensive duties. Before the introduction of Moroccan troops to the fighting in Europe the French 
War Ministry informed French officers that Moroccan troops were ʽcourageousʼ, ʽsoberʼ and 
ʽgood marchersʼ, as well as being better marksmen than Algerians, especially certain among them 
of the ʽBerber raceʼ.158 Although the Algerians were deemed less warlike than the Moroccans, they 
were still considered a martial race. As one French Army report noted, the Arabs and Berbers were 
a warlike race, for whom war was not an accident, but something to be accepted as normal, 
including death in it. The report then comments that such fatalism makes good soldiers.159 As their 
Moroccan counterparts, they were deemed better suited for the attack, and much less for defensive 
duty, digging or manning trenches. It was necessary to move them frequently to stave off 
boredom.160 The Moroccans and Algerians, childlike and simple, supposedly craved wide open 
action that they could find on the Western Front unless on the attack.161 
 That was one of the reasons why the martial hierarchy of the French was topped by the 
French white soldiers, against whom every other warrior race was to be compared. While West 
and North Africans could display courage and attacking spirit, they did not have the stoicism of 
the French soldier, his intelligence, spirit of initiative or self-discipline. That is why the French, 
during the First World War thought Moroccan troops ill-suited for tasks such as patrol duty or 
reconnaissance missions where French supervision would be less and independent action 
necessary. Nor could officers afford to leave them on their own, due to their ʽinstinct for piracyʼ, 
which could lead them to commit acts of pillaging and rape.162 While the Moroccans in the 
Spanish Civil War enjoyed a terrifying reputation among their Republican enemies, in the case of 
the First World War, it seems that this role was filled by black West African troops whose elite 
warlike characteristics included savagery, and towards whom the Germans, according to some 
French officers, developed an irrational fear.163  
 The perceived limited qualities of the North African soldiers, and colonial ones in general, 
led to inclusion of white French troops in the lower ranks of colonial native units. White men, with 
their preeminent quality of calm self-sacrifice were supposed to shore up their less reliable 
comrades under fire and help sustain their morale.164 Practical reasons were also at play, such as 
the necessity to police the behaviour of potentially unreliable natives, especially when the Muslim 
Ottoman Empire joined the war alongside Germany. Technical reasons were also important. The 
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French Army did not believe the natives were capable of performing specialised tasks that required 
good knowledge of French or technical knowledge (such as being liaison agents, telephone 
operators, clerical personnel), so they were mostly excluded form artillery units, or from using 
machineguns or any other duties that went beyond the West and North African less complicated 
roles of attacking and of managing rifles.165 As such, and since white soldiers filled all the 
administrative and technical positions, the white component in native battalions was, in 1915, to 
be raised to 20% of total men in each company.166 That is equal to the (theoretical) percentage that 
was decided in 1914 with regard to the Regulares troops, and with partially similar reasoning 
behind it. 
The French perceptions did not change much after the end of the war. As Moshe 
Gershovich argues, while the French superiors used to hail Moroccan soldiers for their courage 
and resilience, submission to rigorous discipline and dependability, one trait rarely ascribed to 
Moroccan soldiers was initiative or any similar quality associated with intelligence. Moroccan 
soldiers were often depicted as ‘born warriors’ but hardly the material to be trusted with 
complicated, skills-related tasks.167 Such assessment could still be found in a 1939 study of 
Moroccan soldiers, which noted the will of some recruits ‘to learn more or less complicated 
mechanics’, but acknowledged also that ‘Moroccan specialists—radio transmitters, vehicle drivers, 
etc.—are rare since their training is long and more costly than that of French youth’.168 Also, in 
regarding the Moroccan Goums the French thought that Moroccan Goumier ʽworks with his 
instinctʼ, and ʽdoes not reason, he follows his chiefs with confidenceʼ and ready to accept 
anything. However, only his chiefs, by showing example, can maintain him through desperate 
situations. A Goum unit without its (obviously European) chiefs is a ʽsimple band of fugitivesʼ.169 
It is not surprising then that the practice of putting white troops among native ones continued, 
though the percentages could be much lower than the 20% of the First World War. A French 
document in 1943 on the Moroccan Goums troops gives for a Tabor 833 natives plus 65 French 
officers, under-officers and specialists.170   
 Conclusion 
The Moroccans, rather than forming just another group of soldiers, were considered combatants 
with special qualities and aptitudes predetermined either by their religious or ethnic background. 
Special traits were assigned to them, such as agile walkers, excellent night vision, and a cunning 
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ability for surprise attacks. The Moroccans were therefore sometimes tactically used according to 
these preconceptions, even though the realities of the battlefield meant that they were not always 
deployed according to the ideal the Spanish commanders had of them. In that way they resemble 
colonial combatants in other European armies. The perception of the otherness of the Moroccan 
served the Nationalists well by using the Moroccans to instil fear among the Republican enemy, a 
fear that continued well beyond the end of the formal hostilities in April 1939. In some respects, 
there were many Moroccan veterans who confirm the stereotypical traits that were ascribed to 
them and the roles that they were assigned to. While they were also aware of the terrifying image 
they had and the psychological impact they brought with them to the battlefield, most protested 
that such image was mostly not based on reality, and that they were innocent of the horrendous 
deeds attributed to them. The otherness of the Moroccans not only in great measure determined 
their use in the battlefield, but also the relation they had with their army. It is to that aspect that the 






The Moroccan and his army1 
 
This chapter deals with the relation between the Moroccan troops and the Spanish army outside the 
scope of tactics and the military role assigned to the Moroccans by their Spanish commanders. It will 
examine how the Spanish army tried to keep the Moroccan soldiers contained within a Moroccan 
sphere by the use of separate Moroccan units and separate facilities that were oriented towards the 
Moroccan units. It will examine how the relationship between the Moroccan soldiers and their Spanish 
officers reflected the prejudices the Spanish had about the distinct psychology of the ‘Moor’. But it 
will also examine how the Moroccan soldiers themselves remembered this soldier-officer relationship. 
These reminiscences will illustrate that the perception of this relationship is not uniform, and ranges 
from the positive, even to the point of adulation on one hand, to the extremely negative on the other 
hand. The chapter will also demonstrate that in many occasions the Moroccan soldiers were not only 
at the receiving end of the policy and practice of the Spanish army, but that they could themselves 
influence their conditions should they perceive unfair treatment from the superiors. It will examine 
causes of dissatisfaction among the Moroccan troops as well as forms of expression of such 
disgruntlement: complaints, demonstrations of protest, individual desertions and mass unit-size 
mutinies.  
Moroccan units for Moroccans 
That the Moroccans mainly served, during the Civil War, in Moroccan majority units of the Spanish 
army was the desire of both the Spanish Army and the Moroccan soldiers themselves. One veteran 
remembered that when he moved from the French zone of Morocco to enlist in the Spanish zone ‘two 
Spanish soldiers met me and using signs and pointing to their uniforms tried to tell me to join them, 
but then a corporal of the Regulares came and told me to join them as there were other Muslims’.2 The 
recruits did not only prefer Muslim majority units but they also preferred to be around their kin. One 
veteran remembered that the Spaniards ‘had promised not to disperse the volunteers of the same tribe. 
The old ones told us that it was encouraging in combat’.3 Putting members of the same tribe together 
in the same units also helped to surmount problems of communication.4 It would have certainly 
maintained the bonds necessary to hold small units in combat, especially if members of such small 
units did not enjoy enough time to build the needed bonds of comradeship.    
 This however does not mean that Moroccans did not serve in other units that had a Spanish 
majority among their members. Unlike the French Foreign Legion in Morocco, which did not accept 
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Moroccans in its ranks,5 there were Moroccans in the Legion, but also in the Bandera de Marruecos of 
the Fascist Falange and other Spanish units.6 But it seems that with the passage of time most of the 
Moroccans who enlisted in such units regretted their choice and desired to move to Moroccan majority 
units.7 According to Nerín 25% of the Falangist Moroccan Bandera members were Moroccans, and 
still racist attitudes were widespread in it.8 Balfour thinks that the Moroccans found it difficult to 
adjust to the culture of the Spanish Legion.9 Not only Moroccan individuals were present in majority 
Spanish units, but Moroccan units were also inserted in larger Spanish formations. This had its tactical 
justifications, but it also reflected an attitude of distrust on the part of Franco towards metropolitan 
conscripts, because he thought that they were imbued with leftist ideas. To guarantee the fidelity of the 
conscription troops, until 1938 they were not used without the accompaniment of either Moroccan 
troops or Legionnaires or Falangist or Requeté volunteers.10 This is attested to by one of the veterans 
from Regulares Ceuta, whose company was transferred to a Spanish Cazadores battalion, until 
November 1938, where they had the task of guarding its members and prevent them from deserting to 
the Republicans.11 Apparently, by 1938 the rationale was not compelling anymore, as the Republic 
was clearly on the losing side. In July 1938 General Orgaz proposed to Franco to dissolve the 
Moroccan companies that had been attached to the Cazadores battalions, to complete their combative 
efficacy and compensate for their inexperience. The reason for the dissolution, Orgaz gave as ‘the 
inconvenience that always is produced by the coexistence in one unit of elements of such different 
psychology’, and given that the reason for the inclusion of such Moroccan companies in the otherwise 
Spanish battalions is no more relevant, and given the diminishing numbers of the members of the 
Moroccan companies it would be better to dissolve them and send their elements to the Regulares. 
Franco, in answering Orgaz, approved of the suggestion.12 
 Yet, and despite the arguments of Orgaz, one must not forget that even in Moroccan majority 
units, there was a percentage (as discussed in chapter 2) of Spanish troops that could reach 20% of the 
total effectives in a Tabor, although that percentage was possibly lower than that for most of the 
Tabors during the greatest part of the war. It is difficult to ascertain how the relationship was between 
the Moroccan soldiers of these Tabors and the Spanish members of the same units. This issue does not 
figure in the documentation, and hardly in testimonies by the Moroccan veterans, whether deserters 
speaking to French interrogators or old men being interviewed by historians in more recent times. This 
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indicates that either the numbers of Spanish soldiers in the units of those veterans were very marginal, 
or very isolated, or that there were very little problems worth mentioning in documents or worth 
lingering in memories. Mohammed Abdullah Susi mentioned the relationship between Moroccan 
soldiers and Spanish ones as being always positive,13 although he did not specify whether those 
Spanish soldiers belonged to Regulares units or that they belonged to other ones. Whether his opinion 
represents the majority of what other Moroccan soldiers thought, remains to be confirmed. 
Uniforms and emblems 
Not only the Moroccan majority units served to create a separate space for the Moroccans, this 
function was also in a way played by the uniforms and emblems of the Moroccan units. The uniforms 
of the Regulares form part of the exotic image of these units, helping them to create the esprit de corps 
that characterise them. The ‘idiosyncrasy’ of the Moroccans was taken into the uniforms, as the 
leadership that designed them knew how to incorporate in the clothing the characteristics of the Rifian 
and Berber countryman and enriching them with colourful accessories.14 Until 1943 there was no 
official regulation governing the uniforms of the Moroccan troops in the Spanish army, but General 
Berenguer, who founded the Regulares in 1911, deemed it necessary that the uniforms of the 
Moroccan soldiers should fit with the native environment in Morocco and their individual parts drawn 
from the traditional clothing of the Moroccans. The distinctive elements of the Moroccan military 
attire were the: serual (trousers that have a baggy form); alquicel (a Moorish cloak, usually white in 
color and relatively light in weight, more often worn by the cavalry troops); sulham (a somewhat 
heavier cloak than the alquicel. In the Spanish army it had either a blue or a red color); chillaba (a 
long loose fitting robe, with long sleeves and a hood, usually made of wool); and gandora (unlike the 
chillaba, it does not have a hood, and its sleeves are short. It was more proper for summer campaigns). 
The headgear consisted of the tarbuch (fez), or a white turban. The European troops were to wear the 
same clothing as the Moroccans with the exception of the serual, which were replaced by European 
style trousers, distinguishing them from the Moroccan soldiers.15 Moroccan officers also were distinct 
from their European counterparts, as they wore the broad serual and had to wear either the tarbuch or 
the turban as headgear and never wore the European cap. The European officer had the freedom 
however to choose between the European cap or the Moroccan tarbuch which many chose to wear. 
 As has been mentioned in chapter 2, the presence of Moroccan soldiers in many instances had 
a psychological edge, encouraging beleaguered Nationalist troops and spreading anxiety or even panic 
among Republican ones. The clothing of the Moroccan troops obviously played an important part in 
this regard as it made them easily distinguishable. A famous example of the use of the Moroccan 
clothing came in Seville in July 1936 when General Queipo de Llano resorted to letting colonial troops 
drive around the city and regularly changing attire to give the impression that a far larger force was 
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present. One Moroccan veteran remembered the episode commenting that when ‘we landed in Jérez, 
we mounted lorries to Seville. We entered it in the morning. They would put chillabas on us, and they 
would take us and then bring us back wearing gandoras to trick the people into thinking that another 
army has arrived, and another time [we were] in [regular] uniformʼ.16 
 Not only the Moroccan attire provided a psychological advantage but it also apparently 
brought prestige to its wearers and those who surrounded themselves with those wearing it. Many 
young Spanish officers wore the chillaba as well as some Nationalist commanders who made their 
military careers in Morocco. One Spanish officer mused about: 
 
this curious phenomenon which is the inclination that has developed among the superior 
commands of having a personal escort of “natives” or legionnaires, when there were many 
native units (without quotation marks) which have distinguished themselves as well as any, 
and every young man of these lands is [as formidable] like a castle. But there are those that do 
not rest until they have behind them a Moor with an umbrella or half a dozen of legionnaires, 
even if they were from San Sebastián.17 
 
His remark is interesting, especially his mention of the quotation marks, as he suggests that some 
officers either took ‘natives’ who were not soldiers to become personal guards, or these guards were 
not even ‘native’ at all, only clothed to look so. The most famous of these escorts were of course the 
Moorish Guard of General Franco, who were distinguished with their white capes and turbans, 
whether on foot carrying rifles, or on horse, carrying spears, with their rifles slinging on their backs. 
Also significant was the symbolism that the Moroccan attire carried with it, whether worn by the 
soldiers or by their Spanish commanders. When Madrid surrendered on 28 March 1939, the 
Republican officer charged with delivering the surrender, Adolfo Prada Vaquero, met in the ruins of 
the University City with Colonel Eduardo Losas, the commander of the 16th Division who was 
wearing a striped chillaba. The picture of that meeting seems like the ultimate symbol of the victory of 
the Moroccan army and its Africanista officers over their Republican opponents. 
 The distinct features of the attire of the Moroccan troops was not always a blessing, and often 
that Moroccan attire was not even available anymore during combat. The red tarbuch formed a 
dangerous item easily recognisable from the air,18 obliging soldiers to remove it and replace it with a 
khaki coloured turban.19 In some units, the longer the war progressed the less the attire of the 
Moroccan soldiers conformed to either the standards of the army or the Moroccan traditions. As one 
veteran put it ‘during the war the clothes do not remain the same, because due to plenty of lice we 
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would throw the clothes away and take others from inside the front, civilian clothes.20 Such shabby 
conditions became reason for complaints among some soldiers,21 and a partial reason for desertion 
among others. One soldier, however, was lucky not to wear a traditional Moroccan headgear, which 
probably saved his life or at least freedom from imprisonment. In 2011 he described how one night, 
after the fall of Teruel in the Nationalist hands, his company, now reduced in numbers, was ordered to 
climb Peña Juliana, a rising on the Teruel front. He was in forward position with two others, and when 
the morning came they moved forward only to discover that the company had retreated.  ‘Suddenly the 
enemy came. We were lucky that we were wearing the same headgear [as the Republicans], so they 
thought we were from their own side’. According to this veteran, he and his two companions acted 
like they were part of a Republican attacking formation. Perhaps the lack of enough light in the early 
morning hours and a sufficient distance prevented their recognition. The three managed to sneak away 
and return to their unit where ‘the officer, when he saw me, embraced me and lifted me in the air’.22  
 The emblems of the Moroccan troops served a similar function as the uniforms, in that they 
were supposed to relate to the Moroccans by figuring the Islamic crescent, and that they served to 
further distinguish Moroccan troops from Spanish ones. Some of the banners of larger formations such 
divisions also figured Islamic symbols like the ‘hand of Fatima’ in the emblem of the 13th Division 
(see appendix 4). One must also assume that they had the same psychological effect the Moroccan 
uniforms had in the battlefield. 
Discipline 
In 1957, a Spanish officer and veteran of the Civil War recounted an incident which he described as 
‘very expressive of the character of the Moors’. During operations on the Andalusian front in early 
April 1937, a position that was defended by both Spanish peninsular (the 6th Granada regiment) and 
Moroccan Regulares soldiers was coming under heavy attacks and bombardments from the 
Republicans for a couple of days. During a lull in the fighting, a Moroccan soldier, ‘one very young, 
who perhaps was no more than seventeen years old’, faced his commanding Lieutenant and told him: 
‘Moor no eating, Moor no sleeping, Moor leaving’. More than 24 hours had passed without any 
supplies coming in, and all the cold food provisions were spent. But despite of this, ‘no Spaniard had 
complained about such an exhausting situation’. The Moroccan took hold of his rifle and tried to 
translate his words into deeds. He was seriously reprimanded by his officer, while the enemy started 
their pre-attack fire. While the young Moroccan was walking to the rear the officer threatened to apply 
disciplinary measures and he prepared his pistol, as ‘the demoralisation of one could infect the rest’. 
Then, a more ‘mature’ Regular with a ‘copious black beard’ intervened and took the would-be deserter 
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by the arm, bringing him back to his position and later telling the lieutenant: ‘I told him where the 
Spaniard stays without eating, drinking or sleeping, the Moor, his brother, has to stay’.23  
 This anecdote is interesting because of the ‘expressive of the character of the Moors’ comment 
by its author. He did not elaborate what he meant by that. Was it expressive in the sense that the 
‘Moors’ were impatient or whimsical? Or that they were stubborn and rebellious? Or that they did not 
enjoy the necessary endurance capabilities to withstand adverse situations? Regardless, what the 
anecdote illustrates is that the Moroccan soldiers were far from the blindly obedient warriors, or 
passive followers.  
The idea that the Moroccan soldier was a different breed of warrior with a special psychology, 
and for whose leadership officers of special aptitude were needed was an idea that preceded the 
Spanish Civil War. This supposed fact was mentioned on the first page of the first issue of the 
magazine of the Spanish army in Morocco Revista de Tropas Coloniales in 1924.24 But this idea also 
survived the test of the Spanish Civil War into later years. An article in the army magazine, Ejército, 
in 1946, found that the:  
 
Moor of Jebala and the Rif, and specially this last, is not similar to those of other Moroccan 
regions. These Moors were famous for being disrespectful towards authorities, for being 
rebellious towards orders, for having always lived in conflict with the Makhzen [The 
Moroccan government] and for being indomitable in their vengeance. They are all to the 
contrary if they are ruled well and with justice. They like to be under the protection of a strong 
but fair authority. They need the chief, the guide, the adviser, even for the most minimal 
details in their life, and that spiritual director is the Officer of the Intervención when he knows 
the psychology of the Moor and gives him an example in virtues, because otherwise he would 
never exercise the indispensable influenceʼ.25 The author, who became director of the Army 
museum after the Spanish conflict, concludes that ‘generally, the Spanish Moor is so obedient 
that he dispenses with his sentiments in order to obey. That is why he is a good soldier.26 
 
According to the author the Moroccan soldier not only needs a strong and fair hand, but he is basically 
in need for a leader for everything. Rather immature is the Moroccan soldier that this article portrays. 
It is a view that is also reflected in a 1945 army document titled ‘Justification for the creation of the 
Inspection of the Regulares Groups’, which came to argue against the loss of the peculiarity of the 
Regulares units, that had become at that time integrated within army divisions, which precluded the 
independent form of life these units enjoyed before. The document explained that the Regulares, since 
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their creation, had their peculiar manner of functioning that differed from the rest of the army. It also 
observed that the ‘Moor is generally very religious and a lover of his traditions’ and though he does 
not reach extremes in following his traditions and many times could be indifferent, he does not take 
kindly to those who ‘force him to act against them’. More importantly it explained that the ‘Moor is a 
volunteer but with a concept that is very different from the Spanish volunteer. For the simple fact of 
enlisting in the army he thinks that the government which he is serving has to support him, help him 
and solve for him his problems, both official as well as the more intimate family-related ones’. The 
‘Moor’ basically, according to this document, was loyal to who pays him, supports him and treats him 
well. The document then continues to emphasise the differences between the Regulares and other 
Spanish army units. The mode of recruitment is not the same, neither are the forms of promotion, nor 
should the same rules for leaves be followed as the Spanish, given the different religious festivities, 
neither should the training programs be the same. The document then proceeds to warn against 
imposing ‘our customs’ without caution and avoidance of clashing with the Moroccan traditions.27 
Although both texts were written in the 1940s, they must have taken their cue, at least 
partially, from the experience of the Civil War. The Spanish army leaders thought that the Moroccan 
soldiers were a different and sometimes difficult type of soldier that needed guidance from officers 
who were more familiar with his idiosyncrasy, a reference that often emerges in both official 
documents as well as military publications. This ‘idiosyncrasy’ was partially the reason why the 
Delegation of Native Affairs operated in Spain during the war to intervene in the affairs of the 
Moroccan soldiers, as well as Moroccan civilians who were needed to provide services for those 
soldiers, and why this Delegation intervened in all Moroccan affairs without distinguishing between 
military and civilian matters, as the Moroccans themselves, according to this office, did not make that 
distinction.28 
Moorish officers 
The necessity to have a different approach towards the Moroccan soldier was also one of the main 
reasons why the position of ‘Moorish officer’ was created in 1909 in the first place. Although these 
‘Moorish officers’ exercised the command of a platoon, the principal function was to aid the captain 
commanding the company by advising him on the aspects of life, customs and the necessities of the 
Moroccan soldiers.29 According to Spanish historian Salafranca Álvarez,  Spanish officers 
commanding Moroccan units were supposed to learn Arabic, but the complexity of the language and 
the existence of numerous dialects made the understanding between the commanders and their native 
troops difficult; help therefore was needed from these Moorish officers.30 In the numerous dialects 
Salafranca Álvarez mentions, one must also include the non-Arabic – that is Berber (Tamazight) – 
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ones. However, there existed since the early days of the Regulares, efforts to teach the Spanish 
language to the Moroccan troops, with course materials going as far back as 1916.31  
In general, and in European armies in particular, it is accepted that non-commissioned officers 
form the backbone of armies as they usually rise from the ranks, with long years of experience that 
enable them to gain the trust of their men. They form a strong link with young officers who would 
arrive at their units possessing a higher formal authority, training at a military academy, but little 
actual experience of military life.32 It is obvious that the Moorish officers (and non-commissioned 
officers for that matter) played a similarly important role as a link between the Moroccan soldiers and 
the Spanish commanding officers, especially that the overwhelming majority of these Moorish officers 
rose from the ranks and attained their commissions either through seniority or through combat merits.  
The requirements for the obtainment of the rank of Moorish Officers 2nd Class (2nd 
lieutenant), as established when the Regulares corps was formed, were eight years of service, 
including three years as a sergeant, unblemished conduct and the passing of an exam.33 For a 
Moroccan then to rise to the rank Moorish Officer 1st Class (equal to the rank of lieutenant), as per a 
1919 order, he would have had to serve 10 years in the previous rank.34 Combat merits, either during 
the colonial war or the Civil War shortened the period required for promotion for many Moroccan 
officers and sergeants. During the Civil War, a dozen Moroccans even graduated from military 
academies to become Alféreces Provisionales,35 but still most of them had long years of military 
service enough to describe them as, if not the backbone of the Spanish Moroccan units, then a 
component equal in its strength to that of the Spanish commanding officers.  
 At the start of the Civil War there were 59 1st Class Moorish Officers and 23 2nd Class Officers 
in the Spanish Army (excluding the units that officially belonged to the Moroccan government but 
used by the Nationalists).36 Their numbers would vary later as the Tabor numbers grew, Moroccan 
officers were killed or wounded, and non-commissioned officers were promoted to the rank of officers 
as a reward for courage, to replace the casualties, or to fill the requirements of more units, while some 
of the current officers were promoted to a higher rank. Yet the Moroccan officers could not generally 
rise beyond the ranks of Moorish Officer 1st Class or Moorish Captain (equal to a regular captain rank) 
and few reached this latter rank.  
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The Moroccan officers were not supposed to command Spanish troops. That would disrupt the 
colonial hierarchy. The only exception to this rule was Mohammed Ben Mizzian. The career of Ben 
Mizzian in the Spanish Army started, apparently, during a visit by King Alfonso XIII to a native 
school in Melilla, where Mizzian, the son of a pro-Spanish Riffian leader, was a pupil. Having solved 
a math problem and showed some geographical knowledge of Europe that impressed the King, 
Alfonso asked the boy Mizzian what he wanted to become. His answer was ʻa captainʼ.37 The King 
sponsored Mizzianʼs admission to the Infantry Academy in Toledo, for which the law had to be 
changed, for the academy had never before admitted non-Christians. After graduating, he was 
incorporated into the colonial army in Morocco, and later fought with distinction during the Riffian 
rebellion in which he was wounded, and later attained the rank of captain. It was during that war time 
that he befriended Francisco Franco. According to a story a Melilla paper published in 1924, Mizzian 
saved the life of Franco by killing a Riffian rebel who was pointing his rifle at the future Spanish 
Caudillo. A Major and Tabor commander by the time he joined the Nationalist rebels in July 1936, 
received the prestigious individual Medalla Militar for military actions in Spain, was wounded, 
became commander of Regulares group of Ceuta, and ended the war with the rank of colonel and the 
command of the Spanish 1st Navarrese Division. Later he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant 
General and assumed the command of the military region of Galicia (where Franco was born) and of 
the Canary Islands.38 He was not just another ʻMoorish officerʼ, and his military career was more 
Spanish in nature than Moorish. He was the exception, although perhaps an exception that set apart 
right-wing Spain from other ʻliberalʼ European powers like Britain and France, but an exception 
nevertheless. The task of commanding the Moroccan troops fell mostly in the hands of Spanish 
officers.  
According to Mesa, not all Spanish officers were successful in leading Moroccan soldiers and 
even competent officers could fail. Especially important was the demonstration of great personal 
valour at great risk to themselves. It seems, still according to Mesa, that the strongest bonds were those 
formed between veterans, both Spanish officers and Moroccan soldiers, of the Moroccan wars in the 
1920s, and the sacrifices and losses of Spanish officers in Morocco were important when the time 
came in 1936 to test the loyalty of their old native sergeants and soldiers.39 
When the Civil War started in July 1936, however, and with the need to increase the numbers 
of both the Moroccan troops that were to fight in Spain as well as the number of the Spanish officers 
to command them, it was obvious that the Moroccan units could not always count on the presence of 
officers with experience in the language and the customs of the Moroccans or who had at least enough 
time to familiarise themselves with them. Nor could the new Moroccan recruits always afford the time 
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to familiarise themselves with their commanders or to learn Spanish for that matter, a fact that was 
particularly relevant for new recruits coming from the French zone of the protectorate. This meant that 
there was a variation in the aptitudes of the Spanish officers commanding Moroccan troops, their 
experience in Moroccan affairs, languages and customs, as well as the nature of the relationship 
between these officers and their troops.  
This point was probably not lost on Colonel Juan Beigbeder, the High Commissioner for 
Morocco, who had suggested to Franco towards the end of 1937 to send officers with ‘special 
aptitude’ to the Regulares units. The answer was however that there were very few such officers. The 
possible alternative was that the chief of each native unit could give a number of lectures to the 
Provisional Second Lieutenants about ‘matters of the Moors and the treatment that they should give 
them’.40 Only after the war, speaking Arabic and having experience with African troops, became a 
pre-condition (as par decree of General Varela, the Minister of the Army after the war) for officers 
wishing to be assigned to the Regulares units.41 As a consequence, it is interesting to know how the 
relationship between the Spanish officers – given the lack of many of them with a ‘special aptitude’ – 
and their Moroccan troops were perceived by the Moroccans. 
Relations with officers: The Moroccan perception 
The relationship with the Spanish officers as perceived by the Moroccan soldiers differs according to 
the sources. There are two sets of sources to be employed here. The first source commonly used by 
historians to assess the perception of the Moroccans consists of interviews with Moroccan veterans of 
the Spanish Civil War conducted by historians decades after the end of the war. The second source 
consists of reports of 147 interrogations of Moroccans from the French Zone who had joined the 
Spanish army and fought in Spain and later deserted back to French Morocco, only to be interrogated 
by the French military there between June 1937 and February 1939. This chapter might be the first 
effort to use this contemporary source to supplement the information gathered from the latter-day 
interviews.42 Both sources have their characteristics. The veterans of the first source are soldiers who 
completed their service and did not desert the army and therefore might have a different and longer 
experience than those who deserted. The passage of time and their continued contact with the Spanish 
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might have embellished their memories or idealised them. The deserters from the second source 
present a contemporary, fresh account of their experience in the Spanish army, though their 
interrogation by French authorities might influence their testimonies. For they might have had to 
justify their desertion by trying to portray the circumstances of their recruitment and military life in a 
way that would draw the sympathy of the French interrogators, since being recruited by the Spanish 
Nationalist army was illegal in French Morocco. Therefore there is a risk that some might have 
invented or modified injustices done to them in the Francoist forces in order to avoid a harsh 
punishment. What also sets these deserters apart is their different geographical origin, French 
Morocco, which might have influenced their treatment by their Spanish superiors or the soldiers’ 
perception of that treatment. Expounding on the reminiscences of the Moroccan soldiers will make the 
difference in both sets of sources clearer. 
 If there is any point where there exists a majority consensus about in the accounts of latter day 
Moroccan veterans, it is the issue of treatment of the Moroccan soldiers by their superiors during the 
Spanish Civil War. Commenting on their officers, in my interviews in 2011 the answers ranged from 
‘they were not bad with us’,43 to ‘the officers treated us very well. There was no discrimination 
between us and the Spaniards’,44 to a more extended ‘The Spanish treated us well. They gave us at the 
front bread and fish and everything. There was no discrimination, we were treated equally. They were 
only bad with the rojos, but with us they were very good. All the officers and captains and 
commanders were good with us’.45 Even those who were indignant about the meagre pensions they 
received had to concede that ‘the treatment was good, there was no racism. They loved us, we fought 
for them’.46 In some cases, the answers equalled good treatment with how much and how good the 
food was the soldiers received and how the ‘colonel of the regiment was a real soldier, there were 
always clothes, there was always food’,47 and how many sheep were provided for the men to feast 
on.48 More of my (over a dozen) interviewees expressed similar positive comments on the treatment 
by their officers. It seems that the majority of veterans interviewed by other historians also confirm 
this positive image. One veteran, talking to Sebastian Balfour in 2000, described his commanding 
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Asensio as a saint.49 Balfour concludes that the majority of the colonial 
troops maintained their morale and fighting quality despite the high casualties they suffered, a fact 
attributed in great part to the good officer-soldier relationship.50 The overwhelming majority of the 
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interviewees of Mustapha El Merroun, in the 1990s, also concede that their treatment by their Spanish 
superiors was good.51   
Although there is a broad consensus in the narratives of the veterans about the good treatment 
received by their immediate superiors during the war, there is a variation in interpreting how well-
intentioned the good treatment was. In the case of one veteran, the memory of the officers was so good 
that the names of not few of them flowed out of his mouth with little trouble, a feat unmatched by 
other veterans, and he had much praise for the famous Spanish officer of Moroccan origin Mohammed 
ben Mizzian who was ‘a good person’.52 Next to the extreme satisfaction with the way officers treated 
the Moroccan soldiers,53 or even the comment that ‘officers were good, may God have mercy with 
them’,54 there are others who put that good treatment in the context of negative consequences for bad 
treatment, such as to ‘avoid soldiers running away’,55 but more importantly, as Al Filali comments, for 
self-preservation purposes as ‘they feared for themselves. If someone [of the officers] was rude, he 
would be shot from behind. In Spain they were good with us, I cannot lie. The officers were good to 
us’.56 This observation is supported by two others who remarked that Spanish officers were ‘forced to 
treat us well because they feared for themselves, because he was an outsider among us’,57 and ‘had 
they done anything disgraceful we would have given them hell’.58 In at least one case, the threat was 
acted upon. Ahmed Al Omari, who was interviewed in the 1990s, relates one instance in which a 
Moroccan who went by the name Al Huzi, was struck by a sergeant, though it is not specified whether 
the sergeant was Spanish or Moroccan. Al Huzi ‘took the opportunity of going to combat and he killed 
him’, only for him to be arrested and shot.59 Al Zargui, a veteran interviewed in Ceuta, gives a further 
twist to the self-preservation, though conceding that the treatment by the officers was good, he pointed 
that the captain of his company ‘was afraid of us’, because – Al Zargui thinks – the captain was, deep 
inside, a rojo. That leaning to the rojos applied, in his view, to ‘half of them [officers]’.60 This 
accusation of hidden red sympathies is important for those who experienced a change in treatment 
after the war.  
While all the veterans who expressed an opinion on their treatment by their superiors during 
the Spanish war overwhelmingly affirmed the good treatment, though with different interpretations, a 
small number of these testimonies (four to be precise) complained about the treatment after the war. 
Al Filali, who affirmed that ‘in Spain they were good to us, I cannot lie’ found that ‘when the war 
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ended and we returned here, then they became ugly’.61 He did not give a reason for the change in 
attitude but the three others did and it is remarkable how they coincide in their views. In their stories 
they are quick to pinpoint the reason. ‘We found [after the war] that the officers and sergeants that we 
captured on the fronts were now ruling us’.62 The veteran making this statement was referring to 
officers whom he believed had Republican sympathies and who were indignant at any Moroccan who 
had fought in Spain. One day in 1940, in Morocco, he was to receive his pay when a Spanish officer 
asked him whether he had participated in the war. He, cautiously, denied it. But then ‘one Muslim 
betrayed me’ and told the officer that he killed so many Spaniards until he was ‘exhausted’. Having 
been betrayed, the officer called him later and told him menacingly that he knew about his 
participation in the war. The soldier answered the menacing tone by reminding the officer that ‘We are 
in our country here’ and that the officer should be the one to watch his manners. The soldier was 
punished by being sent with a platoon to a remote location in Morocco.63 
This one is not alone in his judgement. Another veteran of the war perceived a change. After 
the war, as he relates, he and others were tasked with ‘hard labour’, building camps, bridges and 
digging wells. These were tasks which he interpreted as punishment for ‘they wanted to take revenge 
on us because they were rojo’.64 Dandi Mohammed, a soldier who served in Spain in operations 
against the Maquis, had a similar impression. Commenting on the treatment of the officers, he found 
that ‘some of the officers were fair, others were not’. Interpreting why others were not, he believed 
that ‘after the war, officers who were sons of the rojos joined the army, they went to the academy and 
became officers, and then some of them would remember what the [Moroccan] soldiers did to the 
rojos. So sometimes they would treat him [the Moroccan] badly. They would punish him or make him 
do labour. The soldier could not do anything. The officers could do what they wanted’.65 These three 
testimonies share an interesting point. If an officer maltreated someone then the only possible 
explanation is that he was rojo in his heart all along. Either these veterans had internalised the 
Nationalist propaganda about the evil of the rojos or they wondered: who other than a rojo would 
maltreat the Moroccans who are loyal soldiers of Franco? Also interesting is the consideration of work 
on construction as a type of punishment. It appears that such work was not popular among more 
Moroccan soldiers.66  
 The Moroccan deserters’ perception 
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The second set of sources, that of the interrogations of the French Moroccan deserters, provides a 
somewhat more mixed image of the relationship with the Spanish army and the Spanish officers. 
Certainly, there was no shortage of deserters who commended their officers and were clear about the 
good treatment they received from the army in general and their officers in particular, while 
expressing their satisfaction about supplies, soft discipline, hospital care etcetera.67 There were some 
who were not satisfied with the rations and pay, but still found that the officers were well respected 
and observed that ‘certain among them have great moral authority over the troops’.68  
There are however others who were not quite satisfied with the officers they met. One veteran, 
who otherwise praised the Spanish army, noted that officers who did not speak Arabic were isolated 
from their men.69 More negative toward their commanders were some who blamed their officers for 
‘not knowing well’ the troops or being ‘disinterested’.70 Corporal or other punishments were also the 
subject of complaint of others.71 Equally negative was a deserter who stated, on the subject of officers, 
that few of them spoke Arabic and that the career officers were killed and were replaced by younger 
officers ‘who maltreat the natives’. He further complained that the Spanish non-commissioned officers 
were brutal with the soldiers and that their native counterparts imitated them.72 The difference between 
old and new officers was also noted by a deserter, Mohamed Ould Mhamed M’kik, who in his 
interview in July 1938 spoke of the mediocre morale of the Muslim troops, which he ascribed partly to 
the newly promoted officers who demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the native troops. 
They [the officers] ‘even thrashed them [the troops]’. These officers did not concern themselves with 
material questions such as nourishment and clothing. M’kik contrasted these new commanders with 
the old ones who ‘knew the Muslims well and who were loved by the troops’, but who were either 
killed or had been transferred to other units. While these negative comments suggest that soldiers were 
at the receiving end of a bad relationship, according to one veteran it was the officers who feared their 
men, a fact which led to the absence of sanctions on pillaging.73 These negative comments could mean 
that such a bad relationship with Spanish officers contributed to the decision of these soldiers to 
desert. There is a possibility however that these deserters made up these negative experiences to attract 
the sympathy of the French interrogators and therefore receive mild punishments for enlisting in the 
Spanish Army, although others chose to desert despite the great praise they had for their Spanish 
officers and without giving any detrimental comments about them. 
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As the preceding views by Moroccan soldiers of their Spanish officers demonstrate, there is no 
uniformity on how positive the relationship between the two parties was. In the first set of sources the 
balance obviously and overwhelmingly tilts toward a positive view by the Moroccan veterans of their 
Spanish officers, although the motives of the Spanish officers as seen by some Moroccan veterans 
were self-serving and self-preserving. In the case of the second (French) set of sources the image is 
roughly evenly balanced, in terms of numbers of respondents, between those with a positive view 
towards their chiefs and those with a negative one. This discrepancy between the two sets of sources 
either reflects the variation in the characters and capabilities of the Spanish officers commanding 
Moroccan soldiers, or exaggerations on the part of some deserters to justify their desertion to their 
French interrogators. It might even reflect the positive bias by some Spanish Moroccan veterans who 
idealised their experiences, as they grew older and were, in later decades, invited by the Spanish to 
attend commemorating ceremonies of the Regulares troops. But as the following pages will 
demonstrate, even Spanish military documents attest to the existence of indignation by the troops that 
sometimes is linked to the behaviour of their Spanish officers. If some soldiers had no other way but 
stoically bear the maltreatment of some Spanish officers, or even the army in general, others did not 
tolerate what they perceived as injustice and took action to remedy them either softly, noisily or even 
violently.  
When dealing with examples of unruliness, rebellion and desertion, it is important to note two 
facts. First, while rebellious behaviour or acts by Moroccan troops caused occasional concern and 
sometimes alarm within the Spanish Nationalist army, they remained the acts of a minority of 
Moroccan soldiers and units. It would not be unreasonable to assume, however, that the measures the 
Spanish army took to remedy Moroccan grievances as a response to unruly behaviour contributed to 
the disciplined behaviour of the majority of Moroccan troops during most of the period of their stay in 
Spain. The second fact is that acts of indiscipline, and specially desertion, also manifested themselves 
within Spanish units of the Nationalist army, as well as the Republican. Numbers of Moroccan 
desertions have been described as minimal and irrelevant as compared to those of the Spaniards.74 In 
general, the Nationalist army, to which the Moroccans belonged, suffered less from acts of indiscipline 
compared with the Republican army, and the Nationalists contained desertions and defections better 
than the Republicans did.75 
The Moroccan soldiers could complain, protest, mutiny or take matters into their hands in 
another way in the face of combat exhaustion or perceived insult or injustice. The relations the 
Moroccan soldiers had with their (mostly Spanish) superiors played a role in the decisions many took 
to protest, desert, mutiny or even kill as a way of expressing their disgruntlement, though in the case 
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of desertion, the circumstances could also be almost totally unrelated to the soldier-officer 
relationship.  
Breaking contact by way of desertion 
There were many soldiers who were pleased with their war experience. According to one French 
Moroccan deserter, the Moroccans of the Spanish zone he met in Spain were ‘happy with their fate’, 
as they had everything they could desire: a fight, money, food, women, ‘everything that a Moroccan 
would like’.76 But many of course were less than happy after a seemingly never ending war that would 
have dampened the initial enthusiasm. The most common way for soldiers that were not satisfied with 
their situation in the army, for whatever reason, to escape their unwelcome circumstance has been to 
desert. In Spain, as Pedro Corral demonstrated in his study Desertores, more than two million people 
either evaded military service or deserted after serving in the frontlines.77 For Moroccan soldiers 
fighting in Spain, this option however had its limits. Being in a foreign country, they could not desert 
and simply head home because the Mediterranean sea separated Morocco and Spain, not to mention 
the challenge of passing all military check-points on the way, which made a journey home unlikely to 
succeed. The option for desertion was therefore two-fold: either going over to the Republicans, or 
benefiting from a leave of absence, usually in the wake of an injury to go to Morocco and there to take 
the decision of not returning to the army at the expiration of the leave. Going over to the Republicans 
had its hazards, as most of the Moroccans were fearful of a horrible fate, that included torture or 
execution, awaiting them should they fall in the hands of the Republicans, a fear that was founded on 
the experience during the early months of the Civil War when a number of Moroccans were executed 
upon being captured by the Republicans.78 Besides, it would have been impossible to return to North 
Morocco as it was in the Nationalist hands. The second option, benefiting from a leave of absence, 
was safer, although those who did risked being prosecuted. War fatigue meant, however, that some of 
the soldiers on leave, including those recently discharged from military hospitals decided on their own 
accord to extend their absence, a court martial offence which the Nationalist authorities found difficult 
to repress so as to avoid trouble with the tribes and not push those on leave to desert completely.79 The 
Nationalists even set up a ‘Recuperation Service’, to try and entice them back to the war.80 
The motives for desertion, from the point of view of Moroccan veterans, have not been 
discussed by aging veterans who were interviewed by historians, simply because these veterans did 
not desert. There is little information on the numbers and motives for desertion of Moroccans from the 
Spanish Zone. The French files of interrogation of Moroccan deserters however provide a variety of 
reasons for desertion as stated by the interrogated Moroccans. In 22 cases of the 147 reasons are 
neither listed (mainly because the question was not asked) nor are there easy indications that could 
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help explain the motives to desert. In some cases one wonders why these deserters left the army in the 
first place. For example, Tahar d’Alilou Hammou si Ali, professed to have been satisfied with his stay 
in Spain and being able to provide for himself and make good savings but did not give a reason for his 
desertion, 81 which is similar to the case of El Khamar ould ben Mohamed El Bernouss who praised 
the pay, food and morale of the Moroccan troops stating that the Moroccans did not believe that the 
war would last longer than two to three months, but also not explaining why he deserted, though his 
interrogation report does not figure the question being put to him.82 But in most cases, the reasons for 
desertion are quite clear, though various in nature and not always directly connected to the Spanish 
experience. 
For a large group of those who returned to French Morocco and were interrogated, the 
peculiarities of their interaction with the Spanish army had hardly anything to do with their decision to 
desert. 54 deserters indicated homesickness and missing family members as the main or only reason 
for desertion.83 Some of these deserters even spoke highly of the Spanish army and their Spanish 
superiors and the treatment they received.84 For them, the stated reasons for desertion lay mainly at 
home and their families rather than in Spain.85 As they came from French Morocco, practically a 
foreign land where enlistment in the Spanish army was forbidden, they could not expect to receive 
letters from their families, a factor which might have contributed to their increasing homesickness. 
This was a different situation compared with the soldiers from Spanish Morocco who could 
correspond, mostly with the help of scribes, with their next of kin. The loss of contact with families 
back home led in the case of one soldier, Mohamed ben Abdesslem ben Si Ahmed, to receive news 
that people in his home village thought that he was dead. Only one year later he had finally been able 
to attain a leave of absence for Morocco and decided to rejoin his family.86  
However, a sizable part of the deserters left the Spanish army due to circumstances related to 
their stay in Spain. fifteen deserters explicitly indicated that combat fatigue and fear of (renewed) 
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injury or the mere desire to avoid fighting, were the leading reasons to desert. nine other deserters 
simply stated that they did not want to go back to the front, and since most of them had been injured it 
is implied that they deserted for the same reasons as the earlier mentioned fifteen.87 One deserter who 
had left for Spain in April 1938, to get injured almost immediately, and who deserted in May 1938, 
made no secret of his fear of ‘the intensity of combat’ and his worry that his leg would be amputated 
should he receive a new injury.88 Even for those who had not indicated fear of being repeatedly 
wounded or combat weariness as a motive for desertion (including those citing homesickness as 
motive), the battle injuries must have played a great role, as the majority of the deserters to the French 
Zone who were interrogated were convalescents of battle wounds and many were wounded more than 
once, and therefore the fear of injury and combat fatigue must have contributed to the desertion of far 
larger numbers than those who stated explicitly to have deserted to avoid combat or suffering more 
injuries. 
Besides homesickness and war weariness, others were simply disillusioned with the army life. 
25 stated clearly that dissatisfactions with life in the army or its material rewards was a central or sole 
reason to desert. There were eleven others who did not state explicitly their reasons for desertion but 
whose interrogations imply that their dissatisfaction with army life pushed them to desertion. Some 
were disappointed because the material gain was not up to their expectations and they failed to amass 
enough savings.89 Others were angry because of irregular pay, or bad conditions including poor 
nourishment and clothing.90 In some cases the deserters claimed that part of the pay of French 
Moroccans was withheld by the Spanish as a discouragement against desertion.91 Some complained 
about their treatment by their superiors, a matter already mentioned above, although not all those 
dissatisfied with army life or pay were necessarily on bad terms with their immediate superiors. A few 
complained about promotions.92 In a few cases deserters indicated that their recruitment in the Spanish 
army was not voluntary in the first place and they therefore wanted to desert since the beginning.93  
A distinctive case concerns Ahmed ben Mohamed Soussi, who was described as an officer in 
the Regulares, and is the only Moroccan deserter featured in the French files who carried this rank. He 
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was simply tired after having served the army for thirty years. After participating in combat in Spain, 
and desiring to retire, his request was refused and he deserted because, according to him, Franco raised 
the total required service period before eligibility for retirement to 36 years.94 Even more noticeable is 
the case of Said ben Mbarek, a corporal who was arrested in Ceuta, on his way to Morocco on 
convalescence leave, for suspicion of ordering his men not to fire on the enemy during the last combat 
in which he participated. Imprisoned for two months, he escaped and reached the French zone where 
he was interrogated in February 1939. He did not explain whether he was guilty of the charge, but 
stated that his imprisonment reinforced his already existing (unexplained) intention to desert. 95 
Desertion was a way of expressing dissatisfaction for those who had the opportunity of returning to 
Morocco on leave, and more so for those who could afford to desert to French Morocco, where they 
would be out of the reach of Spanish military justice.  
Protest 
For the majority of the Moroccan soldiers serving in Spain with no near prospect of receiving leave for 
Morocco, the expression of dissatisfaction could take the form verbal protest or group demonstrations 
as in the case of the dissolved unit of Tiradores del Rif. In early February 1937, a number of members 
of the Tiradores del Rif were present, without being granted authorisation, in Salamanca, where 
Franco’s headquarters were located, to ask an audience with the Generalissimo to level a number of 
complaints with regard to bad treatment, pay issues and the lack of leaves. Subsequently the 
Nationalist commander of the Madrid Division sent a letter to Franco, in which more details on the 
unit to which these protesters belonged and of its problems come to light. The Tiradores of the Rif 
was a Harka, an irregular unit formed by a certain major Doval. Their members were not to receive 
any salary from the military, but had to live off the loot of the razzias they committed during their 
march that took them up to Seseña (Toledo province) where they camped. As such, the lootings this 
unit committed were not only sanctioned (one of the rare cases where officially permissible looting is 
documented), but were integral to its existence. The problem was, as the commander of the Madrid 
Reinforced Division pointed out in his letter to General Franco in February 1937, that this source of 
income for these troops had ceased to exist. They were demanding now to be treated as soldiers of 
Regulares or Mehal-las and therefore to receive salaries, and that was, according to the Madrid 
Division commander the only reason for their dissatisfaction. He suggested to Franco the dissolution 
of the unit, and integration of any of its members who wished to do so, into the Mehal-las of the Rif, 
Tetuan and Larache, each according to his origin.96 Franco agreed to the suggestion and the unit was 
disbanded.97  
This unit was, as far as the documentary material shows, the only one to have been dissolved 
as a result of protest by its members, as well as being the only one that lived solely through plunder. 
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The dissolution of the unit did not bring the matter to an end as various members were simply 
discharged and sent to Morocco, where they protested being discharged ‘having committed no fault’ 
and demanded a return to the frontlines. The Tetuán regional office for the Delegation of Native 
Affairs promised those disgruntled a speedy assignation to other units, in the belief that it would 
prevent these elements from spreading dissatisfaction among friends and families, and especially since 
their discharging documents had not labelled them with misconduct.98  
A few months after the issue of the Tiradores of the Rif was laid to rest, a group of disgruntled 
Moroccan soldiers appeared, once again in Salamanca, this time belonging to the 1st Tabor of 
Regulares of Ceuta. 125 soldiers that were supposed to move from the Madrid front to Baena, where 
the Tabor was stationed, came unannounced to Salamanca on June 11, 1937, led by a sergeant. After 
receiving food and orders to continue to Baena, many of them refused to march claiming that someone 
had promised them that they would receive their leaves of absence in Salamanca. The military 
governor sent a detachment of civil and assault guards to force them to embark on a train and to leave 
the city towards their Tabor. After the train drove away, twelve of the group jumped from the train and 
were arrested. Interrogated by the Moroccan military police, the mejasnia, they declared that they all 
had been injured before and received no leaves and that certain amounts were due to them. Eleven 
were released and one, a corporal who was believed the mastermind of the protest, was detained. The 
captain of the military police however, sympathised with the demands and expressed his opinion to the 
Salamanca military governor.99 
In response to the incident, the Delegation of Native Affairs tried to explain the existence of 
dissatisfaction regarding the lack of leaves. It noted that there was no problem in relation to the 
injured, and that between April and July more than 3,800 leaves were issued by military hospitals 
under the instructions of the General Directorate for Mobilisation, Instruction and Recuperation, but 
that the problem was with those who had been injured and discharged before the mentioned period, 
and with those who were not injured. It recommended, given the duration of the campaign, and the 
‘idiosyncrasy of the Muslim’ to concede leaves, in certain proportion, to those who had not received it 
yet and particularly to those who had suffered injury before. To prevent the loss of those going to 
Spanish Morocco with leaves, all the information concerning the convalescents was to be provided to 
the Delegation to pass them on to the interventores of the tribes to which they belonged. The 
Delegation also ascribed this lack of discipline to the fact that it concerned recently recruited soldiers 
who were not knowledgeable of military virtues, and although it was deemed excusable, it opined that 
for reasons of setting an example, the masterminds of the incident should not receive leave.100 While 
the incident might have been rather exceptional, given the amount of correspondence related to it and 
the concern it arose, it would have certainly contribute to greater awareness of the injustices regarding 
                                                 
98 ‘-:Nota:- sacada de la hoja secreta nr. 158, del 16-3-1937, de la Regional de Tetuán’.AGA, Af, 81.2195 
99 Note from the 23rd Division, 25 June 1937. AGMAV, A. 1, L. 59, Cp. 27. 
100 Delegation of Native Affairs/Service in Spain to Commander of the Army of the South. 14 July 1937. 




the lack of leaves, and greater response from the Spanish military leadership, which in this case as in 
others demonstrated readiness to accommodate the demands of the soldiers. 
The Spanish Nationalist army was always interested in remaining up to date with the status of 
morale of their Moroccan troops. A document in December 1937 relates what was reported by a 
Moroccan lieutenant, who was sent to Saragossa to eavesdrop on troops and gain information on their 
comments and opinions.101 The troops belonged to the Tiradores of Ifni, Regulares of Ceuta and the 
Mehal-la of Gomara. According to the report all were dissatisfied except for the soldiers of the Mehal-
la. Those of Ifni complained about delay of eight months in payment, and recounted that during a 
confrontation with the adjutant of the commander of the Tiradores unit, a Moroccan sergeant shot the 
adjutant before turning the gun on himself, an episode which was followed with rapid fulfilment of the 
due payments. The soldiers of Ifni and of the Ceuta Regulares also complained about their clothing 
and compensations, claiming jackets were distributed to Spanish soldiers but not to them. 
On the subject of officers, these soldiers noted that while some of them behaved well, many 
stayed hidden in the valleys while the troops fought and later these officers received rewards to the 
exclusion of the troops. The lieutenant-turned-spy heard expressions like:  
 
this has become too long! At the beginning it was alright, but now many people have died! We 
will die here too! As it has rained in our land, it is there that we must stay. Nobody is taking 
care of us. They scorn us. Even Franco does not take care of us, for in Morocco they say to us 
that Franco loves us very much and he considers us the same as the Spaniards and that is why 
we came with many of us, but later this is not true anymore. 
 
 The lieutenant also heard from the troops that the:  
 
Muslim authorities who come to the zone to visit them, come in trips paid for by the Makhzen 
[government] and to enjoy their time, that these [the Muslim authorities] tell them that their 
wives are alright and that Franco is taking care of them and that he loves them very much, and 
that they will convey their needs to Franco. But later, as it happens, they do not tell him 
anything, they mislead him, and their wives are not paid and they [the troops] are not attended 
to.  
 
Later, fourteen soldiers from Regulares Tetuan arrived, and the lieutenant took the opportunity to 
speak with them and to learn that they had escaped their camp to complain to General Moscardó about 
a Moroccan soldier who was shot in the hand, and was subsequently charged with self-mutilation and 
shot, while a Moroccan kaíd was imprisoned for objecting to the decision. The fourteen came to 
                                                 




demand the release of the kaíd or otherwise the whole Tabor would come to Saragossa. Among other 
observations the lieutenant made was the complaint that in units with old officers and chiefs of the 
Moroccan forces there were no problems and the troops were well understood and attended to by their 
officers. But the problem was that unit commanders could not choose competent officers for these 
Moroccan units, but had to deal with whatever officers they were sent, and that the experience of the 
Alféreces Provisionales had produced bad results. Officers of the Moroccan troops insisted to him that 
new officers must follow a special course before assigning them to Moroccan units.102 
In connection with the previous report, there was a proposal by captain Torres to ‘remedy’ the 
potentially dangerous situation. Among his suggestions was to appoint an inspector for Moroccan 
forces along with auxiliary personnel that should interfere immediately to resolve any incident. These 
auxiliary groups should contain an Arabic speaking officer that was specialised in commanding 
Moroccan troops, and aided by Muslim agents of investigation and surveillance drawn from soldiers 
of high confidence. He also suggested creating a command school for Moroccan forces.103  
 Personal prestige of the Moroccan soldiers appears to have played a part in the troubles some 
of the soldiers caused. A report in September 1938, the commander of the Group of Regulares of 
Ceuta noted that the ‘Moor’ tries from the first moment to distinguish himself within his unit so that he 
will be chosen by his company captain or his Tabor commander for promotion. Two factors are 
essential for one to attain ascendance: how the soldier conducts himself, and his permanence within 
his unit. But problems arose with wounded soldiers who, after recuperation, were sent to Tabors other 
than their original ones to cover losses according to arising military needs, which for the concerned 
soldiers meant loss of built up prestige in their original units. The report complains that, since those 
recuperating were sent to units where nobody recognised them a phenomenon came to service 
whereby the ‘Moor’ either deserted from his new unit to go and join his old one, or kept causing 
trouble so that he would be sent to his old unit.104 These examples of protest demonstrations were, 
despite their serious potential, easily manageable and solvable affairs. Dismissing them, however, 
would have entailed great risks of mutiny, especially on the battlefield.  
Violent protest and rebellion 
Cases of mutinies by Moroccan troops at the front were rare. There were, however, serious incidents 
that could have produced extremely negative consequences for the Nationalist war effort. In discussing 
the nature of the troops from Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, Fernández-Aceytuno asserted that justice is 
an extremely valued concept for the people of those regions. And while they in general do tend to 
avoid following the law, they are very demanding of justice from authorities, and if they are caught in 
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violation of the laws they would patiently accept and tolerate the due punishment. But since they are 
very sensitive to injustice dealt to them they could retaliate very strongly. Aceytuno then proceeded to 
relate an incident which though he described as an unjustified example of indiscipline, he nevertheless 
blamed the Spanish officers for its occurrence. In September 1938 and after successful operations a 
Tabor of Ifni soldiers were brought to a train station in Saragossa where they had to wait for a special 
train to take them to another sector. They had not received their pay for a substantial time, their 
clothing was in tatters and no food was prepared for them. In this precarious situation the majority of 
the officers committed the ‘grave error’ of going to town to rest and came back in the night, some of 
them having had ‘one glass too many’. Only one young lieutenant decided to stay with his troops and 
share their tiresome situation. When the time came to embark on the train, only the platoon of this 
young lieutenant obeyed the orders, while the rest refused to do so. One of the other officers drew his 
pistol to enforce the order but he was immediately shot by multiple rifles. Despite this example of the 
extreme ‘sensibility’ and ‘irritability’ of the native soldiers towards injustice, Aceytuno found that the 
soldiers from Ifni and the Sahara were very good and compliant soldiers if they had a sensible officer 
of moral integrity, and that they were ready to forgive in silence the unintentional human mistakes. 
Such an officer would never have more ‘loyal and obedient’ troops.105 Obviously, not all officers 
could aspire to be of such quality and therefore there are more instances of violent protest and even 
rebellion.  
Jorge Vigón Suerodíaz, a Nationalist officer, tells in his memoirs, published in 1970, of a 
mutiny at the Teruel front of an unnamed Moroccan Tabor, during the second half of February 1938 
when the fighting to capture the city was very fierce. The soldiers overthrew their officers and would 
not listen to ‘reason’. The circumstances of the mutiny, which he likened to mutinies of the Spanish 
Tercios in Flanders in the seventeenth century, are not clear in Vigón’s account, except that it was the 
result of ‘lack of knowledge of their psychology’. The situation lasted until after the recapture, by the 
Nationalists, of Teruel. During this time the Tabor kept fighting and advancing ‘on its own account 
and risk, and not badly’. After the end of the battle the Moroccan commander Mohammed Mizzian 
arrived to attempt mediation. The Tabor insisted that ‘Franco is their father but that the officers are 
rojos’. Here we see again the inclination to label bad officers ‘red’ and therefore enemies of the 
Nationalist cause. The matter was resolved in an apparently non-violent way and many would be sent 
home.106 According to Mesa, the Tabor involved in this incident, was the 10th Tabor of the Regulares 
Alhucemas. After losing all their native and Spanish officers during an attack at the Teruel front, the 
troops of the Tabor were sent a Spanish captain who had recently joined the Nationalists after having 
deserted from enemy lines. The troops did not trust deserters from the enemy camp, they rejected the 
appointment and named a Moroccan sergeant as their commander and sent a report to Franco 
informing him of their lack of officers and that they would only follow the orders of the 
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Generalissimo. The Tabor persisted in rejecting officers who were sent to them to the extent that they 
posted machine guns to the front and back to watch against anyone approaching their lines.107 
The Varela archives contain documents on an act of mutiny by a Moroccan Tabor on the 
Teruel front, roughly in the same period as the incident named by Vigón and Mesa, though the Varela 
documents show that it involved a different unit than the one Mesa mentions and for slightly different 
reasons.108 On 17 February 1938 an unknown Moroccan entered the liaison office of the German 
Legion Condor and delivered a letter, written in Spanish and from a certain M. Busta, on the Teruel 
front, addressed to a certain ‘Mr. German lieutenant colonel’, informing him that the 4th Tabor of the 
Regulares Larache Group was ‘separated from its chiefs’ due to the prior execution of three ‘Moors’ 
and planned execution of two more, ‘without a single motive’. The writer of the letter explained that 
he had written 15 letters before to Spanish superiors without receiving a response, and that he 
therefore asked the German lieutenant colonel to inform General Franco or ‘our general Hitler’ of 
these events, as the writer was convinced that all the Spanish officers were withholding this 
information from Franco and from ‘our chiefs and officers from Germany’, finishing his letter with 
stating that the Tabor was doing its service on the front line as it should and under the command of a 
Moroccan officer who – a strange and inexplicable statement this is – has ‘German lawyers’.109 
The chief of the Condor Legion liaison office did not attach much importance to the matter 
and therefore did not detain the unnamed Moroccan who delivered the letter, but he passed the letter to 
the 5th Army Corps the head of which expressed resentment at the idea of Moroccans complaining to a 
foreign officer about ‘the treatment they receive from us’.110 Other letters, written in early March 
(which means that the troubles with the Tabor were still unresolved) by the same Busta, who called 
himself the officer in chief of the Tabor, portray a more detailed picture of the grievances about which 
he was complaining and the situation with the Tabor. The letters mentioned a number or grievances: 
the previous execution of three soldiers on the Asturias front, for no obvious reasons, and another one 
at the Guadalajara front for which the blame was laid at the doors of ‘the captain of his company’. The 
planned shooting of two others was also mentioned. According to Busta, one soldier entered a house in 
a village and brought with him a coat which he showed to the captain of his company, and he was 
punished for this by receiving 300 beatings, and was to be shot.111 
It is implied in the letters by Busta that the soldiers threw their officers out and took charge of 
the Tabor under the leadership of the only Moroccan officer they had. The letters do mention that on 
25 and 26 February the sending of provisions to the Tabor was stopped, and that the soldiers were told 
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that ‘the Moors are not needed here in Spain’. In addition, charges of robbing wages are levelled at a 
number of officers, and a list was provided with names of officers and civilian officials, both Spanish 
and Moroccan back in Morocco who, according to the complaint were stealing their wages, and some 
of whom were even molesting war widows. Busta, while still affirming loyalty to Franco and to Spain, 
demanded justice stating that ‘we came to Spain, voluntarily! To save and love our dear Spain. We did 
not come to Spain to receive beatings and so that these chiefs shoot us without reason’, and expecting 
from Franco a response ‘to know whether your Excellency want the Moors or do not want them’.112 It 
is not clear from the Varela archives, how the matter was resolved, what happened to Busta himself or 
whether any of Busta’s letters made it to ‘father Franco’ himself. 
Conclusions 
Rather than blindly obedient soldiers and mere pawns who were passive to how the army and the war 
affected them, many Moroccans of the Spanish army showed that when disgruntled, and with no 
appreciation of their grievances, they could choose to protest, rebel, or decide to leave the army 
altogether. The Spanish army harboured the idea that the Moroccan soldiers needed especially apt 
Spanish officers to lead them with an important role left to Moroccan officers as the middle link in 
between. It seems that in many cases, and probably the majority of the cases, the Spanish officers were 
successful in maintaining a positive relationship with their Moroccan subordinates. This is reflected in 
the memories of the aging veterans. Other officers however were not successful, and the tense 
relationship and lack of trust could lead to desertion or rebellion. Prior experience in Africa might 
partly explain the difference in performance of Spanish officers and the view of Moroccan soldiers 
towards them. Officers with experience in leading Moroccan troops, especially if they had participated 
in the war against the Rif rebellion and therefore developed a sympathy towards Moroccan troops, 
might display more enthusiasm to gain the trust of the Moroccan troops, compared to officers who had 
only served in Spain and had only just begun to take command of Moroccan soldiers. That would 
certainly apply to higher ranking Africanista officers, including Franco. New Spanish officers with no 
prior African past would have to take time to gain the trust of their culturally different men.  
Disgruntlement of the Moroccan soldiers, however, was not only caused by the nature of their 
relationship with their officers. Homesickness, war weariness and irregular pay could be causes of 
desertion even with the presence of officers deemed to be good and respectable by their troops. For 
many of those who were tired of military life with no recourse to rebellion or desertion, its end in 1939 
must have come as a great relief. 
 
 
                                                 
















Women and Religion. 





Victims, wives and concubines. 
 Relations between Moroccan troops and Spanish women 1 
 
It has generally been argued that during and after the Spanish Civil War the issue of Moroccan troops 
interacting with Spanish women was both a difficult and highly charged matter for the Spanish 
Nationalists. One scene in a Spanish film, Libertarias (1996), sums up the standard perception of this 
interaction. Towards the end of the film, a contingent of Moroccan soldiers takes a group of milicianas 
(militia women) by surprise and slaughters them with knives. At the same time, a nun, who had 
accompanied the militia-women, is forcefully undressed by two Moroccans while others are seen 
expressing sadistic enjoyment at the sight. Fortunately for the nun, a Spanish officer intervenes in time 
to save her from rape and possible death.2 This film represents the typical view of relations between 
Moroccan soldiers and Spanish women during the Civil War - a relationship of sexual aggressors and 
victims. Given this common viewpoint, it would be difficult to imagine that there were in fact 
voluntary carnal encounters, love stories and marriages between the two groups. However, these 
existed – even to an extent that suggests that they were more than incidental.   
The intent of this chapter is to furnish an overview of the interracial and intercultural relations 
between Moroccan soldiers who fought in Spain during the Civil War and the Spanish women of that 
time, and how the Spanish Nationalist authorities viewed and regulated these relations. The focus will 
be on the voluntary relations between these two groups. These relationships were an important 
indicator of how officials, particularly military authorities, in a European country regarded the 
interaction of what were effectively temporary Muslim immigrants with a European civilian society. 
In this regard, the reader will notice that the prevalent attitude in contemporary Spain that romantic 
relationships between Muslim men and Spanish women are doomed to failure,3 was also reflected in 
the outlook of the Spanish military authorities who brought Moroccan soldiers to Spain during the 
Civil War, despite their generally sympathetic attitude towards these soldiers and their culture.  
The Victims 
As growing numbers of Moroccan soldiers were either airlifted or shipped to southern Spain, in July 
1936 and afterwards, they came increasingly in contact with Spanish civilians in the areas they 
occupied. Soon stories of Moroccan atrocities and the mass rape of Spanish women started to spread 
among the pro-Republican population. These were generally reinforced by the traditional Spanish 
image of the ‘Moor’ as a lustful irrational being. There are a small number of testimonies of people 
                                                 
1 A large part of this chapter has appeared as ‘Victims, wives and concubines. The Spanish Civil War and 
Relations between Moroccan Troops and Spanish Women’ in: Götz Nordbruch & Umar Ryad eds., 
Transnational Islam in Interwar Europe. Muslim Activists and Thinkers (New York 2014) 211-232.  
2 Directed by Vicente Aranda, Spain, 1996.  
3 Daniela Flesler, The Return of the Moor. Spanish Responses to Contemporary Moroccan Immigration (West 




who claimed to have actual first-hand information of these charges. These will be the starting point in 
the discussion of this first and most controversial aspect of the interaction of Moroccan men and 
Spanish women during the Civil War. 
At some point in October 1936, at the crossroads outside Navalcarnero (to the west of 
Madrid), the American journalist John Whitaker wrote, in a classic and frequently cited account, how 
he met a Moroccan officer, Mohamed El Mizzian, who would eventually rise to the rank of general in 
Franco’s army. El Mizzian, according to Whitaker, had brought two young girls (presumably 
Republican militia-women) for interrogation and then taken them to a schoolhouse where forty 
‘Moorish’ soldiers were resting. When Whitaker asked what would happen to them, El Mizzian 
responded, ‘Oh, they’ll not live more than four hours’.4 Of course the reason that this anecdote is 
frequently quoted is that it probably is the only one that reported a rape in progress. Moreover, it 
cogently highlighted the reputation of Moroccan soldiers as the Civil War’s prime rapists. For 
propaganda purposes this reputation was also strongly promoted by General Queipo de Llano, the man 
who almost single-handedly took control of Seville in July 1936. During one of his infamous and 
terrifying evening radio speeches of that year Queipo luridly noted: ‘our brave Legionnaires and 
Regulares have shown to the reds what it means to be a man. Also to the red women, who now have 
finally come to know real men [Italics added]’.5 In one equally shocking comment (already referred to 
in chapter 1) and in the aftermath of the capture of the city of Talavera de la Reina, Queipo announced 
the fall, in the Nationalist hands, of ‘numerous male and female prisoners. How satisfied will be the 
Regulares and how envious La Pasionaria would be [Italics added]’.6 While Queipo frequently mixed 
truth and lies in his speeches, and sometimes took to the microphone while drunk, his propaganda 
chief, Antonio Bahamonde, who later defected to the Republicans, is along with Whitaker one of the 
authorities cited concerning accusations of Moroccan troops raping Spanish women. For instance, he 
mentioned in his memoirs, published 1938 in Barcelona, that in a number of Andalusian villages ‘the 
Moors raped the women they found on their way and killed them later’.7 Though there is certainly 
                                                 
4 John T. Whitaker, We Cannot Escape History (New York 1945) 114. ‘I suppose Franco felt that women had to 
be given to the Moors’, concludes Whitaker, since the Moors ‘were unpaid’. The military historian Jesús María 
Ruiz Vidondo denies in his article. Whitaker’s version of the events, arguing that the Regulares group Nr.5 
(Alhucemas), of which El Mizzian was a Tabor commander, did not advance through Navalcarnero but through 
Boadilla. He does not provide evidence for his argument. See: Jesús María Ruiz Vidondo, ‘Ben Mizzian, el 
General Moro de Franco’, Arbil, nr. 119 (2009), accessed 4 September 2013, url: http://revista-
arbil.es/119ruiz.htm. However, the records of Mizzian’s military career, kept in the military archives of Segovia, 
credit him and his Tabor for playing a part, on 29 October 1936, in the occupation of Navalcarnero. Whitaker 
was therefore correct about at least the month and the location in which Mizzian was present. Archivo General 
Militar de Segovia, Caja 746, Exp.6/pag. 59. 
5 Ian Gibson, Queipo de Llano. Sevilla, verano de 1936, 84. See Gibson’s comment on the different versions of 
this quote. 
6 Ibidem, 431. 





some truth in his claims, he might have exaggerated the scale of the rapes.8 The question then revolves 
around the scale of cases of Moroccan soldiers raping Spanish women during the Civil War. 
Firstly, there is evidence that during the first weeks of the Civil War there were sexual assaults 
committed against suspected Republican women by Nationalist men (and one would assume that 
Republican males committed similar acts against Nationalist women). These would seem to have been 
the work mostly of Spaniards. Carlota O’Neill, the Mexican wife of a Republican pilot executed early 
in the war, for instance, tells of women with Republican sympathies being raped in Melilla during 
1936. The perpetrators were always Spanish Falangists.9 Consequently, perpetrators of such acts, if 
they occurred on a wide scale, were not solely Moroccans. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that 
Moroccans constituted the majority of the offenders. Secondly, unlike those quantitative studies of 
rapes committed by Allied troops, both Western and Soviet, in post-World War II Germany and 
Eastern Europe,10 there are no comparable studies concerning the similar behaviour of Nationalist 
troops, including Moroccan troops, during the Spanish Civil War. While there can be little doubt that 
such acts did take place, it is not known whether the numbers were in the thousands, or hundreds or 
even less. Historians have never managed to translate these probabilities into bottom-line figures. 
Francisco Sánchez Ruano is unique in attempting to quantify rape cases that Moroccan troops 
committed, or might have committed, though in the end he does not produce solid numbers. Based on 
his research of mainly municipal archives, he concludes that large scale cases of rape committed by 
Moroccan troops were confined to the initial stage of the war in a few villages of Andalusia, 
Extremadura, and in the zone of Toledo (in Castilla la Mancha) as well as during the last phase of the 
war in Catalonia.11 Thirdly, oral testimonies from Spanish citizens who witnessed the war produce 
contradictory images of the conduct of Moroccan troops. To take an example from Asturias, two 
female witnesses comment, around six decades later, on the presence of Moroccan troops. One stated 
                                                 
8 An example of such exaggeration is the estimation of Bahamonde of 150,000 executed in the area of command 
of General Queipo, which could not have happened during the period that Bahamonde worked for Queipo and in 
the geographical area under Queipo’s command. Bahamonde claimed that Moroccan troops were brought by 
planes to Jérez, and were tied to the wings so as to transport the greatest possible number.  He claimed to have 
witnessed two ‘Moors’ in Seville who showed the marks of ropes that were used to tie them on the wings. See: 
Bahamonde, Un año con Queipo, 26.   
9 Carlota O’Neill, Trapped in Spain (Toronto 1978) 42-43. 
10 For example, J. Robert Lilly estimated that American soldiers committed 17,800 rapes in England, France and 
Germany.  Antony Beevor estimates the number of rape victims of Soviet troops in Germany to be around two 
million. Soviet troops even raped ‘liberated’ female prisoners from Polish, Ukrainian or Russian nationalities. 
See: Robert J. Lilly, Taken by Force: Rape and American GIs in Europe during WWII (New York 2007) and 
Antony Beevor, Berlin: The Downfall 1945 (London  2002). 
11 Francisco Sánchez Ruano, Islam y Guerra Civil española. He studied and documented 34 cases of rape and 
murder in Catalonia committed by Moorish troops and believes that those practices were widespread in 
Catalonia, see his conclusions: Ruano, Islam y Guerra Civil, 381. He leaves the question undecided whether the 
geographical concentration of the crimes in mainly Catalonia and Andalusia has something to do with a lack of 
research on other regions or with different behavior by Moorish troops in different places. He takes precautions 
in his conclusions though. Sometimes troops of different origin operated together in the same region making 
identifying particular units difficult, besides the fact that after the effective ending of military operations the 
Moorish units were moved out, being followed by a period of post-combat repression in which the actors were 




that ‘we had to be at home early, because of the Moors, who were stationed in one corner and had 
carte blanche for doing what they liked’. Although she does not explicitly mention what it was what 
they liked, and whether anyone was a victim of that carte blanche in her village, the fear from what the 
Moroccans could do specifically to girls if they were not home early is implicit. But then there is 
another witness who spoke of the Moors who were walking through the mountains with their sheep 
and goats and stated that ‘the truth is that with us, when we met them, they behaved well’.12 Fourthly, 
there is evidence that except in cases where it was the deliberate policy of the regional commander 
(Queipo de Llano, for instance) to use sexual violence or the threat of it as a weapon, it seems that 
Moroccan troops generally, as the testimonies of individual Moroccan veterans assert, did not overstep 
discipline. When individual soldiers did, punishment would often follow quickly and harshly.   
A number of historians who discussed this issue either confirm the existence of widespread 
sanctioned rapes or deny them by giving a number of interesting arguments. As it has already been 
mentioned (see chapter 2) El Merroun rejects what he considers to be fabrications about rape charges 
towards the Moroccans. One argument he uses is that Islamic law severely opposes as well as punishes 
such crimes.13 That is not a strong argument as history is full of examples of soldiers violating 
religious commandments against rape, murder and theft. Therefore, this argument, while it might 
apply for some, is not a reasonable basis for the denial of the accusations. Furthermore the Moroccan 
soldiers themselves hardly proved to be uniformly religiously observant.14 The argument that 
Moroccan soldiers would refrain from rape because of their religious upbringing was already used, in 
1940, by the Spanish priest and Arabist Miguel Asín Palacios when he argued that the respect for 
Islam towards the virtue of chastity was evidenced by ‘our very own Moroccan soldiers’, who turned 
their eyes, with clear embarrassment, away from immodest images to the point that in some hospitals 
they were seen tearing the pages of the Spanish magazines that were put in their hands for 
entertainment. Based on that, the author wonders whether any value or fundament can be attached to 
the calumnious campaign that the Marxist press undertook since the start of the campaign attributing 
to the Moroccan soldiers the savage rape of women, which is far from the spirit and the letter of their 
religious law, ‘a law that is an irreconcilable enemy of adultery which Islamic law punishes with cruel 
penalties’.15 El Merroun has other arguments however, as he also points out that the Moroccan troops 
had access to brothels in several corners of the peninsula. More importantly, he argues that the 
                                                 
12 Testimonies by, respectively, Faustina Lobo Díaz , (from the Aller region) and Elena Fernández González 
(from the region of Lena), in: Caunedo, Díaz and Alonso, Asturias, 70 años, 70 voces. Testimonios y memorias 
de una guerra, 216, 238. 
13 El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíes en la Guerra Civil española, 203. 
14 See the following chapter ‘Moros y Cristianos’.  
15 Miguel Asín Palacios, ‘Porqué lucharon a nuestro lado los musulmanes marroquíes’, in: Miguel Asín Palacios, 
ed., Obras escogidas II y III de historia y filología árabe (Madrid 1948) 125-151, here 145. He published this 




Nationalist authorities would severely punish those crimes, including using the death penalty.16 As it 
will be illustrated below, his arguments have some valid basis in the historical record. 
The other side of the debate is represented by scholars like de Madariaga and Balfour. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, Madariaga argues that atrocities, including rape, constituted standard practice 
of the colonial forces both in Morocco and in Spain that were encouraged by their commanders. 
Similarly, Balfour argues that Moroccans and Legionnaires knew no other form of war than colonial 
war and that was characterised by massacres and looting as well as rape. Understandably none of his 
Moroccan interviewees, however, confirms that.17  
The arguments of both Balfour and Madariaga are reasonable and the reference to the colonial 
wars in Morocco is compelling. However, there are a few comments that could be made about them. 
First, there was a decade separating the end of the rebellion in the Rif and the start of the Civil War, 
making the suggestion that raping in Spain would be merely an automatic continuation of raping in 
Morocco not very convincing. As of 17 July 1936 (the start of the military coup), such practices had 
not been routine behaviour for the Moroccan troops, for at a decade. Second, as earlier mentioned, the 
number of veterans of the colonial war in the Moroccan units were no more than a couple of 
thousands. While previous veterans of the Moroccan colonial war might have re-enlisted, the great 
majority of the enlistees were probably youngsters who had no military experience and were generally 
no older than between 6-10 years when the war against Al Khattabi ended, even if they would have 
known the stories of the war. For them, there would have been no continuation of rape as a colonial 
practice, nor would it apply to the thousands of volunteers from French Morocco who had no 
experience in the Spanish colonial army or its brutal practices during its fight against the Riffian 
rebels. This does not invalidate the arguments of Madariaga or Balfour, but that they would apply to a 
far smaller proportion of the Moroccan army in Spain than their arguments would suggest. 
Charges of rape committed by Moroccan soldiers cannot be dismissed, but the assessment of 
this phenomenon at times lacks a clear basis in documents and testimonies. For example, Gustau Nerín 
claims, in his otherwise valuable work, that ‘many of the Moroccans who were convicted during the 
war, were accused of sexual abuses, but the sentences were very light (months, including days of 
imprisonment)’. However, the archival sources, which he uses to support this claim, contradict his 
conclusion.18 Among hundreds of offences, ranging from drunkenness to murder, seven cases are 
related to rape (violación). In three of these, the offenders received life sentences, while the military 
courts handed out two other Moroccans thirty years of imprisonment each. There is also one case of 
sexual assault (abusos deshonestos) for which a sentence of fourteen years, four months and one day 
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was given. The lightest sentence, mentioned in this source, for an offender convicted of rape was six 
years, one month and sixteen days. These judgments hardly validate Nerín’s claim of ‘light’ 
sentences.19 
Western historians have usually neglected the Moroccan side of the rape issue which has been 
elicited in the recent past through interviews of aging veterans. Despite the necessary caution that one 
should take in considering these interviews, they cannot in fact be ignored given the pejorative 
historical legacy and reputation that have been associated with the actions of Moroccan troops during 
the Spanish Civil War. This legacy and reputation continues to this day to be linked in Spanish public 
discourse to the ‘Moor’. 
In these interviews the majority of Moroccan veterans indicated that they had not witnessed, 
participated in or had any knowledge of cases of Moroccan troops raping Spanish women. All agreed 
that their superiors forbade them, on the pain of death, from attacking civilians or hurting women.20  
At the same time, some admitted that looting was permissible upon first entering an enemy village or 
town. One of the veterans noted that ‘there never was aggression against civilians. It was the finest 
army. It was forbidden to touch women or any house. The major, San Martín, told the Tabor: “no 
touching of women, no touching of anything’”.21 
Still there were a few Moroccan veterans who did confirm that some soldiers were involved in 
cases of rape; one veteran even confirmed more than one instance. He noted that when the army 
entered a city the soldiers were free to loot as they liked, but that civilians were, according to him, off-
limits. Failing to respect that order entailed a consejo de guerra (court martial). He witnessed the trials 
of two cases of rape that Moroccan soldiers had committed, one case occurred in Seville, where the 
perpetrator received the death sentence. The other took place in Catalonia, when three soldiers raped 
two girls of one family. Two soldiers were subsequently executed after interrogation while the third 
fled to the ‘rojos’.22 This last incident is suspiciously similar to one recounted by another veteran, in 
whose version three Moroccans raped girls from one family and killed the parents. Two of the 
perpetrators were caught and executed, while the third managed to flee and eventually to find his way 
back to Morocco.23 Both accounts could be of the same incident. But in the second version, General 
Muñoz Grandes plays a part as he spoke to one Moroccan kaíd (native officer) asking him: ‘We were 
at war in Morocco. Did we do such things?’ The kaíd answered in the negative where upon the general 
                                                 
19 Whether the convicts served their full sentences is another matter, which the source does not clarify. 
20 Among testimonies that claimed the strict prohibition on rape, usually to be punished by death, are those of: 
Mohamed Imhaouesh, Mohamed ben Amar ben Al Hashmi, Ahmad ben Abdullah Al Omari, Al Massari, Al 
Bouyekra, as well as other testimonies in the personal archive of El Merroun, and those of most of the veterans 
interviewed for this study. 
21 Interview with Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed, Alqazarquivir, 21 February 2011.  
22 Testimony of Mohammed al Ayyashi Al Bakouri who served in the headquarters of his unit working on legal 
and native affairs. 7 April 1994, El Merroun archive.  




asked ‘then why did these [soldiers] kill [those] people?’24 The native officers of the unit then put their 
signatures on the execution order.  
Another veteran relayed how on one occasion a girl was raped. After dismissing the first two 
groups of soldiers that were brought to her, she identified the supposed perpetrator in the third group, 
and thereupon he was executed by his own unit ‘so that others would not be able to do it. Therefore, 
when we entered an inhabited place we could not do anything’. The chief of his unit had told its 
members that Spain was not like Morocco. In Morocco ‘the women do as you want from them’, but in 
Spain if a woman ‘wants to, then it does not matter to anyone. But if she does not want to, then there is 
nothing [that can happen] by force’.25 In fact the Moroccan veterans who expressed their views on this 
issue always approved of the shooting of a rapist, whether they witnessed an actual rape or not. But 
punishment was not always taken for granted, as rape charges were sometimes disputed by fellow 
soldiers. One death sentence for two Moroccans accused of rape and killing, for instance, prompted a 
Tabor of the Mehal-la – that thought the soldiers were innocent - to refuse to follow orders and to start 
marching towards Salamanca with the intention of protesting to Franco that they were ‘dying in times 
of war and in times of peace’.26 
The testimonies of the Moroccan veterans concerning the issue of rape leave one with the 
impression that Moroccan troops were strongly discouraged by their Spanish officers from committing 
rape, at least after late 1936. Further, if they did in fact commit the act and were caught they generally 
suffered harsh penalties ranging from extended incarceration to execution. Moreover, there are two 
contemporary accounts by Moroccan soldiers from the Spanish army who deserted to French Morocco 
that confirm the views given, more than half a century after the war, in the previous testimonies. 
Among the 147 Moroccans from French Morocco who had served in the Spanish army and returned to 
the French zone, only two spoke of rape cases. Although they did not specifically state that they 
witnessed the rapes themselves, they stated that in both cases the perpetrators (one perpetrator in one 
case and four in the other) were shot.27 Not one of the 147 spoke of any license to commit rape, or of 
any rapes that went unpunished. Although most of these 147 soldiers did not participate in the first 
brutal weeks and months of the war, and although only two deserters spoke of cases of rape, these two 
still could be considered as strengthening the version of the events given by the veterans’ testimonies 
mentioned earlier.  
                                                 
24 Ibidem. However, the reference with regard to the Rif war, though it might be the experience of Muñoz 
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25 Interview with Masoud Ballah, Brussels, 5 November 2011.  
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the incident himself, but heard it from soldiers of the Mehal-la involved, while he was receiving treatment in the 
hospital. 
27 Interrogation of Mohamed B. Omar ben Amar Taliouani, and of Mohamed B. Omar ben Amar Taliouani, 




Rather than dismissing on the one hand the Moroccan deserters’ and veterans’ version of the 
rape subject as self serving or apologetic, or on the other hand the accounts of rape by Moroccan 
troops of Spanish women as trivial, both versions can be reconciled by considerations of the timeframe 
of the enlistment of the Moroccan interviewees. Most of the Moroccan veterans interviewed by 
historians, decades after the war, as well as the deserters interviewed by French authorities in French 
Morocco, were deployed in Spain after the first weeks and months of the Civil War when most of the 
sexual aggression by the Army of Africa (as well as others) took place in an environment of sweeping 
and often uncontrolled violence and terror, before the relative stabilisation of frontlines. Therefore the 
accounts of the Moroccan veterans and their own version  of the rape subject for the periods in which 
the majority of them served, can be considered reliable. 
To conclude this issue we must consider an important point and that is the scarce documentary 
evidence on the part of the Nationalists about sexual aggression committed by their Moroccan troops, 
which is remarkable given that these troops were accused of committing these crimes on a grand scale. 
It is even more remarkable when one compares it to the acts of rape committed by the Moroccan (and 
other North African and ‘coloured’) of the French Expeditionary Corps that fought in Italy in 1943 and 
1944, acts which were committed on a larger scale in May 1944 and immortalised in the 1960 movie 
Two Women (with Sophia Loren). Those acts of sexual aggression are somehow better documented 
than the rapes attributed to the Moroccans of the Spanish Civil War. The French military archives 
contain reports on more rape incidents and attributed to the Moroccans of the French army during the 
first half of 1944 in Italy than the Spanish archives have on rapes attributed to Moroccan soldiers 
during the whole 1936-1939 period,28 although these French documents do not give a specific number 
for Italian victims or rape and at first sight do not seem to speak of hundreds let alone thousands of 
rapes that were reported in Italy.29 Then remains the question of whether French commanders 
encouraged Moroccan troops and other colonial soldiers to commit atrocities in the Italian countryside. 
According to Italian sources, General Alphonse Juin promised, in a declaration written in Arabic, the 
colonial troops of the French Expeditionary Corps that they would have ‘women, houses, wine’ and 
everything they would desire. They could take, burn and destroy everything they wanted during fifty 
hours, should they penetrate the enemy line without leaving an enemy soul alive.30 Of course, the 
French commanders of that campaign have not admitted this allegation. However, the rapes in Italy 
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http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Ddlpres&leg=13&id=1012 (accessed on 11 July 
2013). 




led, on the part of the French, to hesitation on whether to use the Moroccan troops and specifically the 
irregular Goums for the liberation of France.31  
 On the point of scarce documentary evidence on rapes by Moroccan soldiers in Spain 
compared to the French case in Italy, we can discern important differences. Firstly, in Italy there were 
other international military forces in operation, especially the American forces that reported to the 
French command many of the offences committed by Moroccan troops against Italian civilians 
including rape. Secondly, by the time the Moroccans were fighting in Italy the Italian authorities had 
become partners with the Allies against the Germans, and so Italian police and military were able to be 
present in territories where French forces were also present and thus able to record and report excesses 
committed by the French colonial soldiers in general and the Moroccans in particular. Thirdly, since 
the Italians were not enemy and certainly not the civilians, and given the previous two considerations, 
the French would not or could not go to great lengths in hiding the crimes, although if thousands of 
Italian women were indeed raped then the French military must have committed great neglect in 
recording this. In Nationalist Spain, on the other hand, there were no significant international parties 
present, during the first weeks of the war, to witness and report any large scale rape incidents that 
might hurt the reputation of the Nationalist army nor any independent and neutral police force that 
might seek to defend the interest of Republican female victims of rape. But an alternative explanation 
for the scarcity of documentary evidence on rapes committed by the Moroccans of the Spanish 
Nationalist army (an explanation which is certainly unpalatable to those asserting that rape by 
Moroccan troops took place on a grand scale) is that these sexual crimes were far less frequently 
committed than usually is thought and, as the veterans maintain, that the harsh punishments were 
enough deterrence to keep those deeds in the category of the exception rather than the rule. One might 
also argue that that the fear of the Moroccans, strategically utilised by the Spanish Nationalists, caused 
an overreaction and led to the aggravation of the reputation of the Moroccan soldiers, and reinforced 
the image of the lustful and violent Moor that had been around for hundreds of years. 
The Allied campaign Italy was not the first episode to generate a negative attitude towards 
French colonial troops or blemish their record by accusations of sexual aggression. That fate befell  
the colonial troops of the French Army during the occupation of the Rhineland in 1920s. Between 
25,000 and 40,000 soldiers originated from Senegal, Algeria, Morocco and other French colonies in 
Africa. Discriminated against and targeted as a racially primitive and alien threat in the ‘heart of 
Europe’, they  were represented in the German media as being governed by dangerous, uncontrollable 
sexual instincts and desires, and depicted as an evil presence. Campaigners mobilising against the 
colonial soldiers denounced them as a ‘Black Shame’, and were concerned that the use of ‘primitive’ 
black troops to watch a ‘white nation’ would seriously undermine and threaten the ideology of white 
domination. That ‘savages’ could act like masters in Europe and that ‘coloured tribes’ were ‘allowed 
                                                 





to tyrannise a white people’ seemed outrageous to many Europeans in the early 1920s. The allegations 
united several liberal and left-wing organisations, trades unionists, German and international women’s 
organisations, members of parliament from different European countries and the United States, with 
Christian groups and the extreme right-wing in Germany.32 In Great Britain, the press either falsely 
represented or greatly exaggerated the behaviour of French African troops in the Rhineland, which in 
turn further stimulated racial animosity towards black people and mixed relationships in Britain.33 
The Wives 
For all the horror of individual and gang rape, relations between Moroccan soldiers and Spanish 
women during and after the Spanish Civil War were in fact much more nuanced and complex. Despite 
their propaganda-inspired reputation as lustful aggressors, a number of Moroccan soldiers had 
romantic relationships with Spanish women. In fact, there were a sufficient number of these 
relationships to alarm the Nationalist military and to motivate it to take measures to impede them.  
The following anecdote, by a veteran of Regulares Ceuta, El Hussein ben Abdesselam, is 
illustrative of the general attitude of Spanish society and the military towards mixed Moroccan-
Spanish relationships. One day, during the later stages of the war, El Hussein’s Tabor arrived at the 
Extremaduran village of Puebla de la Calzada, where some of the soldiers were quartered on the 
opposite side of a workshop where several girls worked sewing clothes. The owner, a wealthy Spanish 
woman, used to invite a number of Moroccan soldiers to come and sit with them. As the gatherings 
became more frequent the Spanish owner fell in love with a corporal, a fellow Regular of El Hussein, 
who was from Larache and was called Abdesselam,  and who apparently was well versed in Spanish. 
The romance ended in agreement between the two to marry. Upon hearing of the marital intentions of 
this Spanish woman, the people of the village were filled with dissatisfaction and a number 
complained to the commanding officer of the Tabor, demanding an end to the relationship. The 
commander promised to stop the intended marriage. He summoned the Moroccan corporal and 
assigned him fixed office duty, effectively preventing him from leaving his quarters until the unit left 
the village. El Hussein was one of the soldiers who informed the Spanish lady about these actions.  
After realising what happened she took her car and drove south, crossing into Morocco and 
heading towards Tetuan where she had an audience with the Khalifa, Mulay El Hassan ben El Mehdi, 
to seek his intercession. Commenting that he had no problem with a Spanish woman marrying a 
Moroccan subject, the Khalifa reassured her that he would intercede with Franco in the matter. 
Whatever the Khalifa might have written or said, it seems that it had the intended effect. Sometime 
later the Tabor commander summoned the people who complained to him about the Spanish-
Moroccan marriage, and told them that he had received instructions from Franco not to hinder the 
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marriage of the corporal and the Spanish lady. This did not mean the end of the story as the unit was 
moved out to be stationed, in the following months in a number of different places, with the Spanish 
fiancée of Abdesselam following the unit and renting a place in each locality that the unit came to 
settle in. But after several months the marriage documents were ready and the corporal was discharged 
from the army and remained in Spain with his Spanish wife.34 
This happy ending to the story of the Moroccan corporal and his wealthy Spanish wife was not 
representative of the majority of the cases of romantic relationships between Moroccan soldiers and 
Spanish women. The difficulties that these couples faced were significant. As one veteran pointed out: 
‘It was not easy to marry a Spanish woman. Not like today. They [the military superiors] would forbid 
it’.35 Indeed, this was the policy that the Spanish military, and the Protectorate authorities through their 
interventores, sought to implement. Franco’s positive attitude in the aforementioned anecdote was the 
exception to the rule. 
It is important to note that in the majority of documented cases of mixed marriages, intended 
marriages or other romantic relationships, the soldiers in question can be divided into two groups. The 
first consisted of wounded men who obviously had enough free time to stroll outside the hospitals and 
make contact with women of the cities where the military hospitals were located. ‘The nurses loved 
the Moroccans’, asserts one veteran, ‘the correspondence between the soldier and the nurse continued 
even after he returned to the front’.36 A letter, intercepted by the military censorship, in April 1938, 
speaks of a romance that developed during a period of recovery from injuries. In the letter sent by a 
Spanish woman, a resident of La Coruña, to her lover and ‘only protection in this world’, a certain 
Dris, in Morocco, she reminds him how she took care of him during fourteen months in La Coruña as 
he was injured. The letter speaks of her as an orphan and apparently no other relatives. She also asks 
him that when he reaches Morocco he should do whatever the military government of Spain entrusted 
him to do and that is to ask the High Commissioner in Morocco a permit so that she could pass to 
Morocco. She also informs him that she received in her town a travel permit that would allow her to 
travel.37 Whether the letter arrived at its destination and whether Dris managed, or even desired, to 
arrange for the permit is not known.38 
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The other group of soldiers involved in romantic relationships with Spanish women, a smaller 
group, consisted of those who were assigned duties that left them behind the front-lines, like the 
Moroccan military police, the Mejasnia, or those performing guard duties for high Spanish figures, 
such as General Franco. These circumstances facilitated the relationships that started to worry the 
Spanish military authorities.  
In May 1937 the Delegation of Native Affairs of the High Commissariat reported the case of a 
young Spanish girl form Saragossa, where a Muslim hospital existed, who tried to accompany an 
injured Moroccan back to Morocco with the intention of contracting a civil marriage. The report 
expressed relief that the lack of necessary documentation kept the girl from crossing the border at 
Castillejos into the Protectorate.39 However, it also expressed concerns that such instances might take 
place in the future and that such unions not only produced insurmountable problems but impeded the 
protecting mission, though it does not state how. The report asked for adequate measures to impede 
such journeys, preferably cutting them short in the places of origin, usually cities where Muslim 
hospitals existed.40 But such relationships continued to take place, and apparently not all military 
commanders were aware of their duty to stop intended marriages between Moroccan soldiers and 
Spanish women. In October 1937, a letter to the Delegation of Native Affairs asked its opinion on 
authorisation for matrimony between a soldier of Regulares Alhucemas and a Spanish woman, 
pointing out that the commander of the Regulares Alhucemas Group did not object to the matrimony 
but did not find himself in a position to authorise it as, in his opinion, the native authorities were the 
ones who should do so.41 In response the Delegation of Native Affairs advised, unsurprisingly, against 
such marriages, as the Spanish women were ignorant of the Muslim customs and lifestyles. It also 
objected on the grounds that such marriages demanded the matrimony to be Islamic, and that the 
meagre salary of a soldier would not economically be proper for a Spanish woman, which would be 
even worse if the couple were to live in a village rather than a city. 42 
Another case of an intended Moroccan-Spanish marriage that illustrates one of the 
justifications the Nationalist authorities used to oppose this type of relationships was that of the 
military policeman, or mejasni, also a member of Franco’s Moroccan Guard, Ben Brahim Susi. In 
March 1938 the Delegation of Native Affairs was informed that Susi had divorced his Moroccan wife 
and intended to marry a Spanish woman from Salamanca. The interventor in North Spain (the Spanish 
military controller of native affairs), who was charged with investigating the matter, noted that the 
Spanish woman had a limp and judging from ‘her physical look’, concluded that the Moroccan 
mejasni intended to benefit materially from marrying this much older woman. The interventor visited 
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the Spanish lady and ascertaining that she was not pregnant, tried to convince her of her wrong choice. 
His argument was interesting. The Spanish officer told her that ‘the Moors in a European environment 
are only useful for military service’. He also argued that Moors are ‘such friends of fantasy’ that he 
must have created grand stories about his personal attributes and great possessions.43 
The ‘problem’ of inter-religious marriages emerged with such frequency that it eventually 
became a matter for ministerial consideration. In July 1938 the Nationalist minister of National 
Defence issued an order prohibiting ‘illegal marriages’ between ‘Muslim soldiers’ and Spanish 
women. The order came as a result of a lengthy complaint concerning these marriages, which the 
Legal Department of the Ministry of Defence had previously formulated. The specific incident that 
prompted this complaint and the subsequent order was a marriage in Melilla between a Moroccan 
corporal of the Regulares and a Spanish woman who had come from the Peninsula. What was even 
more egregious and reflected a ‘lack in morality’ was that her father even gave ‘authorisation’ to the 
marriage. The Legal Department outlined in its report the possible consequences of such marriages. 
One negative effect mentioned, citing the opinions of military authorities in the Protectorate’s eastern 
region, was that these unions would enrage native women. As the report noted, the differences in 
tradition would ‘degenerate into quarrels that would cause continuous bitterness between women of 
both religions’.44 In addition, the report expressed a concern for the well-being of ‘our [female] 
compatriots’ who would gain neither spiritual nor material advantage from these marriages. The 
Ministry’s Legal Department urged civilian authorities in the Peninsula to do their utmost to legally 
hinder inter-religious relationships, and noted that the Church’s cooperation should not be a problem, 
as it can within its functions work to encumber such marriages. The report also lamented the fact that 
the Civil Code on marriage contained no prohibition regarding differences of faith. On the other hand, 
it noted that the Defence Minister could use the current law to insist on prior authorisation for any 
soldier wishing to contract marriage, and thus could legally require civilian authorities in Spain and 
Spanish Morocco to refuse to register such marriages without this authorisation. Finally, the report 
recommended that all sectors and commanders of Moroccan units be informed of this policy; but that 
it be done as discreetly as possible, given the ‘delicate’ nature of the matter. Further, the units should 
be ordered to keep authorisations to a minimum. 
The Defence Minister’s instructions did ultimately achieve the desired result. It prohibited the 
Muslim religious personnel attached to military units from actually sealing the marital contract, which 
was easy to do since many of them held the rank of officer. An example of such personnel attempting 
to seal undesired marital contract comes from March 1938 when the director of the Muslim hospital in 
Saragossa informed the interventor of Moroccan affairs in northern Spain that he learned about an 
intended marriage between a Spanish woman and one of the Moroccan patients who had asked the 
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hospital’s imam and the catib (scribe) to arrange the marital union. The director managed in time, 
though this took place before the ministerial July instructions, to instruct his two subordinates to stop 
the arrangements. Additionally, the interventor ordered the hospital’s religious staff to refrain from 
effectuating any further marriages without the authorisation of his office and without first providing 
the interventor with information on the ‘Moor’ and the ‘Christian’ woman and the circumstances of 
their relationship.45 
In light of the efforts of the Spanish military authorities to forestall marriages between Spanish 
women and Moroccan soldiers based on religious and cultural differences as much as possible, one 
might imagine that conversion to Christianity would have raised fewer objections to such unions. In 
1938, there was just such an instance. The military Muslim hospital of Medina del Campo reported 
that a member of the Mejasnia intended to marry a Spanish woman and would convert to Christianity 
to do so. This, however, presented the Spanish military with a more explosive issue since the intended 
conversion might give the appearance that the hospital administrators were condoning proselytising 
activities that were strictly forbidden in Muslim hospitals. The hospital’s director was eager to 
communicate that no such forbidden conversions were taking place.46 This sensitive issue was very 
important to Franco and his followers who presented themselves as ‘men of God’, whether Christians 
or Muslims, fighting the ‘godless reds’. As Carmen Franco, the daughter of the Generalissimo, stated, 
her father ‘had much respect for Islam’. For instance, he never advocated that the members of his 
Moorish Guard, who had married Spanish women, convert to Christianity. He thought that the 
Moroccans should not change religions because they were ‘very impervious and it was a complication 
to mix both religions’.47 While it probably can be concluded that Franco was not a supporter of these 
types of marriages, at least in the case of the Moorish Guard, he did not actively oppose them.  
In the 1940s when a sizable number of Moroccan soldiers were still stationed in Spain, the 
issue of Moroccan-Spanish marriages continued to concern the Franco government. As in the past, the 
same uncomfortable questions of religious and cultural differences dominated these alliances. As one 
veteran remembered during this period:  
 
The captain would be informed about the marriage. They would call the woman and ask her if 
she agrees to marry with him. She says yes, he says yes. Then they [the military superiors] 
would say: “he is a Moro and you are Spanish, how will you marry? If you agree to marry him 
according to his religion, then fine. If no, then you stay with your religion and he the same, but 
without marriage”. But when the children are born, that is a problem. When the child is born, 
they come and say: “what name will you give it”. Many times, they went to the priest, and the 
priest talks with the soldier: “the children must have the same religion, they cannot be parted, 
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you have the Moorish religion, the Muslim one, and she has the Spanish religion. It must be 
given a careful thought”. One of them must fall in the trap, the man or the woman. If the man 
loves her and wants to marry her then he must become a Spanish subject. They go to the priest 
and he baptises him. And if not, they remain like this [in non-marital relationship].48 
 
As such, the end of the Civil War in April 1939 did not put an end to the troubling issue of Moroccan-
Spanish marriages. Though large numbers of Moroccan troops returned to Morocco, others remained 
for garrison duty and to mop up the remnants of Republican resistance. This meant that the continued 
presence of some Moroccan troops in populated location in the Spanish Peninsula, led to continued 
romantic attachments leading to marriages, despite the restrictions imposed by the Spanish state,49 
which grew stronger in 1941 when it forbade municipal judges from authorising civil marriages, 
except for those who were not Catholic and those who could prove that they were not baptised. 
A July 1939 report highlighted yet another aspect of this issue: the question of the nationality of the 
Spanish female who contracted marriage with a Moroccan. The report noted an increase in the 
frequency with which Spanish women were entering into civil marriages with Moroccans either in 
front of Spanish municipal judges or justices of peace in Spanish Morocco.50 A problem arising from 
these unions was the question of the woman’s nationality. According to Article 22 of the Spanish Civil 
Code at the time, a Spanish woman who married a foreigner lost her Spanish nationality and 
automatically assumed the nationality of her husband.51 At the same time, Moroccan law did not grant 
Moroccan nationality to a foreigner marrying a Moroccan subject. The report also indicated that the 
local Moroccan authorities were too inflexible in providing these Spanish women, who decided to 
move with their husbands to Morocco, with the necessary Moroccan documentation. On the other 
hand, some Spanish women found it difficult to obtain the necessary Spanish documentation to travel 
with their Moroccan husbands in the first place, since they were now considered non-citizens by the 
Spanish authorities. As noted in both the documents of the Protectorate authorities and the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were also concerns for the political and legal well-being of these 
Spanish women.  They were losing the protection of Spanish laws, and while these were not the most 
liberal during this era the Spanish most certainly considered them more ‘progressive’ than those that 
existed in Morocco. This was yet another reason for the Spanish Nationalist authorities to feel 
uncomfortable with Moroccan soldiers having lasting relationships with Spanish women. In legal 
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terms, this concern was solved in March 1941 by prohibiting Catholics from contracting civil 
matrimonies.  
 There was one way of shielding Spanish women from the perceived disadvantages of moving 
with their Moroccan husbands to Morocco. The Delegation of Native Affairs in Tetuan noted in 1942 
that Moroccans who contracted legal marriages with Spanish women and had children with them 
should be exempt from the efforts by the General Directory for Morocco and Colonies to deport 
Moroccans who were deemed undesirable or illegal to avoid ‘the arrival to Morocco of these women 
and children where they would lead a life incompatible with the one led in the protecting nation’.52 
The problem of course was that most of the mixed couples moved to Morocco and the concern of the 
Delegation of Native Affairs in this regard was, in terms of the scale of the problem, of secondary 
importance. 
During the Civil War the Nationalist policy with regard to romantic relationships was still 
taking its nascent steps. Such policy was not yet well defined. It was not until the mid 1940s that the 
Spanish Protectorate authorities, especially the Delegation of Native Affairs, developed a ‘doctrine’ 
with regard to impeding relations between Moroccan men (who now included, in addition to soldiers 
and ex-soldiers, also many students) and Spanish women.53 The Delegation deemed such relationships 
damaging for the prestige of the protecting power, and resolved to cooperate with the Spanish 
‘national board for the protection of women’ to avoid their continuation. The Delegation found that 
Spanish women who consorted with Moroccan men did so out of ‘pretentiousness, ignorance, vice or 
greediness’ and considered the cultivated and suave ‘Moor’ the most dangerous type. But by this time 
the Delegation had a well-established practice in place, starting with intercepting letters between 
Spanish women and Moroccan men, gathering information to establish the nature of the relationship 
(is it mere friendly or romantic?) and taking steps to prevent the Spanish woman in question from 
moving to Morocco and the Moroccan man from coming to Spain,54 as well as informing Spanish 
family members so that they would take action.55 The mere interception of letters that never reached 
their destination was probably enough in some cases to end the relationships as it gave the impression 
to lovers that their partners neglected or had abandoned them.  
One wonders whether Moroccans were also encouraged to display their disapproval of such 
marriages. In 1941, in Tetuan, on the occasion of the Day of the Hispano-Arabic Book, a literary 
contest was celebrated in which two short stories won the first prizes, one in the Spanish language 
category and the other in the Arabic language category. The Arabic story, called Taha, tells of two 
brothers, Taha and Ali, from a poor family who end up in Spain after the outbreak of the war. Ali 
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volunteers for the army, and his father praises him for choosing to fight for the Nationalists, whose 
victory will make Morocco great. Ali ends the war winning ‘the trust of his chiefs and their admiration 
with the courage that he demonstrated in the battlefields’. But the more studious Taha wins a 
scholarship to study medicine in Spain. Taha’s father has only one warning for his son. ‘I only warn 
you of one thing, and that is: the woman. You will find there beautiful girls, and the new life will 
seduce you in many forms so do not be seduced’. But apparently it is not enough to warn his son once, 
so the father charges again. ‘Know, o Taha, that between you and the future that you are awaiting there 
is only one ghost, if you overcome it you will overcome the rest. It is love! It is love!! It is love!!!’. It 
is a love that, the father continues, ‘would draw you backwards’. By heeding the warning Taha would 
be ‘worth of the aid that the Spanish government has given to you’. After graduation the son ‘could do 
what you like’, but we must presume that after graduation Taha did go back to Morocco. What is 
certain is that Taha heeded his father’s advice, otherwise he would not have ‘made medical discoveries 
that turned the known medical rules upside down’.56 One wonders whether the story won the first prize 
because of the family’s pro-Spanish attitude, Ali’s demonstration of courage as a warrior, or the 
father’s repetitive warning to Taha not to mix with Spanish women. 
The Spanish military and the Protectorate’s Spanish authorities generally tried to prevent 
Moroccan soldiers from marrying Spanish women. In their ‘protective mission’, the Spanish 
proclaimed their desire to prevent their Moroccan subjects from suffering a religious lapse, to preserve 
the harmony of family and village life in the Protectorate and to placate the sensitivities of the native 
women.57 But the Nationalist policy towards interreligious marriages also stemmed from the decided 
viewpoint that romantic and marital relationships between peoples of two different cultures and faiths 
were incompatible and thus ultimately doomed to failure. The Spanish military officers and officials 
who considered themselves to have the closest cultural and personal ties to Morocco and its people, 
given their years of military service in the Protectorate, and who had no issue with the Moroccan 
military presence in Spain, were the ones who probably had the greatest concerns about their 
Moroccan brothers-in-arms establishing personal liaisons with Spanish women.   
Despite the policy of obstructing interreligious marriages between Moroccan soldiers and 
Spanish women, the Spanish Army never actually resorted to penalise, during the Civil War in any 
case, those soldiers who had relationships with Spanish women, nor did it resort to physically 
preventing Spanish women (by imprisonment for example) from consorting with Moroccan soldiers. 
And the law did not, until the end of the Civil War, prohibit such marriages. In practice, interreligious 
marriages and romantic relationships continued to take place during and immediately after the war. 
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From the group of French Moroccan deserters who commented on the issue, four maintained that 
marriages or romantic liaisons took place between Moroccan soldiers and Spanish women, two among 
these four placing these relations in the context of good contacts with the civilian population, while the 
two others affirmed that relations with civilians were forbidden.58 One of them, even though 
acknowledging this prohibition, still managed to have a mistress in Granada named Juana who - the 
deserter found it interesting to mention - had a liquor license.59 The existence of such romantic 
relations or marriages, occasionally taking place with the permission of the unit commander, gave 
some Moroccans the obviously mistaken impression that the Spanish Army not only tolerated but 
looked positively upon mixed marriages.60 Yet, the majority of Moroccan veterans conceded that such 
unions were either difficult or totally forbidden.  
There are no definite estimates as to how many Moroccan soldiers serving in Spain married 
Spanish women or had a romantic relationship with the possible intention of marriage. But 
fragmentary reports and a number of examples of oral anecdotal evidence give insight into the 
contexts of these marriages. Towards the end of 1939 reports by a number of regional military 
controllers’ offices in Spanish Morocco were sent listing the names of Moroccan men (both military 
and civilian) and Spanish women who were married to each other. According to these reports there 
were: sixteen cases in Tetuan, one case in each of the places Rincón de Medik, Beni Ider, Anyera and 
Xauen, five cases in the region of Villa Sanjurjo, and seven cases in Nador.61 In addition, there is 
another report listing the names of 68 different ‘Muslims who live maritally or have relations with 
Spanish women’, as well as the names of Spanish women who either were residing in Morocco or 
were living in Spain and corresponding with their Moroccan lovers. Most of the listed men were 
Moroccan Muslims, save one case concerning an Indian resident of Tetuan, who was corresponding 
with a Spanish woman from Seville, and a Moroccan Jewish resident of Tetuan who received letters 
from two Spanish women, bringing the total to 99 cases of ‘Muslims’ who were married to or had a 
romantic relationship with a Spanish woman, of which 97 are related to Muslim Moroccans.62  
In one case, it is mentioned that the affair is liquidado (terminated), and therefore one must 
presume that the rest of the affairs or marriages were ongoing. Although many of the men in question 
were soldiers or non-commissioned officers (and even one captain), there were merchants who 
obviously met their Spanish women while selling their wares to Moroccan troops. In one case the 
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commitment to the woman went as far as conversion, as demonstrated by the case of Mohamed Sahafa 
Mohand Bejneni, a sergeant of the Mehal-la of the Rif, who was baptised in Spain, taking the name of 
Juan.63 It is not clear how many of the Spanish women who were residing with their Moroccan men in 
Morocco were already living in Morocco before the Civil War, but there are four instances listed of 
mixed marriages that took place before the war going back to 1924, and February 1936 (both cases 
related to Tetuan), 1935 (Rincón de Medik) and 1932 (Anyera), and we have to presume that the rest 
of the cases, or the overwhelming majority of them, took place after the outbreak of the Civil War. 
This must not be seen as an exhaustive list, as we must assume that there were relationships with 
Moroccan soldiers or merchants who died during the war and therefore would not figure in these 
reports, and that a number of Moroccans stayed in Spain with their Spanish women. About this last 
group we can at least learn from a report by an interventor in February 1941, that the matrimonies 
existing in Spain at the time were numbered at only five, one of which had produced offspring.64 
Furthermore, we have to take into account the relationships that were terminated long before the 
authorities had any knowledge of them. 
The passage of time since the end of the Spanish Civil War did not diminish the reservations 
in the policy towards marriages between Spanish women and Moroccan men. By 1952, there were 
almost no Moroccan units operating in Spain as the anti-Franco guerrilla movement was completely 
destroyed, but there still existed the Moorish Guard of the Generalissimo. Some of its members, even 
though a small number, married or at least planned to marry, Spanish women. One case, occurring in 
1952, concerns an officer, Sidi Mohamed ben Yilali who applied for authorisation to marry a Spanish 
woman. As he was to marry a Catholic woman, and even though he had received the necessary 
dispensation from the Church, his superiors sought the advice of the chaplain of Franco’s headquarters 
and the chaplain advised that the opinion of the church was that such mixed marriages are rarely 
authorised, and if so only after the assurance that the husband would not try to convert his wife, would 
permit her to practice her faith and would educate his children according to the Catholic religion. In 
the specific case of this officer who has to constantly live with Moroccan units, the chaplain found that 
in the few similar cases which he came to know, the results were not satisfactory, as these units were 
composed of soldiers of the Islamic faith who were extraordinarily intransigent and fanatic, which 
would make coexistence difficult for a Moroccan whom they think has abandoned his religion and 
accepted the catholic one. Following this advice, the chief of the Casa Militar (General Franco’s 
headquarters) ordered the captain commanding the Moroccan officer’s company to try ‘with the 
utmost possible tact’ to convince him of abandoning his plans, and should he persist, to apply for a 
transfer outside the Moroccan unit. In the end the Moroccan officer received the military authorisation 
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necessary.65 This case is interesting, as the main obstacle presented, is not the guarantees that the 
Church demanded from a non-Catholic would-be husband, but the hostile position of other Muslims 
vis-à-vis a Muslim who would marry a Christian woman, a position that could be so troubling that it 
would necessitate the transfer of an officer outside his unit, which shows that reservations about mixed 
marriages continued long after the civil war and came from both sides, Spanish and Moroccan.    
As far as evidence from the Moroccan perspective about Moroccan-Spanish marriages is 
concerned, all of the Moroccan veterans who personally knew other Moroccan soldiers who had 
married Spanish women and brought them back home, confirmed that these women had left Morocco 
in the wake of Moroccan independence, either with their husbands or alone (often after the demise of 
the husband) and moved to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or returned to their original 
towns. For those Moroccans who married Spanish women and lived in Ceuta and Melilla or in the 
Spanish Peninsula they remained in place, acquiring the Spanish nationality.66 In hindsight this would 
seem to have vindicated official Spanish scepticism that Spanish women could make a life in a country 
so alien to their culture and religion.  
Before closing the discussion on marriages, one should wonder whether the general Spanish 
attitude towards mixed marriages and relations was mainly due to the Islamic faith of the Moroccans, 
separate in itself, or due to the mixture of Moroccan/Muslim of the inhabitants of the Spanish 
Protectorate. In other words, would a non-Moroccan Muslim have received a better reception to his 
intentions? There is one such example (and probably not many others exist) in the case of Amet Handi 
Hassen Bey. Hassen Bey was a Turkish soldier who was captured by the French in the Balkans during 
the First World War and was transported to a prisoner camp in French Morocco from which, after a 
few failed attempts, he escaped to Spanish Morocco and then to Malaga where he enlisted in the 
Spanish Foreign Legion in 1923 and participated in the war against the Moroccan rebels of 
Mohammed Ben Abdel Krim. In 1932 he was a sergeant when a companion of his returned from a 
family visit in Madrid carrying a picture of a niece of him. Hassen Bey took the picture in his hand 
and told his companion ‘tell your niece she already has a fiancé, a sergeant of the Legion’. Later his 
companion received a family visit in Morocco that included the said niece and Hassen Bey was set to 
marry her, and after a visit by him to her grandmother in Madrid the two were officially engaged, with 
the acceptance of all family members. It was however a very long engagement of five years, due to the 
political events of the Asturias rebellion in 1934, as well as due to the delay in his application for 
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naturalisation, and the start of the Civil War in 1936 where he served in the general quarters of the 
famous Colonel Yagüe. One difficulty to surmount was the religious one, and the couple applied to the 
Pope for a dispensation for mixed marriage which they received. That indicates that the family of the 
girl would not have been content with only a civil matrimony, and that Hassen Bey did not convert to 
Catholicism to marry. Not only does Hassen Bey not mention any objections on the part of the family, 
but he does not mention any objections from the army either. The couple married in Trujillo (Cáceres 
province) in 1937, the groom’s best man being the administrator of a Spanish nobleman. His position 
close to Yagüe and the rank of the best man were apparently prestigious enough for the local paper to 
publish a piece on the wedding.67 
 The story of Hassan Bey has a number of interesting elements. The romance was not the fruit 
of the vicissitudes of the Civil War, although the marriage took place during its course. The woman in 
question did not marry under circumstance of objection by the military or social circles surrounding 
the couple, and in no way could the Delegation of Native Affairs interfere, since Hassan Bey was no 
‘native’, or better said, a Moroccan. The issue of difference in faith proved to be no problem even 
though both spouses kept their religion, but Hassen Bey apparently did not contest that the offspring 
would be raised as Catholics, as he mentions that his first born was baptised,68 indicating that he might 
not have been a conservative Muslim, and that this factor might have helped him to be accepted by his 
Spanish in-laws. For all intents and purposes Hassen Bey was embraced as a member of the family 
and society, as a Spaniard. His association with a Spanish woman was no problem. His story however, 
stands alone, and with no similar ones with which to compare, it would be difficult to see a pattern in 
attitudes and policies that one could recognise and apply generally to the Moroccans.69  
 This chapter has so far focused on the mixed relationships between Muslim men and Spanish 
women in Spain. Relationships between Muslim women and Spanish men during the Civil War in 
Spain must have existed, but if they did then they would have been very scarce, to the point that they 
do not figure in the military archives of the Civil War period. Mateo Dieste notices something similar 
in Spanish Morocco. He states that Spanish colonial literature reflected the fascination of Spanish men 
with the mystery and inaccessibility of Muslim and Jewish women in Spanish Morocco. Nevertheless, 
in reality the dominant type of mixed relationship was that of Spanish women and Muslim men, even 
though this kind of relationships is absent from colonial literature, because it contradicted the 
masculine and colonial model of domination.70 
The Concubines 
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Now that it is clear how the Spanish Nationalists viewed mixed marriages, the final issue is how they 
approached and dealt with another kind of relation between Moroccan soldiers and Spanish women. 
The Spanish Civil War witnessed a significant growth in the number of women turning to prostitution. 
Many of these were the wives and daughters of Republicans who had either died, were imprisoned or 
fled Nationalist repression, and many of which had probably few means to sustain themselves. As a 
consequence, the Nationalist camp experienced a relaxation of sexual morality that saw an increase in 
regulated or tolerated prostitution.71 Even the Spanish religious hierarchy, which supported the 
Nationalists, does not seem to have protested – in the name of Catholic morals - against the tolerance 
of prostitution.72 
The tendency, by the Spanish military authorities, to limit relationships between Moroccan 
soldiers and Spanish women also echoed in its policy toward prostitution. The term ‘policy’ however, 
in this case, must be used with extreme caution. For in contrast to the instructions with regard to 
Moroccan-Spanish marriages, no documentary material has come to light so far that explicitly 
prohibited Moroccan soldiers from using the services of Spanish prostitutes. Still there are some 
indications that seem to confirm the aforementioned tendency. Moreover, as a rule, Moroccan troops 
were generally serviced by Moroccan prostitutes.  
In the early days of the war, the presence of Moroccan troops in southern Spain contributed to 
an increase in prostitution. In Seville, for instance, prostitutes frequented the gardens of the María 
Luisa Park where the Regulares camped.73 This did not apparently please the Spanish authorities. One 
Moroccan, interviewed by Mateo Dieste, remembered with a laugh, that when he arrived in Seville 
‘the Spaniards say to the women, the Moors has a dick like a donkey. The Spaniards [say] to the 
women. [The Moor] Probably has the prick like a donkey’. Only when the ‘gypsy women’ arrived 
‘then the [Spanish] women came to where we were’.74 To control these sexual relations the Spanish 
Nationalist military expended some effort to facilitate prostitution for their Moroccan troops by 
establishing special brothels for them.75 These brothels were generally staffed with women from 
Morocco; military authorities took care to facilitate the movement of Moroccan prostitutes to the 
Spanish peninsula. There was, for example, a request sent by the commander of the Army of the North 
to Franco in April 1938, asking for permission to establish a ‘Concubines Centre’ in the 
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neighbourhood of the city of Fraga to service the needs of eleven Moroccan units belonging to the 
Moroccan Army Corps. Franco agreed to the proposal.76 
There were earlier efforts to accommodate this need. In December 1936, General Orgaz, the 
Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco at the time, planned to organise an effort to move dozens of 
‘Chejas’ and musicians whom he intended to use to build a Moorish quarter in Spain that would serve 
to entertain the troops.77 One such entertainment expedition, from Xauen, comprised three musicians, 
36 women and two café sellers.78 In a December 1937 report, a Republican spy also noted the 
transport of ‘Arab’ women to Spain. He stated that after trouble arose among the Moroccan soldiers 
who had been isolated in ‘special camps’, the military administration felt compelled to bring these 
women and settle them in farmhouses near these camps. The reason for this ‘isolation’ of the soldiers, 
this Republican report claimed, was that the Regulares continued raping even after conquered territory 
was organised.79 Some of these prostitutes arrived either in pairs or individually, in some cases 
transporting with them significant amounts of narcotics (kif) and tobacco.80 
Although prostitutes were deemed to provide a valuable service for the Moroccan troops, 
some of them had a negative effect on military discipline or morale. In February 1939, the commander 
of the 17th Division asked a colonel from the Delegation of Native Affairs to solve the issue of a 
soldier of Regulares Tetuan, who had complained that during a 48-hour leave, he had paid a Moroccan 
prostitute 140 pesetas in advance for a planned two-day liaison. The prostitute, however, left without 
coming back and the duped soldier complained to the disciplinary service of the Moroccan military 
police, the Mejasnia. The men of that service told him that they could not do anything for him because 
the prostitute was the lover of the head of said service. The Native Affairs colonel reprimanded the 
involved Mejasnia personnel to order the delivery of the swindled sum and, should that not happen, to 
arrest the prostitute so that she would receive the ‘proper punishment’. A stern warning was issued to 
the members of the Mejasnia for neglecting their duty and severe punishment was promised should 
such a case repeat itself.81 In a different case, an apparent addiction to prostitutes pushed one soldier to 
desert. This soldier, who had come from French Morocco, told his interrogators that he ‘saw that he 
did not gain as much money as he hoped’, and the money that he did gain he spent on ‘women of bad 
ways’, though not specifying whether these women were Spanish or Moroccan, detailing that in 
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Saragossa such a woman cost him 10 duros in addition to 1 duro for tea, and 1 duro (one duro is five 
pesetas) for the phonograph.82 Therefore he preferred to return to his village.83 
In Morocco itself, sending Moroccan prostitutes to Spain had provoked early in the war the 
outrage of the wives of the Moroccan soldiers fighting in Spain. According to the memoires (published 
in 1997) of Rosalinda Powell Fox, the British mistress of Colonel Juan Beigbeder (High 
Commissioner of Morocco from 1937-1939), a group of Moroccan wives stormed the Larache train 
station where a train of female ‘camp followers’ stood ready to follow the troops. The wives attacked 
the prostitutes in a battle where ‘hair was pulled out by the roots’, ‘earrings wrenched from a delicate 
ear’ and ‘dresses were torn and bosoms exposed’, managing to prevent the departure of the prostitutes 
that day. Only under the cover of the early hours of the next morning did the train with ‘its fallen 
human cargo’ leave the city.84 
There is no hard evidence to indicate the total number of Moroccan women who travelled to 
Spain to provide sexual services to the members of the Moroccan units or how long they remained. 
Only shreds of information are available. For example, in September 1938, 21 women were on route 
to a brothel in the village of Valmanya (in Lérida, and not far from the already mentioned Fraga), 
where a little less than 50 women were already stationed. However, in a report from the Commander 
of the Aragon Army Corps, these women were no longer needed since there were no more Moroccan 
units in the sector.85 This again demonstrated that Moroccan women had the task of servicing 
exclusively Moroccan troops. 
Why did the Spanish military take the trouble of importing prostitutes from Morocco for its 
Moroccan soldiers? Certainly there should have been, in a time of war and devastation, no shortage of 
available prostitutes in Spain itself, or even women who could not be deemed professional prostitutes 
but who temporarily traded sexual favours for food or other goods that were in shortage. For example, 
upon the entry of Nationalist troops in Barcelona, recalls one veteran, women in the city called on the 
Moroccan soldiers to sleep with them ‘for there was hunger’.86 One answer to the question may be that 
Moroccan prostitutes doubled as dancers and singers and thus created an overall entertainment 
environment that was more familiar to and in accordance with ʻMoroccan cultureʼ. It is not clear from 
the source material, documentary or oral, whether the Moroccan soldiers preferred Moroccan 
‘concubines’ over local Spanish women. However, the obvious objective was also to discourage 
Moroccan soldiers from having sex with Spanish women. In some cases, the Moroccan troops were 
forbidden from going into the cities during their leisure time. In 1993, one veteran specifically noted 
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this prohibition but then indicated that he and his comrades would ‘go secretly to the places of vice’ 
during the night only to return to their positions in the morning.87 
The Nationalist military policy concerning the use of prostitutes was to separate, as best as 
possible, Spanish and Moroccan troops. This separation was based on a practical rationale: some 
Spanish prostitutes simply did not want the Moroccans. One such veteran prostitute recalled in the 
1970s that ‘nobody wanted the Moors, because they came accustomed to the carte blanche that they 
gave them and they wanted to do whatever they desired. In one village in Asturias they left the 
majority of the women there pregnant’.88 But the separation in the prostitution sphere must have also 
been due to the instances of friction and incidents that might have arisen in the brothels between 
Moroccan and Spanish soldiers,89 especially if some Spanish soldiers would have objected to a 
Moroccan having sexual contact with a Spanish woman even if it was consensual. It would also reduce 
tensions with other European soldiers such as the substantial number of Italians in Nationalist Spain. 
In Seville, for instance, during the early phases of war the ‘Moors’ were forbidden from visiting night 
clubs so as to avoid contact with the Italians who called them ‘Abyssinians’ and had frequent and 
violent clashes with them.90 Since efforts by the Spanish military authorities existed to prevent marital 
relations between Moroccans soldiers and Spanish women, it is safe to assume that the Spanish 
military sought to apply this policy to prostitution as well, the difference being that the Moroccan 
troops were offered an alternative in the form of imported Moroccan prostitutes.91 
A European issue 
Spain was not the only colonial power to have struggled with the issue of mixed sexual relationships 
between its colonial soldiers and European women, whether those sexual relationships developed into 
marriages or took place within the realm of prostitution. Pre- and post Spanish Civil War conflicts in 
Europe brought to notice these issues. Concerns about imperial prestige always played a role in the 
mind of the military authorities that controlled the colonial troops. This is clear, for example, with 
regard to the British Indian Army during the First World War. As David Omissi puts it, frequent 
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dislocations of military life might easily disrupt the sexual mores of the Indian soldiers, while 
encounters between white women and Indian troops could be charged with the heightened curiosity of 
racial and cultural difference. Soon after arriving in Europe Indian soldiers began obtaining access in 
Marseille to women of the neighbourhood and illicit sex took place. Wounded men recovering in the 
hospitals of Brighton or Bournemouth walked out with white women. Authorities regarded these 
encounters as prejudicial to good discipline and did their best to keep Indian troops under strict 
surveillance. Sex with English women was considered detrimental to the prestige and spirit of 
European rule.92 But it is also remarkable that some Indian troops also thought these liaisons to be 
distasteful, especially if there was a concern that an Indian soldier willing to marry a European woman 
might convert to Christianity.93  
The discomfort towards mixed sexual relationships also included the French authorities during 
the First World War, especially the censors who were preoccupied with the effect upon the prestige of 
France, French females, white women in the colonies, and the European prestige that justified and 
supported European rule in the colonies.94 Colonial soldiers discovered that they could in the 
metropole approach white women and have relationships of some equality with them.95 Despite efforts 
to discourage relations between French women and colonial soldiers, French officials nevertheless felt 
that these efforts could not stop these liaisons. There were some officials who took a liberal view 
towards these relations especially if they were ‘consecrated by a birth’ of a child, to whom the state 
should feel an obligation,  and who thought that the French goal of assimilation and civilisation of 
colonial subjects could be reached by permitting a large number of colonial soldiers to have a more 
prolonged stay in France.  Yet,  the overall official attitude was negative,96 for it violated the necessary 
racial distance between the colonial subjects and the French nation to which they in theory belonged, 
but a distance that was necessary to maintain colonialism, empire and French power.97 Ironically, the 
French officials found that their control of the colonial order in the metropole was more equivocal 
because of social and administrative disorder that the war brought about, and because they called 
colonial soldiers to defend a motherland with which these colonial subjects supposedly had strong 
bonds, certainly a situation that is not so dissimilar to that of Spain during the Civil War. 
When the Second World War broke out, similar concerns came back to life in Europe. To take 
for example the use by the British Empire of black soldiers of the South African High Commission 
Territories in Europe. British colonial authorities viewed with concern the move of these troops into 
Sicily and Italy. Contact with Europeans might show these in a bad light and corrode the racial 
‘balance’ of Southern Africa. Sexual opportunities and the sight of impoverished Europeans 
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threatened white prestige, and had implications for the return of Africans to their colonies. A British 
colonial adviser wrote: ‘The temptations to which these men are subjected in Sicily and Italy are 
serious. ... The people are large producers of potent wine ... [and] women of Sicily and Italy display a 
deplorable lack of any sense of moral decency’. This touched deep-seated fears for white prestige, 
particularly on the subject of sex.98 Another adviser deplored the more relaxed racial attitudes, which 
he considered common among southern Europeans, and because of the ‘extreme poverty and want of 
the local population’, in which circumstances the colonial soldier is ‘necessarily in a far superior 
position ... and is able to offer many things which they are in dire need of’.99  
 The French, during the Second World War, were not less concerned than the British, nor less 
than they themselves were during the First World War, even when it came to the women of their bitter 
enemy Germany. Some French officials felt, with regard to their own Moroccan troops, that having 
defeated the Germans and been welcomed by the German women, these Moroccans had lost their 
deference towards the Europeans.100 In June 1945, a few weeks after German surrender, the French 
commander of the 4th Group of Moroccan Tabors sent a letter to the commander of Moroccan Goums, 
requesting that certain measures should be taken to maintain the morale of Goumiers that would make 
them capable of completing their current mission of occupation, and that would eliminate causes of 
disorder and indiscipline that could take place. Among those measures he requested increasing the 
staff of groups of prostitutes to the Moroccan units, to the amount of fifteen women per Tabor, as the 
numbers had been currently insufficient. The rationale was that ‘one cannot ask from the Goumiers, in 
their majority originating from the Berber tribes of easy morality to live in complete self-control for 
long months’. The officer concluded that to fill the ranks of the prostitutes groups was the best means 
to mitigate rape or attempts of  rape that could take place in Germany. But  for reasons of European 
prestige, and in consequence French prestige, he judged that it would be inappropriate to recruit 
European women for this task, and that ‘native’ women should be sent over.101  
  Conclusion 
The Spanish Nationalist military felt uncomfortable with the issue of Moroccan soldiers interacting 
with Spanish women. The Nationalists faced a fundamental dilemma. They had brought Muslim 
Moroccans to Christian Spain and expended considerable effort to justify their presence as true allies 
in the crusade against the godless ‘reds’. At the same time, the Nationalists portrayed themselves as 
fighting for traditional Catholic Spain: the same Spain that had put to an end to the Moorish political 
presence at the end of the fifteenth century and its demographic presence in the early seventeenth 
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century. These were also the same individuals who did everything they could to impede interactions 
and marriages between Moroccan soldiers and Spanish women. 
In her work on the cultural Spanish responses to modern Moroccan immigration in Spain, 
Daniela Flesler discusses today’s public opinion about romantic relationships between Muslim men in 
general and Moroccan men in particular and Spanish women. She notes that contemporary Spanish 
literary works as well as feature movies that have dealt frankly with this issue, and have generally 
criticised racist attitudes towards such relationships, have nevertheless tended in the end to judge these 
intercultural and interreligious romantic bonds as almost always doomed to failure.102 In this regard, 
and if one can cautiously speak of continuities in attitudes, it probably should be noted that Spanish 
society, civilian and military alike, whether Francoist or democratic, sympathetic or not to the ‘Moor’, 
whether in the 1930s, 1940s or in the twenty-first century, has displayed a relative consistency in its 
attitude towards romance between the Muslim Moroccan male and the Spanish woman. 
 Given that the sexual relation between a Moroccan soldier and a Spanish woman was to be 
avoided whether it was the fruit of a romantic relationship or a business transaction, and that the 
greatest possible distance between the Moroccan man and the Spanish woman was sought, one 
wonders then (to come full circle) how it is possible for Spanish commanders to allow their Moroccan 
troops, even for a brief period at the beginning of the war, to engage in acts of raping Spanish women 
(a more damaging act to the Spanish prestige than a consensual sexual relationship) when the Spanish 
military command did not want the Moroccans to romance, marry or solicit one? The answer, as 
suggested by some historians and already mentioned above, might be found in the degree that 
Republicans in general, and Spanish women in this case, were stripped from their Spanish-ness, as 
they belonged to a political side that was against the ‘true’ Spain. Therefore, while romantic 
relationships and marriages were considered meetings between the Moroccan and the Spanish that 
ought to be controlled, condoned sexual assaults (not necessarily condoned on a large scale) were 
encounters between a Moroccan and a non-Spanish alien element that could be allowed to take place 
(as a punishment for the enemy) without much interference from the powers that be. 
There is an anecdote that illustrates how deeply entrenched the willingness was to keep the 
Moroccan and the Spanish separated sexually, except that this one involves a Spanish man and a 
Moroccan woman. One of General Mohammed ben Mizzian’s daughters married a Spanish officer 
without the consent of her father. After their marriage the couple travelled to Morocco, invited by 
Mizzian, who had become chief of independent Morocco’s army, on the pretext of reconciliation. At 
the airport, the police detained the daughter and deported her husband.103 Despite later attempts by the 
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Spanish husband to reunite with his wife and complaints to Franco, the new state of affairs prevailed. 
Attempts at freezing the pension of Mizzian from the Spanish army were rejected by Franco himself 
who probably understood Mizzian’s decision and, given the policy of his regime, approved of it. The 
principle of rejecting Spanish-Moroccan mixed marriages (though this time it was between a Spanish 
man and a Moroccan woman) scored yet another victory. 
The interracial and interreligious relations between Moroccan soldiers and Spanish women are 
a good example of the ambivalence with which the Spanish Nationalists looked upon their Protectorate 
in Morocco and its inhabitants. As much as the Nationalists deemed the Moroccan soldiers an essential 
part of the Spanish Nationalist Army and their ‘crusade’, their policy was to ensure that these ‘Moors’ 
retained their Muslim identity and space and were kept, as much as possible, separate from the 
Spanish population, particularly its female inhabitants, but more importantly not to allow disruption of 
the Spanish imperial hierarchy and prestige by letting the Moroccans step outside their defined 
boundaries as people under Spanish protection. Interracial marriages were deemed destructive to these 
aims. However, the importance of the Moroccan soldiers for the war effort necessitated that this aim – 
separating Spanish women from Moroccan soldiers - was to be achieved with ‘tact’, and the reality of 
their omnipresence in Spain made a totally successful effort to achieve this impossible.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
political asylum, but that the department of Moroccan Affairs at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
responded by requesting the husband to inform his wife not to take refuge at the embassy in Rabat because of the 





Moros y Cristianos. 
Religious aspects of the participation of Moroccan soldiers in the war 1 
 
‘…with the spirit of God’s vengeance at the point of their bayonets, they pursue, destroy and kill 
without giving time to the fugitives to protect and save themselves. Covered now with blood, the 
column advances…’ 
- Alberto Risco- 2 
 
The Spanish Civil War was not at first supposed to be a holy war in the religious sense. Nor were the 
majority of the Spanish Nationalist officers who rebelled against the Spanish Republic in July 1936 
particularly religious, despite their political conservatism. In fact, it was in the Spanish Protectorate of 
Morocco where the military coup first received its holy war denomination, and it was the Moroccan 
Khalifa, the nominal representative of the Moroccan Sultan and the highest Moroccan authority in the 
Spanish zone, who first did so.3 This chapter will discuss the religious aspects of the Moroccan 
participation in the Spanish Civil War.4 The idea of a religious alliance between the Moroccan 
Muslims and the Spanish Christians against a supposedly atheist enemy will be examined from the 
point of view of the Spanish Nationalist propaganda, but also from the point of view of the Moroccan 
soldiers. The chapter will also demonstrate that the Spanish Nationalists portrayed the Moroccans in 
their Moroccan Protectorate as devout Muslims. This portrayal influenced the propaganda the 
Nationalist used to win the loyalty of the people in Spanish Morocco. With regard to the Moroccan 
soldiers, many aspects of their daily life had to defer to the notion of the religious Moroccan and the 
Spanish Nationalist military endeavoured to create a separate Muslim religious sphere for the 
Moroccan soldiers. The chapter will show that the Nationalist authorities did not only want to respect 
the Islamic religion of their troops but also expected the Moroccan soldiers to adhere to the idealised 
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image of devout Muslims even when some of these soldiers did not desire to comply with that 
idealised image. 
Soon, after the outbreak of the Civil War, strange scenes started to emerge during the war: the 
archbishop of Toledo, Isidro Gomá y Tomás, returning to his archipiscopal see escorted by Moroccan 
Muslim troops or a priest accompanying Moroccans into battle. Cheering crowds pinned scapularies 
on the chests of the Moroccans. Andalusian girls handed out images of the Sacred Heart of Christ or 
détentes (stops) to the Moroccans and Legionaries who arrived in Cádiz or Jerez. José María Pemán, a 
Spanish conservative writer told Franco in Seville how these détentes ‘carry embroidered around the 
heart a short prayer saying “Stop, bullet, for the Heart of Jesus is with me!” They have been a great 
success with the Moors, who call them “bullet stoppers”’. There were many similar scenes.5 In Ceuta, 
the Nationalists authorised the building of a new mosque in which stones from the battlefields of the 
Alcazar of Toledo, Oviedo and Teruel were integrated as an ‘official recognition’ of the existence of 
Islam in Spain and as a ‘proof’ of the significance these ‘martyr cities’ had for the Muslims.6 
 In fact, the Spanish Republicans inadvertently helped the Nationalists’ propaganda in 
portraying this war to the Moroccans as a struggle in which the Republic targeted Islam and 
Moroccans in particular. Early in the war, Republican planes struck the native medina of Tetuan, 
hitting a mosque in the process, and later dropped bombs near a ship that was to take pilgrims on their 
trip to Mecca, while the Republican navy shelled a number of coastal towns in Spanish Morocco.7 In 
August 1936, the Spanish paper Diario Marroquí highlighted an air raid that supposedly targeted the 
Mezquita of Córdoba, ‘the historical monument of Arab civilisation’.8 
 The Nationalists portrayed the struggle against the Republic to the Muslims of Spanish 
Morocco as a conflict in which religion played a prominent role because the Nationalists saw the 
Moroccans as primarily driven by religion and religious biases. The Moroccans were first and 
foremost Muslims. That they were perceived as extremely religious was obvious to both those who 
held either a negative hostile view or a benign and paternalistic one of Islam and Moroccans. A 
comment by an officer in the Spanish Foreign Legion reminds us of the inseparable link that the 
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Spanish perceived between being Muslim and Moroccan. Seeing for the first time the Tiradores de Ifni 
soldiers, who were darker in skin than the Moroccan soldiers he had met so far, he called those of Ifni 
‘more religious and rough, in one word: more Moorish’.9 One Spanish soldier who fought for the 
Nationalists remarked retrospectively on the ‘Moors’ he met in Melilla in 1936 that they were ‘in this 
aspect [being religious] superior to us who never remembered to visit a church’.10 The religiosity of 
the Moroccan soldiers was admired by a Spanish army chaplain who remarked how ‘in Spanish land 
some renegades who abused the faith and the churches and assassinated the priests. On the contrary, 
some simple Muslims idolised God and entrusted themselves to him. It was not difficult to guess that 
these men, who wore chillabas and rural garments were simple folk and of grand religiosity’.11 The 
Nationalists also forbade foreign journalists - and we must presume Spanish ones too - to describe the 
Moroccans in any way except as devoted God-fearing soldiers.12 
García Figueras, one of the most prominent administrators of the Spanish Protectorate in 
Morocco, considered the greatest achievements of the Nationalist administration in Morocco those that 
took into account the spiritual and religious nature of the Moroccan populace. This understanding 
obviously applied not only to Moroccans but to Muslims in general. In 1939 Franco sent a letter to the 
Association of Muslim Youth in Cairo, answering a memorandum that the Islamic Conference in 
Cairo sent to him. In his letter, Franco commended the ‘Muslim people’ for succeeding in preserving 
their ‘spiritual treasures’ in a materialistic age, and pointed to the blood bonds that were formed with 
the Moroccan people in defence of the ‘faith and spiritualism’.13 Regardless of propaganda, Franco 
seemed genuinely to believe that the idea of a deeply religious Muslim was not a palatable one. In a 
less public remark he declared that ‘the Arab without a turban is a future Marxist’.14 
This Spanish policy regarding Islam was much older than the Spanish Civil War. From the 
1920’s onwards, the policy guidelines for colonial officers from the Delegation of Native Affairs 
insisted on the need of a respect for Islam, provided that this respect did not contradict the principal 
objective of political domination. Among the arguments used to justify this ‘respect’, Spanish 
Africanism appealed to Spain’s Islamic past. As stated in the manuals written for colonial officers, the 
official strategy was that of a formal respect of Islam, combined with the aim of controlling the chiefs 
of the brotherhoods in order to avoid potential dangers.15 Once local resistance was defeated in 1927, 
the Delegation of Native Affairs promoted the reconstruction of religious buildings and support of 
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certain rituals which reinforced the submission of the local political and religious authorities or which 
legitimised the power of the new colonial government.16 In accordance with this propaganda policy, 
the Spanish administration restored religious buildings, promoted rituals and maintained the formal 
independence of the habus (religious endowment) properties. The Spanish policy of toleration towards 
Islam went so far as to annoy the Spanish bishop in Tangier who in 1921 criticised the participation of 
Spanish soldiers in Muslim festivities ‘as if they were Muslims, or as if it did not matter that they 
acted like Muslims, when they were Christians’. He also criticised constructing shrines for Muslim 
holy men and ‘not one shrine for the Christians’.17 
Some of the Nationalist veterans of the Protectorate perceived that the religiousness of the 
Moroccans was neither blind nor absolute. Ruiz Albéniz, also known as El Tebib Arrumi or The 
Christian Doctor, an important journalist and radio speaker for the Nationalists during the Civil War, 
observed in the early years of the Protectorate that the Moroccan religiousness was practical in nature 
and that religious observance was ultimately subordinated to profit.18 Once secure in his faith the Rifi, 
guided by his innate desire for profit would associate himself with the actions of the Protectorate.19 
But that security in faith for the Moroccan must first be guaranteed by the Spanish.. The Spanish 
considered it essential to attach the greatest importance to the religious factor when communicating 
with the Moroccans of their protectorate or when buying their support. One remarkable example on 
the Republican side proves the point. Early in the war the communist paper, Mundo Obrero, published 
what seemed to be a note by a young Moroccan prisoner of war denouncing Franco. The paper 
published a Spanish translation of the letter as well as a picture of the original. While the Spanish 
version denounced Franco as a ‘traitor’, it is visible in the Arabic text that the word ‘infidel’ is added 
to ‘traitor’, but which the paper omitted from the translation.20 Perhaps the Republican paper’s lack of 
accuracy in translation stemmed from the unwillingness to portray the conflict in religious terms. Its 
Republican readers would not in any case identify with an orthodox Islamic perspective. But this 
example shows that even when the Moroccan soldier wanted, or in this case (it is not easy to ascertain) 
probably felt forced to attack the Francoists he could only do so in terms of who was a believer and 
who was an infidel. It comes then as no surprise that early in the war Franco paid a lot of attention to 
sponsoring the pilgrimage of Moroccans to Mecca. 
El Hajj Franco 
In early 1937 Franco scored one of his most impressive propaganda achievements in relation to the 
Muslims of the Spanish Protectorate and his army: the Franco-sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca. In 
December 1936 the High Commissariat had requested Franco to assign a ship for the Spanish 
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Moroccan pilgrims to Mecca, and Franco agreed on the same day and ordered the navy to take the 
necessary preparations.21 At the time the High Commissioner in Morocco was General Orgaz, but it 
seems that the one behind the idea was the Arabist Colonel Juan Luis Beigbeder, secretary general of 
the Commissariat at the time and later High Commissioner himself.22 The Nationalist navy prepared a 
ship that was to depart from Ceuta at the end of January 1937, and which was arranged so as to 
become a ‘floating mosque’. Nationalist aviation and navy protected the pilgrimage part of the way 
until the Italians took over.23 Nationalist Spain appointed a consular agent for Jeddah and Mecca. The 
choice for this position fell on a Muslim officer of the Regulares (though of Spanish nationality).24 
Franco also prepared an audience for the pilgrims in Seville upon their return in March. This gesture 
was not an easy matter, considering that much of the Spanish Navy had fallen into Republican hands 
at the start of the Civil War, and Franco could barely dispense with any ships. In the words of 
Rosalinda Fox, it was ‘like asking Whitehall [British War Ministry] in the middle of a war to release 
half of the Royal Navy’.25 
 The first pilgrimage that left from Ceuta in 1937, carried with it 298 pilgrims who were joined 
by others in Melilla and Libya which was then under Italian occupation. The next year the expedition 
took 451 pilgrims from Ceuta and Melilla plus 337 from Libya, and the 1939 took a total of 800 
pilgrims to Mecca.26 The Francoist pilgrimage not only helped spread and reinforce Franco’s message 
that he was a friend of Islam. The Franco-sponsored pilgrimage shined in comparison with the 
transport the French provided for their Algerian pilgrims, strengthening the credentials of Franco even 
more.27 But the Spanish sponsorship and control of the pilgrimage was also meant to shield the 
Spanish Moroccans from any undesirable outside political influence, particularly French propaganda, 
as until the first Francoist pilgrimage, French shipping companies monopolised the transport of 
pilgrims to Mecca.28 As a result of Franco’s sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca, the Khalifa in Tetuan 
described Franco as the ‘protector of Islam’.29 In addition to the political benefits in Spanish Morocco 
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itself, the pilgrimages must have left an impression on the soldiers fighting in Spain too.30 Some 
soldiers were selected to be awarded grants (tickets and travel expenses) for the trip to Mecca. The 
pilgrimage was presented as a reward for the Moroccans for helping Spain, and therefore lists of ‘loyal 
Moroccans without resources or with merits of war’ were presented by each intervención or Group of 
Regulares. Also selected were religious figures and tribal figures who were invited for being a ‘moro 
amigo’ (friendly Moor) and as a reward for efforts to recruit Moroccan soldiers for the war effort.31 It 
is probably due to this pilgrimage and others that followed during the course of the war that Franco 
became known as El Hajj Franco (the pilgrim Franco), a title the northern Moroccans and his ex-
soldiers used to refer to him, some doing so even to this day,32 because ‘he had the character of 
Muslims’.33 
A religious alliance? 
In the struggle to save Catholic, spiritualist, and traditionalist Spain, the Moor who was the old enemy 
of these three had become the ally of the regenerated traditional country. In an interview that appeared 
in a French publication, Franco declared that ‘we, all of us who fight, Christians or Muslims, are 
soldiers of God and we do not fight against other men, but against atheism and materialism’.34 This 
alliance with the Muslim Moroccans was certainly not a self-evident development but proved to be an 
uncomfortable one that required justification for at least a part of the masses to which the Nationalists 
appealed. One Nationalist Catholic writer commented, perhaps uneasily: ‘It does not matter that next 
to Christians, the turbans of Mohamed are seen. The sword is of rich Toledan steel, even if the hilt had 
an Arab enamel, and the Moors and Christians were united in some of the endeavors of the medieval 
Christian kingdoms’.35 One Nationalist newspaper, ABC Sevilla, while commending the Moors of 
whom ‘no one put a step backwards’ went further by calling Morocco the ‘Covadonga of the current 
reconquista’ in a reference to the place that symbolised the birth of the first successful Christian 
resistance to the medieval Muslims and the start of the Reconquista.36 In one anecdote, the Spanish 
priest and Arabist Miguel Asín Palacios related how in one hospital a print of the Virgin was going to 
be removed so as not to hurt the feelings of the Moroccan wounded, when one of these protested 
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against the removal by stating that ‘the Virgin is good for everyone’.37 The priest used this to 
demonstrate how much these Moroccans had in common with the supposedly true Spaniards.38 García 
Figueras saw no problems in coexistence between Islam and Christianity as the political issues of the 
Reconquista no longer were applicable and both religions were engaged in a fight against the godless 
nations and creating bonds between people who believe in the one and only God.39 
 The propagation of religion as the bond that united the Spaniards and Moroccans comes also 
as part of the wider Nationalist camp. Catholicism, like nationalism, was a powerful instrument for the 
unification of the disconnected rebellious factions that lacked a common goal other than overthrowing 
the Popular Front government. The Francoists mixed national struggle with religious struggle because 
Catholicism was a privileged and central element in traditional Spain, and it seems that Francoist 
recruits were exposed to the religious awakening of Nationalist Spain.40 
 In 1940 Miguel Asín Palacios published a paper called ‘Why did the Muslim Moroccans fight 
on our side?’ In one of the most eloquent Nationalist rationalisations of the Moroccan participation he 
answers: ‘Below the rugged crust of these simple and brave Moroccan soldiers, beats a heart that is 
identical to the Spanish, which renders reverence to some other-worldly ideals, not very dissimilar to 
ours, and which feels the religious emotions which we feel, because it follows many of the Christian 
dogmas which we follow and which atheist Marxism repudiates and persecutes’.41 To illustrate that 
this was not an opinion based on wishful thinking, he refers to a supposed Moroccan soldier who, 
using a hand-grenade, intimidated a ‘Marxist’ soldier by crying in Spanish ‘Tú no estar de Mahoma! 
Tú no estar de derechas!’ (You are not of [the followers of] Mohammed! You are not one of the 
Right!).42 
One wonders whether the position that Palacios took was representative of the Spanish 
Catholic clergy, even in a mere propagandistic sense. Let us consider two views, those of a priest and 
a bishop, both captured by the Republicans. Their situation as prisoners of war might not make their 
statements ideally reliable, but it is interesting since it gave the Republicans the chance to ask, face to 
face, the representatives of the Church about why it stood in the same camp as the Moors. In January 
1938, the priest García Blasco was captured by the Republicans during the battle of Teruel. During his 
interrogation he was asked whether he ever thought of protesting against the use of Moroccan troops 
by the Nationalist command. The priest answered: ‘Not in public. But of course during private 
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conversations I commented upon it, that the old history would feel disturbed when the greatness which 
we acquired by fighting Islam would look like a lie now that we are fighting alongside those who used 
to be our enemies’.43 Speaking as a prisoner the priest might naturally have given his interrogator the 
answer he desired, although his other answers with regard to morale in the Nationalist rearguard - 
which he described as high - was not what a Republican would necessarily wish to hear.  
But ingratiating oneself to an enemy interrogator does not seem to be the case with the bishop 
Polanco who also fell prisoner in Teruel. When questioned in January 1938 about the presence of the 
Moroccan troops in Spain, he answered that he saw nothing wrong in Franco using them, for Franco 
saw them as ‘soldiers in the service of Spain’. When the interrogator pressed that it was strange that 
the Church, after long years of fighting the Muslims, was now coexisting with them, and asked 
whether that could be considered an acceptable Christian approach, the bishop answered in the 
affirmative. In his opinion history witnessed many occasions of alliances between people from 
different religions to fight an enemy, alliances that were based on a ‘perspective that had nothing to do 
with religion’.44 Perhaps, with his grand depiction of Muslim-Christian brotherhood, Asín Palacios 
was a minority voice among the Spanish clergy after all, even in the pure propagandistic sense. 
Probably his sympathies with the Moors derived more from his background as an Arabist rather than 
as a priest. 
Not all the Spanish combatants on the Nationalist side seem to be impressed by the religious 
brotherhood propaganda either. One officer of the Regulares, an alferez provisional, writes in his diary 
entry for 17 and 18 September 1937 that this unit arrived in Sigüenza and was taken to the cathedral, 
which was in a deteriorated state and where the soldiers spent their night, while their commander slept 
in an adjoining house. The next day the lieutenant met a number of indignant comrades. Asking them 
what happened they answered him ‘the Moors did one of their deeds this night. It seems that they 
found the chapel open and they took the mats, the carpets and the garments the priests use to officiate’. 
But the lieutenant did not blame his soldiers. For he writes that when his unit arrived at night everyone 
thought that the town was abandoned and ‘my Moors’ thought that this was the front, even to the 
extent that ‘when witnessing the ruins and the ominous silence that surrounded us they loaded their 
guns’. And they thought furthermore, the lieutenant continues, that the cathedral was abandoned. But 
then, in his defence of his ‘Moors’ he counters ‘In addition, why did they order to billet the Tabor 
there, knowing that the Moors do not understand our religion? Because of all of this, my opinion is 
that it is the fault of those who brought us there’.45 After all the propaganda efforts of the Nationalists 
to cast the Moroccans as religious allies, this officer (and certainly many like him) who is supportive 
of his Moroccan soldiers to the point of defending stealing from the cathedral, is not affected by that 
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propaganda and does not consider the Moroccan soldiers as people who understood the religion they 
were supposed to defend.  
In any case, the Moor, the fanatic foe of the recent Rif wars, was rehabilitated in Nationalist 
Spain by the Nationalist state, its leading military figures and its propaganda machinery, which 
included press, cinema and poetry.46 This rehabilitation was perhaps not difficult to accomplish. In the 
end it required simply an adjustment to the presentation of basically the same image of the Moor. As 
the irrational Moor became simple, childlike and innocent, so the fanatic became pious, in fact 
spiritualist. 
The view of the Moroccan soldiers as religiously devout and controlled by his religious 
prejudices, which was in turn derived from the same view the Spanish had of the Moroccan society 
that they ruled, motivated the explanations the Nationalists gave to the outside world with regard to 
the motivations of the Moroccan soldiers for fighting in Spain as well as the policies the Nationalists 
conducted with regard to the interaction of the Moroccan soldiers with their Spanish environment, 
especially when involving direct religious aspects. The actions of the ‘Moorish’ troops, their lifestyle, 
the incentives etc, were supposed to be shaped by or directed towards their Muslim-ness. On this 
point, facts were sometimes mixed with wishful thinking, and it is here that we explore the border 
between the two, starting with the supposed religious motivations of the Moroccans for fighting 
against the Republic. 
Jihad 
While the Spanish Nationalists adequately promoted the idea of a religious alliance to defend the faith 
against godless Communism, the Moroccan side did not fail to support this rhetoric. The native urban 
political elite helped the religious interpretation for the enlistment of the Moroccans to fight in Spain 
as well. In 1937 Al Hurriya, the daily of the Spanish Morocco-based Nationalist Reforming Party, 
explained in an article called ‘The Nationalist Movement and Communism’ its position towards 
Communism. ‘The Moroccan nationalism is totally contradictory in its principles and directions to the 
corrupting Communism. Even more, it [Moroccan nationalism] considers anyone who belongs to 
Communism to be alien from Islam and the Moroccan nationality.47 Then on the day following the 
official end of the Civil War in April 1939, the paper expounded on the circumstances and motives of 
the Moroccan soldiers who went to Spain. The newspaper rejected any notion that economic motives 
were primarily behind the enlistment of the locals. Instead it listed other reasons, among which was 
the fear for their ‘religious sentiments’. ‘For Communism has run rampant and dominated these lands 
[Spain], for the Muslims are, by the nature of their situation, staunch enemies of the idea of equality in 
wealth’.48 Either this merely and blindly followed the Spanish Nationalist line or the paper could not 
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accept the stigmatisation that came with the notion of the mercenary, or both. 49 In fact, and at the start 
of the Civil War in July 1936, the future leader of the not yet established Nationalist Reforming Party, 
Abdeljalek Torres clashed with High Commissioner Orgaz against the recruitment for the Mehal-la 
units and their imminent participation in the war on religious grounds. Torres pointed out to Orgaz that 
the Regulares were units which were part of the Spanish Army. The Mehal-las, however, were 
Moroccan Muslim units which served under the Moroccan flag, and hence were religiously prohibited 
from participating in war among Christians serving a cause and under a flag which was not Moroccan 
or Islamic, a participation which would make the Moroccan government a warring party and violate 
the neutrality which Torres and his comrades sought.50 Given the circumstances, the ruthlessness with 
which the Nationalists in general dealt with their opponents and the importance that the Spanish 
Protectorate and its Moorish troops had for Franco, Torres was lucky to escape with merely being 
angrily dismissed by Orgaz, who countered that he had the support of the Khalifa, the Grand Vizier, 
the ministers, the tribal chiefs, the chiefs of the religious brotherhoods and the Cheriffians 
(descendants of the Prophet).51 Torres later made a complete turnabout and threw his weight behind 
the Nationalists, with his Al Hurriya paper providing the already mentioned religious justification for 
the Moroccans’ support for the war. In his new position he had the support of prince Shakib Arslan, a 
leading Pan-Islamic exile from Lebanon, who was based in Geneva and who functioned since the early 
1930s as a mentor for the Moroccan nationalists of both the French and Spanish protectorates.52 In 
November 1936 Arslan wrote to Torres:  
 
I am satisfied about your policy towards Spain (..) a different attitude would have hurt you 
much…it is more likely that the government of Madrid will not be victorious (..) the Muslims 
would not like a victory for Madrid (..) nobody ignores that this communist government is in 
favour of disorder…if the Republic wins, its disastrous ideas will run the risk of spreading in 
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the northern zone. The only thing that we could have expected from it is the independence 
which it [the Republic] never considered.53 
 
The pro-Franco political forces, be they Spanish or Moroccan, might have used the religious element 
in their propaganda to justify the participation of Moroccans in the war, but it was apparently an 
impression that even some on the Republican side believed.54 The same narrative was adopted by 
some foreign pro-Nationalists observers of the war. A prominent one among them is the American 
Russell Palmer who spent the period between 1936 and 1938 filming the war in Spain and then 
presented his documentary that was called Defenders of the Faith,55 in which he adopts the Nationalist 
narrative of the war as an effort to save Spain from the chaos and destruction for which the 
Republicans were responsible. Among the faith defenders he shows are the Moroccan soldiers. 
Palmer, who was also the film narrator, describes the ‘Moors’ as ‘famous for their hatred of 
communism’ and that they consider the reds ‘infidels’ because they burnt churches. 
The Nationalists went to great lengths to portray the enlistment of their Moroccan troops as 
ideologically motivated, but that is an interpretation that has proven difficult to defend by historians. 
María Rosa de Madariaga and Sebastian Balfour, convinced as they are that the volunteers who filled 
the ranks of the Moorish units in the Spanish peninsula joined for purely economic reasons, reject the 
idea that there are any higher ideological causes behind the participation of the Moorish troops in the 
Civil War. For them the issue is simple and they probably represent the opinion of the majority of 
those studying the Spanish Civil War.  
The issue is less simple for two Moroccan historians who seem convinced that the religious 
appeal of the cause, propagated by Franco’s agents, was an important factor in the decision made by 
Moorish recruits to enlist in the Spanish Nationalist army. According to El Merroun, Franco’s rhetoric 
about Communism and its destruction of Christian and Muslim religions left an impression on the 
Moroccan troops. He cites a Moroccan soldier ‘In Spain ar-rojo [the red one, the communist] comes, 
burns shrines, kills saints. Moor comes to help Franco fix Spain’.56 Thus, the religious aspect was an 
important one in pulling the Moroccans towards the Nationalist Spaniards.57 
Ibn Azzuz Hakim (perceived in Morocco as one of the most prominent historians working on 
the history of the Moroccan nationalist movement and northern Morocco) attacks the historians who 
did not trouble themselves with the real reasons for the Moroccan participation in the war which, 
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according to him, were that ‘the agents of Franco wanted to give the Muslims the opportunity for Jihad 
alongside the People of the Book, the believers in one God, against the Infidels’ and that the 
Moroccans ‘entered the war alongside the Catholics of Franco for religious solidarity’.58 He continues: 
‘some chiefs of Muslim brotherhoods, paid by the Francoists, were spreading in low voice  the news 
that general Franco had converted to Islam’ and was waging a campaign against ‘those without god’. 
In fact, Hakim regards the view that the ‘Moors’ died or became handicapped for a cause not theirs, 
only attracted by money and as simple mercenaries, as unfair.59 It appears that both historians base 
these opinions mainly on the discourse of both the Spanish Nationalists and the Moroccan nationalist 
and collaborating elite. But they are deeply motivated by the morally negative presentation of the 
Moroccan soldiers as pure mercenaries attracted solely by money and the prospect of looting.  
Ironically, the voice of those around which the debate of religious motives revolves, is the 
voice least heard. The historians of latter day rarely if ever based their statements on the views of the 
soldiers whose motives they interpreted, or even took the trouble of citing them to support the pro or 
contra arguments of this religious aspect of conflict. Today, there are only a few indications and 
examples that can help modern historians understand the position that the Moroccan soldier held with 
regard towards the religious nature of his struggle in Spain, and the image that arises from these 
examples is still a mixed one. 
In March 1938 a group of spokesmen for the 6th Tabor of the Regulares Ceuta and for the 
wounded soldiers in the Granada military hospital sent a letter to the interventor in Seville 
complaining against one of the Muslim clerics serving in Spain. After the death of a number of 
soldiers during the ‘jihad’, this cleric refused to wash the bodies of the ‘mujahedeen’, to lead the 
prayers for their souls or even to attend the funerals. Compounding this insult, he stated that ‘everyone 
who died in the lands of Spain was an absolute infidel’.60 The complaint denounced this man calling 
him ‘red’. This document draws attention for its use of the terms ‘jihad’ and ‘mujahedeen’ to describe 
the war in Spain and its Moroccan participants, but also for its labelling as rojo those who disputed the 
religious legitimacy of fighting in Spain.  
The ‘jihad’ term also appears in the calls for recruitment that circulated in Spanish Morocco. 
One important source is the personal archive of Mustapha El Merroun, in which dozens of interviews 
with Moroccan veterans are preserved. One of these Moroccans described the recruitment by stating 
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that the tribal chiefs shouted ‘O, servants of God! Those who wish to perform the Jihad, the Jihad has 
now returned’.61 In the battlefield itself, the attacking waves of the Moroccans started with cries 
exalting God or the prophet Mohammed. Ruiz Albéniz, the Nationalist propagandist, cites one such 
cry ‘Jandulilah! La [Ilaha] Illa Allah, Sidi Mohamed Rasul Allah…’ (Mobilise for Allah, there is no 
god but Allah).62 According to Sanchez Ruano,63  the Moroccans entered the battle crying ‘Allah 
Akabar’. A more typical charging battle cry commenced with praising the prophet ‘O lovers of the 
prophet, pray on him’, and ending with ‘heaven is for the patient, and hell is for the infidels’.64 Do 
such religiously inspired battle cries necessarily mean that the soldiers, or the majority of them, 
believed at the time they were fighting for a religiously sanctioned cause? Or do they merely reflect 
their cultural background and as such it would not only be normal to utter cries and perform pre-battle 
rituals by way of self-encouragement and perhaps protection?65 Or was that simply a confirmation of 
the point of view that asserts that everyone is religious in the trenches? There is no easy answer but 
such examples make it difficult to dismiss out of hand the notion that the religious factor played a role 
in how the Moroccan volunteers viewed or justified their part in the war. 
Whether the Moroccan soldiers actually went to war motivated by the moral message of a holy 
war or not, it seems in any case that many, if not the majority, deemed their Republican opponents on 
the wrong side as far as godly matters where concerned. This is shown in the way veterans, 
interviewed by El Merroun, describe the Republican rojos. According to one Moroccan, ‘the rojos 
killed the monks and destroyed the churches so they believed only in the hammer and sickle’.66 A 
similar definition of a rojo was ‘the enemy of Spain or the criminal who abandoned his religion’.67 
One veteran remembered that ‘our jefes [chiefs] told us that the rojos have come from Russia and from 
France to occupy Spain’, and that the Moroccans were in Spain defending their own country ‘for if the 
rojos would win, northern Morocco would be occupied by the rojos’.68 The first impression the ‘reds’ 
left upon the memory of another soldier was equally typical: ‘When we went [to Spain] we found that 
the rojos were burning churches’.69 Consequently it would normally follow that if a Moroccan 
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defected to the reds ‘he would die as an infidel’.70 One veteran told Sánchez Ruano that the Moroccan 
soldiers would not desert to the Republicans, for they thought that ‘if they died, they would go to 
heaven for performing the Jihad’.71 
Given these late testimonies it seems that the Nationalist propaganda about a holy war 
succeeded in so much as convincing Franco’s Muslim soldiers that they were at least not fighting for 
the wrong camp. David Montgomery Hart, who did an ethnographic and historical research on the 
Beni Uriagel in the Rif, commented on the religious character of the call to arms and the Riffians’ 
response to it by stating that ‘at any rate as far as they were concerned it seems that the moral issues of 
the war were clear enough: they were helping those Spaniards, whom they knew and liked, as against 
others whose lack of religious belief was both incomprehensible and insulting’.72 
Hart arrived at this conclusion in the 1970s, although he does not make clear whether this was 
based on his interviews with those Riffians who returned from Spain or whether this was based on 
Spanish or other literature. Discussing the tribe of Ulad Settut, David Seddon, who also conducted 
research in the Nador province, concludes that there was a rapid development of ‘a considerable 
hostility against those who came to be known locally as “reds”’.73 
When turning however to the accounts by Moroccan deserters who originated from the French 
zone, there is an absence of religious rhetoric in fighting the Republicans. Religion does feature in a 
few testimonies in terms of the praise for how the Nationalists respected the Muslim religion and 
Muslim religious festivities,74 or the visits of religious figures to the fronts. There is one testimony that 
mentioned the existence of activities of religious brotherhoods in propagating the Francoist cause but 
without going into further detail.75 However, none of the interrogated deserters originating in the 
French zone mention, in their interviews with the French officers, traces of coming in contact with the 
religion versus atheism or Christian-Islamic alliance propaganda, or traces of the description of the 
Republicans as anti-religion fanatics. This element is completely absent in these interrogations. How 
should this fact be interpreted? Does it signify that the narrative of the religious war was adopted by 
the veterans only after the war as they were trying to make sense of their participation or to idealise it? 
Or that somehow those of Spanish Morocco were more susceptible or more frequently subjected to the 
religious propaganda than soldiers from French Morocco? The absence can also simply be ascribed to 
an absence in questioning on the part of the French officers. Indeed never once did the French officers 
put this question to the deserters. 
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It was only a decade before since French Morocco found itself the subject of the Jihad of 
Mohammed ben Abdel Krim’s Riffian rebels, whose attack on the French Protectorate pushed the 
French to collaborate with the Spaniards in destroying the movement. A decade before that, France 
had found itself the target of a guerrilla movement in Morocco that was financed and partly managed 
by German agents who encouraged Moroccan tribesmen, mainly in the Rif, to wage Jihad against the 
French, as the Ottoman Empire had taken the side of Germany during the First World War. Germany 
at the time thought it could mobilise the religious feelings of a large Muslim nation to destabilise the 
colonial empires of its enemies, even though the German endeavour produced little results, though it 
did provoke great concern among the French in Morocco.76 In light of the experiences of the two 
decades prior to the Spanish Civil War, one would have expected the French interrogators to show 
more interest in talk of holy war on their northern frontier which was controlled by a not so friendly 
Spanish regime that was allied to Germany. 
Letters and Graves 
Since the Nationalists perceived and presented the Moroccan soldiers fighting in Spain and the 
Moroccan population of the Protectorate in general as first and foremost religious people, it was 
natural that the Nationalists took great care not to offend the religious feelings of their Muslim 
soldiers. This happened sometimes at the request of the Moroccan soldiers themselves, others at the 
request of higher Moroccan authorities and at times even when this care was not requested. Such 
attention in policy manifested itself in many aspects of the daily lives of the Moroccan soldiers, for 
example when making use of Muslim religious festivities to release Moorish detainees (troops 
incarcerated for different offences) as a sign of respect for the religious feelings of the Moorish 
troops,77 and therefore asserting the pro-Islamic stance of the Francoist government. Other aspects 
such as correspondence paper; graveyards; dietary habits and preoccupations; conversions; and 
especially life in hospitals display the great lengths the Nationalists went to create the religious space 
in which the Nationalists wanted their Muslim soldiers to stay and which they assumed their soldiers 
wanted.  
The provision of an Islamic diet is one of the first issues that comes to mind when considering 
religious necessities of the Moroccan Muslim troops, and the Spanish army seems to have been 
relatively successful in this regard. As Seidman puts it, the quartermaster was especially proud that 
meals of Regulares contained a considerable quantity of meat, which North Africans were allowed to 
butcher themselves according to Muslim rite. Authorities permitted Moroccan butchers to supervise 
operations in their canning and meatpacking factories.78 
One less evident aspect of the military policy of respecting the religion of their Muslim troops 
or, alternatively, the policy of maintaining a safe distance between the religious sphere of the 
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Moroccans and that of the Spaniards was manifested in the issue of letters the soldiers sent to their 
families. These letters were naturally subjected to censorship. In February 1938 the political section of 
the High Commissariat in Tetuan wrote to the chief of staff of the Morocco Forces expressing concern 
that many Muslim soldiers were sending letters to their families on a type of stationery with Christian 
religious symbols printed on it.79 To correct this, considerable effort and time was invested in the 
arduous task of copying the letters on a different type of paper. There were already requests to closely 
monitor the type of paper used by the Muslim soldiers, going back as far as October 1937.80 The 
February 1938 complaint suggested measures such as to force vendors accompanying the units to 
carry a different kind of paper. More importantly, and to understand what annoyed the author of the 
angry complaint, and it was one of many similar complaints, was the argument that the use of the 
aforementioned kind of paper would help circulate rumours of the existence of Christian missionary 
activities among the Muslim troops.81 This was a concern that the Nationalist military authorities 
reiterated several times in relation to other aspects of the daily life of the Muslim soldiers. 
 Burial places formed another aspect of the religious policy that must have been of greater 
emotional importance for the Moroccan soldiers than the letters. It can be said with certainty that no 
Moroccan soldier (or at least almost none) who died during the Civil War in Spain had his corpse 
taken to Morocco for burial. They were all buried in Spain, which applies to almost all of the foreign 
nationalities that participated in the war in great numbers.82 In many cases, particularly during the heat 
of battle, it was not possible to bury the dead Moroccan soldiers in proper cemeteries, and these 
fatalities were buried where they died, collectively sometimes. In some cases, the dead were buried 
mixed with the Christians, especially in the beginning.83 Whether by their own initiative or in response 
to demands of Moroccan soldiers, the Spanish started to separate the burial places. According to a 
veteran ‘during one of the battles, the dead were mixed, so they [the Spanish] looked for the Muslim 
corpses to bury them. So they took the trousers off the dead to see who was circumcised’.84  
Burial in a proper cemetery proved sometimes possible, but Spanish Catholics were not keen 
on having Muslims buried in Catholic cemeteries so the Muslim corpses were put to rest in civil 
cemeteries, along with the ʻredʼ the Moroccans had come to fight.85 The Nationalist army tried, early 
in the war, to provide for separate cemeteries that were to be designated as Muslim. In October 1936, 
the chief of staff General Varela instructed the military commander of the northern town of Vargas 
(near Santander) to send all Moorish soldiers, killed in fighting or dead as a result of sickness, to 
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Talaveral de la Reina to be buried in the ‘Moorish cemetery’ there.86 The Talavera de la Reina 
cemetery was established by taking the part of the municipal cemetery that was usually reserved for 
non-believers and suicides. A room was constructed there for washing the bodies. In 1939, a tile was 
dedicated to the buried soldiers that was adorned with the ‘Solomon seal’ (a six point star), and that 
read ‘From the Group of Regulares Tetuan nr. 1 to its Muslim comrades, fallen for Spain’.87  
There were also those who died later in the hospitals as a result of their wounds. As these 
Moroccan soldiers were usually treated in so called ‘Muslim’ hospitals, the Nationalist military 
authorities required them to take careful measures when burying the Muslim dead troops, so even if 
they were to be buried in a Catholic cemetery the Muslim deceased should have their own separate 
section within the cemetery and, if possible, with a separate entrance point.88 
One of the earliest descriptions of the rituals for the preparation of the burial of dead soldiers 
came from the memoirs of Mekki Redondo who was curious as to how his father died in Spain in 
1936. He was gravely wounded in September at Talavera de la Reina near Madrid and died shortly 
after admission to the hospital near that city.89 The faquih had inculcated the shahada (the statement 
that there is no god but Allah and that Mohammed is his messenger) and prepared his body for 
burial.90 The faqih was the only religious official in the campaign hospital that Colonel Yagüe 
established at Talavera de la Reina. He recalled being woken by a nurse to tell him:  
 
 that one of the four heavily injured soldiers was dying. I went instantly to him and found him 
dying while at the same time trying, in vain, to pronounce the shahada [the statement that there 
is but one God and that Mohammed is his Messenger], and therefore I had to inculcate this 
until his soul was given to the creator. I later called the doctor, Lieutenant Castro, who 
certified his death. His corpse was then brought to the hall of ablutions where, at sunrise, I 
washed him and put him in a shroud. After saying prayers for his soul, we buried him in a 
cemetery that I myself habilitated, a cemetery where, the previous day, we had buried 104 
Muslims who had perished on the same day. I still have the register where I wrote down the 
names of the dead Muslim soldiers I helped wash, laid shrouds for and buried during the three 
months I stayed in Talavera, and which reached 597.91 
 
It is not clear whether the idea for separate Muslim cemeteries, in hospital grounds, first came from the 
Spanish Nationalist army or from Moroccan officials. But sometimes the Moroccans appeared to take 
the initiative. In March 1937 a Moroccan minister of the Spanish zone of Morocco, visiting Spain, 
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suggested that Muslim hospitals dedicate a place for burying the Muslim dead,92 a suggestion that was 
welcomed by the Nationalist authorities and was included in subsequent instructions for military 
hospitals. But as we have seen, there was already a Moorish cemetery in Talavera in 1936. In some 
cases the establishment of a Muslim cemetery was done without Moroccan supervision, such as the 
one in Seville, which had a Muslim cemetery built in September 1936, while in another case, that of 
Barcia (Valdés region of Asturias), the Muslim cemetery was built by civilians from the Valdés 
region, but the process was completely directed and controlled by Moroccan religious officials.93 
 The efforts to provide separate burial spaces for the Moroccan soldiers continued after the war. 
In 1940 the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that efforts be undertaken to determine the 
burial places of many Moroccan soldiers with the goal of separating the Muslim dead from the 
Christians. A Moroccan official was to participate in efforts as head of a special section created for 
this goal at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.94 A number of provincial governors and heads of 
municipalities provided information that made it possible to identify a number of places and in some 
cases the number and identities of Moroccans buried there. For example: in Toledo 614 dead 
Moroccans were located plus an undetermined number in Seseña and Puente del Arzobispo (both in 
Toledo province). In the Barcelona province 31 Moroccans were located plus two questionable cases. 
In the province of Guadalajara the burial places of 42 Moroccans were located in different 
municipalities. The causes of death were in some cases identified. Some had died from sickness and 
there was one case of suicide in the municipality of Fuentelsaz. In the case of three soldiers buried in 
the municipality of Molina de Aragón, they were court-martialled and received capital punishment for 
unknown reasons. 24 were buried in the capital city of the Ávila province, in the municipal cemetery, 
with the specific numbers of the graves provided. In the case of Tarragona province only the names of 
the municipalities where Moroccans were buried were provided without an estimation of numbers. 
Many Moroccans in these different reports were buried in the municipal cemeteries; in some cases, it 
is explicitly mentioned that they were buried in the civil part of the cemetery. In one case, Torremocha 
de Jadraque (Guadalajara province) was a Moroccan buried in a ‘Catholic’ cemetery. From the reports 
we can also identify special cemeteries for Muslims established in the cities: Puerto de Santa María 
(Cádiz province), Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz province), Seville, Granada,95 Córdoba, Penarroya-
Pueblonuevo (Córdoba province), Saragossa, Salamanca, Cáceres, Plasencia, Antequera (Málaga 
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province), Ronda (Málaga province), as well as other localities where Muslims were buried but where 
the reports were not certain whether there were separate burial grounds for Moroccan Muslim 
soldiers.96 
Conversions 
If writing letters on stationery with Christian symbols caused enormous irritation with the bureaus of 
native affairs and the Spanish military, then converting the Moroccan soldiers raised great alarm. Such 
proselytising activities apparently happened only in hospitals, as these were the places where priests, 
or others with a strong religious fervour, likely had enough time to engage in the process. But the 
military authorities were never happy with Spanish religious personnel roaming inside hospitals where 
wounded Moroccan soldiers were treated. It was probably in November 1936 when a report by the 
Army Inspector brought to Franco’s attention for the first time the disturbing effects of the efforts of 
the ‘señoritas’ and priests to convert the injured Moroccans to Catholicism.97 Immediately, Franco 
instructed military hospitals to ‘respect the religious creeds of the natives’.98 
It appears, however, that the missionary zeal still persisted in some places. The Inspector of 
Moroccan Affairs suggested in November 1938 more active observation of non-hospitalised persons 
entering hospitals, and issuing serious instructions to religious authorities on this topic.99 Copies of a 
telegram by Franco forbidding converting Moroccans were supposedly hung in some hospitals ‘in big 
letters’.100 The Generalissimo himself personally gave demonstrations of his will to dissipate any 
doubts as to the sanctity of the Islamic space of his Muslim soldiers. One day he arrived at a hospital 
for a quick inspection. Entering a ward where Moorish wounded soldiers were being treated, he took a 
look around noticing a couple of crosses hanging on the walls of the ward. He obviously did not like 
that and ordered them to be removed immediately.101 Nevertheless and despite all the stern warnings 
and precautions, there were individual cases of Moorish soldiers who converted to the Catholic faith. 
In 1938 for example the Bureau of Control for Moroccan Affairs in Spain reports about such a case, a 
Moorish soldier named Bin Kiran. A difficult aspect of this case was the fact that the conversion 
happened under the auspices of General Moscardó, the famous protagonist of the siege of the Alcázar 
of Toledo. Still, the report goes on to instruct directors of military hospitals to warn charity sisters as 
well as nurses of the damage their proselytising activities would cause to the National Movement. The 
damages would include reversing years of work done in the Protectorate, and besides all this, the 
Bureau of Control for Moroccan Affairs believed the conversions were ‘almost always fake’.102 It is 
difficult to ascertain the real motives of those converted since there are no testimonies of Moroccan 
veterans who had converted. The concerns for these religious transformations were still an issue even 
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after the war when a couple of conversions were recorded, like one in Córdoba. In March 1941 the 
Bureau of Control for Moroccan Affairs commented on the case of Mohammed El Uariachi who after 
the war was expelled from Spain only to return and manage to stay by being baptised and marrying a 
Spanish woman. The bureau commented that the majority of such cases revolve around ‘opportunistic 
people’. It is safe to say, however, given the relatively few cases mentioned,103 that those conversions 
were certainly not significant enough to have an impact in Spanish Morocco or in the army fighting in 
Spain. 
Hospitals 
As the conversion issue makes clear, hospitals were the places where the Muslims and Christians 
interacted the most. In hospitals Moroccan soldiers fell in love with Spanish women, priests tried to 
win new souls for Christianity, complaints on religious matters were made and compromises reached. 
A military hospital was almost the only place that offered the Moroccan soldiers a better chance to get 
to know Spanish society well, or at least its Nationalist version.  
 While the stay in hospitals was comfortable for the majority of the Moroccans, many might 
have missed the opportunity of resting in those hospitals and even having their lives saved. It appears 
that in some cases the evacuation of Moroccan injured was not as effective as it should have been and 
that many of those responsible laxed in their tasks. One Spanish officer angrily wrote in December 
1936 how: ‘on the road I come across various stretchers with corpses of Regulares of Tetuan and I 
curse the stretcher-bearers who abandoned them. I send a go between so that people of my tabor would 
come to collect them’.104 An incident recounted by a German observer is quite illustrative. He tells 
how one day he entered a house which was used as a station where wounded soldiers, who were 
carried to it by stretcher-bearers, would be further evacuated by a motorised vehicle. He comments: 
 
Immediately, two Moroccans were carried in. Jebalans whom nobody could understand. One 
had a chest wound, the other had his shin shattered. They sat there speechless. The young 
emergency doctor wanted to sit with his aides at the table. I watched the misery of the 
Moroccans and asked the doctor, why the wounded were not being immediately transported 
further. When he says, these are lightly wounded, I attack him sharply and tell him that I 
would report his roughness to General Yagüe. Yagüe would have the doctor shot, because this 
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efficient general would commit his life for his Moroccans. No minute more lasted before the 
wounded were taken away. The eyes of the Moroccans glistened with gratitude when I spoke 
to them.105 
 
This story illustrates two points: the first is that the fate of Moroccans was apparently not taken 
seriously by some Spaniards, and that they displayed total apathy towards them. The second point, is 
that it appears that Africanista commanders were well-known to have a great attachment to the value 
of Moroccan troops to such an extent that would make these medical personnel fearful for their lives. 
 Once the Moroccans reached the hospitals, the care they received greatly improved. If the 
testimonies of the surviving Moroccan veterans are any indication, then a significant segment of the 
Moroccan combatants in Spain spent some amount of time in the Spanish military hospitals. Barely 
any one of those witnesses who was not wounded in battle and stayed in the military hospitals of 
Spain. But soon, the Moroccan wounded were hospitalised in a separate space. This usually meant 
separate wards in the same hospitals where Spaniards were treated. The Nationalists, however, also 
began to establish separate Muslim hospitals, which spread all around Nationalist Spain, given the 
presence of the Moroccan units in all areas of operation.106 The Muslim hospital in Saragossa grew 
later in the war to be the most prominent one. In such hospitals in the Peninsula, care was taken to 
provide a Muslim diet for the wounded,107 and to distribute the tables for prayers times.108 For the 
entertainment of the inmates there were Moorish cafés. Even story-tellers were sent to the hospitals to 
‘mitigate the torment of these wounds’.109 It appears that sometimes, even in the field of surgery, the 
Spanish doctors had to accommodate religious sensitivities of some of the soldiers. In Salamanca, a 
young Moroccan patient being prepared for surgery in March 1938 asked not to be given the ‘water 
that makes you stupid’ (ether, which is alcohol-based), and, in deference to his wishes and his 
religious sensibilities, the doctor induced the patient with Evipan before then giving ether to maintain 
anaesthesia.110 At other times, it seems that Spanish doctors wrongly attributed to religious motives or 
afterlife considerations, fears that were understandably normal. An example of such attributions we 
find in the diary of Sir Robert Reynolds Mackintosh, a New Zealand-born surgeon who volunteered in 
1937 to help in Nationalist Spain. Describing a visit to the Muslim hospital in Saragossa, he recorded 
that:  
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the men [the Moroccan inmates] appeared to be very contented. One of the doctors told me 
that they had great difficulty in persuading the Moors to submit to any amputation. It appears 
that their religion tells them that paradise is full of houris [female companions in paradise], 
whose sole mission is to smile on the fortunate men who reach paradise, but unfortunately 
these houris will have nothing at all to do with a man who has not a complete body, and I am 
told by the doctor that dozens of Moors have preferred to die without having their leg 
amputated, when by having it taken off, they could have saved their lives.111 
 
This is another example of how the Spanish attributed the behaviour, motives and fears of the 
Moroccan soldiers to their religious background, when fear of amputation, due to its permanent nature 
and the impediment it could cause for having a normal functioning life, would be a normal fear 
expected from anyone in a similar situation, even if there were any truth to the houris story. 
As the presence of Muslim hospitals in Spain had no precedent in recent Spanish history, and 
certainly not on such a large scale, some problems and complaints arose at the beginning due to the 
lack of an established Islamic diet, organised religious personnel, rules of communication and so on. 
In November 1936 the army inspector Cabanellas complained to Franco about what he saw in some 
‘Muslim’ hospitals that he visited. In addition to his disapproval of proselytising attempts in the 
hospital he remarked that some patients were deceived into believing that the meat they were served 
was slaughtered according to Muslim rites, only to discover later that this was not the case, leading 
some to refrain from eating for days.112 Such complaints led to individual efforts to correct the 
situation and, in 1937, to organised efforts that were initiated by both the Moroccan authorities as well 
as the Spanish Nationalists to adapt the hospitals to a Muslim environment so as to make the stay for 
the wounded a pleasing one. This adaptation effectively meant the creation of a separate Moorish 
space. 
In March 1937 the Moroccan vizier Ben Ali visited Spanish hospitals, whereupon he wrote a 
letter suggesting the establishment of separate Muslim hospitals in the rear-lines. He suggested that the 
wounded be quartered separately according to their military affiliations: the Regulares and the Mehal-
las. The vizier also suggested a Moorish staff consisting firstly of a faquih (cleric) who would be 
charged with the duties of Imam, butcher, notary and undertaker; secondly, a raqqas whose duties 
were to carry the letters and money to the families in Morocco; and thirdly, an interpreter. Among 
other suggestions, like the establishment of ablution and prayer halls and a burial place, Ben Ali 
suggested the establishment, in each town with a Muslim hospital, of an ‘Arab café’ for the Muslim 
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wounded. In that case, he continued, the Muslim wounded would be prohibited from entering ‘foreign 
cafés so that they would not have forbidden drinks. For that, a special vigilance must be appointed’.113 
 In the requests of the Moroccan minister we see the attempt to exercise some control on the 
lives of the Moroccan subjects in Spain through limiting the Moroccan soldiers’ contact with the 
surrounding Spanish ambience and preventing its perceived corrupting influence like alcohol. In 
February 1937 the High Commissariat had already preceded the Moroccan minister by issuing 
instructions on the organisation of Moroccan hospitals in Spain. The proposed religious staff was 
larger than that suggested by the minister. It would consist of an Imam, chief of the religious staff, 
who also functioned as a notary, a mudarris (teacher) to answer religious questions, a catib (writer) to 
write letters to the soldier’s families and a munadif el mauta (cleaner of the dead) who was responsible 
for the burial preparations. These were assisted by two cooks who were also butchers, as well as four 
assistant cooks, plus two couriers to carry the needs of the injured as well as inheritance material of 
the deceased, in addition to an interpreter. As for general hospitals with ‘Moroccan departments’ the 
staff would vary according to the number of wounded present.114 
 The General Staff in Salamanca was in agreement with much of the minister’s request and 
especially with regard to the prohibition of visiting European cafés. It cited as an extra reason the fear 
of espionage and the necessity of avoiding incidents which had been ‘unfortunately frequent’ in towns 
where many Moroccans were present.115 Franco had also already referred in February 1937 to 
‘Moorish cafés’ which would provide the wounded soldiers with a place that had a ‘familiar’ 
environment.116 It seems that the prohibition of selling alcohol to Muslims was not an equal success 
everywhere. In March 1938, a report on drunken Moroccan inmates lamented the absence in the 
southern town of Jerez de la Frontera of a prohibition on selling alcohol that reigned in other places.117 
In March 1938, Salamanca suffered from the same problem, and the local authorities apparently did 
not prevent selling alcohol to the Moroccan inmates of the military hospital there, necessitating the 
intervention of Moroccan military police to stop the ‘scandals of the Moors’.118 But hospitals were not 
allowed to actually forbid Moroccan inmates who were in a state to walk to take strolls outside the 
hospital. In March 1937, a report brought to the attention complaints of Moroccan soldiers in a 
Salamanca hospital that they were not allowed outside nor were visitors for them  allowed inside, 
which in turn led to instructions by the commander of the Army of the North to this hospital not to 
forbid the inmates from taking walks outside the premises.119 Much later, in December 1938, the Army 
of the South tried one more measure to reduce the strolls of the Moroccan soldiers outside the hospital 
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by exempting the products of the Moroccan cafeteros (café owners) from custom duties if they were to 
be sold inside the hospitals, and therefore to make it cheaper for the inmates to order their 
consumptions inside.120 
 As one could infer from the previous paragraph, the presence of Muslim hospitals must not 
have been met with enthusiasm by the local population everywhere. One of the places where the 
presence of a Muslim hospital troubled the local population was Sánlucar de Barrameda (Cádiz), or at 
least that is the impression that a Spanish citizen from that town, Dominguez Lobato, gives in his 
memoirs.121 Lobato does not hide his disdain for the Moroccans, who were for him a ‘decrepit race, 
full of misery’. According to him the aversion of the local population  to the presence of the Moroccan 
wounded had its roots in the colonial wars in Morocco, the horrors of which some of the locals had 
witnessed, as well as the ‘thunderous entry’ of the Regulares to the town in July 1936,122 which 
apparently had a strong pro-Republican base. These negative preconceptions were only strengthened 
when the Moroccan inmates, or those who were fit enough to wander about the town, displayed 
behaviour that did not endear themselves to the populace, nor it seemed that these Moroccans cared 
about ingratiating themselves with the people. In Lobato’s version this negative behaviour took the 
forms of stealing from the local shops,123 loudly expressing their disapproval about the presence of 
young Spaniards who otherwise should be fighting on the front crying ‘This cannot be, this cannot 
be…We fight for Spain. The young without fighting for Spain, impossible. Every one fight for Spain! 
And if not, leave Spain alone…’,124 aggressive attempts to win the attention of local girls who 
disdained them,125 as well as the insistence by the relatively healthy inmates to be treated, i.e. 
pampered, the same way as the badly wounded.126 The degree to which the presence of Muslim 
hospitals troubled the Spanish population in general is difficult to determine, and is dependent on 
anecdotal evidence. As we saw in the previous chapter, rather than disdain, there was a fair number of 
women, in other cities, who fell in love with the Moroccan wounded, ended up marrying them, or even 
took the trouble to travel to Morocco to join them.   
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 Despite the care the Nationalists took to respect the religious sensitivities of their Moroccan 
soldiers, complaints in this regard still arose. Sometimes the reason for these grievances was the 
behaviour of the Moroccan religious personnel themselves. From drinking excessively to continuously 
shaving their own beards, or failure to lead the prayers were reasons given in a number of complaints 
about these foqaha (plural for faquih).127 Similar complaints about drinking were occasionally also 
filed against members of the native military police who were detached to military hospitals.128 These 
complaints seemed, however, not as grave as failing to perform duties towards the dead, or even flatly 
refusing to do so on the ground that the dead did not deserve them. 
 When religious-based complaints arose in hospitals the Nationalist authorities spent serious 
efforts to investigate and verify them. One hospital that received frequent complaints was in 
Villafranca de los Barros (Badajoz province). The complaints against the director of the hospital 
revolved around the presence of religious (Christian) images, the lack of a separate kitchen for the 
Muslims and the lack of a separate space within the same kitchen (that the same utensils were used for 
Spanish Christians as well as for the Moroccan Muslims for halal and non-halal meat), the refusal of 
the director to provide transport for the burial of the dead, the existence of a ‘bar’ inside the hospital, 
etc.129 Upon investigation the complaints were found exaggerated: the religious images were all 
covered, except one in a hall that was forbidden for the inmates to enter; the Europeans cooked and 
used their utensil in separate space in the kitchen and plans were made for an independent kitchen; the 
burial transport problem was a one-time incident due to maintenance problems and in fact not all the 
Muslim religious personnel agreed with the content of the complaints. The investigation recognised, 
however, that the director of the hospital was not quite amiable.130 This shows, if anything, the extent 
to which the Nationalist military authorities were prepared to accommodate the sentiments of the 
Moroccan soldiers, and the privileged position these soldiers (and the Muslim clerics) had in imposing 
their own lifestyle and wishes in hospitals in a country in which they were foreigners. It is remarkable 
that the archival material neglects to reflect complaints on the Spanish side about these Moroccans 
who acted with a sense of entitlement rather than of gratefulness.  
Some additional examples of the Nationalist efforts to provide a religiously agreeable stay for 
the Moroccan inmates include a mosque that was established on the grounds of the Military Hospital 
of Bella Vista in Vigo and another at the Hospital of La Barzola in Seville. At the inauguration of the 
latter, thousands of pesetas were directly distributed to the Moroccan patients. In the former 
establishment during Ramadan, Vigo sent its municipal band to entertain patients, who were offered 
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treats during the festivities. The walls of the Granada hospital, one of the largest, were covered with 
lofty Koranic maxims in Arabic.131 
Regardless of the occasional complaints and the initial problems earlier mentioned, the 
memories the hospitals left on the surviving veterans are mostly positive and remembered with 
nostalgia. ‘The food was good, the beds were changed daily. The daughters of generals and officers, 
and the sons of merchants and doctors did that. They were polite’, remembers one who worked 
there.132 ‘The hospital of Seville was very nice. A delegation of Moroccan kaíds and bashas [tribal 
leaders and city high officials] visited us. So we were given plenty of clothing and food’.133 The old 
nurses were remembered affectionately. ‘The nun there [in the Salamanca hospital] was very nice to 
me and used to call me son’.134 Messoud Ballah, recalled that when he was wounded, and as he was 
dressed in the uniform of the Spanish Foreign Legion, he was taken for ‘a Christian’, and was at first 
taken to a ward for Europeans. Later he was put in a Muslim ward.135 But he praised the treatment of 
the injured. Another veteran praised the treatment and the food in the hospitals though admitted that 
‘the Moroccans displayed some bad behaviour like throwing the plates’.136 On this kind of behaviour 
another veteran remembers that: ‘one Moroccan ordered food and he did not like it so he threw the 
plate at the nurse. So when chaos arose and the Colonel came and asked, he told the nurses you know 
that the Moroccans are not civilised people and that they do not understand, that they do not know, 
that they cannot be patient and they are troublesome. She who can be patient with them can stay and 
she who cannot must go to another Christian hospital to work’.137 This account not only shows that in 
some hospitals not everyone was completely well disposed towards the Moroccan patients,138 (though 
in this case the inmates share the blame) but it also makes clear the degree to which those working in 
hospitals were prepared to go in satisfying and showing patience toward the Moroccan inmates.  
The majority of the memories of the stay in the military hospitals are positive. It is possible 
that the passage of decades has filtered out any memories of discomfort or the occasional irritation, but 
the positive view of the treatment in hospitals is also visible in the contemporary testimonies of the 
interrogated French Moroccan deserters who fought in Spain, even among those indignant on other 
aspects of army life. One of them, while on one hand negative about the irregular pay, lack of normal 
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shelter, and the ‘stinginess in giving leaves’, he was quite positive on the other hand about how 
‘perfectly organised’ the hospitals were where the inmates were treated according to their religion and 
received food prepared by their fellow believers.139 The positive recollections of the Moroccan inmates 
of Spanish hospitals might also simply reflect a contrast with the medical facilities and treatment 
available for them in the Moroccan Protectorate itself, whether French or Spanish, which must have 
been of lower standard with the ones found in the Spanish Peninsula. 
The positive memories coupled with the documentary evidence of the hospital policies of the 
Nationalists lead to the conclusion that the military succeeded to some degree in establishing a little 
Morocco for its wounded Moroccan men, though it did not always manage to keep them within its 
confines. In any case the Nationalists tried to present the image of Muslim-friendly hospitals. They 
succeeded in gaining the satisfaction of Moroccan notables visiting the hospitalised in Spain.140 
The Nationalists also tried to sell the image of Muslim-friendly hospitals to the media. In 
Russell Palmer’s colour film on the war in Spain, footage is shown of Moroccan wounded and 
recuperating soldiers posing outside a Muslim hospital, along with smiling and friendly looking nurses 
as well as what seems to be Muslim religious officials and Moroccan officers. The mood seems 
relaxed, with two Moroccans playing music and dancing. The commentary reminds the viewer that 
these are special hospitals for the Moroccans where the tenet of their religion could be observed in 
matters of diet. It then goes further to state that the simple tastes and happy disposition of these men 
makes life in these hospitals interesting. 
A place less pleasant to stay for Moroccan soldiers and the civilians who provided services for 
them were Spanish prisons. But even there the Spanish authorities deemed it appropriate to separate 
the Muslim inmates from the Spanish ones. In August 1938, the Delegation of Native Affairs 
requested the interventor of the Bureau of Moroccan Affairs in North Spain to carry out the necessary 
efforts to locate certain Moroccan prison inmates, as it was not favourable that they ‘would suffer their 
sentences in coexistence with the Spanish penal population’. The inmates were supposed after being 
located to be sent to the Uad-Lau prison in Morocco.141 However even after the end of the Civil War 
there were still Moroccans held in Spanish prisons as it is obvious from a missive sent on 22 January 
1941 by a representative of the Delegation of Native Affairs to the director of the Comendadoras 
prison in Madrid, requesting that the Muslim prisoners should receive food that they could prepare in 
accordance with their religion, and to try to let the Muslim prisoners sleep in cells or sections that 
were separated from the Spanish.142 
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For all the attention the Nationalists gave to the religious sentiments of the Moroccan soldiers, and for 
all the efforts to portray them as God-fearing pious soldiers, many of these young men do not seem to 
have been particularly pious Muslims. There is no way to quantify those who fulfilled the profile of an 
observant Muslim as opposed to those who did not or those who were only partially observant. These 
last would have probably formed the majority. As we have seen, some hospitals struggled with the 
issue of Moroccan convalescents who caused ‘scandals’ connected to drinking alcohol. In Sanlúcar de 
Barrameda, Dominguez Lobato sarcastically relates in his memoirs how one of the Moroccan inmates 
of the hospital ‘says that he does not drink, that “the Koran prohibits wine”. Well, every evening 
before dinner, he drinks a whole cup of Moscatel [Spanish Muscat wine]’, adding how ‘a serious 
thing’ it is to watch a ‘drunken Moor’.143 Also sarcastically he pointed to how the ‘true Koranic 
practitioners seemed absolutely unaware of the Ninth Commandment’, lusting after girls in the town 
and how the Moroccan convalescents’ ‘favourite pastimes’ was frequenting a little street where four or 
five houses were ‘generously open’ and where ‘the moritos [little Moors] found the best welcome’, 
referring obviously to houses of prostitution.144 As shown in the previous chapter the Moroccan 
soldiers developed sexual relations with Spanish prostitutes upon their arrival in Spain. But that 
sometimes led to brawls with Spanish soldiers, and furthermore, they were not always welcomed by 
the prostitutes. That was perhaps one reason why the Spanish military arranged, early in the war, for 
Moroccan prostitutes, as well as dancers and singers who doubled as prostitutes to be shipped to Spain 
and quartered near Moroccan units where they exclusively serviced the needs of these units. But it also 
happened that, during hard times and due to lack of food, Spanish women exchanged sexual favours 
for food with Moroccan soldiers.  
The evidence seems to demonstrate that among the Moroccan soldiers who fought in Spain, 
those who observed prayers, teetotalism and fasting were in the minority. ‘Most of them were not 
religious’ remembers one veteran.145 In the entire company of another Moroccan veteran only one 
member performed the prayers, though they all fasted in Ramadan.146 Alcohol was often consumed,147 
although according to one testimony, Muslim officers would be punished by imprisonment if they 
drank alcohol.148 Earlier it was referred to some towns’ institution of prohibition to sell alcohol to 
Moroccans while in other towns that same measure did not exist. One veteran remembered that in one 
unnamed town the ‘camarero [waiter] was punished because he let the Moroccans drink’, and that the 
bar owner excused himself by stating that he was confused because the bar was full of Tercio and 
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Requeté soldiers and that the one who paid the bill was not even a Moroccan. The owner was warned 
not to give alcohol to the askaris.149 But other sources for alcohol were the Moroccan mobile 
merchants who followed the troops and installed their shopping posts whether on streets or at the top 
of mountains, selling tobacco but also alcohol.150 It is not clear whether in general, the Spanish army 
was more lenient towards its Moroccan soldiers who consumed alcohol in Spain or did not adhere to 
Islamic practices in general, compared to Moroccan authorities, or whether those serving in the 
Spanish Regulares were differently treated than those serving in the Mehal-las which officially 
represented the Moroccan state.151  
 If many Moroccan soldiers proved not to be very practicing Muslims when it came to 
performing prayers, drinking alcohol, or visiting prostitutes then they at least showed somewhat more 
observance towards the fasting month of Ramadan. Fernando Fernández de Córdoba, a famous radio 
announcer for the Nationalists during the war, related how one evening in 1936 near Valdemoro (south 
of Madrid) the ‘Moors’ suddenly started to fire continuously in the air creating a tense situation that 
confused Spanish troops nearby until the head of the Moorish unit resolved it by explaining that 
Ramadan had begun. These ‘infantile and simple men’, believed, according to Córdoba, that “the first 
one to fulfil the ritual of firing his rifle will gain a place next to Allah”.152 Whether the majority of the 
soldiers fasted during actual combat operations is a question in need of clarification, and it would be 
hardly surprising if the clerics attached to the Moroccan units gave the soldiers permission to break 
their fast. One veteran however remembers, while speaking about the respect towards Muslim holy 
occasions that ‘the commander would stop the Tabor and would say tomorrow is Ramadan, who is 
going to fast and who is going to break the fast? The one who wants to fast goes to the right. Then one 
who wants to break the fast goes to the left’.153 This division might imply that those who would choose 
to observe the fast might expect different, probably lighter, military tasks, at least when the front was 
calm. 
De Mesa mentions that the combats during the Battle of the Ebro in 1938 in which the 1st 
Navarrese division under the command of Mohammed Mizzian participated, coincided with Ramadan, 
and that despite the fighting the commander refrained, along with Spanish and Moroccan members of 
his staff, from having any food until nightfall, maintaining themselves solely with tea,154 which is not 
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strictly in compliance with the fasting that mandates abstaining from food and liquids. As for the rank 
and file it seems that in times and places when and where the troops were recuperating or resting most 
of the troops either observed the fasting or at least refrained from breaking it out of fear of the 
judgment of other soldiers.155 It seems that there was a greater tendency to reprimand those who did 
not fast, compared to those who did not perform prayers.156 
Even in hospitals the wounded seem to have observed Ramadan. Esyllt Priscilla Scott-Ellis, a 
British woman who volunteered her services as a nurse in southern Spain, commented negatively on 
the fasting of the Moroccan wounded. She stated in her diary of November 1937 while working in an 
unidentified hospital, that she was ‘beginning to loathe the Moors. They are so tiresome … it makes 
me mad to have a lot of filthy, smelly Moors ordering me about … the trouble is that they are doing 
their periodic fasting and eat nothing till dinner, so are all very irritable’.157 It seems then that the 
majority of the Moroccan soldiers who were fighting in Spain, rather than being the devout Muslims 
the Nationalists portrayed them to be, were in fact often prone to ‘sinning’, while selectively observing 
their religion at other times.  
Islam and European armies 
The position of Islam in European armies was treated with perhaps no less care than it was in the 
Spanish Army, even by countries not traditionally associated with colonial armies that contained large 
numbers of Muslim soldiers. The Germans during the First World War employed religion as a tool of 
propaganda to incite Muslim soldiers in the British and French armies to desert. In prisoner of war 
camps, they spent much effort and money to show the Muslim prisoners how much Germany 
sympathised with Islam, building mosques in the camps and attending to their religious needs.158 
German fascination with the idea of attracting Muslims as potentially powerful allies resurged during 
the Second World War. Himmler was personally fascinated by the Islamic faith, which he believed 
fostered fearless soldiers, and marvelled at the idea of a Bosnian military division composed of 
Muslims. The SS sought through the creation of such a division to rally all of Islamʼs disciples to their 
side.159  
But the careful attention to the religious feelings of colonial, and especially Muslim, soldiers is 
also seen in the British and French armies. For the British the crucial lesson of the Indian Mutiny 
(1857), triggered by a perceived offence against the religious feelings of both Hindu and Muslim 
soldiers, was that military discipline could be preserved only if the authorities understood the religious 
needs of the men. Many experienced officers believed that the first qualification of a leader of native 
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troops is that he should be intimately acquainted with and known to his men.160 British authorities did 
much to include customary practices in the routine of military life. Religious teachers, blessed the 
weapons and colours of the regiment. Religious ceremonies were closely integrated with the 
regimental calendar. During the First World War a fund was set up in Britain to provide articles of 
religious importance. 161 
So did the French who were very particular about not offending the religious feelings of their 
Muslim soldiers, especially the North African ones. The French army policy also focused on North 
African soldiers as Muslims because of a long tradition in France, predating the colonial experience in 
the region but also shaped and intensified by it, of viewing the ‘Arab Islam’ of North Africans as 
inherently fanatical, politicised and impervious to outside influences, particularly the progressive and 
modernising influences of French colonialism. This in turn shaped and reinforced a tendency to view 
the Muslim identity of North Africans as the primary, often the only important consideration when 
formulating colonial and military policies towards them. They were above all, in some ways ‘only’, 
Muslim.162 Officials made special efforts to accommodate Muslim religious beliefs within the French 
Army. Authorities felt especially vulnerable to criticism on these issues, because it was crucial both to 
maintaining morale and to combating German and Ottoman propaganda. In fact, efforts in the army to 
accommodate Islam were particularly focused on three key areas: burial rites, the observance of holy 
days and the provision of clerics, imams, to minister to soldiers’ religious needs while serving in 
France.163 The army also made attempts to facilitate the observance of Muslim holy days. From the 
opening months of the conflict, the Ministry of War instructed local commanders to give Muslim 
soldiers some respite from their daily duties on religious holidays and to allow them to pray in 
common and to celebrate according to their customs, and observe the fast of Ramadan, even given that 
some French officials noted the lax religious attitude of many Muslim soldiers outside the Muslim 
holy month, and the inconvenience for commanders to change work and meal schedules for an entire 
month.164 Probably not much changed during the Second World War, at least with regard to the 
sensitive issue of the precise observance of Muslim burials customs,165 and respect towards Islamic 
observation of the holy month of Ramadan.166 
While these different European attitudes share much with, and in many cases are a mirror 
image of the Spanish Nationalist religious policy towards colonial soldiers, that does not mean that the 
Spanish experience does not have its own unique elements. In comparison to the British, French and 
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German nations, Spain was the country that had most based the establishment of its nationhood on the 
struggle against Islam, and yet was the nation which had most shared cultural and historical bonds 
with Islam and Muslim Morocco. Spain’s call to Jihad against infidels might have been similar to 
German in the First World War. But Germany was dependent on the Ottoman Sultan as the official 
bearer of the Jihad banner, while Franco managed to present Nationalist Spain in its own right as the 
bearer of a holy war banner that included Islam. For the Spaniards who looked to their struggle against 
the rojos through a religious prism, the Moroccan Muslims might have been more natural allies than 
the North Africans were to the French or the Indian to the British. The practical benefits of respecting 
the religious feelings of colonial Muslim soldiers were evident for the different European powers and 
a strong motivator to show such consideration and tolerance. But the Spaniards could claim, or even 
convince themselves, that they did so out of genuine historical and religious bonds and goals, which 
one could regard as distinct from the French with acted upon their propagating of universal, egalitarian 
values, or from the British with their fears of a repeat of the 1857 Indian Mutiny. 
Conclusion: To be or not to be a Muslim 
Religion was important in the way the Spanish Nationalists viewed, presented and treated their 
Moroccan troops. In a Cruzada against those accused of anti-religion, religiousness was the raison-
d’être for the presence of these troops in Spain. Faith, i.e. belief in an old organised religion, and 
respect for old traditions, was the only binding element that could be argued. The Moroccans 
therefore, in their participation to create a traditional Spain, had to be religious or at least be presented 
that way. But it was not only a matter of temporary practicality. The image of the religious Moroccan 
simply fit the standard stereotype the Spanish had of the Moor and that fluctuated between presenting 
him as a ‘fanatic’ at times or as ‘deeply religious’, two terms referring to two sides of the same coin.  
 Perhaps one of the most prominent propaganda expressions that praised the religious 
Moroccan was the film, La canción de Aixa (the song of Aixa), a Spanish-German co-production, 
which was released in Spain just after the end of the Civil War.167 It tells the story of two cousins, 
Hamed and Abslam, who come from rival families and who vow to end their rivalry, but who both fall 
in love with the mixed race singer Aixa, which rekindles their rivalry. From their first encounter in the 
film the contrast between the two cousins could not be greater. Hamed is a westernised man, wears a 
tuxedo, drives a car and drinks alcohol. The other cousin, Abslam is traditional and conservative, 
wearing a white turban and a Regulares uniform, the latter not being a small detail, as the Nationalist 
army’s policy was to keep the Moroccans (or to encourage them to remain) in their religious place. 
When they meet by chance at a hotel in Tetuan, Abslam notices Hamed drinking alcohol and when 
asked about it, Hamed answers ‘it is necessary here. One must be modern and forget the prejudices’, 
an answer which Abslam indignantly retorts with: ‘And you call prejudices our faith and the laws of 
our forefathers?’ As the film progresses, we learn more about the two. Hamed is disrespectful of his 
                                                 




father, listens to music from ‘Paris’, is apparently interested in western books and befriends people 
who smoke and drink, while Abslam is respectful towards his father and the patriarchal order. The 
film clearly steers the viewer towards sympathy with Abslam and his values rather than the 
westernised Hamed who clearly is depicted as morally inferior to Abslam. In the end Aixa decides to 
give her love to the more religious of the cousins, and ‘getting the girl’ is usually a strong criterion by 
which film characters are categorised as deserving the viewersʼ sympathy. But the film also steers the 
viewer towards the idea that traditional ways are more befitting of Morocco than western values or 
even western technology (as in the scene where the car of Aixa and her uncle breaks down and has to 
be towed by horses).  
American writer Susan Martin-Márquez also analysed the film and sees in it a symbolic 
representation of the contrast between the Spanish and the French colonial practices in Morocco: 
Hamed who listens to Parisian music and therefore is aligned with the French style of colonisation and 
is eager to reject his own traditions in favour of European culture and technology, while Abslam 
served in the Spanish army, an institution that has clearly allowed him to maintain his own cultural 
inheritance.168 In addition to this contrast, Martin-Márquez sees the film as expressive of Nationalist 
Spain’s new identity, for Morocco in the film not only signifies Morocco but also Spain, a nation set to 
embark upon a period of autocracy, characterised on the cultural front by the Nationalist regime’s 
rejection of a modernity now deemed foreign and its exaltation of timeworn national traditions.169 
American writer Daniela Flesler seizes upon this understanding to assert that ‘in this way, La canción 
de Aixa erases Moroccan/Spanish differences, emphasising their commonality’.170 Flesler has a good 
argument here, but at the same time the ‘commonality’ between Spain and Morocco that the Spanish 
Nationalist regime was selling its audience was presented as an implied and common understanding 
between the Moroccans and the Spaniards. The understanding is that Morocco should remain 
Moroccan, Muslim and therefore different. It must have been a relief to watch the film for those wary 
about the cultural hazards of the presence of Moroccan troops in Spain. 
The Spanish Nationalist military and state sought to maintain a separate religious space for its 
Muslim soldiers. The Muslim hospitals and cemeteries, the Muslim diet, the prohibition of Christian 
proselytising among Muslim troops, etc., were all part of this separate religious space. In some cases it 
was the Moroccans who sought it, either soldiers or visiting native officials. This was, therefore, a 
policy that had the approval of both the Spanish and the Moroccan sides and that was initiated from 
both sides. 
 The motives for such a policy suggest a question: did the Spanish Nationalist military conduct 
the policy of creating a separate religious sphere for Muslims out of a genuine respect for the faith of 
its Muslim soldiers? Or was it because the Muslim North Africans were seen as impervious to 
                                                 
168 Susan Martin-Márquez, Disorientations. Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity (New 
Haven 2008) 240. 
169 Ibidem, 241. 




Christianity? Or because of political calculations regarding the stability of the Protectorate, or a mix of 
all or some of the above factors?  
Whether the respect for the faith itself was genuine or not, a concern for the religious feelings 
of the Moroccan troops is sensed in the many documents and reports that touch on the matter and 
therefore must be considered real. These documents do not show any cynicism on the part of the 
Spanish military with regard to the religious feelings of the Moroccan soldiers. Treating their 
Moroccan soldiers well, also in matters of faith, ensured that the Spanish officers could obtain the best 
performance from their soldiers. But it was also of political importance, ensuring stability and 
continuing support in Spanish Morocco by presenting Franco as a protector of the Muslim faith.  
Franco was not the only ʻprotectorʼ of Islam and Muslims of the time. Mussolini had also 
decided to declare his friendship to Arabs and Muslims, obviously to rival British and French 
influence in the Mediterranean, and while visiting Libya in the spring of 1937 (the same period when 
Franco sent his pilgrims to Mecca in cooperation with Italy), he was handed, during a grand ceremony, 
‘this well tempered Islamic blade’, by a Berber colonel who had served in Italy’s forces, reminding 
him that the Muslims of the Mediterranean ‘see in you the great Man of State who guides, with a firm 
hand, our destiny’. The Duce, riding a horse, lifted the Sword of Islam to the cheers of the public. 
What the Sword of Islam meant was not quite obvious, but it was a great spectacle which secured the 
necessary headlines.171  
The policy or religious tolerance was continued in Morocco after the war. As Albet-Mas puts 
it, the political and religious tolerance displayed by Spanish administrators in Morocco during 
Franco’s dictatorship was in sharp contrast to contemporaneous behaviour and policy in metropolitan 
Spain until the late 1950s. In Albet-Mas’ opinion the tolerance was real but reflected a perception of 
necessity rather than choice.172 It might be a necessity rather than choice with regard to the 
Protectorate itself, but when it came to the soldiers, the Nationalists, in their general policy (which was 
not uniformly translated into practice) went a long way to make sure that the Moroccans did not have 
the choice of being anything other than pious Muslims.  
It seems however, that the religious policy was not only a matter of protecting the spiritual 
space of the Moroccans or pleasing the Moroccan authorities. The rejection of the idea that conversion 
to Christianity could ever be genuine, and the presentation of the Moroccans to both the Spanish 
people and to the world as deeply religious and spiritual, and the establishment of a traditional Spain 
reminiscent of the medieval one meant that the Moroccan soldiers in Spain had to be Muslim and had 
to be religious whether they liked it or not.  
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It is appropriate to close this chapter with a curious story that illustrates the complexities of 
the religious aspect in the partly Islamicised Spanish military. In the 1950s Mohammed Ben Mizzian, 
the only Muslim to attain the rank of general in the Spanish army, was appointed Captain General of 
Galicia, who in his new position had the duty of conducting the yearly traditional honours, in the name 
of the head of state, towards the apostle Saint James of Compostela, known as Santiago Matamoros 
(Santiago the killer of the Moors). It is said that to avoid an embarrassing situation, flowers or a 
blanket were used to cover the parts which showed the holy apostle crushing the Moors, so as not to 
offend the general.173 There is a similar story, recounted by Federico García Sanchiz in 1941, whereby 
the crushing of the Moors is covered with branches as a courtesy to the Regulares who were 
garrisoning Compostela. One of the Regulares, according to Sanchiz, protested: ‘No, do not cover…. 
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The Republic and the Moroccans 
 
In a letter, during a famous correspondence between the two Spanish writers Miguel Unamuno and 
Angel Ganivet that lasted between 1886-1898, Unamuno told Ganivet: 
 
I do not wish to know anything about the Arabs. I feel a deep antipathy towards them. I hardly 
believe in that what they call Arabic civilisation, and I consider their passing through Spain 
the greatest calamity that we have suffered.1 
 
Ganivet responded by saying that he was born in a place (Granada) that before it was Spanish, was 
‘Moorish, Roman and Phonecian’, and that the greatest influence on Spain after Christianity, the 
influence that ‘gave us our Quixotean spirit, was the Arabic one’. These words, as Madariaga argues, 
represented and continue to represent the two tendencies that divided and still divide Spanish opinion 
towards the Arabs, a division between ‘Morophobia’ and, if not ‘Morophilia’, a certain recognition of 
the legacy of the Arab culture and its importance within the Spanish one. Ironically the profoundly 
anti-Arab Unamuno would later, in his writings, oppose the Spanish military adventure in Morocco, 
while the self-professed heir to the Islamic-Arabic culture was an early proponent of the idea of an 
imperialist project in Morocco on the basis of the common racial traits of both the Spanish people and 
the Muslims of that country.2 In this part of the study, this current chapter and the following one will 
examine the attitudes towards the Moroccans that ranged from the hostile, on the part of the 
Republicans, to the mixed attitude of acceptance and distance on the part of the Nationalists. 
In 1937 in France the Spanish journalist Manuel Chaves Nogales published a collection of 
nine short stories called A sangre y fuego. Horrified by the cruelty of both parties to the war he exiled 
himself to France where he wrote about the ugly aspects of the conflict. Though classified as stories, 
each of his accounts have been ‘extracted faithfully from a strictly true fact, every one of its heroes has 
a real existence and authentic personality that has been discreetly veiled only due to the proximity of 
the events’.3 One of these stories, in fact two stories in one, deals with the fate of two captured 
Moroccan soldiers. The first one, being injured, was taken to a village called Monreal, where he was 
medically treated. The revolutionary committee discussed his fate, with anarchists favoring his release 
if he was to reject his past and commit himself to become a worthy citizen of a free Iberia. The 
communists suggested he should serve against the ‘rebels’ though under a watchful eye, while the 
Republican delegates demanded he be sent to Madrid. But the ‘people’ demanded his death, and so it 
happened. After his successful treatment at the hospital militiamen put him against the wall and shot 
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him. The second was captured along with other Moroccans during the assault on the University City in 
Madrid. The Republicans paraded them in the main avenue of Gran Vía to a public that seemed less 
hostile, some of whom even believed the Moroccan had rebelled against Franco. But by nightfall the 
prisoners were taken to a quiet spot on the outskirts of the Spanish capital where they were shot dead.4 
Aside from the assurances of the author there is good reason to believe that his stories were 
merely dramatised versions of the truth. Archival material presents a similar case. In October 1936 the 
general staff of the Nationalist columns of the southern sector reported that ‘in Madrid a captured 
legionnaire has been paraded, maltreated and later shot, also a number of Regulares [were paraded] 
were photographed and later shot’.5 Manuel Tagüeña, one of the notable Republican commanders in 
the war, writes about how at the end of August 1936 in Peguerinos, his forces managed to repel a 
Nationalist attack and a number of prisoners, including ‘Moors’, fell into his troops’ hands. The 
orders, according to him, were to shoot all prisoners, an order dutifully carried out. A lucky Moroccan 
was the last prisoner to fall into their hands, by which time the soldiers ‘were tired of spilling blood’. 
The Moroccan turned out to be a veteran of the Verdun battle during the First World War, and was 
sent to Madrid where ‘he might save his life there’.6 
 The early period of the war witnessed the execution of Moroccan troops with such frequency 
that even though there was no Republican governmental or military policy to sanction the killings, the 
chances of a Moroccan soldier surviving capture were low, a pattern that might have decreased with 
the progression of war but was still visible from time to time. Ruano cites the American journalist 
Knoblaugh, who reported that captured Moroccans were burnt alive by the Republicans in the 
neighborhood of the Escorial.7 The Republican well-known communist commander Valentín 
González, better known as El Campesino, is reported to have had many of the captured Moroccan 
prisoners executed.8  
 Some on the Republican side, generally outsiders, admitted the existence of the problem of 
executing the Moroccan prisoners and tried to remedy it. In October 1936, the French communist 
leader, André Marty, reported to the Comintern that:  
 
our [communist] party took the right position vis-à-vis the Moroccans. All the [Spanish] 
papers were constantly cursing the Moroccans. We made the first attempt to win over the 
Moroccan people. With this goal in mind, we put on the radio an Arab public speaker. It is 
possible that the Moroccans did not understand him since he spoke in the literary language, 
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which is different from the common Arabian language. But the first step was taken, and it had 
significant consequences. The anarchist organ began to write “about our brothers, the 
Moroccan soldiers”. And we made it so that captured Moroccan soldiers could freely walk the 
streets of Madrid without risking their lives.9 
 
Another foreigner who tried to solve this problem was Najati Sidqi, a Palestinian communist whom 
the Comintern sent to Spain in October 1936 to encourage Moroccan soldiers to switch to the 
Republican side by writing pamphlets, in Moroccan Arabic, and even using the megaphone on the 
frontlines.10 While in Spain he assumed the alias of Mustafa bin Kala.11 Though he started 
optimistically, the mission soon left him frustrated. The Spanish ‘comrades’ were always suspicious of 
any Moroccan, and while Sidqi struggled to convince Moroccan soldiers to surrender, he complained 
more than once about the execution of Moroccan prisoners of war at the hands of the Republicans who 
‘rarely showed mercy’ when they captured Moroccans. According to him the Spanish communist 
leaders showed indifference towards the executions and towards ‘the Moroccan cause’ in general. 
Sidqi ‘started to feel, deep in my heart, that my mission was failing’.12 He left Spain at the end of 1936 
for Algeria to seek a more effective method of inciting the Moroccans to rebel against Franco by 
establishing a radio station. The ‘Algerian project’, however, never materialised and Sidqi never 
returned to Spain.13 
The reasons for the frequency with which captured Moroccans were executed are diverse. 
Some Spanish soldiers complained to Sidqi about their distrust of Moroccan soldiers who on more 
than one occasion, the Spanish soldiers claimed, would feign surrender by raising their fists and 
shouting in broken Spanish ‘yo estar rojo’ (I being red), only to follow by throwing hand grenades.14 
The hostile attitude was undoubtedly linked to propaganda about the ‘Moroccan savage’ that leading 
Republican figures spread and the atrocities they attributed to the Moroccan soldiers. But it was also 
the result of years of demonising the Moroccan as a result of the Rif wars of the 1920s and a simple 
Spanish historical bias against them. The philosopher and writer Juan Goytisolo concludes that ‘our 
Left, apart from some exceptions, has chosen the myth, the fantasy, the cliché’ in dealing with the 
Moroccan aspect of the war. He states that the Spanish secularist bias against the Moroccan, deeply 
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ingrained in the traditional collective discourse has ‘overcome the socio-economic analysis of our 
Marxists’, and he describes the Republican attack on the ‘Moroccan’ as ‘xenophobic, openly racist’.15 
Madariaga agrees and notices that the old prejudices were so deeply rooted, not only in the popular 
classes but among many at the top of the Republican camp, that the Republicans had no well-defined 
ideas about how to orient their propaganda towards the Moroccans.16 The Spanish Popular Front, in 
spite of 'many efforts to see them with different eyes and use a language more in accordance with 
leftist ideology' continued to consider the Moroccans as ‘cruel’ and ‘savages’.17 Certainly, an 
important factor was the leftist rebellion in Asturias in 1934, the legacy of which was that the left as a 
whole held the Foreign Legion and the Moroccan Regulares principally responsible for crushing the 
Asturian revolution, as well for the immediate repression, summary executions and looting that 
followed.18 
The Republicans’ hostile attitude was translated into a general refusal to give quarter or accept 
surrender by Moroccan troops.19 The Moroccan soldiers were aware of the grim fate that they faced, 
should the Republicans capture them. Jorge Vigón Suerodiaz, a Nationalist officer at the time of the 
war, wrote that in January 1938, during the battle of Teruel, he witnessed a large formation of 
Republican prisoners marching past who were guarded by Regulares soldiers. One of the prisoners 
was in extremely bad condition and Vigón accompanies this ‘poor young man’ to the nearest first aid 
post. But one Moroccan sergeant reacted with surprise to the officer’s ‘poor young man’ comment and 
responded: ‘Poor no, my commander, poor is the Moor whom they take and kill, poor is the Moor 
whose feet the red burns. The red is not poor, the red is bad’.20 One Moroccan veteran witnessed the 
body of a fellow soldier, cut-up and hung: ‘we said to each other: look what the reds do to the 
Muslims! And if we got one of them the same would happen, like the other’.21Another affirmed that 
‘the reds, if they captured one [Moroccan] they would kill him and that is just that’.22 Or, as already 
mentioned, the execution could be postponed as ‘at first they would parade them in the streets and then 
kill them’.23 A few Moroccans who deserted back to French Morocco told their interrogators similar 
tales. Layachi o si Mohamed ould si Ali who constantly referred to the Republicans as ‘Russians’, 
stated that the Moroccan noticed that the ‘“Russians” would cut the throats of and shoot the prisoners 
they take whereas General Franco is merciful towards those his troops capture’, an interesting account 
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since this deserter does not seem sympathetic to the army or the war effort.24 Another deserter, 
Mfeddel ben Taieb bel Hadj Ali who spoke about low morale in the army noted that despite the weak 
spirit among the troops, deserting to the enemy was not an option because ‘their fate would be 
worse’.25 This made the Moroccan soldiers generally more tenacious in fighting, and in large part 
accounts for the low numbers of soldiers willing to surrender to the enemy,26 or accept the fate of a 
prisoner of war. Even among the few who deserted some were not to spend the entire war in the 
Republican camp and deserted back to the Nationalists.27 
It is not known how many Moroccan prisoners of war were captured by the Republicans or 
how many Moroccan troops deserted to the enemy. There is a document by the General Staff of the 
Republican Army listing 61 Moroccan prisoners of war and deserters who came under Republican 
control between mid 1937 to mid 1938. One third of these came from French Morocco; the majority 
were under 25 years with one 14 year old (with several unlisted ages); 25 are listed as having been 
taken prisoner while the rest (minus three cases that are not described) are categorised as either 
escapees (evadidos) or those who presented themselves voluntarily (voluntarios), among whom were 
three who were members of the respectively socialist and anarchist trade unions: UGT and CNT. 28 
The fate of some of the prisoners who escaped execution demonstrates still how discriminating 
the Republicans were in dealing with the Moroccan soldiers. Madariaga mentions a trial, conducted by 
the Popular Tribunal on 26 October 1936 against four Nationalist soldiers, three Moroccans and one 
Spanish. Two of the Moroccans and the Spaniard belonged to a Tabor of Regulares of Melilla, the 
third Moroccan belonging to Regulares of Larache. The charge was ‘aiding the fascist rebellion 
against the government of the Republic’ and confronting the militias in the Toledo front. Shockingly, 
the three Moroccans were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, while the Spanish soldier 
was acquitted as the tribunal found that he had given ‘unwitting support to fascism’.29 
There is scattered evidence on individual Moroccans who became prisoners of war and 
survived to tell the tale. One of the few pieces of evidence concerns Mohamed ben Amar Illase, who 
claimed in 1941 that he went to Spain in 1937 along with the Regulares of Tetuan. While on the 
Toledo front, he asked permission to bathe and was taken prisoner by the Republicans who took him 
to a prison in Madrid, and later to one in Valencia and later still to Barcelona by boat. In Catalonia 
while working close to the French frontier he fled to France where he was detained for three months 
before being released. According to him, he demanded repatriation to Spain which he only managed to 
do in February 1941 when he was detained by the Guardia Civil.30 This piece of document does not 
provide however, information on whether there were other Moroccan prisoners, and if there were, 
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whether they were treated differently or segregated, or whether Moroccans suffered any racially 
motivated maltreatment. Further, explanation is needed for the long period spent in France before the 
ex-prisoner managed to return to Spain. 
The Moroccans meet the ‘rojos’ 
How did the Moroccans, whom the Republicans were either trying to vanquish or induce them to 
surrender, view the Republicans and how did they react to them and to their attempts at enticing them 
to go over to the other side? Already an impression has been given of the certainty of the Moroccan 
soldiers about the bad fate of those who would become prisoners under Republican control. The 
general image that emerges from many testimonies of veterans is that of a violent and ruthless enemy, 
and not only towards the Moroccans themselves. One veteran remembered upon entering a city that 
‘we met Spanish women, clothed in black and weeping on their men and novios and sons for they did 
not want to march with the rojos’.31 As it has already been mentioned for many of the Moroccan 
veterans, the Republican soldiers were opponents who would give them no quarter. Not only death 
would follow falling into the hands of the enemy but mutilation as well. Two others spoke of dead 
Moroccans being ‘crucified’,32 their eyes gouged out, or the genitals cut off and put in their mouths.33 
There are very few admissions, by Moroccan interviewees, of killing Republican prisoners, 
and whenever they did admit such actions they would frame it as a reaction to supposed Republican 
atrocities committed against Moroccan soldiers. The veteran who spoke about Moroccans being 
crucified explained how in return ‘we burned them!’34 Rather than literally setting enemy soldiers on 
fire he meant killing a great number of them, although there was a system to this. ‘We would kill a 
part of them and another part would be spared’. The part that was killed, according to this veteran 
were the ‘genuine reds’ not the ones ‘taken by force’. How they would distinguish between the 
‘genuine’ and ‘forced’ ‘reds’ he partially explains by describing how he received the surrender of a 
Republican soldier. Speaking with a slight admiration for the stubbornness of the ‘reds’, he tells of 
how he demanded of a Republican prisoner to shout:  
 
Viva España! But the prisoner ‘would say “no”. I give him hell. He says “Viva España”. I tell 
him “Viva Franco!”. He would say “No. Franco no. I will not say viva. [Even if you] kill me I 
would not say Viva Franco”. We would get hold of him and would shoot him in the head and 
kill him and [still] he would not say “Viva Franco”.35 
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As for those spared, some of them ended up in Morocco where they worked, long after the end of the 
war, on constructing roads and fortifications, ‘while we were guarding them’.36 If admissions to killing 
Republican prisoners were rare, it is even rarer and rather exceptional to find an admission in oral 
testimonies that un-armed and even civilian people were shot. Already a mention has been made 
(chapter 2) of an anecdote in which a Spanish commander told Moroccans ‘wherever you find reds kill 
them’, and ordering the execution of two unarmed prisoners’.37 Others put the blame on the Spaniards. 
One remembered that ‘the commander would order whether they would kill them [prisoners]. They 
would bring them to the trenches and execute them, but the Spaniards would do the execution. We on 
the contrary had sympathy with them because they were like us, forced to do this war’. 38 
Speaking to the Republicans 
When the Moroccans and Republicans were not trying to kill each other, there was communication 
between the two sides as the fronts sometimes stabilised and opposing lines drew close to each other. 
Communication ranged from continuing the fight verbally, trying to entice the Moroccans to desert to 
the Republicans or even, though rarely, have a friendly trade. In 1937 the Nationalist ABC Sevilla ran 
a story about one such communication though it was probably embellished to show the high morale of 
the Nationalist Moroccan forces. As the writer was ridiculing a planned Republican offensive he 
wrote:  
 
I cannot fail to mention a dialogue, last night, in a certain parapet, where one jamete was 
interrogated thus by the unknown and hidden Marxist: 
-Why won’t you come over, Moors? We have everything and we will give you much money. 
But if you won’t come over soon you can be certain of death, because we are preparing a 
terrible offensive along the whole front, and we will slaughter you all. 
-Are you not deceiving the Moor? Finally, an offensive of the reds? Moor is very happy! 
Because the captain forbids looting [the corpses] if there is no offensive by the reds and I was 
wishing you will do an offensive because then [we] will be authorised by captain to loot’.39 
 
Aside from the somewhat belittling ‘jamete’ term by the writer to describe the Moroccan soldier, in 
the story the Republican enemy speaks to the Moroccan as a soldier who is mainly motivated by 
economical gain which is something the Moroccan soldier, according to the writer, confirms. 
More importantly are the surviving Moroccan veterans’ memories of some of the Republicans’ 
attempts to induce them to surrender. ‘In the trenches we would hear the Moroccan darija [Moroccan 
colloquial Arabic], they would bring them [Moroccans in the Republican camp] and they would talk 
using the megaphone. We did not know whether they captured them or whether they were on their 
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side. They would say “we are in good health, we are well treated, we captured Tetuan, we captured 
Larache. They only lied, it was but propaganda’.40 One anecdote that would bring to mind the story of 
Najati Sidqi describes how ‘the reds put a megaphone on an olive tree and someone called in classical 
Arabic “You Rifian heroes, you freemen of Jebala. We appreciate your jihadi capabilities which are 
not appreciated by Franco who does not give you good food or money. Come to us and we will give 
you money and women and good food”’.41 One wonders whether the classical Arabic was spoken by a 
Spanish, a non-Maghrebi Arab or even Sidqi himself, as neither the date nor the approximate period 
for this incident is given, nor Sidqi himself mentions promises of women to the Moroccan soldiers. 
According to yet another account, a voice of a Moroccan called Milud from Melilla was heard in 
Asturias who used to talk to Moroccans, calling them to desert to the Republicans for ‘we have drinks 
and food and women. Here, we are filled’. Those whom he called upon to desert would respond by 
insulting him and the Republicans with ‘you son of Jews’ and ‘you sons of dogs’.42 Others responded 
to the invitation to surrender in return for money and women with the more obscene remarks of ‘hijo 
de Pasionaria, hijo [de] puta’.43 Trading insults became a habit for many. ‘They used to talk to us in 
Spanish, and we would respond in what Spanish we had. They would insult us and tell us what are you 
Muslims doing in our country Spain?’44 Interestingly one of the veterans told the Republicans that 
‘you came to our lands to fight us, so this is us coming to your lands to fight you’.45 It is a remarkable 
comment from someone, who was an ex-member of the Abdelkrim Al Khattabi’s resistance movement 
and who later fought on the side of the very army that crushed the Abdelkrim rebellion of the 1920s in 
Morocco to which he was referring. It would have certainly been unwise to utter that statement where 
it could have been noticed by the Spanish superiors or reported to them.  
It is clear that since the Republicans who spoke to the Moroccans were convinced that the 
Moroccan volunteers in Franco’s army came to Spain solely due to economic motives and to enjoy the 
loot, including women, it was more than natural that money and women were the main incentives used 
to try to attract Moroccans to desert. It would appear that archival evidence, at least on one occasion, 
might corroborate the oral testimonies with regard to using women as incentives for Moroccan soldiers 
to desert. In February 1938, the second Tabor of the Regulares Alhucemas, in the sector of Porcal 
(south of Madrid) sent an extract of a speech by the ‘reds’ directed towards the ‘natives’ in which it 
was claimed that many ‘Moors’ were captured in Saragossa and were currently in Madrid and 
Barcelona, inviting the Moroccan soldiers to come over to their side as they will benefit from 10 
pesetas (a higher pay than in the Nationalist army) and would have a ‘happy life’, reminding them that 
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they, far from resting, ‘live continuously in the trench where, unlike them [a clear reference to the 
Republican soldiers], they do not have women and other diversions’.46 The speech points to the 
possibility of receiving those mentioned diversions should any Moroccan soldier join the Republicans. 
One piece of Republican propaganda planned to be aimed at the Moroccans, though it is not clear if 
this actually happened, that refrained from offering economic incentives and referred to the 
supposedly inferior position of the Moroccans and to the religious paradox of fighting for the 
Catholics:  
 
The Moors that are wounded are killed in hospitals so that they would not be fed. The Italians 
receive better pay and live better than you do. You will forever be the cannon fodder that 
Franco and the Italians need. You fight for the Spanish officers who invaded Morocco and 
treat you and look at you as slaves. So you fight so that the enemies of your country will win. 
You fight for the domination of the believers of a faith – the Catholic – that is not yours, a 
faith that always fought against yours until you were expelled from Spain and enslaved in 
Morocco. The war that you wage is not sacred nor is it for the independence of your country 
but to enrich Franco and to bleed Morocco dry by the Germans and Italians.47 
 
For all the invitations to join the Republic, the Republican propaganda towards the Moroccans 
displayed on rare occasions other sentiments, as happened to a Moroccan unit that witnessed, while 
exiting a town in Extremadura, Republican planes dropping leaflets in which the Moroccans could 
read ‘If you win we will rule, and if we win we will rule. We the Spanish are brothers. Out with the 
garbage’.48 
But the ‘Moors’ who fought against the Republic were not the only ones to suffer from a 
hostile attitude displayed by the Republic, for the same Republic displayed a similar attitude towards 
the North Africans who, in far lesser numbers, fought for the Republican cause. This attitude towards 
pro-Republican ‘Moors’ serves to strengthen the opinion that the Republic’s attitude towards the pro-
Nationalist Moroccans was partially motivated by tradition anti-Moorish attitutes. 
The Republican ‘Moors’ 
Mohamed ben Larbi Cherif was perhaps the first Moroccan Muslim volunteer for the Republican case. 
All that we currently know about him is what the Diario Marroquí mentioned on 1 August 1936: that 
he was ‘a Moorish instructor of red militias’, who had gone to Ceuta to provide military training to red 
militia in the Union district of the city and who was detained on 31 July.49 Other than that, it is not 
known whether he was instructed to train the ‘red militia’ or if it was of his own accord, and whether 
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he was a native of Ceuta or not, or whether he was at the time, or had been before, a member of the 
Spanish military.  
But early in the war there were other Moroccan ‘volunteer’ cases which are better documented 
and sometimes tragic in nature. In his memoirs of the war, the Pravda correspondent Mikhail Koltsov 
talks about the so-called Batallón de Milicias Marroquíes, a unit that is supposed to have been formed 
by the communist 5th Regiment and which supposedly contained anti-fascist Moroccan elements. 
Gárate Córdoba suspects though that the Moroccans, recruited to fight for the Republicans, were not 
formed into independent units but distributed among other existing units of the 5th Regiment, and later 
among units of the International Brigades, and that the Militia Battalion might not have existed.50 But 
according to Ben Salem, the aforementioned battalion did exist but it met with a tragic ending. It was 
formed by around 300 Moroccan prisoners, deserters and volunteers along with other Moroccan and 
Muslim residents and workers in Madrid who were rounded up from the streets and pressed into 
military service. They were then sent to the front lines in the Ciudad Universitaria which was 
witnessing heavy fighting since the last months of 1936 when the Nationalist forces closed in on the 
capital. Most of these Moroccans perished during the fighting. The Republicans then shot the handful 
of survivors for ‘leaving their positions’, although Ben Salem does not provide a source for this 
information.51 He does quote however the Journal de l'Afrique Francaise which reported a similar 
story on December 1936 that Moroccan factory workers in Spain were forcibly recruited at the start of 
the war by the Republican side and formed into a battalion which was later sent to the Guadarrama 
front to the north of Madrid. The battalion was decimated in the fighting there, leaving angry survivors 
who mutinied and were therefore shot by the Republicans.52 
The suspicious attitude that the Republican left had towards the Moroccans was extended even 
to the admittedly small number of Arabs and other Muslims, some of them communists from various 
countries who volunteered to fight for the Republicans as part of the International Brigades. Little is 
known about those Brigadists, and there are hardly any testimonies from the part of these Arab or 
Muslim Brigadists. Abdul Latif Ben Salem estimated the ‘Arabs’ fighting in the International Brigades 
at 800.53 There are other lower estimations. Soviet records used by Salvador Bofarull identify 110 
‘French’ volunteers with Arab names, 38 of whom are listed as coming from Algeria, the origin of the 
rest is unknown. The records identified also one Lebanese, one Syrian, three Egyptians and two Iraqi 
(one Jewish, one Arab), one Moroccan, and three Palestinian volunteers.54 According to Castells there 
were 716 Arab volunteers, the greater part of whom came from Algeria (493), while Morocco 
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provided 201, and the rest came from Tangier, Syria, and Saudi Arabia (4).55 It seems in any case that 
the greatest share of volunteers came from French possessions in North Africa, mainly Algeria.  
 One of the North African volunteers was Mohamed Belaidi, a machine-gunner in a Potez 540 
French-made airplane, and who was killed in 1936 after being hit by a German Heinkel fighter. He 
inspires the character Saïdi in the novel L’Espoir, published in 1937 by the French writer and anti-
Fascist activist André Malraux.56 In the novel, Saïdi explains why he came to Spain, stating that ‘when 
I learned that the Moors fought for Franco, I told my socialist section: “we have to do something. If 
not, what would the comrade workers say about the Arabs?”’57 The historiography of the Moroccans 
in the Spanish Civil War registers one interview with a Moroccan veteran of the International 
Brigades. That interview was conducted by Ruano who met said veteran in Tangier. Al Hachmi, who 
at the age of 18 volunteered in Tangier, then an international city, to fight in Spain. He explained his 
motives by stating ‘I was with the workers and the poor. Besides, I did not like fascism then, nor now’. 
He volunteered with two Moroccan friends, left for Marseille and then for Spain. According to him his 
two friends were similarly motivated and he did not know of Arabs in the International Brigades who 
joined as mercenaries. He fought in different places, including Madrid, Teruel and the north. In 1938 
he left for France and took part in the anti-German actions of the French resistance, for which he was 
given a pension by the French government.58 
The ‘Arab’ volunteers were not organised in independent battalions or companies based on 
ethnicity or place of origin as was usually the case with the English, French, German, Italian or 
American volunteers. It is not known whether this was deliberate or not, and if it was, whether the 
Spanish Republicans were behind it. As a French pro-Republican participant in the war, Paul Nothomb 
comments on the Spanish Republican attitude towards the pro-Republican Muslim volunteers: ‘We 
knew that the many Arabs in the International Brigades were treated by the Republican officers with a 
condescension that was clearly tinged with contempt’.59 
This situation was not helped when the voice of North African members of the International 
Brigades was, albeit rarely, heard in public. Skoutelsky, in his Novedad en el frente,60 provides 
excerpts of radio speeches by two North African volunteers of the International Brigades, one 
Moroccan from Rabat, a veteran of the Great War who came to Spain from France, and the other an 
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Algerian former sergeant of the French army and later member of the Spanish Communist Party who 
rose to become a company commander. In their speeches they explain their motives for fighting in 
Spain and interestingly link the Iberian struggle to the struggle against the injustices of the colonising 
power, with the Moroccan volunteer asserting that ‘we want to save Morocco from colonial 
exploitation and then we will have to help ourselves win independence’, having confidence that ‘our 
Spanish comrades’ were fighting for the freedom of all people, and especially ‘for the liberation of 
Spanish Morocco’.61 The Algerian, in his radio speech, complained about the moral oppression his 
country was suffering at the hands of the ‘colonist’ and asked his French comrades to be interested in 
his country, but he did not go as far as demanding independence for either Algeria or Morocco.62 
These two volunteers were perhaps too hopeful. In this regard it is worth noting the comment by the 
Palestinian Sidqi, that after moving to Paris from Algeria, where he incurred wrath from both Spanish 
and French communists because of his opposition to their ‘colonialist leanings’.63 Whatever the case 
may be, it is possible to indicate that the absence of independent ‘Arab’ units was a reflection of the 
suspicious attitude that the Spanish Republicans held towards the loyalty of any North African 
volunteers, although there is no hard evidence to prove that this was a deliberate policy.   
The North African pro-Republican fighters figure sparsely in Nationalist documents. In 
November 1936, a French deserter from the newly arrived International Brigades appeared in Casa de 
Campo and told his Nationalist interrogators that his unit contained a number of Algerian Arabs who 
desired to desert to the Nationalist ranks but were afraid of retaliating measures.64 In December of the 
same year, two Spanish deserters from an engineer unit also appeared in Casa de Campo to announce 
that the unit was under the command of ‘the Moroccan lieutenant’, whose name was not mentioned. 
They did mention however that he ‘has much enthusiasm for the red cause’ and does a great job of 
encouraging his soldiers.65 
Equally interesting is the account by a Moroccan volunteer in the Republican army who was 
taken prisoner by the Nationalists. Hamido ben Mohamed Hach, from Tangier, had been living in 
Spain since 1935 when he moved to live with his sister in Madrid who was married to a Spanish 
citizen. The ‘National Movement surprised him in Madrid’ and he was evacuated to Valencia and later 
to Barcelona. In Mataró he enlisted ‘as volunteer’ in 1937 in the Second Battalion of the division that 
was commanded by Lister, and took part in the Ebro operations, where he was captured by Italian 
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forces (it is unknown exactly when).  He was moved to a number of locations before ending up in a 
concentration camp for foreigners in San Pedro de Cardeña (Burgos) where he was put to work in the 
75th Disciplinary Battalion in Belchite.66 Though interesting, this account does not give us insight into 
the motives that led this ex-Republican Moroccan soldier to enlist as a ‘volunteer’, if he had any 
political leanings of any kind, or if he simply found himself in the wrong place in the wrong time, or 
why did he not volunteer when he was in Madrid. It does not provide information on whether other 
Moroccans or North Africans were present in the same unit, or whether this soldier’s Moroccan origin 
played a part in his relations with his comrades in arms. Aside from these persons who fought for the 
Republic, the Nationalist documents also tell us of a Muslim called ‘Hanak’ who was a speaker for 
Radio Barcelona.67 
With the terms ‘Moor’ or ‘Moroccan’, the discussion revolves obviously about people who are 
Muslim. Indeed, many sources from that era make the distinction between ‘Moor’ and ‘Israelite’ while 
referring to citizens from the same country. But it is noteworthy to mention, in passing, the fact that a 
very small number of Jewish Moroccans of another religious persuasion, namely Jewish, were also 
present in war-torn Spain on the side of the Republic. So far, accounts by Moroccan veterans and 
those found in archival material have not provided information on the presence of any Jewish 
Moroccans on the Nationalist side.68 Moroccan volunteers for the Republican cause were not, 
however, enough to solve the Moroccan problem that ached the Republic. To shake the power base of 
the Nationalists, Spanish Morocco had to be destabilised. 
To re-conquer Morocco  
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After returning from Spain where he fought as a member of the Trotskyist POUM militia, George 
Orwell noted in frustration that:  
 
What clinches everything is the case of Morocco. Why was there no rising in Morocco? 
Franco was trying to set up an infamous dictatorship and the Moors actually preferred him to 
the Popular Front Government! The palpable truth is that no attempt was made to foment a 
rising in Morocco, because to do so would have meant putting a revolutionary construction on 
the war. The first necessity, to convince the Moors of the Government’s good faith, would 
have been to proclaim Morocco liberated. And we can imagine how pleased the French would 
have been by that! The best strategic opportunity of the war was flung away in the vain hope 
of placating the French and British capitalism’.69 
 
Was Orwellʼs suggestion practical or even possible? In 1992, Madariaga rejected this possibility. She 
argued against critics of the Republic who blamed it for not promising autonomy or even 
independence to Moroccan nationalists in order to weaken Franco’s position in Morocco, to which she 
countered that the Republic was in no position to give such concessions, and that the Moroccan 
nationalist movement was too urban and weak to do anything to undermine the Francoists 70 A 
proclamation by the Republic or even a promise for future independence for Morocco might have 
caused many troubles for the Nationalists in Morocco, though perhaps not in a decisive way. One 
Moroccan nationalist figure, M. Bennuna, told Ruano that although there were not many militant 
Moroccan nationalists in the principal cities, they did have members in the mountains who would have 
conducted military action against Franco, though this would have had more success hindering the 
recruitment of soldiers for Franco, rather than attacking the Francoist army, mostly composed of 
Moroccans.71 
 
The fact is that the Republic was ready to give up the Protectorate to France, give concessions 
to Britain in Morocco,72 or alternatively offer Germany a deal that would give Berlin French-African 
territories which would be compensated by giving Spanish Morocco to France in exchange for 
Germany stopping its aid to Franco.73 These initiatives failed, especially as Britain did not wish a 
greater French influence in that part of Morocco facing Gibraltar.74 The Republic seemed ready to 
negotiate the fate of its protectorate with anyone except the Moroccans themselves. Orwell was partly 
correct about the French factor in the Republican attitude towards fomenting a rebellion in Morocco. 
                                                 
69 George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (London 2000) 219. 
70 María Rosa de Madariaga, ‘The Intervention of Moroccan Troops in the Spanish Civil War: a 
Reconsideration’, European History Quarterly 22 (1992) 67-97. 
71Ruano, Islam y Guerra civil, 215. 
72 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 562. 
73 Mesa, Los moros, 167. 




The foreign communists also complained about it. André Marty reported that ‘we must give freedom 
to some Moroccans. Until now we have done nothing in that direction. The Republican Prime Minister 
Largo Caballero refused to discuss this question, pleading that he did not want to spoil relations with 
the French government’.75 The fear of the French that a rebellion by natives in Spanish Morocco could 
foment nationalist unrest in the French protectorate was the most important factor to be taken into 
account in Republican plans to hit the Spanish Nationalist base in North Africa. But according to 
Republican sources,76 it seems that regarding early Republican plans in Morocco the French 
government stated that France approved of the Republican intentions with the only condition that 
under no circumstances ‘would we try to exalt the nationalist sentiments of the natives’.77 The 
Republicans believed in May 1938 when planning another attempt in Morocco ‘that at the moment 
France would permit all action produced in our Protectorate by the legal government of the Republic 
and would even help maintain it if that would not result in damage to the calmness in its zone’.78 This 
of course meant greatly restricting the Republicans in what they could do to foment an action hostile 
to Franco in Morocco. This is not to say that the French government was the culpable party, as other 
factors, including the prevalent Spanish distrust of Moroccans, played a part.  
The Republic did not successfully manage opportunities that presented themselves to stir 
trouble for the Spanish Nationalists in Spanish Morocco, and rebuffed an initial proposal by Moroccan 
nationalists in French Morocco to help the Republic fight Franco. In the autumn of 1936 a delegation 
of the Moroccan Action Committee (CAM) that was based in the French Zone of Morocco travelled to 
Barcelona to make the Republican government an offer regarding the Spanish Zone. The CAM in 
French Morocco took a different direction than the Moroccan Nationalist movement in the Spanish 
Zone and sided, morally at least, with the Spanish Republicans. 
In August of 1936 French socialists visited the C.A.M. and convinced them to try to incite a 
rebellion in the Francoist rearguard. In September 1936 a C.A.M. delegation travelled to Spain to offer 
help in organising a rebellion in northern Morocco, in return for promises of independence or some 
sort of autonomy. The delegation members were detained more than once in Republican Spain and 
subjected to several interrogations, having narrowly missed ‘certain death’ at the hands of Spanish 
anarchists. After reaching a preliminary accord with the Spanish Central Committee of the Anti-
Fascist Militia they were informed that the accord was invalid. The socialist Prime Minister Largo 
Caballero expressed his suspicion and lack of trust of the delegation that he refused to meet, as well as 
pointing to the troubles that an insurgency could cause for the French, which he still hoped would 
openly support the Republican war effort, if it manages to inspire the nationalists in the French zone to 
do the same. As a compromise the delegation was offered money instead of concessions in return for 
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causing trouble in the Spanish Zone. Refusing and returning angrily, the CAM leaders were later 
either exiled or jailed by the French authorities, still under the Popular Front government. In the wake 
of this failed mission, some of these leaders tended to support the pro-Franco attitude taken by 
Moroccan nationalists from the Spanish Zone, especially after hearing reports of the Spanish 
Nationalists’ intention to grant some form of autonomy to their Moroccan region.79 
In light of this outright refusal to even hold talks with potentially anti-Franco Moroccan 
politicians, even if they were from the French zone, it is surprising that in 1937 the Republican 
government of Largo Caballero undertook  a mission conducted by the socialist Undersecretary for 
War Carlos Baraibar to distribute money to Moroccan notables with the aim of launching a rebellion 
in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, a mission which ended in a fiasco.80 The project came to a halt after 
the fall of Largo Caballero in May 1937 in what was called the May Crisis, and it formed a point of 
contention between Largo Caballero and his cabinet.81 It was initially kept secret from other members 
of the government. Research into the Baraibar mission by Luna Alonso, examining the documents of 
the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noticed anomalies in the project that led him to doubt the 
credibility of the plan, among them: the delegation authorised the mission while being aware of the 
French reservations towards any tribal rebellions that could destabilise the French Zone; the 
impossibility to use the French Zone as a base to launch their operation; their exclusive reliance on 
one Moroccan notable, Dris el Riffi whom every report and opinion agreed about being dishonest and 
lacking any credibility among Moroccans, French or Spaniards. Republican Prime Minister Largo 
Caballero refused the more cautious communist plan for agitation and sabotage which gained the 
support of the Spanish consular agents in Morocco, in favour of the dramatic rebellion plan. Luna 
Alonso concludes that the project never intended to be serious and was a card that Largo Caballero 
intended to play in his struggle with the communists. His goal was to remain at the head of the 
government by using the prospect of the imminent outbreak of a rebellion in Morocco that would turn 
the tables on the Spanish Nationalists and secure the victory for the Republic. Luna Alonso concludes 
that the whole undertaking constituted a ‘comedy’.82 The ‘comedy’ that saw the Undersecretary for 
War Baraibar conducting many meetings with Moroccans and going native by sitting on the ground 
and ‘eating with his fingers’ was not without its price, as five agents who entered Spanish Morocco to 
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establish contacts with tribal chiefs were captured and immediately shot, which showed that the 
Nationalists were well informed about the efforts.83 After that, few interesting developments occurred 
on the issue of organising rebellions in Morocco for many months, though the Nationalists claimed in 
December 1937 that there was a Republican attempt to assassinate the Khalifa.84 
Quite often, Republican efforts in Morocco were thwarted or betrayed by Moroccans. We 
already mentioned the case of Dris el Riffi who was determined by the Republicans as being useless 
and corrupt. To add insult to injury, the Spanish Nationalist authorities were aware from time to time 
of the Republican efforts to stir unrest among the tribes in their zone by pouring in money. It seems 
that they were not alarmed, since it involved, as the Nationalist documents state, people who were 
cheating the Republicans out of their money in return for promises they never intended to keep.85 
More seriously was an attempt in April 1937 when a Moroccan betrayed a plot to bomb parts of 
Spanish Morocco. This is according to a report by the Dutch legation in Tangier which informed the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague in April 1937 that a number of non-commissioned officers, 
working at the aerodrome of Aoumara close to the border with French Morocco, between Larache and 
Alcazarquivir, had planned to bomb Larache and Tetuan with the intention of creating panic. This 
would have led ‘to trouble and will give the authorities of French Morocco the wished for opportunity 
to restore order by the force of arms’. The report discloses that it was a Moroccan loyal to the 
government of General Franco who ‘betrayed this conspiracy to the government, so that the plotters 
were arrested in time’. The result was 14 executions in Tetuan.86 The most painful hit was yet to come 
in September 1938. 
 An anarchist plan was proposed in May 1938 in Barcelona to organise yet another rebellion in 
Morocco. This project was partly based on what it claimed were secret contacts in October 1937 with 
Abdel Khalek Torres of the ‘Partido Nacionalista Marroquí’, asking him whether he would be open to 
collaborating with the Republic. Still according to the anarchist plan, he answered that his party could 
not collaborate with the Republic as long as it was in agreement with France. In reply, a letter was sent 
to him that noted the possibility of not making an agreement with France and invited him to negotiate 
directly through two delegates with the Republican government. This way Torres’ desire to collaborate 
with the government of the Republic was affirmed,87 though the plan itself noted that the collaboration 
of France had to be obtained. 
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More importantly, from the religious and racial point of views were the following points: the 
project stressed that any political-social action in Morocco must be religious and nationalist in nature; 
it suggested procuring support from both Muslim and Jewish elements (through Zionist circles in 
London and Paris) but pointed to the necessity of keeping the Jewish support secret from the Muslim 
would-be allies that would reject any cooperation with the Jewish ‘elements’; and the plan hoped to 
make use of what it perceived as anti-European attitudes among some Moroccans. Discussing the 
organisation of rebellions in Ifni and the Sahara, the plan proposed attracting chiefs of the Requibat 
tribes, among which were the Ulad Musa who were ‘always ready to fight against the Christian’,88 and 
noted that among another tribe, the Ait Ussa, ‘we would always find people ready to jump upon the 
Christians’ given their ‘xenophobic and marauding instincts’.89 In any case, the plan was not, at least 
not in its ambitious nature, put into practice. How much of it could be related to the September 1938 
attempt based at the international zone of Tangier to incite rebellion in Spanish Morocco is unknown. 
By 1938 the Republican leadership should have known that it could not rely on strong support 
in Morocco. There is a Republican intelligence report from 1938 listing about 83 key Moroccan 
notables and important figures in the Spanish Zone, their positions, and updates. Among them are five 
to six whom the report describes as either friends of the Republic, having Republican sympathies, or 
easily attracted to the Republican cause; two others are described as being opposed to the recruitment 
in their regions; two more as being enemies of the Spanish Nationalists and two others who were 
being distrusted and observed by the Nationalist authorities in Northern Morocco.90 The rest were 
portrayed as loyal to the Nationalists, including Torres, who figured as a potential ally in the anarchist 
plan. In total between six and nine Moroccans could be theoretically attracted to the cause of the 
Republic, according to this report, which was not promising considering that having sympathies is not 
the same as being prepared to act. 
The last Republican attempt against the security of the Nationalist zone in Spanish Morocco 
occurred on the night of 11 September 1938 in Tangier, during the height of the Czechoslovakian 
crisis which could have precipitated a European war with a possible invasion by France of Spanish 
Morocco, and which ended with an agreement in Munich which permitted the annexation by Germany 
of parts of Czechoslovakia and opened the door to the occupation of the rest of that country later on. 
The Dutch acting consul in Tangier sent an alarming report describing the attempt. ‘A conspiracy was 
discovered which could have had enormous consequences’.91 It turned out that ‘50 Arabs and red 
Spaniards’ were surprised and detained after one of the conspirators reported them. The arrests by the 
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Tangerine gendarmes took place while the conspirators ‘were in taxis and trucks and tried to enter the 
Spanish Zone along a side-road’. They turned out to be armed ‘with automatic revolvers and provided 
with the needed ammunition’. After further investigation ‘arms caches were discovered in the 
surroundings of Tangier’. The arrests were ‘still in full swing’. The report further stated that the goal 
of this conspiracy ‘that had branches in the whole of the Tangerine and the Spanish Zone was to incite 
a rebellion in the last [i.e. Spanish] zone’.92 The goal was to create enough chaos for the French to 
intervene while counting on a failure to end the Czechoslovakian crisis peacefully. 
There are a number of interesting facts regarding this last chance to cause the Nationalists to 
lose Spanish Morocco. Firstly, the Spanish Consul General in Tangier was relieved of his duties by the 
government of Negrín, the new socialist Prime Minister on the very same day the attempt failed and 
sent to Argentina. Secondly, once again a Republican conspiracy was betrayed by a Moroccan. Lastly, 
apparently some Republican agents on the ground were kept in the dark with regard to the attempt. 
The anarchist documents provide a comic portrayal of this affair. While the anarchist leadership in 
Barcelona was aware of the plot and indignant at its failure, its agents in Tangier remained convinced 
in their reports that the whole business was the work of Moroccan agents provocateurs working for the 
Spanish Nationalists,93 and no one bothered to correct the impressions.  
Conclusions 
The relationship of the Republic with the Moroccans was generally a troubled one, mixed with missed 
opportunities and mutual mistrust. Most of the Moroccan soldiers distrusted the Republicans and were 
not ready to desert to their ranks, while the Republican soldiers distrusted Moroccans in general and 
displayed little sympathy or mercy towards those who surrendered. Republican attitudes reflected 
traditional Spanish negative views of the Moroccans which were strengthened by the memory of 
colonial wars and the recent memory of the Asturias 1934 uprising as well as the crimes attributed to 
the Moroccans during the early stages of the war. Since the Republicans did not control Spanish 
Morocco, nor any Moroccan units, they were probably less motivated to encourage a less negative 
attitude towards Moroccans in general. Some foreign allies of the Republic were more sympathetic to 
the Moroccans and even considered it practical to display a positive attitude towards the Moroccans as 
individuals and also towards the cause of autonomy or independence of Morocco. The Republican 
leadership rejected and distrusted any political agreement with Moroccan nationalist leaders. Even the 
traditionally anti-imperialist communists (both Spanish and French) were not in favor of raising the 
issue of the independence of Morocco.    
The other side of the story is that the Republic met obstacles on more than a few occasions in 
its attempts to cooperate with Moroccans in order to stir troubles in Spanish Morocco. These obstacles 
were partly the result of amateurish planning and lack of serious effort. But they were also partly the 
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result of actions by a number of Moroccans who proved themselves to be either corrupt or deliberately 
deceitful, and which led not only to squandering of money, but loss of life and political embarrassment 
and therefore, it is safe to assume, strengthened the suspicious attitude the Republicans already had 





To be Spanish, to be Moroccan 
 
‘Every Spaniard, deep down or otherwise, has a Moorish spark in his character’ –A British 
diplomat in Spain - 1937.1 
 
‘I am Spanish. My grandfather came here in 1926 after fighting for the French. My father fought 
for Franco, I was born and raised here’ - A Muslim resident of Melilla - 2 
 
Since sexual and religious relationships have been discussed, this chapter sheds light on further 
aspects of cultural relationships by revisiting the position Spaniards held between accepting the 
‘Moor’ and excluding him from Spanish community, and examining Spanish rhetoric, policy, and 
the realities of mutual relationships. Equally important is the view the Moroccans adopted in 
relation to the brotherhood message the Spanish projected, the position they took in relation to the 
social and cultural border between them and the Spaniards, and their willingness to cross it. How 
did the Moroccans envisage the Spanish-Moroccan brotherhood? How did they perceive the 
mixing of the two cultural spheres? Spain’s policy of maintaining a separating zone between 
Moroccans and Spaniards was not a one-sided affair. If the Spanish wanted to keep the two 
separate, so did the majority of Moroccans. 
The rhetoric  
In 1937, a Nationalist observer of the war in Spain wrote:  
 
This valiant Moor, simple, loyal, has helped us in an extraordinary way in this terrible war 
that we are sustaining for the moral and material salvation of our fatherland. This Moor is 
the same one who yesterday fought against us when he thought and believed that we had 
desires of annexation and conquest. It is the same one who understood much later our 
civilising mission, the same one who came to know our Generalissimo and was captivated 
by him as by the prototype of manhood, intelligence and authority in their highest 
standards.3  
 
As the text implies, the positive image of Moroccan soldiers in Spanish Nationalist propaganda as 
loyal in a common struggle contrasted with the extremely negative view most of the Spaniards, 
including much of the military, had of Moroccans during the two preceding decades. Centuries of 
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reinforcing the image of the Moor as a traditional enemy were strengthened by the military 
engagements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Morocco. This was particularly the 
case during the colonial war against the Rif rebels of Mohammed ben Abdul Krim Al Khattabi, 
when Spain suffered one the most humiliating colonial defeats in the battle of Anual. Racist 
attitudes towards Moroccans were prevalent among vengeful Spanish officials, soldiers, 
politicians, and the press, describing Moroccans as uncivilised, xenophobic, fanatical, brutal, 
degenerate, and deceitful. Some called for the complete extermination of Moroccans. At the same 
time, others were attracted to Moroccan culture; they recognised a shared history between 
Morocco and Spain, and even saw Moroccans as younger brothers. In fact, many Spaniards 
displayed contradictory responses towards Morocco and its people. The brutal colonial war, which 
ended ultimately with Spanish victory, had its effect on the development of the image of 
Moroccans.4  
The fellow imperialists of Ganivet had their way in Morocco and established their 
protectorate in the early twentieth century. In 1936, they employed the legacy of the Arab culture 
and the shared history between Moroccans and Spanish to bring Moroccan troops to Spain. Queipo 
de Llano was one of the first to make a reference to medieval history when he remarked on 26 July 
1936, during one of his radio chats that, ‘it is curious that to Córdoba have arrived those brave 
Regulares to defend that beautiful monument La Mezquita, that was erected by their ancestors 
[Italics added]’. 5 
For those who believed that there was a historical paradox in bringing Moroccans, there 
was no shortage of expert historical argument that there was no such paradox. On 4 April 1937, 
‘patriotic’ celebrations were held in Seville which were attended by General Queipo de Llano. 
Performances of patriotic hymns and cinematic screenings on Marxist destructiveness were 
followed by a speech by José María Pemán, a famous right wing intellectual and writer. Among a 
number of issues, he referred to the collaboration of Muslims with the ‘endeavor of Spain’ which 
he found in ‘congruence with History’. He added that ‘it [History] surprises only those who are 
ignorant, for those who are familiar with the past know that El Cid had more Moors in his army 
than Spaniards’.6 
Not only the shared history was used during the Civil War to explain as propaganda the 
military participation of Moroccan troops, but also the continued presence of units in Spain, 
especially the famous Moorish Guard of the Generalissimo, though the historical justifications of 
this might raise some questions. In 1952, Juan Priego López published a book on the Moorish 
guards of different Spanish sovereigns. Referring to the Moorish guards, he notes the following:  
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our old sovereigns had in their service, especially during the age of the Reconquest, we 
find ourselves in a very distinct case, for the soldiers who constituted them [the guards] 
were not completely strangers to our race, but on the contrary they originated from a 
people that is very similar to ours and connected traditionally to our political vicissitudes. 
In reality, the existence of such Moorish escorts or guards has obeyed well the brotherhood 
that was established, since remote ages, by the geography and history between two peoples 
which reside on one side and the other of the Strait of Gibraltar.7 
 
After mentioning how the Iberians and the Berbers were similar racially as well as spiritually, he 
compares the Spanish struggle against Arab domination with the Berber struggle against the same 
domination. Therefore, the heroic deeds of Pelayo, the first leader of the Spanish resistance against 
the Moors, had their parallels in the Berber tribes of Miknasa, Barguata, and Matgara.8 This is 
somewhat remarkable, because other propagandists for the Spanish-Morocco brotherhood, make a 
point of this brotherhood being built on the shared Arab-Islamic history that followed the Arab 
conquest of the Iberian peninsula, not the resistance against it. And the Spaniards hardly made a 
distinction in their policies or discourses between the Berber and the Arab. The Moroccans were 
usually lumped together as Moors. In general, Spanish officers refused to promote an Arab/Berber 
division in the manner of the French.9 In any case, Priego continues by mentioning how the 
medieval King Enrique IV liked to share the customs of his Moorish guard, and that many 
Castilian noblemen ‘showed their preference and sympathy for the Muslim customs’.10  
Was Priego López perhaps justifying the all-too familiar scene of many Spanish officers 
and generals, most notably Varela moving about wearing the Moroccan chillaba? After that 
historical precedent it was normal that during the pacification campaigns of the early twentieth 
century ‘the military comradeship, that existed in other periods between Spaniards and Berbers, 
was re-established between the soldiers of the native forces and the Spanish officers and non-
commissioned officers who commanded them’.11 Priego then comes to the natural conclusion that 
follows all of the above, and states that Franco ‘conscious of this’ history did not doubt in using 
the Moroccan forces:  
 
because - as we demonstrated and repeated many times- the Moors cannot be considered 
strangers to our race’. And to show his confidence in the Moorish soldiers, General Franco 
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decided to entrust them with guarding his person the moment he was invested with the 
functions of chief of state.12 And ‘with that an old tradition is renewed and a symbolic and 
brilliant expression of racial and historical brotherhood is given between Spaniards and 
Moroccans.13  
 
The rhetoric that justified the presence of Moroccan soldiers in Spain, in terms of Hispano-Arabic 
identity or Muslim-Spanish brotherhood, was not completely born on the spur of the moment. 
According to Geoffrey Jensen, the contrasting notion of Moroccans as ‘brothers’ was not 
‘conjured up out of nothing’. Instead, it always had a place in traditionalist rhetoric, albeit at times 
alongside contradictory, negative portrayals of Moroccans.14 Modern Spain’s officers displayed 
ambivalent attitudes towards Moroccans since the Spanish-Moroccan war (1859-1860), also called 
the War of Africa. Like civilian writers and artists, some mid-nineteenth Spanish army officers 
portrayed Moroccans in unabashedly negative terms, while others wrote surprisingly favourably of 
their north African ‘brothers’.15 During the War of Africa, Spanish soldiers met families with 
peninsular, i.e. Spanish, surnames which generated both curiosity and sympathy among some 
Spaniards.16  
Proponents of Andalusian regionalism in Spain, like Blas Infante and Rodolfo Gil 
Benumeya also played a role in glorifying the Muslim past, and stressing the links between the 
people of Andalusia and Morocco. Blas Infante used his understanding of Andalusian culture to 
justify Spanish colonialism in Morocco. Even though he was executed by the Nationalists at the 
start of the war, his discourse was appropriated by Francoist intellectuals to justify Spanish 
colonialism in Morocco.17 For Gil Benumeya, who converted to Islam, the builders of the 
Alhambra were the ‘ancestors of the current Spaniards and the current Moroccans, not the 
ancestors of Muslims who live today in the Orient’.18 For him, Spain and Morocco were two 
halves of the same piece of fruit,19 and therefore, Spanish intervention in Morocco was a moral 
obligation. 
According to some, including the Spanish imperialists themselves, Spanish imperialism in 
Morocco distinguished itself from its French and British counterparts by the lack of a fully 
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oppositional Moroccan ‘other’, as Jensen explains.20 Rom Landau, Arab specialist and traveller, 
also noted the contrasts between French and Spanish Morocco: ‘the Moors have at least had the 
satisfaction of not being regarded as members of an inferior species. The attitude of racial 
superiority maintained by all too many Frenchmen in their Zone was rare in Spanish Morocco. In 
fact, many Spanish residents pride themselves on their distant Moorish ancestry’.21 It might be 
true, as Jensen asserts, that only in Spain right-wing ideologues thought that colonisers and 
colonised had many things in common,22 and that Spanish colonialism in Morocco tried to see 
itself as different from other European powers. Since it had no evangelising mission in Morocco, 
and in the face of the lack of a fully developed racial ‘other’, the perceptions of a shared history, 
culture, and even a shared racial identity, as well as the echoes of medieval conviviencia (medieval 
Muslim-Christian coexistence) provided means to moralise the colonial endeavour. It was 
presented as Spain bringing civilisation and repaying the Moors for the gift of civilisation that they 
brought to medieval Spain.23 Therefore, and since the concept of the Hispano-Arab identity 
loomed large in the worldviews of some officers – both liberal and conservative – Francoist 
ideologues did not have to invent it.24 The Francoist regime went to such lengths that a book 
published by the Franco dictatorship’s office of popular education described medieval Spain as 
nothing more than the ‘real Spain wearing a turban’, and ‘the builders of the Alhambra were the 
grandfathers of today’s Spaniards and Moroccans’. 25 
  The adjustment of Spanish (military) views towards Moroccan soldiers, from negative to 
more positive, was therefore not entirely surprising. Jensen, in his study on the Spanish colonial 
administrator and writer García Figueras, provides an example of this by comparing two novels 
Figueras wrote about Morocco. The first novel, Del Marruecos Feudal, was published in 1930 and 
the other, Ramadan de Páz, was published after the Civil War. In both novels, as Jensen illustrates, 
the primary role of Islam as motivating the Moroccan characters is emphasised. Both novels 
contain elements of a shared identity between Moroccans and Spaniards. But while in the first 
novel the emphasis is more on negative Orientalist stereotyping, including the attribution of the 
characters’ fatalism to Islam, in the second, the stress is on the compatibility of both faiths, Islam 
and Christianity. Emphasis is also placed on the strong religious values of the Moroccans, and 
therefore a more positive attitude towards them.26  
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 The development of more positive views towards Moroccans during the 1920s and 1930s 
was facilitated by the military experience of Spanish officers in Morocco and the identification 
many of them felt with the country. Franco is famously quoted stating that ʻwithout Africa I can 
scarcely explain myself to myselfʼ.27 It was perhaps facilitated by the years of peace that followed 
the colonial war, but certainly by the bonds that were formed between the Spanish officers and the 
native troops in the years after the Anual disaster in 1921, and by the existence of enlightened 
officers (before and after the colonial war) who rejected the overt racism of many of their 
colleagues and tried to develop a more positive, though paternalistic approach towards the 
Moroccans.28 Paternalistic, because after all, the Moroccan-Spanish brotherhood was unequal. The 
Moroccan was seen as the little brother in need of guidance from his older Spanish brother who 
looks upon ‘the Moor, not as an inferior being, but as a friend, or rather as younger brother that has 
to be tutored until he reaches his maturity’, as one of the manuals for the interventores, written in 
1935, stated.29 It is the same way the Moroccan soldiers in Spain were described as infantile. In 
that, the Nationalists did not differ much when they equated the Moroccan soldiers fighting in 
Spain with children. As one propagandist put it, ‘like the little child when he finds himself in some 
danger or notices that he is being offended, he runs anxiously or threatens with telling his loving 
father, such are the little Moors with their father and our father Francoʼ.30 
Despite this official rhetoric of which many Spanish civilians and military could have been 
genuinely convinced, it was certainly not universally accepted in Spain. In his introduction to his 
Arabic translation of Joseph McCabe’s work, The Moorish Civilization in Spain, Mohammed 
Taqiyyuddin Al Hilali, a Moroccan Islamic scholar, writes:  
 
during the last World War, I was in the city of Granada in the Andalusian lands of Spain 
for four months. The Moroccan students visited me daily at the hotel where I was staying, 
and they complained about what they heard from their professors who cursed the Moors, 
which is how Moroccans in European languages are called. And they claimed that every 
evil that exists in the Spanish lands and every custom is the legacy that was left by the 
Moroccans during their rule of those lands.31 
 
Therefore, Al Hilali used McCabe’s book on Moorish Spain to disprove the arguments of those 
teachers. It is noteworthy that in an age when the Francoist regime was propagating the Hispano-
Arab identity, such negative stereotypes of the Moors were being spread in a Spanish university. 
Perhaps it simply meant a return to the old customs of disparaging the Moors, and these professors 
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belonged to the Morophobic section of Spanish society, a section that existed both among the 
supporters of the Nationalists, as well as the Republicans. Al Hilali himself praises a few Spanish 
scholars who took it upon themselves to defend the Islamic civilisation of Spain, and who ‘do not 
care about the wrath of the Falange or the indignation of those enthusiastic extreme nationalists’,32 
showing that not all of Francoist Spain embraced its Morophilic message. 
This Spanish rhetoric of the Spanish-Moroccan brotherhood and its partial acceptance, 
justified by history, of the Moroccans within the Spanish Nationalist geographical and ideological 
realm, not only explained the normalcy of having Moroccan soldiers in Spain, but it implied also 
that the shared history also mattered to Moroccan soldiers themselves. In the March 1941 issue of 
the Spanish Ejército magazine, Federico García Sanchiz of the Spanish Royal Academy wrote 
how one day during ‘the war with the reds’ in Toledo, a lone Moor, ‘one of the innumerable 
Regulares of the Uprising’ was standing on the bridge of San Martín. The writer was remembering 
how the rape by Don Rodrigo [the last of the Visigoth rulers of Spain] of La Cava [daughter of a 
legendary ruler of Ceuta called Don Julián] caused the treason of Don Julián that brought the Arab 
invasion of Spain. He wondered whether the Moor was ‘dreaming, after centuries have passed, of 
that one [century] when his ancestors burst into the Peninsula, dominating it in the same way that 
Don Rodrigo lost it, for it looked more like rape rather than conquest the fulminating Hagari 
conquest?’33 By Hagari, he refers to Arabs as the sons of Ismael whose mother, the wife of 
Abraham was Hagar.  But did the shared medieval history and perceptions of Moroccan-Spanish 
brotherhood actually matter to the Moroccans? 
During the Spanish Civil War Moroccan nationalists adopted the Spanish Nationalist war 
propaganda that glorified the Moroccan-Spanish religious brotherhood that was cemented by the 
fight against communism. Moroccan nationalist figures either reflected or parroted the slogans of 
the Spanish Nationalists, and the references to the shared medieval past. In September 1936, 
Torres, who in July, had opposed the sending of the Mehal-las to Spain, travelled to Seville to be 
hosted by General Queipo de Llano. Torres spoke on Queipo’s radio of the glorious Muslim past 
of Seville, and the tight bonds of friendship and fraternity between Morocco and Spain. It was for 
this reason that Moroccans and North Africans should help the Spaniards with whom they shared 
the same blood.34 However, prior to the Spanish Civil War, the Moroccan elite had a slightly 
different view of the Andalusian past. Moroccan travellers to Spain in the nineteenth century did 
not describe it as an exotic place, but as a familiar one, due to its Muslim past. But the glorious 
history of Al Andalus was contrasted with the later (and contemporary) decadent Spain.35 
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But what of the soldiers themselves? That medieval past, so dear to Spaniards who 
promoted the Moroccan colonial adventure, and who justified the presence of Moroccan troops, 
and so dear to the Moroccan nationalists who came from Andalusian families, was for the 
Moroccan soldiers who fought in Spain inexistent. The answer to the question of Federico García 
Sanchiz, whether the Moroccan soldier who stood on the Toledan bridge of San Martín was 
thinking about the ancestors who irrupted in the peninsula centuries past, would be no. The 
Moroccan most certainly did not think about that. In none of the interviews with Moroccan 
veterans, whether conducted by historians decades after the war, or by French interrogators or 
Spanish propagandists during the war, did the subject of the shared medieval past appear. The 
accounts of the Moroccan participants of the war do not mention them at all.36 No references to the 
Alhambra of Granada, La Mezquita of Córdoba, or the memories of the ancestors in Spain are 
made. Even for those who were convinced of the religious aspect of fighting against an infidel, the 
bonds of history do not appear to have meant anything. History was more important to Spanish 
Africanistas and Spanish Nationalists than to the Moroccan soldiers they commanded. That 
history, in the end, also mattered for the Nationalists less in practice than in theory.   
The brotherhood beyond the rhetoric 
While Moroccans were welcomed in Spanish arms in theory, in practice they were ejected from 
Spain. Not long after the collapse of the Republic, Moroccan troops were repatriated to Morocco, 
and every undocumented Moroccan civilian in Spain who provided services to the military units, 
or who practiced commerce was sent to Morocco. For the first time, Spain was dealing with illegal 
Moroccan migration, with the Moroccan Mejasnia playing a leading role in capturing their 
compatriots.37 The removal of Moroccans from Spain was not without notable exceptions. The 
Moorish Guard of General Franco stayed of course. A small number of units remained in Spain or 
were later brought back from Morocco to help hunt down anti-Francoist guerrillas. As we referred 
to earlier (see chapter four), some Moroccan men married Spanish women and were allowed to 
stay if they had children. Importantly, while Moroccan troops were physically removed, there was 
little attempt to remove their memory or image. Moroccan troops figured prominently in victory 
parades in Spain, both in 1939 and in later years. There was no ‘whitewashing’ at the end of the 
conflict similar to what the French did with black African troops in 1944: the French, under Allied 
pressure, replaced them with ‘white’ troops that could take public credit for victory in the last 
stages of the war,38 and ensured that the liberation of Paris must be seen as a ‘whites only’ 
victory.39 Military publications after the war continued to praise the role of Moroccan soldiers long 
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after it was necessary in terms of war propaganda.40 Indeed, Franco himself, in the script he wrote 
for the motion picture Raza (which screened in 1941) stated, ‘how good and loyal they are!’41  
Despite the Moroccans’ loyalty to Franco and the Nationalists, in the preceding chapters it 
has been demonstrated how the Spanish Nationalist army endeavored to prevent cultural, religious, 
and romantic mixing between Moroccan soldiers and the Spanish population. This was also simply 
a continuation of the policy in Spanish Morocco itself. One good example that occurred during the 
Civil War, is the housing project for Moroccans and Spaniards in Tetuan and Larache. The project 
consisted of building cheap housing for  Spanish and Moroccan labourers. The interesting part of 
the project was as follows:  
 
no different quarter has been chosen, because Spanish and Muslims must coexist, nor the 
ones and the others [i.e. houses] were indiscriminately mixed, because every civilisation 
and every custom has its own shyness. In these neighbourly constructions, the logical 
coexistence was sought without the disorderly and - for ones and others - disturbing 
mixture.42  
 
It is a perfect summary of the policy of racial and religious segregation while maintaining a 
superficial impression of brotherhood; an ambivalent policy towards Moroccans that was followed 
both in Spain and Morocco.43 This ambivalence is also seen in the issue of naturalisation. As many 
Moroccans fought for Spain as ‘brothers’ of the Spaniards, some could lay claim to Spanish-ness. 
The Arabist priest Miguel Asín Palacios, was very enthusiastic in considering that the Moroccan 
soldiers had conquered, with their blood sacrifice, the right to citizenship. He called onto the 
Spanish state not to hesitate in recognising them as Spaniards, and by that ‘elevating them from 
their current status of protected to that of citizens of the same patria, one and indivisible, with the 
same political rights as the other Spanish regions’.44  
Indeed, several Moroccan soldiers gained Spanish citizenship after the war. Several 
notices conferring Spanish nationality to Moroccans, published in the state’s official bulletin, 
make a special mention of the receiver being a veteran of the Guerra de Liberación (Liberation 
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War) or the Moroccan campaigns, or both; thus indicating that they had become Spaniards by 
virtue of their military service.45 For all the policy of separation and segregation, Francoist Spain 
was ready to welcome Moroccans into the Spanish patria. It is not known how many soldiers were 
granted Spanish citizenship, or the ratio of application to acceptance. One document of the 
Delegation of Native Affairs provides numbers of Muslims who obtained Spanish nationality as of 
May 1955. In Tetuan the number was 539, in Villa Nador 79, and in Larache, Alcazarquivir, and 
Arcila, at least 75.46 But the document does not state how many were (ex-) soldiers, or dependents 
of soldiers, though we may assume that the majority received it due to proven loyalty to Spain 
through military service (and of course being a family member of such soldiers). Military service 
would not have been the only criterion for eligibility. Nor was military service in the Spanish Civil 
War enough to be eligible for naturalisation. Good conduct and the absence of disturbing 
antecedents were necessary pre-conditions to be naturalised.47 In the end, the provision of Spanish 
nationality was exceptional,48 although that was due as much to the reluctance of the Spanish state 
to grant it in large numbers, as to the lack of willingness among many Moroccans to make use of 
the opportunity.  
It does seem that the Spaniards placed Muslim citizens on a higher level than the rest of 
the Moroccans, though perhaps not much higher. One Spanish officer told Sanchez Ruano that 
there were two classes of Moors: ‘the shoeblack from Ceuta, influenced by Spaniards, who was 
loyal, and the Riffians who were more difficult’.49 Beigbeder, the High Commissioner in Morocco 
during almost the entire Civil War, wrote that the distinction must be made clear ‘in the eyes of 
everyone’ between the Spanish Muslims, born in Ceuta and Melilla (places of Spanish 
sovereignty), and the Moroccan ‘protected’ Muslims.50 Though this might have been motivated by 
some need to stress the sovereignty of Spain on Ceuta and Melilla, it can be argued that it might 
have also been motivated by the need to stress the prestige that comes with being associated with 
Spain.    
Did the participation of Moroccan troops in the Spanish Civil War truly ‘elevate’ the 
position of Moroccans of Spanish Morocco in the eyes of their Spanish protectors to a position of 
equality? On a grand, abstract level, it certainly did, as many of the texts of Nationalist writers, 
some of which have already been cited, attest. Several Nationalist soldiers, commanders, or other 
witnesses of the war expressed profound gratitude to the Moroccans for their decisive role in the 
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war. But on an individual human level, Moroccans, even those who fought for Spain, were still 
‘little Moors’. The following piece, published in 1947, intended as humour by its writer, describes 
the view Spaniards in Spanish Morocco still had of their ‘protected’:  
 
Buxta ben Abselam, an old soldier of the Regulares and today a quick-witted merchant of 
Melilla, pays a visit to Seville with the goal of greeting some friends, and at the same time 
attempting to sell some Moorish artisan products. In one of the most central streets of the 
beautiful town, one lady calls to him: 
-Listen morito ...,51 paisa ...,52 Mohamed. 
Buxta continues on his way as if he did not hear, and the lady, yet again, calls him raising 
her voice even higher. 
Moroo…! paisa…! Mohamed…! 
At this, our friend Buxta turns around and with a foul humour exclaims: 
-Listen, mojera,53 you, why calling for me moro, saying Mohame and saying paisa? You 
not knowing how I calling? 
- I do not know, morito, answers the good lady. How do you want me to call you, Alfredo? 
-No! Nothing of Friedo nor any such stury. Yo knowing that Moor already fighti in Spain 
with Franco, you knowing that Moor already talking, rayding, already dooing counting 
like aromi.54 True? Then musting calling  DON PAISA.55 
 
A deliberate attempt was made to convey, in English, the broken Spanish with which Buxta was 
speaking. The piece makes fun of the elevated status Buxta, the Moroccan, thinks he has gained by 
fighting for Franco. The text recognises that Moroccans did achieve a rise in standing, which they 
were aware of, at the same time however, it stops short of recognising equal status with the 
Spaniards by highlighting the very broken Spanish that Buxta speaks, and ridicules how he calls 
himself ‘Mr Fellow’. By not speaking fluent Spanish, the position of Moroccans as standing at a 
lower level compared to Spaniards is stressed. It was expected of Moroccans to learn Spanish, if 
they desired equality, rather than the Spaniards to learn Arabic. Many writings on the Spanish 
Civil War by Nationalists (and occasionally Republicans), whether memoirs or propaganda, when 
quoting Moroccans, almost always do so in broken Spanish. It often appears that part of the goal 
of the quotation is to have fun at the expense of the Moroccan who uttered the words, although 
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occasionally a Moroccan could be explicitly praised for speaking correct Spanish. Although the 
Africanistas liked to think that they were versed in Moroccan culture, the majority of the chiefs of 
the Moroccan units, including Franco, did not speak Arabic or Berber,56 or just a few isolated 
words and expressions, hence the need for Moroccan officers. The small number of Spanish 
officers who spoke Arabic was not enough for the growing number of soldiers who fought in 
Spain. Similarly, in the Protectorate, the Spanish civilian population, by and large communicated 
with the native population in Spanish. The Moroccans had to learn Spanish, for most Spaniards 
had no desire or inclination to learn Arabic or Riffian.57 While the necessity to speak Spanish, 
signified a hierarchical relationship whereby the Moroccan stood on a separate (though ostensibly, 
and according to Francoist propaganda, equal) level as the Spaniard, the reality often did not 
correspond to policy.  
 The Practice 
As previous chapters have shown, despite steps taken by the Spanish Nationalist army and 
government to separate Moroccans from the Spanish population in the Peninsula during the war, in 
reality maintaining such separation was not always possible. Romantic relationships and marriages 
between Moroccan soldiers and Spanish women existed. Despite efforts to prevent the conversion 
of Muslims to Christianity there exist cases where such conversions took place, even if the goal 
was usually a contract marriage. The same was true for Spanish-Moroccan relationships in Spanish 
Morocco. The crossing of cultural and religious frontiers also manifested itself from both sides: 
Moroccans converted to Christianity, Spaniards converted to Islam,58 Spanish men married 
Moroccan women, though that happened less often than Moroccan men marrying Spanish women. 
Even Jewish-Muslim and Jewish-Christian liaisons existed. There were different kinds of 
relationships between people belonging to different faiths that ranged from friendship to romantic 
bonds, to matrimonies, and even relations in the realm of prostitution. What distinguished this 
crossing of the cultural line of division, was that they took place mainly between the lower social 
classes.59 On some level, a form of Spanish-Moroccan equality and, perhaps inadvertently, 
brotherhood was achieved because many of the Spaniards living in Morocco were poor migrants. 
Their economic situation did not differ much from Moroccans, thus the issue of haves and have-
nots which was significant between the French colonisers and the native population in the southern 
zone never arose. There were many references to Spaniards in Morocco as poor people, which 
undoubtedly led, in the perception of the Moroccans of the Spanish Protectorate, to the feeling that 
Spanish colonial rule was less severe than the French one. It also led to the inferiorisation of the 
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image of the dominant Spanish coloniser.60 The accessibility of Spaniards and the poor economic 
conditions of many, meant that many Spaniards were employed by Moroccans, often performing 
what was considered by the Protectorate authorities as menial jobs. The Spanish authorities 
considered this damaging to Spanish prestige and tried to prevent it.61 The Spanish authorities tried 
to prevent the inversion of the status of the Spanish as protector and Moroccan as protected. The 
matter extended even to some Spanish soldiers, who were keen to supplement their income and 
were contracted by Riffian farmers in the Oriental Rif to work on the harvest.62  
  An old Moroccan civilian, interviewed in 2011, sums up the attitudes of many Moroccans 
toward the Spaniards who lived in northern Morocco. This Moroccan, remembering 
sympathetically, found on the governmental level that ‘the Spaniards, contrary to the French, did 
not intervene in our affairs. If you go to the Spanish captain or colonel for a complaint they would 
tell you to go to the kaíd or the qadi [Muslim judge]…’. On the human level, he noted that ‘the 
Spaniards were simple people ... sometimes they would ask you if you could treat them to lunch’.63 
That was in the end the fruit of the composition of the Spanish rhetoric on brotherhood, Spanish 
policy of segregation, and therefore intervening as little as possible in the religious traditions and 
affairs of the Moroccans, and the accessibility of the majority of the Spaniards as a result of 
economic realities. That composition also had its effects on some Moroccan nationalists. As the 
son of the Abdeslam Bennuna, the founder of the Moroccan nationalist movement told Dieste:  
 
Between the Moroccan and the Spaniards a very especial relationship was established, [a 
relationship] of tú a tú [rather than the more formal usted]. The Spaniards, from those with 
responsibilities, both politicians and military, to the merchants, or the labourers who also 
existed, coexisted with the Moroccans. They did not treat the Moor as inferior, and 
respected the religious and nationalist sentiments.64 
 
To be or not to be Spanish 
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If the rhetoric of the brotherhood and the poor economic and social standing of many Spaniards in 
the Protectorate contributed to an inferiorisation of the Spanish colonial dominator, so must the 
conflict in Spain have done for the Moroccan soldiers. Queipo de Llano even pointed that out in 
one of his radio chats. Commenting on supposed Republican excesses in Baena, he addressed the 
Republicans: ‘What these Moors did, when they saw your deeds in Baena, was to wonder with 
surprise: These people who do this, are they the ones who want to civilise Morocco? They are 
quite right’.65 But it was not only the supposed crimes of the Republicans that would have made 
the Moroccans wonder on what basis the Spaniards could claim superiority over the Moroccans. 
Spain was for many Moroccans called ʻthe country of hungerʼ,66 where they witnessed people 
starving and begging for food, and in some cases Moroccans providing food for them.67 It was a 
country where Moroccans defeated time and again an enemy that was Spanish, even if this enemy 
was portrayed as red, godless or even un-Spanish. It was a country where they could take the 
possessions of Spaniards, the lives of Spaniards, and sometimes the women of Spaniards, whether 
by force or through courting. It was a land where they inspired fear in Spaniards, and where they 
played a military role that exceeded in its importance their numbers, a fact which they knew very 
well. Buxta, the Regulares soldier who was ridiculed above, had every right to call himself ‘Don 
Paisa’. 
But does a perception of equality, or even superiority (after all the Moroccan soldiers who 
originated in the Protectorate, were the ʻprotectorsʼ of their Spanish protectors) towards the 
Spaniards mean an acceptance by the Moroccans, and especially the Moroccan soldiers of the so-
called brotherhood? Answering this question is complicated because of the complexity of 
Moroccans who interacted with the Spanish. 
The Moroccan soldiers who arrived in Spain came, as it were, in different shapes and 
colours. Some of them had been embroiled in a hostile relationship with Spain, due to the Rif war, 
and were not particularly fond of Spain.68 A German veteran of the First World War, who had 
fought in Morocco against the French along with a force of Moroccan guerrillas, met old comrades 
in Spain. One of them expressed his attitude towards the Spaniards: ‘Trust the Devil and do not 
trust them [Spaniards]’.69 Many younger recruits who were too young to be involved in the 
colonial wars apparently were more receptive to Spanish propaganda,70 and more open to new 
cultural experiences than the older generation who were more conservative.71 Others who came 
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from the French zone and who had no previous contact with the Spaniards and subsequently 
deserted, had probably a stay and experience that was too short to identify with Spain or the 
Franco regime. In any case it is impossible to question them on their views regarding this issue. 
Others had always been in the service of Spain.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the majority of the Moroccans from the Spanish Protectorate, or 
those from the French Protectorate who remained in the Spanish Zone after the war, admitted the 
good treatment they received by their officers in Spain during the war, and mostly did not 
experience racial discrimination; at least that is the view of those serving in Moroccan-majority 
units. The experience was probably different for those serving in the Spanish Legion or the 
Moroccan branch of the Falange units. Some Moroccan veterans remained ideologically 
committed to the worldview of the Francoist regime and the values of order and discipline that 
Franco’s regime represented for them. One of them, who thought of Franco as the manliest of 
Spanish men, even deplored the failure of the right-wing coup of Colonel Tejero in 1981 against 
the democratic rule in Spain.72 Another believed that the problem of Basque separatism could 
simply be solved in one week by sending a force of Riffian soldiers.73 In many cases, the soldiers, 
after Moroccan independence chose to continue serving in the Spanish armed forces until the 
1960s,74 when they retired. Even those soldiers who served in the Regulares in the 1940s and 
1950s, and only served in the Protectorate  praised the Spaniards, both the military and civilians, 
and their correct treatment of them and the Moroccan population. Veterans in Asilah commented 
that there was only one period of tension, during the prelude to Morocco’s independence, when the 
Spanish superiors restricted for a short period the amount of ammunition allocated to Moroccan 
soldiers to five rounds each.75 Rarely did a Moroccan soldier in the Spanish army join anti-Spanish 
movements. However, there were few soldiers who showed the ultimate sign of inclusion in the 
Spanish brotherhood, by accepting the Spanish nationality. 
The case of the highest ranking Moroccan soldier is illustrative. Mohamed Ben Mizzian 
gave an interview to a Spanish journalist, Juan Guixé, who published it in his 1922 book El Rif en 
sombras. Lo que yo he visto en Melilla. In it, Guixé describes the 25 year-old Mizzian as a young 
man who speaks Spanish with a Castilian accent, and who thinks in Spanish, but is troubled by his 
past. Mizzian told him how his family wanted him to learn the Koran, and he could have become a 
religious man rather than a lieutenant in the Spanish army. He continues:  
 
I believe, with time, the Moors will adapt to European civilisation, if not the current ones, 
then their sons and their grandsons. The same will happen to the generations that are born 
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under Spanish action: they will be free from their fanaticism and will look with horror to 
the black spots of their past. The Riffian people are ignorant, and from that ignorance 
comes their evil. They are so ignorant, to a degree that you cannot imagine. That ignorance 
incapacitates them, so that they do not understand the progress that civilisation signifies. 
They live like barbarians and thence comes that violent, shocking and astonishing contrast 
between the life of the Riffian and that of the European.76 
 
True to his word, in the following years and decades he would fight fiercely to establish the 
Spanish order in Morocco. And so he did to establish the order of General Franco in Spain, 
claiming that the war in Spain was necessary to defend Western civilisation from being 
destroyed.77 As an officer in the Spanish army, he also possessed the Spanish nationality; he held 
both military and administrative positions (Commander of the Military Region of the Canary 
Islands and of Galicia) that only Spaniards could hold. For many goals and purposes he was 
embraced as a Spaniard. Although he embraced Spain, this had its limits, as after all, he was still 
of Moroccan descent, and there was no shortage of reminders. In 1952, Mizzian was sent with a 
Spanish delegation on an official visit to a number of Arabic countries. The Spanish ABC paper 
pointed to its readers that Mizzian, a General de División at the time, was ‘of pure Moroccan 
stock’ who had served Spain well. The paper also pointed out that his comrades in arms included 
the generals Franco, Varela, and Gracia Valiño who had the utmost estimation and the closest 
friendship for ‘their Moroccan comrade’. The paper mentioned that Mizzian, in addition to Arabic 
and Chelja (Rifian Berber), spoke ‘correct Spanish’.78 The Moroccan part of the General would 
simply not disappear in the eyes of the Spaniards. Nor could it for Mizzian himself, who, upon the 
independence of Morocco, resigned from the Spanish army, relinquished his Spanish nationality, 
and became Moroccoʼs first Minister of Defence. It was in this capacity that he imprisoned his 
daughter, who was married to a Spanish Christian, confirming that Moroccan and Spanish blood 
and religion should not mix. 
Moroccan authorities of the Spanish Protectorate, even though subjecting themselves to 
the political control of the Spanish authorities were as keen as the Spanish to prevent the crossing 
of the frontier that separated Moroccans from the Spanish in their daily lives, especially when it 
came to Moroccan women. Muslim Moroccan women could be severely punished for marrying or 
having relationships with non-Muslim men. Even during the 1940s, the Basha (native governor) of 
Tetuan persecuted Moroccan women for attending cinemas or theatres, or for even passing through 
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Spanish urban spaces for fear of becoming more like European women.79 Sometimes, official 
positions in the Moroccan government of the Protectorate were filled by Moroccan nationalists. 
Moroccan nationalists who were ready to accommodate the Nationalist propaganda on religion and 
shared history, were only ready to go to this extent and not further. What the Moroccan 
nationalists did not concede, was the concern for the distinctiveness of the Moroccan identity, and 
the avoidance of its absorption by the Spanish one. The National Reform Party (PNR) of Abdel 
Khalek Torres gave an example of this 1937 when its paper Al Hurriya published the so-called 
‘demands of the Moroccan people’. Concerning ‘the Moroccan nationality and civic status’ the 
paper put the following demands: 
 
-Moroccan subjects must not be allowed to disavow the Moroccan nationality by obtaining 
the Spanish nationality in Morocco. 
-Those who are born abroad to a Moroccan father are to be considered Moroccan. 
-The Moroccan nationality must be kept for those who are born in the Spanish colonies to 
a Moroccan father, whether the father was born there or not.80 
 
It would not be difficult to imagine that such demands were partially, if not mainly, written with 
Moroccan soldiers of the Spanish army in mind. The problem of losing the Moroccan identity to 
Spain by way of naturalisation was not a concern exclusive to Spanish Morocco. It had its 
precedents as far back as the nineteenth century with the protection status that some Moroccan 
subjects were granted by multiple European powers who wielded influence in Morocco, and it 
became a problem in the wider Maghreb before the 1930s. As Shadid and Koningsveld explain, 
the European concept of nationality was alien to classical Islamic legal tradition. Since the second 
half of the nineteenth century it penetrated gradually into the Muslim world. This penetration can 
be seen initially as a mere process of translating the existing social and political realities into a 
new legal terminology. However, a new dimension was added in Tunisia and Algeria, when the 
French authorities introduced Laws of Naturalisation in 1923 and 1927. These laws offered French 
nationality and the full rights of French citizenship to Tunisians and Algerian Muslims who 
accepted French civil law instead of Islamic law. This measure was met with fierce resistance from 
many Muslim scholars, who in Tunis issued a fatwa which qualified the person who adopted 
French citizenship under the said law as an apostate. Their view was supported by similar fatwas 
issued by scholars of the famous Islamic centre in Cairo Al-Azhar, and other scholars in Egypt. 
The French stipulated the adoption of French citizenship as a condition to acquire a position of 
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importance in the colonial society; this was part of France’s assimilation policy.81 As a 
consequence of the fatwa, however, only a limited number of Muslims adopted French citizenship. 
Spaniards in the Moroccan protectorate, and certainly under Franco, were far from 
attempting any assimilation policy; or at least, as a country that was supposed to adopt a Catholic 
identity, they did not try to include Moroccans within this identity, whether during or after the war. 
That did not, however, prevent many Moroccans, especially soldiers, from equating the adoption 
of Spanish nationality with apostasy; even though some served with the Spanish army until the end 
of the protectorate and beyond, and even though an organised movement of religious scholars in 
Spanish Morocco against accepting the Spanish nationality was lacking. A former member of the 
Moorish guard who considered that ‘Franco had blind trust in us’, explained how:  
 
I was present at the ceremony of the signature of the [Moroccan 1956] independence 
document. After independence we received a telegram saying: anyone who wants to join 
Morocco can do that. Those who want to settle their accounts can do that, and those who 
want to be baptised and take the Spanish nationality can stay with us. One morning our 
colonel came and started praising us that we were brave men and trustworthy. Then his 
wife Carmen came weeping and wishing we stayed with her. But indeed I joined 
Morocco’.82 
 
Note the use of the word ‘baptise’ when speaking of being a naturalised Spanish citizen. It is a 
term that arises in other testimonies of Moroccan veterans, long after the end of the war. Mateo 
Dieste also noted the use, in the Oriental Rif, of the term ‘abutisar’, an adaptation of the ‘bautizar’ 
to refer to gaining Spanish nationality. Interestingly, he cites a Franciscan father who stated that 
during the Moroccan independence process (1950s), some Moroccans in Tangier stood in a queue 
at the gate of the Spanish church as they had heard that Spanish nationality would be given to 
those who converted to Christianity.83 The same was noted by those who chose to remain under 
Spanish authority and accept Spanish nationality.84 As it happened, the majority of Moroccans 
chose to remain Moroccan, and rejected Spanish nationality, though not only due to religious 
reasons.   
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In the wake of the Moroccan independence, Moroccan nationalists in the former French 
zone started to mount military action against the Spanish territories in Ifni. In December 1957, 
news arrived in Spain that Spanish defenders had abandoned frontier outposts in the face of 
invading Moroccan irregulars. Reports were printed in the Spanish press about Moroccan savagery 
against Spanish civilians including the rape and disembowelment of a pregnant Spanish woman. 
These disclosures set off a storm of anti-Moroccan feeling in Spain. In Madrid, crowds booed 
Franco’s Moroccan guard in the streets and greeted their newsreel appearances with noisy 
catcalls.85 In the face of this, and the disappearance of the African empire that Franco helped to 
construct in northern Morocco, Franco had to disband his guards corps. Some of its members 
accepted the offer of Spanish citizenship and continued service in the Spanish armed forces. 
However, the majority opted to return to Morocco and receive financial compensation.86 With that, 
the vestiges of the Spanish-Moroccan military brotherhood that started with a colonial project and 
was strengthened through a civil war were coming to an end.  
Conclusion 
The relationship between the Spanish Nationalists and Moroccan soldiers during the Spanish Civil 
War reflected in a great measure the relationship that had already existed in the Moroccan 
Protectorate before the war and continued to do after the war. There are three levels in which this 
relationship developed: the level of grand rhetoric, the level of government policy, and daily 
reality that was partly shaped by governmental policies and partly formed by resistance to those 
policies. The grand rhetoric, whether during the establishment of the Spanish Protectorate in 
Morocco or during the use of Moroccan troops during the Spanish Civil War, stressed bonds of 
blood, faith and shared history to present the presence of the Spaniards in Morocco and of the 
Moroccan troops in Spain as naturally and ethically acceptable. Spaniards and Moroccans, 
according to this grand rhetoric, were no strangers in each other’s countries. This rhetoric was 
partially influenced by the views and experiences of the Spanish officers who served in Morocco 
and who established good rapport with their native troops and a paternalistic view towards the 
Moroccans in general.  
On the level of governmental policy in the Protectorate and in Nationalist Spain, the 
brotherhood between the Spanish and the Moroccan communities was approached in a more 
cautious way, with a mixture of inclusion and exclusion. Most of the Moroccans in Spain, soldiers 
and civilians alike, were removed from Spain at the end of the war, though many were presented 
with the opportunity to naturalise and become Spanish. New housing projects in Spanish Morocco 
did not separate Spaniards and Moroccans by assigning new houses to different quarters, but a 
separation of sorts was maintained. The governmental policies, of both the Spanish and the 
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Moroccan governments, tried to control the sexual boundary between the two communities, 
especially preventing their own women from marrying or having any other type of sexual liaisons 
with men from the other community.  
It is with the policing of the sexual mores that it becomes obvious that realities often 
defied governmental policies. Inter-communal sexual relations existed both in Spain and in 
Morocco despite the efforts of the Nationalists or the Moroccan authorities. Such relationships 
were deemed threatening of the Spanish authority if the male partner was Muslim. Other types of 
relationships were deemed injurious to Spanish prestige, like Spaniards being employed by 
Moroccans to do menial jobs. The result of this interaction between policy and daily reality was 
that policies could not be implemented to their full extent, but they still managed to prevent day-
to-day inter-communal relationships from pushing the boundaries further. In the end the Spanish 
imperial ‘racial’ hierarchy did not suffer much from the mixing of cultures and races that the 
Spaniards feared, because the majority of Moroccans themselves, whether on a governmental or 
individual level, were usually not keen to cross the religious or national divide that separated them 
from the Spaniards.  
In a recent interview, José Antonio González Alcantud, a historian, anthropologist, and 
researcher on Spanish-Moroccan stereotypes, commented that Andalusians like to see a Moorish 
part in themselves; but they also belong to the European culture, and therefore ‘we can say that we 
are “cousins but not brothers”’.87 Perhaps that is the view Spanish imperialists, and Nationalists 
who justified the use of Moroccan troops in Spain in particular, had when they struggled to reach a 
balance between including and excluding  Moroccans. 
 
                                                 






When El Hussein ben Abdesselam, the veteran I met in 2011 in Zaouiat Sidi Ibrahim in Ceuta, was 
wounded during the war, he was transferred to the Salamanca military hospital where he was treated 
and then given 24 days leave upon recovering. After spending the leave in Ceuta, he requested 
returning to his Tabor where he, on a doctor’s orders, was to carry out only non-combat duties. It did 
not matter, as the war had ended when El Hussein reached his Tabor. Having been discharged from the 
army, his Tabor commander arranged a job ‘for me with his father in law who was a retired military 
man in Ceuta. I used to carry milk and helped with ironing the clothes and then I helped the lady in the 
kitchen and that became my job’.1 With that, El Hussein who originated in French Morocco, became a 
resident of Ceuta and later a Spanish subject. The family he later established consisted of Spanish 
Muslim citizens, and that thanks to the Spanish Civil War. Not all the veterans became Spanish 
subjects or residents of the Spanish African enclaves. Some of them continued serving in the Spanish 
Army (deployed to different parts of Morocco, the Sahara, or even Equatorial Guinea) until Moroccan 
independence when they were transferred to the Moroccan Royal Army; some continued to serve as 
soldiers for Spain years beyond the independence and then retired and remained in Morocco; and some 
retired and later emigrated to Europe. The post-war lives of these soldiers took different directions, but 
they were united by the experience of the encounter with Spain within a context of war, an experience 
that has left traces visible even today.  
Now that the journey with the Moroccan soldiers of the Spanish Civil War and their encounter 
with Spain has come to an end, what about the question: to what extent was the Spanish-Moroccan 
encounter influenced by both the perception of the Otherness of the Moroccan soldiers’ presence in 
Spain (i.e. their different racial and cultural background as African Muslims in a European ‘Catholic’ 
country) and by the agency of the Moroccan soldiers? The short answer is: the perception of Otherness 
determined the development of this encounter in almost every aspect, and the Moroccan soldiers did 
exercise significant agency within this encounter. In fact, both parts of the answer go hand in hand. 
The perceptions of race, culture and religion determined to a large extent the participation of 
Moroccan soldiers in the Spanish Civil War, their presence in Spain, and their treatment by both the 
Nationalists and the Republicans. The value of the Moroccan troops in the Spanish army was based on 
Spanish racial views of the Moroccans as natural born warriors and views on the influence of Islam 
and geography on the warlike capabilities of the Moroccans. Specific physical and psychological 
qualities determined the way the Moroccan troops should ideally be employed. Given their alien 
nature and their reputation as fierce and savage warriors, they were also on many occasions useful to 
the Nationalists as a psychological weapon spreading terror through the ranks of the enemy, both 
military and civilian alike. But beyond the role of the infantryman, and to a lesser extent cavalryman, 
                                                 




the Moroccan soldiers were not used in other branches of the army such as artillery or armour, not 
even as drivers of motorised vehicles. Their soldierly capabilities, however magnificent they could be 
considered, were limited. 
 The Moroccans were deemed by the Spanish Nationalists to have a different psychology and 
therefore merited different treatment in comparison to Spanish soldiers. Those who commanded 
Moroccan troops would, ideally, be officers with knowledge of that psychology and of Moroccan 
customs, though rates of attrition in war were not always conducive to the achievement of that ideal. 
Differences in language played an obvious role in this need for officers with especial aptitudes, but 
also Spanish perceptions of the Moroccan soldiers’ understanding of soldierly life and discipline. The 
Spanish attitude was a paternalistic one towards soldiers deemed less mature than their Spanish 
counterparts. The Moroccans needed a firm but also just, and occasionally generous hand to lead them, 
a guiding hand to be provided by Spanish leadership. But the relationship between the Spanish Army 
and its Moroccan soldiers went in two directions. Too firm a hand, too long a pay delay, too offensive 
a character of a superior officer, might occasionally lead the Moroccans to display their dissatisfaction 
through loud or even violent protest, or simply desertion. 
 To bridge the distance between the Spanish leadership and the Moroccan troops, there was a 
need, in addition to Spanish officers with ‘especial aptitudes’, of Moroccan officers who could consult 
and translate but also command Moroccan troops. But such officers were relatively few in number, 
even though that number grew as war necessities demanded. And though some managed to gain 
promotions that otherwise would not have been available, there was a limit to the rank they could 
attain. They were also expected to command Moroccan troops, not Spanish ones. After all they were 
not simply called officers but oficiales moros (Moorish officers). They were even limited to wearing a 
headgear that was Moroccan, and not allowed the Spanish officer’s cap (perhaps with the exception of 
Mizzian who followed a regular military career of a Spanish officer rather than a Moorish one).  
 The Moroccan units of the Spanish army were to be distinguished in their appearances. The 
uniforms, the insignia, the unit flags, they all carried Moroccan or Islamic symbols. That was the case 
long before the Spanish Civil War, and it served to reduce the cultural distance between the Moroccan 
troops and their Islamic Moroccan environment. In Spain, that distinctively outer Moroccan 
appearance showed the contrast between the Moroccan troops, their Spanish military counterparts and 
their Spanish civilian surrounding. This distinctive Moroccan world, as it were, was not limited to 
appearances. The Moroccan soldiers had their own military police and served (when convicted for 
crimes) their prison terms separately from Spanish prisoners. They had their own camp followers 
composed of Moroccan merchants, Moroccan café owners, Moroccan musicians and even their own 
Moroccan prostitutes. In hospitals they had their own wards, were served food according to Islamic 
diet, and when died they were buried in separate Islamic cemeteries. Actions aimed at converting 




to convert (for whatever reasons, earthly or otherwise) could still defy Spanish policy. The Spanish 
Nationalists created and maintained a separate cultural space for their Moroccan troops.  
Was that a token of respect towards the traditions of the Moroccans or primarily a measure to 
maintain the distance between these alien troops and Spanish society? Great problems would certainly 
have been created had the Spanish tried to Hispanicise their troops, i.e. systematically blend Moroccan 
troops with Spanish ones, hospitalise injured Moroccans in the same wards as the Spanish soldiers and 
provide them with non-Islamic diet, allowing conversions of Moroccans to Catholicism, or replacing 
the crescent on the Regulares flag with a cross. In short, little good would have come out of making 
the Moroccans look, eat and pray Spanish. That is clear because in many ways, the Moroccans 
welcomed and even participated in the creation of the separate Moroccan sphere. In this the agency of 
the Moroccan soldiers becomes apparent. Moroccan recruits generally favoured enlisting in Moroccan 
units to be among Muslims. Many Moroccan soldiers favoured a commanding officer who could 
understand their culture and speak their language, i.e. an officer who was more familiar with their 
culture than they with his. Respecting the Islamic religion whether in the field, burial grounds or in the 
hospitals was one of the most important positive examples the Moroccan veterans usually cite when 
remembering their Spanish war experience, and was not rarely the result of their own demands. 
Moroccan government officials also participated in creating the separate sphere to maintain the Islamic 
tradition of their Moroccan troops, and Moroccan nationalists were not keen to Hispanicise the 
Moroccan soldiers either, and when many Moroccan soldiers were offered the Spanish nationality at 
the end of their military service, years after the war, most of them declined it. The Spanish Nationalists 
thought the Moroccans should remain Moroccans. The latter equally thought that they should maintain 
their Muslim separate space, and a Moroccan identity (as opposed to a family or tribal one) of which 
many probably became conscious only after serving in the army and moving to Spain. The Moroccan 
side, both soldiers and officials, participated in shaping the cultural space the Moroccans filled during 
their stay in Spain. It is true that the Spanish military and civilian authorities were in a stronger 
position to shape that space, but the Moroccan influence is not in anyway negligible, and with the 
prolongation of the war, the Moroccan agency grew stronger. 
 Despite the fact that maintaining a separate cultural space for the Moroccans was sound 
strategy and that it was conducted in cooperation with the Moroccans themselves, it nevertheless 
responded to Spanish needs to maintain a distance with the Moroccans. The Moroccans could not be 
buried in Catholic cemeteries, not only because the Moroccans would not wish it, but because the 
Spanish Catholics would not prefer it. Moroccan soldiers could not become Catholics, not because of 
respect towards Islamic sensitivity, but because in the Spanish mind it was doubtful whether any 
Moroccan Muslim could genuinely convert without having a hidden agenda. Ironically, the Moroccans 
were welcome to defend the Christian faith, but not to embrace it. Moroccans could not marry Spanish 
women because that would hurt the prestige of the Spanish protective power. They were occasionally 




romantically involved with Spanish women who chose to be with them. The Moroccans were 
excellent soldiers and they were welcome to fight, but they could hardly serve any other function in 
Spain after their military duties came to an end. The Moroccan presence was justified religiously, 
historically and racially by people like Miguel Asín Palacios, José María Pemán, Juan Priego López, 
and others on Nationalist news papers or Queipo de Llano’s Seville Radio. Despite that justification, 
the Moroccans (whose presence in Spain was justified by shared race and history) had, in the end, to 
leave the country. 
The Spanish experience with excluding, separating and constraining the Moroccans is not 
without its notable exceptions. Moroccan officers faced a limit to what they could attain in rank or 
command, but one of them, Mizzian, was allowed to have a Spanish-style military career, enrolling in 
a Spanish military academy, and ended up commanding Spanish troops and officers. He concluded the 
war commanding a division, and later attained the rank of Lieutenant General. Despite his own merits, 
one wonders whether he was shown favour by the Spaniards in order to be a symbolic example of the 
success of the Protectorate. While the majority of Moroccan recruits enlisted in the Regulares units, 
the Spanish Foreign Legion nevertheless (unlike its French counterpart) opened its doors for 
Moroccan enlistees, even though Moroccan enlistment in that corps dwindled with the passage of 
time. The Fascist Falange’s own military unit in the Spanish Protectorate, the Bandera de Marruecos 
contained Moroccan recruits. While tens of thousands of Moroccan troops were sent back to Morocco, 
a select few hundred were chosen to stay and become an elite guard of the head of state himself, 
although this might have occurred, in part, because they would form a symbolic deterrent to future 
opponents of Franco, and because they would be less inclined to sedition or to commit a coup. When 
Moroccan soldiers and officers were supposed to look Moroccan, Spanish officers and commanders 
walked around wearing a chillaba or a tarbush, sat drinking mint tea, and threw Arabic or Berber 
words in their conversations. When Moroccan soldiers were not supposed to look or act Spanish (even 
though the practice might have been different), Spanish officers could, though only in appearance, ‘go 
native’.  
Policy might ban mixed marriages, but in practice they took place, a sign that the agency of a 
determined Moroccan soldier (and a determined Spanish partner) could overcome official opposition 
to such marriages. Such marriages might even prevent Moroccans who remained in Spain after the war 
from being deported to Morocco. While being Spanish meant in Francoist Spain to be Catholic, many 
a Moroccan was offered and given Spanish nationality and the opportunity to become Spanish without 
the necessity of becoming Christian too, even though many Moroccans declined the opportunity. 
It has also become clear that the rhetoric, policies and practices with regard to Moroccans in 
Spain during the war, reflected the rhetoric, policies and practices in the Spanish Protectorate of 
Morocco. The rhetoric of mixed Spanish-Moroccan identity that justified Spanish imperialism in 
Morocco was the same rhetoric that brought the Moroccans to Spain. The policies of separation 




practice this policy was often breached, both in Spanish Morocco as well as in the Peninsula. In some 
ways, the Moroccan military presence in Spain might be interpreted as an extension of the Protectorate 
policies and realities by other means. That the Delegation for Native Affairs brought its offices to 
Spain to try and continue the functions it usually undertook in Morocco is a clear enough indication of 
that continuation.  
The Republicans displayed a clear negative attitude towards the Moroccans. The intervention 
of Moroccan troops in the Asturian Uprising of 1934 and the violent deeds that accompanied the 
march of the Army of Africa in the first months of 1936 stimulated the Republicans to spread a 
demonizing image of the Moroccan troops that often encouraged Republican fighters to show no 
mercy towards those Moroccans who fell prisoner. The Republican attitude probably better reflected 
traditional Spanish hostile images of the Moroccans and position towards them than the Nationalist 
attitude did. The Republic had little interest in promoting a discourse of brotherhood or shared history 
since the Republicans had not imported tens of thousands of Moroccans into Spain and did not need to 
justify their presence. Nor were people who had worked to justify the establishment of Spanish 
imperialism in Morocco by bonds of blood and history were prominently represented in Republican 
circles. But the Republicans let their negative view of the Moroccans, and Maghrebis in general 
determine their attitudes towards those Maghrebis who helped their cause or offered to do so. The fact 
that rightist Spain was more tolerant of and less racist toward the Moroccans is, despite the 
explanation given, remarkable to say the least. 
On the issue of how far can war bend, break, or reshape pre-existing limits, prejudices, and 
taboos that separated the Spanish society from the colonial one, and how far it shaped Spanish policies 
towards the colonials, this study has demonstrated that on the Nationalist side (where this question 
matters most) there existed a (positive) reshaping of existing prejudices on the level of propaganda and 
imagery. There was a slight and temporary liberalisation and expansion of the limits of human and 
cultural interaction and intermixing, a liberalisation that grew partially as a result of the new 
propaganda and imagery and partially as a result of the efforts of the Moroccans who defied and 
crossed the boundaries and taboo-lines between Moroccans and Spaniards. There was also a growth in 
the consideration that the Moroccan colonial society (because of its military value and contribution) 
was accorded in Nationalist Spain. The war had indeed a great impact on the Spanish-Moroccan 
relationship and led to the elevation of the Moroccans to a higher level of partnership with the 
Spaniards, even though the Moroccans were still obviously a junior partner by far. However, what the 
war proved is that, and despite the glaring exceptions, the broad structures that sought to maintain the 
limits separating the Spanish and Moroccan societies from one another were (and again with 
significant Moroccan participation) relatively successfully maintained. 
The agency of the Moroccan soldiers played an important role in both the small opening of the 
Spanish and Moroccan human spaces towards each other, as well as in generally maintaining both 




befriend Spanish civilians, consume alcohol, have a romantic relationship with a Spanish girl, and yet 
be adamant that he received a halal diet in a military hospital, request burial at an Islamic cemetery 
should he die, cause enough trouble to be discharged from the Legion (if unsatisfied) and enlist in the 
Regulares, and decide to return to Morocco should he be offered a stay in Spain. More importantly the 
role of agency reflects both the will of the large number of individuals who chose to cross the cultural 
divide, and the agency of the majority who preferred the comfort of the separate Moroccan and 
Muslim sphere and worked for creating and maintaining it. The temporary nature of the stay of the 
Moroccan troops in Spain (as well as the decision by most of the Moroccans who were offered the 
Spanish nationality to decline the offer) meant that the majority of the Moroccan soldiers could easily 
maintain their familiar cultural identity. Had they remained in large numbers in Spain, as tens of 
thousands of North Africans did in France after the First World War, they could have been captives of 
their new homeland from which they would have had to lend part of a new and conflicting identity. In 
that way, returning to Morocco, or even to the much Islamicised Ceuta and Melilla, must have been a 
great comfort.  
 In many ways the Moroccan participation during the Spanish Civil War reflects other 
European experiences with colonial troops that fought in Europe during both world wars, and 
especially in the French Army. Racial perceptions determined the military role of Maghrebi and other 
African soldiers and the tactics they should use in a similar way to that of the Moroccan soldiers in 
Spain. The French and British armies paid much attention to showing respect and sensitivity towards 
the religious feelings of the colonial troops, whether Muslims or otherwise. In the case of the French, 
they regarded their Maghrebi soldiers as fanatical Muslims. Nevertheless, many of these Muslim 
young men showed themselves not to be strict followers of Islamic tenets in their daily life. Relations 
between colonial soldiers and European women was a sensitive point for European authorities, both 
civilian and military as well as European populations. Aside from the shocking accusations of mass 
rapes by colonial troops, whether in Germany in the 1920s or in Italy in 1944, even consensual 
relationships were frowned upon and met with discouragement. Measures were taken by European 
authorities to hinder this kind of romantic liaisons, justifying them by pointing to the European 
prestige that had to be protected.   
 In the light of these similarities what sets the Spanish experience apart, in light of this study is 
that: firstly, no other European country went so far as the Africanistas in Spain in claiming bonds of 
religion, history and blood between them and the colonial soldiers they employed in fighting their war. 
Secondly, as a result of their larger role and closer historical bonds, the presence of the colonial troops 
in Spain was, in terms of visibility and in terms of acceptance, greater in Nationalist Spain than in 
other parts of Europe between 1914-1945. The Nationalists did not attempt to diminish or downplay 
the significance of their colonial troops in the war. Furthermore, Nationalist Spain had, due principally 
to the religious propaganda it conducted, probably more success in making its colonial soldiers 




powers. However, it remains unclear how much a lack of such an ideological embrace would have 
mattered, given the accompanying material incentives to enlist.  
An innovative aspect of this study is constituted by the fact that it has explored, on a 
significant scale, sources that provided the Moroccan perspective of the Civil War, and that it has 
provided these sources with a greater share in the discussion and presentation of evidence, than has so 
far been the case. The Moroccan perspective not only gives a fresh view of the war and the role of the 
Moroccans in it, but it continues where Spanish documentation stops, by showing the effects of 
Spanish preconceptions, policies and practices and how were they were received and negotiated with 
by the Moroccans. The sources on the Moroccan perspective are varied and range from the 
contemporary perspective of Moroccan soldiers and deserters, captured in documents written in 
Spanish, French and Arabic, to the latter day interviews conducted by this and other authors. In doing 
so, it has emerged that both sets of perspectives, separated by long decades, have much in common in 
the facts and insights they provide. Indeed, they have more in common than not. This study has also 
explored a myriad of sources of multifaceted nature: military; administrative; diplomatic; journalistic; 
published diaries as well as private papers and from multiple non-Moroccan points of view: Spanish 
(both Nationalist and Republican) and foreign (British, American, French, Soviet, German and Dutch). 
Despite the significance of the Moroccan perspective, the picture of the Moroccan participation in a 
civil war that took place in Spain and that involved fighters and observers from many countries would 
not be complete without this international perspective.  
This study has demonstrated that the Moroccan soldiers were active agents in determining 
their fate during their service in the Spanish Nationalist forces, and not completely hapless victims, 
even though this Spanish-Moroccan relationship was not even-handed. The Spanish military and 
political authorities obviously had more power in determining the fate of the Moroccan soldiers and in 
shaping the relationship between these soldiers and their Spanish employers. In this regard, this study 
is one among few in the field of colonial military history that systematically discussed the agency of 
colonial troops, and has done so significantly from the perspective of these colonial troops.  This 
research has also made clear how the separation in cultural spheres between the Moroccans and the 
Spaniards was something the Moroccans (both officials as well as soldiers) cooperated with the 
Spaniards in achieving.  
The memory of the Moroccan troops’ role in the Spanish Civil War has not disappeared. Many 
Spaniards blame the Moroccans for helping establish Franco’s dictatorship. As a former Moroccan 
ambassador to Spain put it in 2009, when Spain was governed by the Socialist Party: ‘Memories of 
this war are still alive. These emotional things are difficult to erase. So the participation of Moroccans 
in the war is a negative factor in ties between the two countries’.2 The opening, in 2006, of the 
Mizzian Museum in Beni Ansar (Nador) celebrating Franco’s Moroccan general, caused outrage 
                                                 




among many progressive Spaniards.3 But there are other aspects of the continuing influence of the 
Moroccan participation in the Spanish war. Cemeteries in Seville, Granada or Griñón, which were 
established to bury Moroccan soldiers have re-assumed their functions as cemeteries that Muslim 
communities nowadays use to bury their departed loved ones. The Regulares units still exist and have 
re-established much of the traditional Moorish features of their uniforms which they had abandoned in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and (in the case of Ceuta) they have annually invited their aging Moroccan 
veterans to attend the 30 June celebrations of the foundation of the Regulares. Many of the sons of the 
Muslims of Ceuta and Melilla continue to serve in the Regulares, and many of them are descendants 
of veterans of the Spanish Civil War. The ghost of the Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil 
War has influenced Spanish Moroccan relationships and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
                                                 



















































Emblems of Moroccan units 
 
 






The emblem of the 13th Division, featuring the ‘hand of Fatima’. The text in Moroccan Arabic states 














The author at the Muslim cemetery of Granada. The three rows in the middle are formed by the graves 
of Moroccan soldiers killed during the Spanish Civil War. The graves do not reveal the names of the 
killed soldiers, and they had fallen in disrepair, before being rehabilitated as a Muslim cemetery for 










The headquarters of Radio Sevilla, where General Queipo de Llano transmitted his speeches, 











The first two Spanish Civil War veterans interviewed by the author: Mohammed Abdullah Susi (above) 
and El Hussein ben Abdesselam. Ceuta, January 2011. 
 
 
The author with two Spanish Civil War veterans: Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed (left) and 









Abdesselam Mohammed Al Amrani (left) and Mohammed ben Al Ayyashi Al Zerki, two Spanish Civil 
War veterans in Ceuta, during the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Regulares. Ceuta, 
June 2011. (Source: author). 
 
 
Masoud Ballah, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War during which he lost the use of one eye due to 












‘The Nationalists’, a Republican piece of propaganda portraying the chief supporters of the 
Nationalists, both domestic and foreign, including two figures representing the Moroccans. 






One hundred years of Regulares 
 










Regulares during the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the foundation of their regiment. Ceuta, 
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Samenvatting van het proefschrift 
 
Wapens, Cultuur en Moren  
Raciale stereotypen en de culturele impact van de deelname van Marokkaanse troepen aan de 




Ali Al Tuma 
Tussen 1936 en 1939 namen meer dan 80,000 Marokkaanse soldaten deel aan de Spaanse 
Burgeroorlog. Ze waren voornamelijk afkomstig uit het protectoraat dat Spanje aan het begin van de 
twintigste eeuw had gevestigd in Noord-Marokko, om – zoals de Spanjaarden beweerden – de 
inwoners de voordelen van de Europese beschaving te brengen. Ze vochten in Spanje, toen een 
republiek, voor de Nationalisten van Generaal Francisco Franco die steun kregen van veel 
conservatieven, monarchisten, katholieken en de fascistische Falange partij, tegen de democratisch 
gekozen Volksfront regering, bestaande uit een coalitie van linkse republikeinen, socialisten en 
communisten die steun kregen van anarchisten.  
Dit proefschrift behandelt het verloop en de gevolgen van de aanwezigheid van Marokkaanse 
troepen in Spanje, een aanwezigheid die – in groten getale, over lange periodes, en verspreid over heel 
het land – leidde tot een ontmoeting tussen twee vreemde culturen. Het ging hier om een cultuurshock, 
waarbij koloniale stereotypes, oorlogsomstandigheden, beleid en praktijk met elkaar botsten. In 
hoeverre konden de Marokkaanse soldaten het verloop van deze ontmoeting beïnvloeden? 
Uit het onderzoek wordt duidelijk dat de Marokkaanse soldaten veel meer invloed hadden over 
hun lot dan algemeen is aangenomen. Ze waren niet passieve werktuigen in de handen van hun 
Nationalistische officieren, noch routinematige plegers van beestachtige oorlogsmisdaden zoals ze 
meestal worden afgeschilderd in de bestaande literatuur. Op basis van uitputtend bronnenonderzoek in 
Spanje, Marokko en Frankrijk laat dit proefschrift zien dat zij de speelruimte die hen toebedeeld was 
konden oprekken en dit gold zowel op het slagveld als daarbuiten. Dit proefschrift laat bovendien het 
perspectief van de Marokkaanse soldaten zelf, op basis van interviews, een uitvoerige rol spelen in het 
beschrijven en analyseren van hun interactie met het Spaansje leger en het Spaanse maatschappij. in de 
oorlog. Als eerste komt de militaire rol van de Marokkaanse soldaten aan de orde, vervolgens hun 
interactie met de Spaanse maatschappij en als laatste de visie op hen vanuit zowel het Nationalistische 
als het Republikeinse kamp 
De militaire bijdrage van de Marokkanen, vooral tot begin 1937, was van vitaal belang voor 




Veel van de Marokkaanse militairen namen dienst in het leger van Franco vanwege economische 
motieven. Anderen zochten avontuur. Velen werden beïnvloed door religieuze propaganda van Franco 
die de Spaanse Republiek afbeeldde als een vijand van alle religies. Deze propaganda was niet alleen 
gericht aan de Marokkanen maar ook aan de Spanjaarden die zich afvroegen hoe het kon dat de Moor, 
de oeroude vijand van katholiek Spanje, opnieuw naar Spanje werd gebracht om een kruistocht tegen 
andere Spanjaarden te ondernemen? 
 De percepties van ras, cultuur en religie bepaalden in belangrijke mate de inzet van de 
Marokkaanse soldaten in de oorlog, hun verblijf in Spanje en de manier waarop ze werden bekeken en 
behandeld door de Spanjaarden, zowel de Nationalisten als de Republikeinen. De militaire waarde van 
de Marokkanen en de manier waarop de Spaanse Nationalisten hen tactisch inzetten werden werd 
beïnvloed door de vooroordelen die de Spanjaarden hadden over de fatalistische karaktertrekken van 
islamieten en de aangeboren fysieke kwaliteiten van de Marokkanen als strijders. Fatalisme zou 
zorgen voor goede soldaten die niet bang waren om te sterven. De fysieke eigenschappen van de 
Marokkaanse soldaten en de invloed van het bergachtige terrein waaraan ze gewend waren, 
rechtvaardigde de inzet van deze soldaten als infanteristen in een aanvallende rol. Ze werden ook 
gezien als ideale soldaten voor nachtaanvallen en operaties in bergachtig terrein. Het historische idee 
van de vijandige Ander, met een zeer gewelddadige reputatie (het gevolg van de demonisering van de 
Marokkanen als gevolg van de koloniale oorlogen in de jaren 1920), maakte dat de Marokkanen 
werden gebruikt als een psychologisch wapen dat de Republikeinen, zowel strijders als burgers, angst 
moest aanjagen. 
Spanjaarden beschouwden de Marokkanen als soldaten met een bijzondere geestelijke aard en 
daarom verdienden ze een andere benadering vergeleken met Spaanse soldaten. Idealiter moesten 
Spaanse officieren die de leiding hadden over Marokkaanse eenheden  genoeg kennis hebben van de 
cultuur en gewoontes van hun ondergeschikten. De oplopende verliezen onder de officieren tijdens de 
oorlog btekenden wel dat dit ideaal niet altijd realiseerbaar was. De Spaanse houding ten aanzien van 
de Marokkaanse soldaten was paternalistisch van aard. De Marokkaanse soldaten werden gezien als 
minder volwassen vergeleken met de Spaanse soldaten. Zij zouden harde, maar rechtvaardige leiders 
nodig hebben. Toch bestond de relatie tussen de Marokkaanse troepen en het Spaanse leiderschap uit 
tweerichtingsverkeer. Een te harde hand, vertraagde uitbetaling van loon, of een te hardvochtige 
officier kon leiden tot protest, desertie of muiterij. 
 Om de kloof tussen de Spaanse leidinggevenden en de Marokkaanse troepen te verminderen, 
was er behoefte aan Marokkaanse officieren die als tolkof adviseur konden optreden en een link 
konden vormen tussen de officieren en manschappen. Zulke officieren waren niet talrijk, al zou hun 
aantal tijdens de oorlog wel toenemen. Hoewel sommigen als gevolg van de oorlog posities zouden 
bereiken die anders niet voor hen open stonden, was er een limiet aan de rangen die ze konden 





 Marokkaanse eenheden moesten duidelijk herkenbaar zijn als Marokkaans. De uniformen, 
emblemen en vlaggen droegen allemaal islamitische symbolen. Dat was al het geval vóór de 
burgeroorlog, en diende om de culturele afstand tussen de Marokkaanse manschappen en hun 
islamitische omgeving te verkleinen. In Spanje zorgden de uiterlijke onderscheidingstekenen juist voor 
een contrast tussen de Marokkanen enerzijds en de Spaanse troepen en burgers anderzijds. Een aparte, 
duidelijk herkenbare Marokkaanse wereld beperkte zich niet tot het uiterlijk. De Marokkanen hadden 
hun eigen militaire politie. Marokkaanse soldaten die tot gevangenisstraffen veroordeeld waren, zaten 
hun straf uit in gescheiden ruimtes in Spaanse gevangenissen of werden teruggestuurd naar Marokko. 
Ze hadden hun eigen cafés, muzikanten en prostituees. In ziekenhuizen hadden ze een eigen afdeling, 
en naarmate de oorlog vorderde, werden de Marokkaanse gewonden ondergebracht in eigen 
ziekenhuizen die waar ze volgens islamitische voorschriften voorbereid voedsel kregen. Het bekeren 
van Marokkaanse soldaten tot het Christendom was verboden. Het Nationalistische leger deed zijn 
best om ervoor te zorgen dat katholieke geestelijken niet in de buurt van de islamitische soldaten 
kwamen. 
 Respect tonen voor de religie en tradities van de Marokkaanse soldaten had natuurlijk zijn 
praktische voordelen. Had men de culturele gevoeligheden van de Marokkaanse soldaten genegeerd, 
dan zou dat negatieve gevolgen kunnen hebben voor de moraal en discipline van de troepen maar ook 
voor de moraal van de Marokkaanse bevolking in het Spaanse Protectoraat van Marokko. Daarnaast 
droegen de Marokkanen ook zelf bij aan het scheppen van een eigen gescheiden culturele omgeving. 
Ze meldden zich liever bij inheemse militaire eenheden zoals de Regulares en de Mehal-las. De 
speciale voorzieningen in ziekenhuizen waren soms het gevolg van eisen aan de kant van de soldaten 
of van Marokkaanse overheidsfunctionarissen. Toen (na de oorlog) veel Marokkaanse soldaten de 
Spaanse nationaliteit aangeboden kregen, weigerden de meesten deze. Er kan dus geconcludeerd 
worden dat zowel Marokkanen als Spanjaarden hebben bijgedragen aan het creëren van een aparte 
culturele ruimte, hoewel de Spanjaarden in een sterkere positie verkeerden om de exacte scheidslijnen 
te bepalen. 
 Het is ironisch dat Marokkanen naar Spanje werden gebracht om het Christendom te 
verdedigen, maar werden ontmoedigd om het christelijke geloof te omarmen. Wanneer er geen 
islamitische begraafplaatsen voorhanden waren, stonden de Spaanse katholieken niet toe dat gevallen 
Marokkaanse soldaten op een katholieke begraafplaats begraven werden. In plaats daarvan kregen de 
Marokkanen een laatste rustplaats op civiele begraafplaatsen, naast de ‘ketters’ tegen wie zij hadden 
gevochten. Trouwen met een Spaanse vrouw mocht niet, want een seksuele relatie tussen een 
Marokkaanse man en een Spaanse vrouw was slecht voor het Spaanse prestige, omdat in een seksuele 
relatie de man als de dominante partner werd gezien. Een Spaanse die gedomineerd werd door een 
Marokkaan werd zeker niet goedgekeurd. Maar tegelijkertijd werden Republikeinse vrouwen in 
Nationalistische radio-uitzendingen bedreigd met seksueel geweld (en dus dominantie) door 




voor het Spaanse prestige want de Nationalisten zagen de Republikeinen niet als echte Spanjaarden. 
De Marokkaanse aanwezigheid in Spanje werd gerechtvaardigd door terug te grijpen op religieuze 
banden (twee religies die vechten tegen het atheïsme) en het gemeenschappelijke glorieuze 
middeleeuws verleden van een islamitisch Spanje. De Marokkanen die naar Spanje kwamen, waren de 
nazaten van middeleeuwse bewoners van Al Andalus, de regio waar Arabisch, Berbers en Spaans 
bloed zich met elkaar hadden gemengd. Toch moesten de Marokkanen aan het eind van de oorlog 
weg, terug naar Afrika. 
Dit verhaal van gescheiden sferen, uitsluiting en beperking kent ook uitzonderingen. Aan de 
rang die Marokkaanse officieren konden bereiken, was een limiet. Een van hen, Mohammed ben 
Mizzian, had echter een ongewoon succesvolle carrière. Aan het eind van de burgeroorlog werd hij 
commandant van een divisie, met Spaanse troepen en officieren onder zijn bevel, en later werd hij 
zelfs luitenant-generaal en commandant van de militaire regio’s van de Canarische eilanden en van 
Galicia. Een dergelijke promotie heeft tot op heden niet plaatsgevonden in een Westerse democratie. 
Hij had dit te danken aan koning Alfonso XIII op wiens instructies en voor de eerste keer in de 
geschiedenis, een Spaanse militaire akademie een Moslim toeliet. Daarmee hebben de Spanjaarden 
waarschijnlijk niet alleen de loyaliteit van de Marokkaanse ‘collaborateurs’ willen belonen maar ook 
van hem een symbool te maken van het succes van de Spaanse Protectoraat.   
 Terwijl de meerderheid van de Marokkaanse troepen diende in inheemse eenheden zoals de 
Regulares, opende het Spaanse Vreemdelingen Legioen (in tegenstelling tot het Franse Vreemdelingen 
Legioen) de mogelijkheid voor Marokkaanse rekruten om zich daar als soldaten te melden. In het 
fascistische bataljon in Spaans Marokko dienden ook Marokkanen, hoewel hun aantal afnam, 
waarschijnlijk als gevolg van de openlijk racistische houding binnen de eenheid. Tienduizenden 
Marokkanen werden teruggestuurd naar Marokko, maar een elitegroep van een paar honderd man 
bleef achter als de persoonlijke garde van Franco zelf, de beroemde Guardia Mora. Terwijl 
Marokkanen zich moesten kleden in Marokkaanse kledij, droegen de Spaanse officieren zelf 
Marokkaanse djillaba’s en tarboejsen (Marokkaanse roodkleurige hoofddeksel) en dronken zij 
muntthee. De Marokkanen dienden zich niet te kleden of gedragen als Spanjaarden, terwijl de 
Spanjaarden zich als inheemsen mochten voordoen, al was het vooral oppervlakkig. Spaans beleid 
verbood gemengde huwelijken, maar toch werden deze gesloten en achteraf geaccepteerd. Dit was een 
teken dat de agency van een Marokkaanse soldaat (en een vastberaden Spaanse vrouw) de officiële 
tegenstand kon overwinnen. Het Spanje van na de burgeroorlog was vooral een katholiek land. Toch 
mochten Marokkanen zich als Spanjaard naturaliseren zonder zich tot het katholicisme te bekeren. 
Kortom, er stonden veel uitzonderingen tegenover retoriek en beleid. 
De retoriek, het beleid en de praktijk ten aanzien van de Marokkanen die in Spanje hebben 
gevochten, was een weerspiegeling van de retoriek, het beleid en de praktijk in het Spaanse 
Protectoraat van Marokko. De zogeheten gemeenschappelijke Spaans-Marokkaanse identiteit en 




aangewend om de Marokkaanse aanwezigheid in Spanje goed te praten. De politiek van het 
gescheiden houden van de gemeenschappen in het protectoraat werd ook in Spanje toegepast. In 
sommige aspecten was de Marokkaanse aanwezigheid in Spanje een voortzetting van de politiek en 
praktijk van het protectoraat. Dat het Bureau van Inheemse Zaken in Marokko haar kantoren in Spanje 
vestigde om zich met het leven van de Marokkaanse soldaten te bemoeien, is een duidelijk bewijs 
hiervan. 
De Republikeinen hadden een duidelijk negatieve houding tegenover de Marokkanen. De 
gewelddadige opmars van het Afrikaleger gedurende de zomer en herfst van 1936 heeft tot de 
demonisering van de Marokkaanse troepen onder de Republikeinen geleid en heeft Republikeinse 
strijders aangemoedigd om geen genade te tonen jegens Marokkaanse krijgsgevangenen. Vergeleken 
met de Nationalisten lieten de Republikeinse zich veel sterker leiden door de traditionele negatieve 
stereotypen over Marokkanen. De Republikeinen hadden niet de beschikking over tienduizenden 
Marokkaanse soldaten en hoefden hun aanwezigheid in Spanje niet te rechtvaardigen. In 
Republikeinse kringen werd het Spaanse imperialisme slechts zelden in termen van bloed- en 
historische banden gerechtvaardigd. De meeste linksgezinden waren (al vóór het ontstaant van de 
Republiek) tegen het militarisme en imperialisme van de militairen en politici die een Spaans 
imperium in Marokko wilden vestigen. De negatieve kijk op Marokkanen beïnvloedde bij de 
Republikeinen zelfs hun beeld van Noordafrikaanse moslims in het algemeen. Zo stonden ze over het 
algemeen negatief tegenover Algerijnen en Tunesiërs die zich als vrijwilligers meldden bij de pro-
Republikeinse Internationale Brigades en tegenover Marokkaanse nationalisten die aanboden om een 
opstand te organiseren in Spaans-Marokko in ruil voor de onafhankelijkheid of een grote mate van 
politieke autonomie. Het is op zijn minst opmerkelijk dat Nationalistisch Spanje toleranter en minder 
racistisch was tegenover de Marokkanen dan de linkse Republiek.  
Aan Nationalistische zijde waren de vooroordelen over, en het imago van, de Marokkanen 
onderworpen aan zekere aanpassingen. Ondanks het Nationalistisch beleid, was er sprake van een 
beperkte liberalisering als gevolg van de nieuwe Nationalistische pro-Marokkaanse propaganda en als 
gevolg van de Marokkanen en Spanjaarden die de gevestigde culturele grenzen durfden over te steken. 
Het besef in Nationalistisch Spanje van het belang van de militaire bijdrage van het protectoraat leidde 
tot een verhoging van de status van de Marokkanen en een beloning op een aantal terreinen. Van de 
vrijheden van politiek en pers in Marokko onder de Nationalisten kon men in het Spanje van na 1939 
alleen maar dromen. Toch bleven de Marokkanen nog altijd de juniorpartners in het Spaanse imperium 
die de paternalistische hand van de Spanjaarden nodig hadden. 
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